JUDGMENT : RAVI S.DHAVAN, J. 1. What would have been the end of this case has become its beginning The matter which the Court was given to understand, may end with an apology has not and will not. 2. The subject matter of this case is contempt of Court. Many cases where contempt is alleged see the end of it with retraction to the correct position followed by an unconditional apology and forgiveness had from the Court. As the end is the beginning of this case, the facts will need to be noticed in that order. Amongst certain other facts of the controversies the matter of apology was connected with indulgence sought from the Court to retract certain statements made on record in the pleadings of the opposite party. Permission to retract the statement was sought by learned Senior counsel appearing for the opposite party after the record of the case had been seen, threadbare upon which deliberations had been made over a protracted hearing. This indulgence was not sought right at the beginning when the return to the allegation in the contempt petition had been filed but sought After the defence of the opposite party had been presented on record by a counter affidavit and, otherwise, offered as arguments and that also after the arguments bad concluded. One set of count el appeared for the opposite party initially, represented by a senior member of the Bar who, whatever may be the reason either withdrew from the case or may have declined to appear. The opposite party was represented by the first set of counsel through Mr. R.N. Trivedi, Senior Advocate, Additional Advocate, General assisted by Mr. Shitla Prasad. Advocate. Additional Chief Standing counsel. They were replaced by Mr. S.N. Verma, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. G.L. Tripathi, Advocate and Standing Counsel. The reason why the first set withdrew, the Court does not know. 3. One thing is on record that after the defence had been offered complete and total opportunity over a prolonged hearing Mr. Shitla Prasad. Advocate. Additional Chief Standing counsel. They were replaced by Mr. S.N. Verma, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. G.L. Tripathi, Advocate and Standing Counsel. The reason why the first set withdrew, the Court does not know. 3. One thing is on record that after the defence had been offered complete and total opportunity over a prolonged hearing Mr. S.N. Verma, Senior Advocate, made a mention on July 26, 1991 to seek indulgence from the Court, appropriately, as the case had already been argued on behalf of the opposite party, that while the rejoinder argument, on behalf of the Petitioner, is being considered by the Court, he seeks permission of the Court to file a retraction of certain statements made by the opposite party with an apology for having made these statements, which he felt ought to have been avoided The statement in question has been the subject matter of a very serious debate' at the Bar of this Court. 4. When the mention was made seeking indulgence to withdraw the statements the Court declared by an order that its doors will always remain open for any party, subject to objections from the other side and within the constraints of law, to consider retraction of Inappropriate expressions, understood to be such by learned Counsel for the opposite party, or to consider an apology, even if it is made late. The order of that date reads: Mr. S.N. Verma, Senior Advocate had concluded his arguments in counter and defence of the opposite party. Mrs. S.S. Bhatnagar, Senior Advocate has begun arguments in rejoinder. Mr. S N. Verma, Senior Advocate sought indulgence of the Court to make a mention to the effect, that the Court be pleased to grant leave and liberty to submit an affidavit of retraction and regret of the particular sentence as is reproduced and referred to in para 9 of the Contempt Petition. He explained the reasons for seeking this leave and liberty because firstly he had concluded his arguments and secondly he would need to discuss the matter with the opposite party. The Court indicated to Mr. S.N. Verma, Senior Advocate, that subject to any objections which may be raised on behalf of the Petitioner the doors of this Court will always be open if any party desires to withdraw any statement which he feels ought not to be made in contempt proceedings. The Court indicated to Mr. S.N. Verma, Senior Advocate, that subject to any objections which may be raised on behalf of the Petitioner the doors of this Court will always be open if any party desires to withdraw any statement which he feels ought not to be made in contempt proceedings. Suffice it to say that the matter would be considered in totality. Heard. Put up on Tuesday, 3rd July, 1991 as Mr. S.S. Bhatnagar, Senior Advocate has mentioned that he may not be in Allahabad on Monday. 5. What are these expressions which even learned Senior Counsel for the opposite party agrees ought not to have been made and who made them are equally important. The statement is about the High Court as an institution. The person making it, the opposite party, was a Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer to the State Government. i.e., Uttar Pradesh At that time he was otherwise a judicial officer and a senior District Judge. Should a person in such a position say, in effect, that the decision of the High Court taken administratively "cannot be treated to be a judicial verdict of the Hon’ble High Court". If this in itself is not bad, the statement continues to declare by implication that the State Government in not bound by it or not to act on it as it "cannot be said to be in defiance of the High Court's order." 6. The opposite party, it is alleged, amongst other aspects of the case, does not recognise the High Court in its administration as a functional institution to be reckoned with and its decisions taken administratively, to put in it very simple terms, are not obliged to be carried out by the State Government. 7. The questions which arise in this contempt proceeding are what is a Court? The difference between the State and the State Government ? The position of the Secretary to the Government and furthermore a Judicial (Law) Secretary and a Legal Remembrancer to the State on deputation from amongst District Judges, the subordinate judiciary ? Another aspect which will need to be considered is whether a judicial officer ought to make submissions of the nature which he has? The position of the Secretary to the Government and furthermore a Judicial (Law) Secretary and a Legal Remembrancer to the State on deputation from amongst District Judges, the subordinate judiciary ? Another aspect which will need to be considered is whether a judicial officer ought to make submissions of the nature which he has? That any one else may will be an entirely different perspective but a person whose exclusive business is to uphold the rule of law and strive to maintain the delicate balance between three working institutions of the government and belonging to the judicial cadre, should such an officer express and declare that the High Court's administrative decisions need not be followed by the Government? This expression of policy or otherwise, is not on record of government files, nor in any communication addressed to the High Court, but at the Bar of the Court in a counter affidavit in writ petition. It lies as a statement sworn on an affidavit on personal knowledge, in a writ petition new decided, against which decision a Special Appeal is pending in this Court. 8. The argument before the Court has been that the statement must be seen in the facts and circumstances of the case. The Court shall consider the statement, as suggested, in the facts and circumstances of the case as also the implication the statement may carry. 9. The Court will now notice the facts and the origins of the controversy. 10. The matter relates to an appointment of a Judge, Family Court, under the Family Courts Act, 1984. The appointment ii from amongst the District Judges of this State. The post may be held by a Judge, so appointed, until the age of 62 years. An incumbent was recommended by the High Court but his appointment was not permitted to continue as so ordered by the High Court. The incumbent, the Petitioner Krishan Gopal Rastogi, H.J.S., a District Judge, filed a writ petition on more than one ground, to hold the post basing his case that his tenure is upon the decision of the High Court and that it cannot be curtailed by the State Government. 11. The incumbent, the Petitioner Krishan Gopal Rastogi, H.J.S., a District Judge, filed a writ petition on more than one ground, to hold the post basing his case that his tenure is upon the decision of the High Court and that it cannot be curtailed by the State Government. 11. The opposite party, a Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer, has taken up the stance, seen in the totality of circumstances in his defence to the writ petition, that the State Government is not obliged to honour the directions of the High Court. His defence is two fold : (1) he justifies the termination "f the services of the Judge, Family Court, earlier than ordered by the High Court, and (2) notwithstanding that the High Court may have ordered that Krishan Gopal Rastogi may continue until the age of 62 years the matter was sub-judice in the writ petition under consideration and the decision of the High Court on the appointment of Krishan Gopal Rastogi was administrative and is not a judicial verdict. It may be, but who made an issue out of it? Not the incumbent who received the tenure from the High Court 12. On October 24, 1986, by a letter No. 6830/T the then Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer, Mr. S.N. Sahai, rightly reminded the High Court that Mr. K.G. Rastogi, Principal Judge, Family Court, would see retirement on October, 31, 1986 at 58 years. In his letter, Mr. S.N. Sahai (as he then was, later Judge, High Court) clarified that Mr. K.G. Kastogi, under the Family Courts Act, 1984, can continue until 62 years. On this proposition he left the matter, for seeking concurrence of the High Court. 13. On October 29, 1986, the Administrative Committee of the High Court resolved that it had no objection in Mr. K.G. Rastogi. Principal Judge, Family Court, continuing as Judge of that Court beyond 58 years. The Registrar, High Court, by his letter of October 30, 1986 informed the Judicial Secretary that the Court had no objection to Sri K.G. Rastogi continuing as Judge, Family Court, beyond 58 years. Accordingly, the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer had government order issued, dated November 13, 1986, that Sri K.G. Rastogi will continue as Principal Judge; Family Court, for one year with effect from November 1, 1986. This implied that the suggestion of the State Government through its Judicial Secretary, that a Judge. Accordingly, the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer had government order issued, dated November 13, 1986, that Sri K.G. Rastogi will continue as Principal Judge; Family Court, for one year with effect from November 1, 1986. This implied that the suggestion of the State Government through its Judicial Secretary, that a Judge. Family Court, may continue, as under the Act. and the High Court upto 62 years was the subject matter of consultation with the High Court and the High Court concurred on the principle that any Judge, Family Court, can have a term upto the age of 62 years. The law also prescribes it so, reference Section 4(5) of the Family Courts Act. 1984. 14. The establishment of the Judicial Secretary wrote to the High Court on September 9, 1987. D.O. No. 5295/Nyay/Uchoh Nyayalaya-740/86, drawing the attention of the High Court to the letter of the then Judicial Secretary, Mr. S.N. Sahai, reiterating, the record that the High Court had concurred with the proposal that after the retirement of the Judge, Family Court at 58 years his term may be extended for two terms of two years each so that in keeping with the Act he could act as Judge, Family Court, upto 62 years. This letter of the Judicial Secretary was placed before the Administrative Committee of the Court and it took a decision that the term of Mr. K.G. Rastogi be extended for one year beyond 31 October 1987. The establishment of the Judicial Secretary and the Legal Remembrancer had a government order issued, dated November 19, 1987, to the effect, that the term of Sri K.G. Rastogi is extended for one year with effect from November 1. 1987 implying thereby that Sri K.G. Rastogi was to continue as Judge, Family Court, until October 31, 1988. 15. By the letter of September 5, 1988, No. 3001/7-A-Nyaya-730/85 the establishment of the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer intimated the Registrar, High Court, in reference to the postings of Judge, Family Court, at Lucknow and Kanpur, that in case the services of these Judges are not dispensed with earlier the Governor has granted permission to continue their services until February 28, 1989. The first slip to violate the legislative intent and the decision of the High Court had occurred here. The first slip to violate the legislative intent and the decision of the High Court had occurred here. To curtail the tenure of a Judge, Family Court, in his appointment, without reference to the High Court, was against the provisions of the Act. The letter from the establishment of the Judicial Secretary was placed before the Administrative Committee of the High Court at its meeting on October 26, 1988. The Administrative Committee resolved that the term of Sri K.G. Rastogi, Principal Judge, Family Court, Lucknow who had attained the age of 60 yean on October 14, 1988, is extended for a period of two years. The decision of the Administrative Committee was in keeping with what the High Court had earlier decided while concurring with the State that the tenure of the Judge, Family Court, be continued as prescribed under the Act upto 62 years. The Registrar, High Court, wrote to the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer's office that the Court had been pleased to extend the term of Sri Rastogi who had attained the age of 60 years in October, 1988 for a period of two years. 16. From now on what happened is unfortunate and unsavoury. 17. The Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer's establishment wrote to the Registrar by its letter dated October 31, 1988, No. 5560/7/A-Nyaya 740/86, that the term of the Principal Judge, Family Court. Sri K.G. Rastogi, had been extended, 'until further orders'. This communication had further laid the seed of incompatible decisions between the Judicial Secretary and the High Court, a concept alien to 'concurrence' as in the Act. No appointment under the Act, if there is no concurrence with the High Court, can be carried through contrary to what the High Court has decided. The High Court gave a term upto sixty two years to the Principal Judge, Family Court, on a concurrence solicited by the State of U.P. The Judicial Secretary's office refuted to recognise the term the Court had set for the Judge, Family Court, and instead of issuing a government order that the term of the Incumbent would be, in effect, upto sixty two years, carried out an order that this term, instead, would be until further orders. After three months the establishment of the Judicial Secretary by its letter dated February 7, 1989 addressed to the High Court, announced that the term of Sri Rastogi it extended for one year with effect from 1-11-1988 to 31-10-1989. 18. By now it was clear that whereas the Administrative Committee of the High Court gave a term upto sixty two years, the Judicial Secretary's establishment declined to concur with this and made the term of the Judge, Family Court, one year instead of two years. This letter of the Judicial Secretary was placed by the Registrar before the then Acting Chief justice. The Registrar was required by the then Acting Chief Justice to inform the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer that the decision of the Court was clear that the Court had agreed and decided that the term of Sri K.G. Rastogi as Judge, Family Court, would be for two years with effect from October 31, 1988, and that it be extended accordingly. Thus, it was reiterated by the Registrar In his letter, D.O. No. C-115/- 1989, dated October 5, 1989, that he had the Court's directions to say that the term of Sri Rastogi, for one year more is to continue and government orders be obtained in this regard. The letter of the Registrar having the views of the Court were compatible with its earlier decision that the term of Sri Rastogi was to be extended for two years with effect from 1988. In 1989 one year had elapsed, thus, the balance of the term for one year as the High Court had directed was to continue 19. Bui, this was not to be On December 12, 1989, by letter No. 5660 (1)/7/A-Nyaya/89 the establishment of the Judicial Secretary and the Legal Remembrancer wrote to the Registrar, High Court that the administration had decided that those employees of the State Government who occupy posts after retirement cannot continue Thus, the tenure of the term of Mr. Rastogi, Principal Judge, Family Court, also cannot continue and the Registrar should seek concurrence of the Court on the name of another incumbent. This letter also said that the services of Mr. Rastogi are being, terminated On December 19, 1989, a government order No. 5874-A-Nyaya/740/86 was issued that the services of Mr. K.G. Rastogi as Principal Judge, Family Court, were being terminated by the Governor in public interest as a general policy. This letter also said that the services of Mr. Rastogi are being, terminated On December 19, 1989, a government order No. 5874-A-Nyaya/740/86 was issued that the services of Mr. K.G. Rastogi as Principal Judge, Family Court, were being terminated by the Governor in public interest as a general policy. A total negation or the concurrence as envisaged under the Family Courts Act, 1984 had been occasioned by the establishment of the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer. This is one aspect of the matter. A clash with the High Court not to comply with the concurrence accorded that the Judge, Family Court, can have his term upto 62 years in keeping with the term provided under the Act. was defined The decision spelt out by the establishment of the Judicial Secretary violated both the intent of the Parliament under the Act and the decision of the Administrative Committee acting for the Court, no matter what the reason as, this would be examined later. 20. The letter from the establishment of the Judicial Secretary, dated December 13, 1989, and the government order of December 19, 1989 terminating the services of Sri Rastogi as Principal Judge, Family Court, were placed before the Administrative Committee of the Court at its meeting on December 21, 1989 to consider the letter from the establishment of the Judicial Secretary and the government order by which, in effect, the tenure of Mr. K.G Rastogi as Judge, Family Court, was brought to an end and recommendation of another judicial officer as Principal Judge, Family Court was sought in place of Mr. Rastogi. 21. The High Court through its administrative Committee at its meeting "resolved that the termination notification dated December 19, 1989 of Sri K.G. Rastogi, Principal Judge, Family Court, Lucknow is not valid and legal in view of Sub-section (5) of Section 4 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. Consequently, he is entitled to continue upto the age of 62 years. 21. The High Court through its administrative Committee at its meeting "resolved that the termination notification dated December 19, 1989 of Sri K.G. Rastogi, Principal Judge, Family Court, Lucknow is not valid and legal in view of Sub-section (5) of Section 4 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. Consequently, he is entitled to continue upto the age of 62 years. The Government be informed accordingly." The High Court by its letter of December 27, 1989, No. C-1491/89, informed the establishment of the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer that the Court had considered the letter of the State Government dated December 13, 1989 and the government order dated December 19, 1989, and that it is of the view that the government order dated December 19, 1989, terminating the services of Sri Rastogi as Principal Judge, Family Court, is not valid and legal in view of Section 4(5) of the Family Courts Act, 1984. The Joint Registrar, accordingly, advised the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer, Mr. K.L Sharma that Sri Rastogi is entitled to continue on the said post upto the age of 62 years. He further intimated the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer "that Government, therefore, be appraised of the above decision of the Court and act accordingly." 22. But, Mr. Karaa Lal Sharma, Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer took the view that the High Court in administration may be ignored by the State Government and needs to be considered, only after a judicial verdict In the history of the Allahabad High Court which has now put In a century and a quarter no District Judge on deputation as a Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer has taken up a posture that he will ignore what the High Court decides as a Court in administration. 23. One aspect it very crucial, relevant and vital. The writ petition which was filed by Kishan Gopal Rastogi would not have had a cause for being filed, if, what the High Court had decided as a court in administration had been complied with, without controversy cither by the State Government or by the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer 24. 23. One aspect it very crucial, relevant and vital. The writ petition which was filed by Kishan Gopal Rastogi would not have had a cause for being filed, if, what the High Court had decided as a court in administration had been complied with, without controversy cither by the State Government or by the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer 24. In the matter before this Court, a chronology of the decisions taken by the Administrative Committee of the High Court, acting for the Court under its Charier known as the Rules of the Court, and the law otherwise, dearly envisages a follow up action that the decision of the Court, of its Administrative Committee, receives implementation. Every time the Administrative Committee took a decision to recommend to the State Government, and that also upon being solicited, ultimate term given to the Judge, Family Court by the State Government was always at variance to that decided by the High Court. This in itself is a very sad reflection that within the secretariat of the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrances a decision is taken at variance to that taken by the High Court. If the High Court had no business to take a decision upon which it was invited it was another matter. But, the High Court acted strictly within its constraints. First, to respond to the request of the State Government to give a term to a Judge, Family Court, secondly this term, without consulting the High Court, the State Government cannot give; thirdly in any case the matter has to be referred to the High Court for concurrence under the Family Courts Act 1984; and fourthly whether under this enactment or the Constitution of India the responsibility to give terms to the Judicial Officers is of the High Court. Only an announcement of it is to be done by the State, as an act of the State as opposed to of the State Government. 25. The opposite party in no uncertain terms was clear in his mind that the Court's decision could be ignored and not implemented more so when it was not a judicial verdict. This was his persons view in paragraph 3 of his counter affidavit. 25. The opposite party in no uncertain terms was clear in his mind that the Court's decision could be ignored and not implemented more so when it was not a judicial verdict. This was his persons view in paragraph 3 of his counter affidavit. He changed his stand in his defence in the contempt proceeding when later he took the position to say that "it was not within his power and competence to annul the termination order passed by the Government. It is further, stated that the deponent had no intention to flout or disobey recommendation of the Administrative Committee of the Hon'ble Court but the proper authority to accept the same was the State Government which passed the termination order. "This submission was partly on personal knowledge and partly legal advice. 26. The opposite party clearly had changed his defence. But, by now the decision of the High Court taken by its Administrative Committee had been compromised. This is a matter of record. 27. The table given below shows in schematic form how the High Court's order was compromised. Extract from the High Court's Administrative Committee meeting held on 21-12-1989 . Resolved that the termination notification dated December 19, 1989 of Sri K.G. Rastogi, Principal Judge, Family Court, Lucknow is not valid and legal in view of Sub-section (5) of Section 4 of the Family 1984. Consequently, he Courts Act, is entitled of 62 to continue upto the age years. The Government be informed accordingly. Endorsement of Acting Chief Justice According to AC's. resolution. K G. Rastogi was entitled to continue upto 62. His petition challenging termination is pending, At present it is not advisable to recommend someone else on the post held by him. Extract from the Communication of the High Court, No. C 1491/1989. December 27, 1989 (Annexure 1 to the writ petition addressed to the Judicial Secretary & L.R.... .... I am desired to say that the Court has considered the aforesaid D.O. letter dated 13-12-1989 and Govt. Notification dated 19-12-1989 for termination of services of Sri K.G. Rastogi as Principal Judge, Family Court. Lucknow is not valid and legal in view of Sub-section (5) of Section 4 of Family Courts Act, 1984. Consequently, Sri Rastogi is entitled to continue on the said post upto the age of 62 years. The Government therefore, be apprised of the above decision of the Court and act accordingly... Lucknow is not valid and legal in view of Sub-section (5) of Section 4 of Family Courts Act, 1984. Consequently, Sri Rastogi is entitled to continue on the said post upto the age of 62 years. The Government therefore, be apprised of the above decision of the Court and act accordingly... Extract from the affidavit of Mr. K.L. Sharma, Law Secretary Judicial Department 3... It may again be mentioned that the Administrative accommodations on the Joint Registrars latter dated 27-12-1989 cannot be treated to be judicial verdict of the Hon'ble High Court and so in the above back ground the action of the Government cannot be said to be in defiance of the High Court order. It is specifically denied that the deponent had any outrageous high handed and contemptuous attitude towards the Hon'ble Court or the Administrative Committee (Affirmation : The contents of paragraphs 3...of the affidavit are true to my personal knowledge.) 28. When a would-be litigant in the Family Court went of the Supreme Court, in the hope that the matter regarding the Family Court would be sorted out quickly, the Supreme Court in its order of 19 March, 1990 expressed itself in no uncertain terms about the decision of the Administrative Committee of the High Court as follows: As regards the order dated 19-12-1989, which has been challenged in this petition suffice it to say that the High Court has, by us order dated" 27-12-1 989 already indicated that the said order was "riot valid and legal and consequently Sri Rastogi was entitled to continue on the post upto the age of 62 years. In our opinion, the proper course for the Petitioner is to approach the High Court for enforcement of its order dated 27-12-1989. With these observations, the petition is dismissed. Order of Supreme Court dated 19 March, 1990 in Writ Petition No. 375 of 1990. V. Srivastava v. State of U.P. and Ors. delivered by their Lordships the Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.D. Ojha and the Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. Ramaswami. Annexure 3 to W.P. No. 12783 of 1990. Krishna Gopal Rastogi v. State of U.P. and Ors. (emphasis) 29. Order of Supreme Court dated 19 March, 1990 in Writ Petition No. 375 of 1990. V. Srivastava v. State of U.P. and Ors. delivered by their Lordships the Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.D. Ojha and the Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. Ramaswami. Annexure 3 to W.P. No. 12783 of 1990. Krishna Gopal Rastogi v. State of U.P. and Ors. (emphasis) 29. The personal view of the opposite party that the decision of the High Court's Administrative Committee cannot be treated as a Judicial Verdict of the High Court, and that it was, not defiance of the High Court when it was not Implemented, was in the face of the observations of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's observation is dated 19 March, 1990. The opposite party's submissions are dated 21 May, 1990, and on personal knowledge. 30. This contempt petition was filed after the order of the Supreme Court that the decision of the High Court be enforced. 31. On this particular aspect in paragraph 3 of the contempt petition, the opposite party, Mr. Karan Lal Sharma (in paragraph 13 of his counter affidavit) says that these are matter of record and do not call for a reply. The observation of the Supreme Court stares the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrances in the face with a precise and clear meaning. But, he bat neither a comment nor a reply on the Supreme Court's observations. 32. A High Court should not have an occasion to enforce its orders and that also against a judicial officer. The writing on the wall was very clear to Mr. Karan Lal Sharma the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrances, when the Supreme Court had made it clear even to a member of the public "to approach the High Court for enforcement of its order". How would an order be enforced by the High Court? And, in a case like this, enforcement would be against a Judicial officer or as the latter would like to put it, against the State Government. Should ' this be made a situation of a clash and, thus a clash between whom? The state Government? or a clash between the High Court and the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer? Or a clash between the Judge Family Court, seeking his tenure according to law, and the State Government or the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer? Nay. Should ' this be made a situation of a clash and, thus a clash between whom? The state Government? or a clash between the High Court and the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer? Or a clash between the Judge Family Court, seeking his tenure according to law, and the State Government or the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer? Nay. Such a clash should never be there as it would be destructive to a very intricate and articulate balance of the High Court in administration which in its working under the Constitution has attributes of a State and in its working the coordination of the executive, the other area of the government, is imperative. 33. What the Supreme Court had Implied by analogy in its order was that the High Court having taken its decision me violation of us order can be enforced. It was an order all right, let there be no mistake on it, as only an order of the Court can be enforced. A superior Court of Record for that matter has its methods for having its orders executed. FT was not necessary, inasmuch as the opposite party expects it to be, that the Supreme Court ought to have given a very long judgment on the status of the High Court. The Supreme Court regards the High. Court, as a Court, in administration also. 34. But, the opposite party, the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer, chose to consider this otherwise. He did not consider the decision of the High Court in its administration as a judicial verdict so as to bind him or the State Government. His own interpretation of the situation was that the decision of the Administrative Committees was, not a judicial verdict. Inevitably, this logic lead to an institutional clash, and a break down of the judicial administration of the High Court. The issue was Implementation of the High Court's order, which the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrances would not implement, as, according to him, the State Government also has powers reserved to it not to implement orders of the High Court. The issue being in Court in a writ petition, the decision of the Court in administration was not recognised for implementation by the Judicial Secretary. The petition, thus, was filed in a frustrating situation, ostensibly, to seek enforcement of the order of the High Court as a Court in administration. The issue being in Court in a writ petition, the decision of the Court in administration was not recognised for implementation by the Judicial Secretary. The petition, thus, was filed in a frustrating situation, ostensibly, to seek enforcement of the order of the High Court as a Court in administration. The orders of the Court in administration, the Judicial Secretary had no intention to implement This Is clear from his defence, that he was, and thus his succession possibly still is waiting for a judicial verdict. What, then is the worth and status of the Administrative Committee of the Court? The Supreme Court referred to two dates in its order, in the three sentence orders of the Supreme Court, there was sufficient hint to the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer that the order of the High Court may be the subject matter of 'enforcement' by the High Court., A Judicial Secretary ought to be able to comprehend how a Superior Court of Record would enforce its orders, more to after declaration by the highest Court of the nation that this exercise may be initiated. 35. But, the decision of the Administrative Committee, in context, remained a dead letter as it was not intended to be complied with by whoever was meant to do so. To do justice in controversies like this, which concern the breach of the directions of a Superior Court of Record the entire record of the High Court, in this case as a Court of Record, has to be seen. No record seen in isolation will give a clear perspective and will further precipitate more injustice to working of institutions, the High Court (under the Constitution) not excluded. 36. This is not a matter in lis between the Petitioner, Krishan Gopal Rastogi, a Principal Judge, Family Court, and the other Karan Lal Sharma, a Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer. The issues are much more Important so as to affect the status and the dignity of the High Court and unless clarified will create a confusion in the minds of the public on what the attributes of a Court and especially of a Court of Record are The matter, thus, becomes an issue of public importance. The issues are much more Important so as to affect the status and the dignity of the High Court and unless clarified will create a confusion in the minds of the public on what the attributes of a Court and especially of a Court of Record are The matter, thus, becomes an issue of public importance. This Court will always have litigations and controversies between persons and persons, people and the State, people and the State Government and vice versa, but, there should never be it controversy in which a High Court clashes with the State, which laymen misunderstand as the State Government. If such a clash occurs or is encouraged to occur, then, the breakdown of the Constitution which governs these relations has been occasioned. It, thus, has become the business of this Court now to see in depth whether what was done by the High Court was incorrect because the entire argument of the opposite party is that what the State Government did instead was not incorrect. The entire issue rests not on any order which may have been taken out by the State Government on the tenure and appointment of the Petitioner. Krishan Gopal Rastogi, as Principal Judge, Family Court, but, on what the High Court decided and conveyed for being carried out, as unless there was concurrence under the Act, no order could be issued by the State of U P. If what the State Government, as the opposite party suggests, said had to be carried out then, there Is no escape from the proposition that there is also another side of it that what the High Court decided must also be followed without avoidance. "The avoidance only is within the system prescribed under the rule of law, and if the situation cannot be avoided, it must be followed. 37. But, the opposite party as Judicial Secretary expressed the view, that, in the facts and circumstances of this case, he can avoid the decision of the Administrative Committee acting for he High Court, because it is not a judicial verdict and as such the decision does not bind the State Government. Bat, what about the State? Thus, the question does arise on further issues on what is the status of the High Court in collective administration and who represents the State Government as opposed to the State. Bat, what about the State? Thus, the question does arise on further issues on what is the status of the High Court in collective administration and who represents the State Government as opposed to the State. Fortunately, sufficient guidelines have been given by the Supreme Court on both these issues to which this Court will refer in detail. 38. Ordinarily people may harbour a misunderstanding that the administration of justice is exclusively that which flows oat of the Court rooms, but, there is more to administration of justice than what is dispensed in Court rooms, to put it simply. There is more meaning to a Court, than what a layman may understand. The opposite party has taken a defence which a layman may or a civil servant may make the mistake to comprehend, but, not a judicial officer. He needs to be reminded that so far as he was concerned as a judicial officer, a senior District Judge, notwithstanding his position, in context, as a Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer, that the High Court in administration is also Court. A (sic) of Judges formally constituted to transact the business of the Court for the business of administration of justice, is not less acting for the State, than the political party returned to power to constitute the government. The High Court is no less an organ of the State than the executive or the legislature. Each has its functions. At the helm, the broad structure is not dissimilar, the formality within may be different. 39. The misunderstanding that the opposite party may not obliged to carry out the decision of the High Court in administration will become clear, if he were to carefully read, imbibe and understand on what the Supreme Court has explained and laid down on what the status of the High Court is under the Constitution and what the meaning of judicature is. 40. In a case before the Supreme Court, Shri Baradakanta Mishra Vs. The Registrar of Orissa High Court and Another, (1974) 1 SCC 374 a judicial officer was recommended for reversion by the Orissa High Court from the post of the Additional District and Sessions Judge to the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) the recommendation was under the modality and pattern of coruscation with the High Court. The Registrar of Orissa High Court and Another, (1974) 1 SCC 374 a judicial officer was recommended for reversion by the Orissa High Court from the post of the Additional District and Sessions Judge to the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) the recommendation was under the modality and pattern of coruscation with the High Court. While the High Court took the decision on reversion, notwithstanding that it was administration the State Government took a reverse decision in the name of the Governor, as in the case under consideration by this Court. The facts are best noticed in the judgment of the Supreme Court itself: 9. Something unusual happened. Without any further consultation with the High Court, the Governor cancelled the reversion order by notification dated March 21, 1972 and on the same day the Chief Minister wrote a confidential D O to the Chief Justice by name explaining the circumstances under which the reversion order was cancelled. The Chief Minister appeared to rely upon a decision of the Orissa High Court which had no application to the facts of this particular case. But any way, it would appear that by reason of the order dated March 21, 1972 the reversion of the Appellant to the post of the Additional District Magistrate stood cancelled and he continued to act in the post of the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Cuttack. 10. The D.O. letter of the Chief Minister remained unopened till the return of the Chief Justice from New Delhi where he had gone to attend the Chief Justice's Conference, It was opened by the Chief Justice on return on March 26, 1972. But In the meantime the Appellant who had gone on leave, having known about the order passed on March 21, 1972 asked for his posting. The rules required that on return from leaves he should produce a medical certificate and he was, accordingly directed to produce one. 11. On March 28, 1972 the Chief Justice placed the letter of the Chief Minister for consideration before the Full Court. The Full Court took the decision to start a disciplinary proceeding against tie Appellant and pending the same, to place him under suspension in exercise of their power under Article 235 of the Constitution. Accordingly on March 30, 1972 the Appellant was placed under suspension and his Head Quarters were fixed at Cuttack. 41. The Full Court took the decision to start a disciplinary proceeding against tie Appellant and pending the same, to place him under suspension in exercise of their power under Article 235 of the Constitution. Accordingly on March 30, 1972 the Appellant was placed under suspension and his Head Quarters were fixed at Cuttack. 41. Then, these conflicting stances between the State Government of Orissa and the Orissa High Court, drew Baradakanta Mist a into contempt proceedings, as he attributed motives to the Orissa High Court In administration, and In the contempt proceedings he questioned the status and authority of the High Court as a Court in administration. 42. While challenging the authority of the High Court in administration, and certain remarks made about the High Court in administration, a show cause notice for contempt was issued to Baradakanta Misra under the orders of the Full Court. Now, Baradakanta Misra filed preliminary objections questioning the High Court, impliedly in administration through its Full Court, to proceed against him in contempt proceedings "on the ground that whatever he had said had no reference to the judicial functions of any Judge of the High Court and, therefore, no contempt proceedings would lie. He pressed for a decision on the point." 43. A Full Court of five Judges heard the matter at the Orissa High Court, Registrar of the Orissa High Court Vs. Baradakanta Misra and Another, AIR 1973 Ori 244 . 44. Baradakanta Misra took refuge under the order of the State Government, which, according to him, were correct, and "the High Court even without any authority or jurisdiction..." He sought justice from the Governor, as the High Court in administration was prejudiced "on its administrative side" (emphasis) 45. The Supreme Court dispelled many misplaced notions of Baradakanta Misra on the status and functions, of the High Court in administration The case of Baradakanta Misra, the report reveals, was argued by very eminent counsel. One of the submissions of the Petitioner before the Supreme Court was that the statements he was being questioned on or being charged for contempt for. did not amount to contempt of Court since they did not purport to criticise any 'judicial' acts of the Judges sitting in the seat of justice, though may be some disrespectful references may have been made, which should not have been done. did not amount to contempt of Court since they did not purport to criticise any 'judicial' acts of the Judges sitting in the seat of justice, though may be some disrespectful references may have been made, which should not have been done. At the Sara time, it was contended that criticism of administrative acts of the High Court even in valedictory terms did not amount to contempt of Court. 46. The Supreme Court considered the issue before it. There must have been a specific purpose that the Supreme Court felt obliged to straighten out the issue before it. The reason is clear. For a judicial officer to ignore the directions of the High Court in administration is violation of the law in the administration of justice When the High Court administers, it does so under the Constitution. In that sphere the legislature cannot legislate. For a judicial officer to ignore the High Court in administration is no different from a civil servant violating the ordinary law of the land. A judicial officer has two obligations, to accept the High Court in administration and accept the law as a common man would. 47. The observations of the Supreme Court in reiterating position of the High Court, as a Court in administration for those who carry out its administration are important. They are: We have been referred to any comprehensive definition of the expression "administration of justice". But historically and in the minds or the people, administration of justice is exclusively associated with the Courts of justice constitutionally established Such Courts have been established throughout the land by several statues. The presiding Judge of a court embodies in himself the court, and when engaged in the task of administering justice is assisted by a complement of clerks and ministerial officers whose duty it is to protect and maintain other records, prepare the writs, serve the process etc. The acts in which they are engaged are acts in aid of administration of justice by the Presiding Judge. The power of appointment of clerks and ministerial officers involve administrative control by the Presiding Judge over them and though such control is described as administrative to distinguish it from the duties of a Judge sitting in the seat of justice, such control is exercised by the Judge as a Judge in the course of judicial administration. The power of appointment of clerks and ministerial officers involve administrative control by the Presiding Judge over them and though such control is described as administrative to distinguish it from the duties of a Judge sitting in the seat of justice, such control is exercised by the Judge as a Judge in the course of judicial administration. Judicial administration is an integrated function of the Judge and cannot suffer any dissection so far as maintenance of high standards of rectitude in judicial administration is concerned. The whole set up of administration of justice, and the control which the judge exercises over his assistants has also the object of maintaining the purity of administration of justice. These observations apply to all courts of justice in the land whether they arc regarded as superior or inferior courts of justice. 44. Courts of justice have, in accordance with their constitution to perform multifarious functions for due administration of justice. Any lapse from the strict standards of rectitude to effect administration of justice which is a term of wider import than mere adjudication of causes from the seal of justice. 43...The mere function of adjudication between parties is not the whole of administration of justice for any court. It is important to remember that disciplinary control is vested in the court and not in a Judge as a private individual. Control, therefore, is a function as conducive to proper administration of justice as laying down the law or doing justice between the parties. 46. What is commonly described as an administrative function has been, when-vested in the High Court consistently regarded by the statutes as a function in the administration of justice... It is obvious that this authority of the Chief Justice to appoint clerks and ministerial officers for the administration of justice implies an authority to control them in the interest of administration of justice...Therefore when the Chief Justice appoints ministerial officers and assumes disciplinary control over them, that is a function which though described as administrative is really in the course of administration of justice...and this superintendence, it is now settled, extends both to administrative and judicial functions of the subordinate courts. 50. 50. But if the attack on the Judge functioning as a Judge substantially affects administration of justice it becomes a public mischief punishable for contempt and it matters not whether such an attack is based on what a Judge is alleged to have done in the exercise of his administrative responsibilities. A Judge's functions may be divisible, but his integrity and authority are not divisible to the context of administration of justice. An unwarranted attack on him for corrupt administration is and potent in doing public harm as an attack on his adjudicatory function. 51. The Full Bench has considered a very large number of cases and come to the conclusion that there is no foundation for the view that an attack on the court in its exercise of administrative functions does not amount to contempt...if by the act or by the conduct of any party the authority of the court is lowered and the sense of confidence which the people have in the administration of justice by it is weakened...It does not appear from the report of the Orissa case that the High Court was in any way concerned with the alleged dichotomy between the Judges' administrative functions and his adjudicatory functions. "Judicial capacity" is an ambivalent term which means "capacity of or proper to a Judge" and is capable of taking in all functional capacities of a Judge whether administrative, adjudicatory or any other, necessary for the administration of justice. There is no sufficient warrant to hold that the Orissa High Court used the words "judicial capacity', with a view to exclude all other capacities of the Judges except the capacity to adjudicate, nor for holding that this Court approved the use of the expression as limited to the Judges' adjudicatory function"...There is no such thing as a denigration of a Judge function-wise". In re Baradakant Misra (SC) Supra. 48. It is not understood why the opposite party took up the posture to tell the High Court by his personal statement that the decision of the Administrative Committee, in effect, not being a judicial verdict the State Government could ignore it until a judicial verdict is delivered. In re Baradakant Misra (SC) Supra. 48. It is not understood why the opposite party took up the posture to tell the High Court by his personal statement that the decision of the Administrative Committee, in effect, not being a judicial verdict the State Government could ignore it until a judicial verdict is delivered. If things had come down to this that the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer was under pressure to ignore the decision of the High Court in administration, then it is not consistent with the obligation of a judicial officer that he can have the decision of an Administrative Committee compromised. If the opposite party was under instructions from the 'government' that the decision of the Administrative Committee is to be ignored as the opposite party would like the High Court to believe, then he should have made a request to the High Court that he was under pressure from the 'government' and he was being cornered to embarrass and compromise the orders of the High Court in administration, and that he would not like to be caught in such a situation and that he be recalled so that his position and the status and dignity of the High Court is not compromised, in conflict which the State Government set about to take with the High Court But the opposite party participated in the exercise by which the decision of the Administrative Committee was belittled, 49. As in the case before the Supreme Court, in re: Baradakanta Misra, (supra), the Petitioner Karan Lal Sharma as Judicial Secretary did not think he had done any wrong, and had taken the stance' that an apology is not called for. Baradakanta Misra invited an observation from the Supreme Court: The Appellant, throughout, took a defiant attitude and did not even think (t necessary to offer an apology. 50. Before this Court the Judicial Secretary's learned Senior counsel left certain expressions by the opposite party could have been avoided. But, the Judicial Secretary did not feel the necessity to recall his statements. So be it. He has brought a conflict between the State 'Government and the High Court. So did Baradakanta Misra: for him the Supreme Court observed: The constitutional issue between the' State Government and the High Court came in only by way of a side wind. 51. But, the Judicial Secretary did not feel the necessity to recall his statements. So be it. He has brought a conflict between the State 'Government and the High Court. So did Baradakanta Misra: for him the Supreme Court observed: The constitutional issue between the' State Government and the High Court came in only by way of a side wind. 51. Both, Baradakanta Misra, a Judicial Officer subordinate to the Orissa High Court, and the opposite party, Karan Lal Sharma, a Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer, did not have regard for the High Court in administration as a Court. 52. The judicial parametrics of the High Court in administration extend even beyond the Full Court and the Administrative Committee discharging its administration for the Court. The Supreme Court noticed with approval the Patna High Court proceedings in contempt against a rash civil servant who criticised an Administrative Judge of the High Court who had made an inspection report on a bureaucrat's Court. The Supreme Court was elaborating on what she attributes of a Court are. Hon'ble Krisha Iyer, J, writing a concurring opinion in the same Baradakanta Misra's case (supra) wrote: Of course, there have been oases sounding a different note. In The State Vs. N. Nagamani, Dist. Magistrate, AIR 1959 Patna 373 one Mr. Nagamani, an impetuous I.A.S. Officer wrote a letter making critical remarks concluded in disrespectful and improper language about the inspection report of his Court by a Judge of the High Court of Patna. However, Mr. Nagamani rendered an unqualified apology and the Court discharged the rule for contempt since in their view the contempt was purged by the apology, of course there was no need to consider in detail whether the letter reflecting upon the Judges who held the inspection was contempt; it was treated as such and the apology accepted. And the High Court's inspection of the judicial work of the subordinate judiciary is a judicial function or is at least para judicial... 80. We may now sum up. Judges and Courts have diverse duties. But, functionally, historically and jurisprudentially the value which is dear to the community and the function which deserves to be cordoned off from public molestation is judicial. 80. We may now sum up. Judges and Courts have diverse duties. But, functionally, historically and jurisprudentially the value which is dear to the community and the function which deserves to be cordoned off from public molestation is judicial. Vicious criticism of personal and administrative acts of judges may indirectly mar their Image and weaken the confidence of the public in the judiciary but the countervailing good, not merely of free speech but also of greater faith generated by exposure to the actinic light of bona fide, even If marginally overzealous criticism cannot be overlooked. Justice is no cloistered virtue. 81. The first part of the present case directly raises the question whether statements made in an appeal to the Governor against an order of the High Court on the administrative side attracts the contempt law. To our mind the answer arises from another question. Is the suspension of, the District Judge so woven into and integrally connected with the administration of justice that ft can be regarded as not purely an administrative-act but a para-judicial function? The answer must, on the facts here, be in the affirmative. The appeal was against the suspension which was a preliminary to contemplated disciplinary action. What was that action about? Against the Appellant in his judicial capacity, for acts of judicial capacity, for acts of judicial misconduct. The control was. therefore, judicial and hence the unbridled attack on the High Court for the step was punishable as contempt A large margin must be allowed for allegations in remedial representations but extravagance forfeits the protection of good faith... 53. The High Court in its judicial role functions within the sphere prescribed for it under the Constitution or any other law. In the matter of Baradakanta Misra (supra) an explanation that the judicial officer had taken refuge under an order issued by the State Government, issued by the Governor, brought no immunity to Baradakanta Misra. The Governor was not questioned, but those who arranged the order of the Governor were. The Orissa High Court was in administration in the administration of justice, a part of its functional attribute as a Court. 54. That the opposite party in this ease attempts to explain why the decision of the High Court; taken by its Administrative Committee, was not followed, is an admission that it was not. The High Court was disobeyed. 55. The Orissa High Court was in administration in the administration of justice, a part of its functional attribute as a Court. 54. That the opposite party in this ease attempts to explain why the decision of the High Court; taken by its Administrative Committee, was not followed, is an admission that it was not. The High Court was disobeyed. 55. The opposite party toys that the new Government took a general policy decision for terminating all re-employments or service extensions granted on superannuation by its government order dated 14 December, 1989 and consequently re-employment of the Applicant (K.G. Rastogi) was terminated by the Government vide order dated 19 December 1989. Where this leave (a) the decision of the High Court, in effect, that the tenure of the Principal Judge, Family Court, be until 62 years, (b) of the reiteration of the decision of the High Court at its Administrative Committee meeting on 21 December 1989 that the act of terminating the act of terminating the (sic) is valid and legal, in view of Sub-section (5) of Section 4 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, consequently, Sri Rastogi is entitled to continue on the and post upto the age of 62 years,' and (c) the legislative intent in the Act, aforesaid, that the tenure of a Judge of a Family Court will be until the age of sixty two years. 56. The opposite party, notwithstanding the High Courts decision, taken through its Administrative Committee on 19 December 1989, and conveyed to him explained why the aforesaid decision of the High Court was not followed. This explanation is apart from the opposite party's understanding that the Court's decision of 19 December 1989, not being a judicial verdict, can be avoided. The opposite party explained in paragraph 4 of his counter affidavit in the writ petition: 4. That the allegations as made in para No. 2 of the writ petition are incorrect and are not admitted The re-employment of Sri K.G. Rastogi was terminated as a consequence of the general policy decision of the Government for termination of all re-employment and extension. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 24586 of 1989 Kumud Lata Singh v. State has upheld the general policy of the Government for termination of re-employment and extension. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 24586 of 1989 Kumud Lata Singh v. State has upheld the general policy of the Government for termination of re-employment and extension. The order terminating the re-employment of Sri K.G. Rastogi is not in conflict with the provisions of Sub-section 5 of Section 4, of Family Courts Act, 1984 because this is an enabling provision which confers discretion on the State Government either to allow or disallow a member to hold the office until the age of 62 years Further Section 4(5) of the Act relating to age merely prescribes a qualification with regard to the eligibility and not the age of superannuation and this provision does not provide either expressly or even by implication that a person appointed as a Judge of Family Court must continue to hold the post until he attains the age of 62 years. 57. The first explanation of the opposite party is an afterthought, permitting the violation of High Court's order to happen and continue for three months. How does the opposite party explain the violation aid disobedience during this period? The decision of Courts Administrative Committee It 19 December, 1989, It was conveyed by the Court's communication dated 27-12-1989. The decision in the matter of Kumud Lata Singh matter is dated 5 March, 1990. Then, there is no similarity in Kumud Lata Singh's matter and the present case in re the matter of K.G. Rastogi, Principal Judge, Family Court under the Family Courts Act, 1984. The High Court's decision in Kumud Lata Singh's matter was declining a writ of certiorari to interfere with the State Government's policy to put an end to indiscriminate largesse of giving re-employment to state employees who had retired at 58 years under the Fundamental Rules. The re-employment, outside the tenure was also not standardised, the periods of re-employment, inequal person to person. In cases, affected by Kumud Lata Singh's matter, judicial officers were unaffected, as a re-employment of a judicial officer as Judge, Family Court the State Government cannot be unless the High Court permits it. 58. The re-employment, outside the tenure was also not standardised, the periods of re-employment, inequal person to person. In cases, affected by Kumud Lata Singh's matter, judicial officers were unaffected, as a re-employment of a judicial officer as Judge, Family Court the State Government cannot be unless the High Court permits it. 58. In the matter of K.O. Rastogi, regarding Principal Judge, Family Court, the High Court came into the picture because (i) the appointment is of a judicial officer, (ii) which appointment is to a court, which cannot be made without the tacit concurrence of the High Court, (iii) the appointment is prescribed under an act of Parliament known as the Family Courts Act. 1984, (iv) the A-t says that the incumbent will hold office by appointment and office cannot be carried over, (v) the salary or honorarium and other allowances payable, and the other terms and conditions of service of a Judge shall be such as the State Government may, in consultation with the High Court, prescribe, and (iv) the appointment itself is with the concurrence of the High Court. 59. Kumud Lata Singh's case is, thus, neither an analogy nor a defence. 60. The appointment of a Judge. Family Court, cannot be made unless the High Court lends its acquiescence; the law calls it concurrence. The Slate Government sought concurrence on such an appointment. It received the High Court's assents on the modality of appointment strictly according to law to give effect to the Parliament's intent, on a tenure upto sixty two years. And. in any case, even the conditions of service, teaure being one of them, cannot be spelled out unilaterally, it has to be in consultation with the High Court. The Family Courts Act, 1984 is the law as an Act of Parliament. The opposite party drew a wrong analogy from Kumud Lata Singh's case where tenures drew to a close at 58 years. Under the Act under reference it is 62 years. The opposite party in trying to explain his actions in defence disobeyed the High Court, violated the law, and misadvised the State Government, all simultaneously. 61. The opposite party, thus justified his action that the services of the Principal Judge Family Court were terminated as a measure of state policy not to grant extension of service after superannuation, which action was upheld by the High Court. 61. The opposite party, thus justified his action that the services of the Principal Judge Family Court were terminated as a measure of state policy not to grant extension of service after superannuation, which action was upheld by the High Court. The second explanation is an afterthought as until it was available assuming the principle of it applied the Court's decision of its Administrative Committee was disobeyed. Otherwise, the analogy was misplaced and out of context. The Family Court Act, 1984, in no uncertain terms gives & tenure to a Family Court Judge until sixty two years. The High Court's decision taken on 19-12-1989, consistent with the law in every aspect, stands even today. It has been disregarded and outraged. The opposite party justified the situation and circumstances, both to say that it was out of his power in complying with it. He accepts that the Court's decision of its Administrative Committee was not followed. According to him the State Government is responsible and he is and was helpless. What he intends to convey is that if (there be any disobedience of the High Court's order, the Stale Government arranged it and both are immune from answerability. And, then he also maintains on personal responsibility that the High Court's decision cannot be implemented as, according to him, it is not a judicial verdict 62. If the opposite party had complied with the directions of the High Court as conveyed to him by the Registrar's (Joint) letter dated 27 December 1989 on the decision of the Administrative Committee, the controversy would not have arisen at all Even otherwise, whether the Judicial Secretary or the State Government or both were to follow the directions of the High Court it would have not only been appropriate but a compliance of the law and the rule of law. The High Court's capacity or obligation to take a decision on locating, processing and giving a term to a judicial officer of a subordinate court cannot be questioned and that also a term which is compatible with the legislative prescription. But, by not following the Court's mandate, a crisis was created. The violation of the High Court's direction had happened. Could it be avoided? But, by not following the Court's mandate, a crisis was created. The violation of the High Court's direction had happened. Could it be avoided? The violation of the High Court's decision bred frustration in the judicial officer (Principal Judge, Family Court by putting him in a quandary over whether he was, or was not a judge Presiding over the Family Court. He was sanctioned with credentials by the High Court to continue his designation until 62 years, a term prescribed, otherwise by a federal legislation. He was Judge to the Family Court recognised by the High Court, and for the special litigants for whose benefit the Family Court has been created. All were under confusion. The opposite party says the State Government would not permit the Family Judge to continue as the High Court directed Thus, It is confusion and conflict both. 63. Attributing confusion to the authority of the High Court, the Supreme Court held it as contempt, in the matter of Dibakar Satpathy Vs. Hon'ble The Chief Justice and Judges of The High Court of Orissa., AIR 1961 SC 1315 . An under Secretary to the Board of Revenue, Orissa, was admonished for contempt and directed to pay costs of the proceedings before the High Court of Orissa, for circulating the view of the Legal Remembrancer and the Advocate General to District Magistrates. The matter was under the Cattle Trespass Act. The Orissa High Court has taken the vies following the Calcutta High Court that for a Magistrate to take cognizance of offences under the Act, authorisation of the District Magistrate is necessary. The decision of the Calcutta High Court saw a dissent in that court, and this was not brought to the notice of the Orissa High Court. The Legal Remembrancer to whom the matter was referred submitted a note which, according to the Orissa High Court, was somewhat ambigouous and did not deal with all questions--consequential and ancillary. The Under Secretary advised the District Magistrates, circulating copies of the opinions of the Legal Remembrancer and the Advocate General, with instructions contrary to that Held by the High Court that authorisation to the Magistrates was not necessary. The Under Secretary advised the District Magistrates, circulating copies of the opinions of the Legal Remembrancer and the Advocate General, with instructions contrary to that Held by the High Court that authorisation to the Magistrates was not necessary. In effect, advising, to ignore the High Court and, the note continued to add that"...This may be followed until the matter is carried to the High Court in some other case, so that the confusion created by the Orissa High Court...might be set at rest..." 64. The Under Secretary, was waiting for another judicial verdict. 65. The High Court (sic) attention being drawn to the note circulated to the District Magistrate (sic) notice to the Under Secretary, Board of Revenue and the Legal (sic) of Orissa to show cause why they should not be committed for contempt. Both of them showed cause. Both tendered apologies to the High Court. The High Court absolved the Legal Remembrancer but convicted the Under Secretary and admonished him. The Supreme Court held "that the Under Secretary was rightly found guilty of contempt. The Supreme Court viewed the matter seriously to hold that the directions to Magistrates to ignore the decision of the High Court was con -tempt, at the decision was binding on them and added, "We have not the least doubt that such a direction is a flagrant interference with the administration of justice by courts, a clear contempt of court." 66. In the present case, the opposite party has done no different than what that Under Secretary did. The opposite party has flagrantly avoided and ignored the decision of the High Court of its Administrative Committee. After not following it, and baiting a litigation the opposite party-has been waiting for a judicial verdict, pitching court against court in the same High Court, by not acknowledging the authority of the Court in administration and creating confusion. This is interference with the Judicial administration. 67. The submission of the opposite party is the reverse of that given by the State of Bihar on the violation of an injunction of the Subordinate Judge and as was suggested to the Supreme Court in the matter of The State of Bihar Vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari, AIR 1961 SC 221 . This is interference with the Judicial administration. 67. The submission of the opposite party is the reverse of that given by the State of Bihar on the violation of an injunction of the Subordinate Judge and as was suggested to the Supreme Court in the matter of The State of Bihar Vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari, AIR 1961 SC 221 . It was contended by the State of Bihar that the officer arranging for the offending notification by which the injunction of the Subordinate judge was disrespected, is (sic) for contempt on the breach of an order, under Order XXXIX Rule 2 of the CPC The State (Bihar) claimed immunity under the Crown Law theorising that the King could do no wrong and that the Crown could not be used for a tort. The matter arose out of a legislation known as the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 which provided for the transfer to the estates within the State. The legality of the enactment had been upheld by the Supreme Court. In a title suit the Subordinate Judge restrained the Defendant (State of Bihar) its officer, servants and employees and agents from issuing any notification under the Act in respect of the Plaintiff's estate and from taking possession of the estate and from meddling or interfering in any way with the management thereof. The injunction was granted in terms of the prayer. The order was appeasable but the State preferred no appeal, so it became final. The State Government had issued a notification, to the effect, that the estates described in the schedule as also the tenure have passed and hare become vested in the State under the provisions of the Act. A faint plea that the constitutional validity of the Act had been affirmed by the Supreme Court and, thus, the notification could be supported did not meet the approval of the Supreme Court itself, to violate an order of the Court. A faint plea that the constitutional validity of the Act had been affirmed by the Supreme Court and, thus, the notification could be supported did not meet the approval of the Supreme Court itself, to violate an order of the Court. The defences of the State of Bihar were many, it was submitted that beyond the issue of notification neither the State nor Us officers or servants, had done anything by way of dispossession or (sic) with the possession of the Plaintiffs; that the order of the Subordinate Judge reasonably and legally represented two interpretations and, thus, the benefit of doubt be given to the contemnors; the rule that the Crown or the State could not be proceeded against for a wrong doing; that even if the State could' be proceeded against for wilful disobedience of a order, the liability of the State and the act, of disobedience has been occasioned by the Additional Secretary who authenticated the notification. On the argument that the order was capable of two interpretations, the Supreme Court found it to be exceptional and the Supreme Court observed: There are two pieces of conduct on the part of the State Government which are wholly inconsistent with the theory that the order was understood by them as the learned Counsel suggested." The Supreme Court went on to say that, "when notice was issued to the Defendant why it should not be committed for contempt, one would naturally except if the point urged has any validity, the defence to based on denial of disobedience, by reference to the sense in which the order was understood." The Supreme Court continued to hold that if denial of disobedience was not the plea, then "The question whether a party has understood the order in particular manner and has conducted himself in accordance with such construction is primarily an one of fact, and where the material before the court did not support such state of affairs, "the court cannot attribute an innocent Intention based on presumptions, for the only reason that Ingenuity of the counsel can discover equivocation in the order which is the subject of enforcement. Then the Supreme Court added : Besides if the case of the State was, that acting bona fide It had committed an error in construing the order, one would expect an "oppression" of regret for the unintentional wrong, bat even a trace of contrition is singularly lacking at any stage of proceedings. (emphasis). 68. On the claim of immunity on the State action the argument was that as the Secretary to the Government had been impleaded as representing the Government the Government should be committed to prison. The Supreme Court agreed with the decision of the High Court that on this point "a more ridiculous prayer could not be imagined". 69. Further, the Supreme Court approved the view of the High Court. The Supreme Court considered the issue that when disobedience of the orders of the Court by State action takes a from of formal government orders, then, in a fit case, the possibility cannot be ruled out to impose a fine on an erring government and "that in a fit case may be imposed by methods analogous to sequestration which would be a distress warrant directed against the properties of the Government or the Corporation.,' (emphasis) 70. There was no controversy before the Supreme Court that the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to pass an interim order of injunction against the State and that such an injunction order was binding against the agents and servants, etc. of the State. On this the Supreme Court observed: "If such were not the law, orders of injunction would be rendered nugatory, by their being contravened by agents and servants of the parties...If such agents or servants, etc. are proved to have formal notice of the order and they disobey injunction they are liable to be proceeded against for contempt...The obligation on the part of the State to obey an injunction and be proceeded against for disobedience if it should take place would appear to follow by necessary Implication : As Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 10 h Edition p 1400 (f) More v. Smith (1858) 28 LJMS 126 puts it (the crown is sufficiently named in the statue with an intention lo include it is manifest)". 71. The Supreme Court considered the question whether the offending notification in disobedience to the order of the subordinate judge, had been established to be the Act of the Stale. 71. The Supreme Court considered the question whether the offending notification in disobedience to the order of the subordinate judge, had been established to be the Act of the Stale. On this the Supreme Court observed: "Even assuming that the order did not originate from the Governor personally, it avails the State nothing, became the Governor remains responsible for the action of the subordinates taken in his name". 72. While parting with the case and not appreciating the stand taken by the government and cashing in on its power to Issue a notification to compromise the orders of the injunction, this is what the Supreme Court said: 44. Before concluding, we consider it proper to draw attention to one aspect of the case. It is of the essence of the rule of law that every authority within the State including the Executive Government should consider itself bound by and obey the law. It is fundamental to the system of polity that India Bas adopted and which is embodied in the Constitution that the Courts of the land are vested with the powers of interpreting the' lay and of applying it to the facts of the cases which are properly brought before them If any party to the proceedings considers that any Court has committed any error In the understanding of the law or in its application, resort must be had to such review of appeals as the law provides. When once an order has, been passed which the Court has jurisdiction to pats, it is the duty of all persons bound by it to obey the order so long at it stands, and it would tend to the subversion of orderly administration and civil Government if parties could disobey orders with impunity. If such is the position as regard private parties, the duty to obey is all the more imperative in the case of Governmental authorities, otherwise there would be a conflict between one branch of the State polity, viz. If such is the position as regard private parties, the duty to obey is all the more imperative in the case of Governmental authorities, otherwise there would be a conflict between one branch of the State polity, viz. the executive and another branch the Judicial, If disobedience could go unchecked, it would result in orders of Courts ceasing to have any meaning and judicial power itself becoming a mockery, When the State Government obeys a law, or gives effective to an order of a Court passed against it, it is not doing anything which detracts from its dignity but rather, invests the law and the Courts with the -dignity which are their due, which enhances the prestige of the executive government itself, In a democratic set up We consider that on the facts of this case there was no justification, legal or otherwise for the State Government to have rushed the notification u/s 3(i) when its application to modify or vacate the order for - interim injunction was pending before the Subordinate Court. But more than mat, when possibly by failure to appreciate their error, the notification had been published, and the propriety and legality of its action was brought up before the Court by an application under O. 39 Rule 2(3) the attitude taken up by the Slate Government and persisted in up to hearing before us, has been one which we can hardly command, If the Government had deliberately intended to disobey the order of the Court, because for any reason they considered it wrong, their conduct deserves the severest condemnation If on the other hand it was merely a case of inadvertence and arose out of error, nothing would have been Ion and there was everything to be gained, even in the matter of the prestige of the Government, by a frank avowal of the error, committed by them and an expression of regret for the lapse, and it is lamentable that even at the stage of the hearing before us, there was no trace of any such attitude. 73. In the present case also, no regret is forthcoming, but instead a justification of what the government can do and there is nothing wrong in what it has done. 73. In the present case also, no regret is forthcoming, but instead a justification of what the government can do and there is nothing wrong in what it has done. The suggestion of the opposite party, as Judicial Secretary and legal Remembrancer is without remorse to submit that the High Court may have taken a decision through its Administrative committee to devoid whatever it did. but be that as it may the High Court should not forget that it is not a judicial verdict and it cannot be Implemented, that the State Government may follow it or ignore it, and that he in his position, it helpless. This, in a nutshell is his defence, spelling out schism, cleavage and discord between the High Court and the Executive, when under the constitution of India, or the Family Court's Act, 1984, harmony has been laid out in the matter of the appointment of a Judge, Family Court. 74. The opposite party spoke for the government He said that the State Government was not bound by the decision of the Administrative Committee and that it will wait for the judicial verdict. There are two aspects of this matter (1) what is the meaning of Government? and (2) what it the position of the opposite party in it? 75. The opposite party cannot hide under the camouflage of the expression 'Government’. He had dual functions as a civil servant with the State Government and as a judicial officer on deputation by leave of the High Court. Amongst the Secretaries, his is a special position to advise the State Government properly in the administration of justice, a subject on which even, according to the substantive law of the land, there is to be harmony, accord, amity, rapport, parallel when in certain identified fields the State Government cannot act on its own or may act only with the concurrence of the High Court. Neither the business of the administration permits discord nor the pattern of the law and the scheme of the Constitution permits a dichotomy or clash which the opposite party suggests. The issue was created let the matter be taken at present at its face value as the opposite party submits, by the State Government when it chose not to act on what the High Court decided through its Administrative committee acting for the court. The issue was created let the matter be taken at present at its face value as the opposite party submits, by the State Government when it chose not to act on what the High Court decided through its Administrative committee acting for the court. The very function of a judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer is connected with judicature and the administration of justice and theses functions are spelt out for him in the compendium, known as the Legal Remembrancer's Manual, and otherwise what he is required to do by the High Court. He is not to have an identity of his own so as to conflict with the High Court. This is precisely what the opposite party had done. But in doing what he did he attributed action to the State Government. Then, the question arises on what the position of a Secretary to a government is when he acts for the government. The Law Secretary and the Legal Remembrancer is not an authority unto himself, though under the Constitution a member of the subordinate judiciary he is under the, control of the judicature that is the High Court. 76. If the explanation of the opposite party Is to be accepted, the opposite party as Law Secretary has now indulged in politics. He seems to think that he has an identity separate from the State Government. His answer is that the Government has issued orders therefore he is immune from being questioned as an order of the Governor once issued will not be called in question in courts of law. Thus, inasmuch as he would like to rectify the situation, he cannot as the matter is beyond his power after the State Government issued the order to terminate K.G. Rastogi's service when the High Court declared that it be extended. The Law Secretary camouflages himself in the name of the State Government on the order being issued by the Governor. For a layman his defence is sound. But, under the constitution, it may not hold. 77. It is the impression of the opposite party as Law Secretary and Legal Remembrancer that once a notification has been issued by the State Government in the name of the Governor, then, has as secretary to the Government immune from being questioned. For a layman his defence is sound. But, under the constitution, it may not hold. 77. It is the impression of the opposite party as Law Secretary and Legal Remembrancer that once a notification has been issued by the State Government in the name of the Governor, then, has as secretary to the Government immune from being questioned. An argument was even raised to the extent that an answer may be sought for not following the decision of the Administrative Committee from the State Government A question does arise, what is the State Government. Is the State Government the State? Or is it that the Secretary acts for the Government? Or is it that the Governor of the State has to be questioned? Bureaucrats may give this answer to the general public but the symmetrical network of the constitution contains a system and it is based on the theory and practice of even controlling politicians if erring actions may be taken in the name of the Head of the State on the State Government. The Law Secretary cannot escape the academics of the very defence which he has taken" from being answered. The State Government cannot be personally answerable to the court though the State Government can or may be in contempt. The Governor cannot be called to the court in the discharge of his duties under the constitution A Minister cannot be questioned for his ministerial action unless he has personally taken up a confrontation and as an individual to violate an order or direction of the court. For the official functions which the Minister discharges, and it is implied within the framework of the constitution, he is answerable to the legislature. 78. The Law Secretary is under the impression that once an order has been issued in the name of the Head of the State it cannot be questioned. He is right as a layman. But he Is wrong if the constitution has to give an answer for it. A Head of the State cannot be questioned for the discharge of his day to day functions in the affairs of the State. But, merely because a notification may be issued does not imply that the High Court cannot question it. The High Court may not question the Governor personally. There is a difference between questioning the Governor and a State action which in itself may be unconstitutional. 79. But, merely because a notification may be issued does not imply that the High Court cannot question it. The High Court may not question the Governor personally. There is a difference between questioning the Governor and a State action which in itself may be unconstitutional. 79. It is often said, as laymen do, that a king cannot be questioned as a king ran do no wrong, One king who claimed this arrogant power lost his head and this matter in constitutional history U a controversy between the State, the king and the Parliament. The equality clause in our Constitution has its origin in this history. The Stuart Kings of England claimed immunity from being answerable to anybody under an illusion of Divine Right. A revolution followed, with England without a monarch during a certain period in the seventeenth century. But the matter has been debated before courts also. The very phrase. "King can do no wrong" is a principle which was seriously considered over a century age at the High Court, in England. In the matter of State of Bihar v. Sonabati Kumari (supra) the Supreme Court was considering facets of this Common Law Doctrine. But, the origins the debate on this legal-point recorded in the annals of decisions by u/s is not noticed, which this Court will. In the matter of tortious the 'liability, the defence was that no liability lay against the Crown as it can do i wrong. 80. The opposite party as judicial Secretary ha taken the defence that it is the State Government which has to be questioned. The order of course has been issued in the name of the Governor. The defence which has been offered as submissions, has even gone to this extent that if any explanation is to be sought it should be sought either from the State Government or the Chief Minister. The Constitution of India has been shown in naming the Governor with further argument that a Governor cannot be questioned. Many myths centre around the concept the State action is immune from, being questioned or a wrong action can be camouflaged in the name of the Head of the State and it is beyond judicial purview. Such is not the case, No one is above the law; not even the Head of that State. Many myths centre around the concept the State action is immune from, being questioned or a wrong action can be camouflaged in the name of the Head of the State and it is beyond judicial purview. Such is not the case, No one is above the law; not even the Head of that State. But the opposite party has raised a controversy and wants to hide behind in claim of immunity, thus, this - Court is obliged to answer the academics and the ingenuity of defence on the answerability of the State or the Head of the State if it is the coverage. 81. An answer like that given by the opposite party was addressed and considered by the High Court in England more than a century ago to explain this misunderstood principle "The king can do no wrong." The case of Feather v. Regina 141 RR 405 is actually a treatise on the dialectical analysis of this aspect. Some of the questions which the opposite party desires the court to answer are available in this judgment. For instance, Cockburn Chief Justice, in this report, consider the question if the sovereign were in propriety persona to direct to a person to affect an illegal arrest in his presence it would be no command. Blackburn. J. agreed with this with the comment to say: "not no-command but no justification". The judges continued to be h agreement to record that law will not draw a distinction between political and private character of a sovereign. The issue had been precipitated in court as a subject of the crown, was seeking a remedy from the wrong acts of the Crown. The court declined to hear" the Attorney General as the controversy at least was clear to the judges for being answered and the court retired to deliver a considered judgment on a future day. It was explained that saying the king can do no wrong rests on hypothesis that the king will do no wrong nor will bi questioned for my wrong which it done in his name. It was explained that the king can do no wrong is a phenomenon which is to be understood as that the king will not permit a wrong to be done. It was explained that the king can do no wrong is a phenomenon which is to be understood as that the king will not permit a wrong to be done. This was followed up with the logical conclusion that any wrong which is done is not by the king or the Sovereign but those who carry out his actions. This wrong which will be perpetuated will be questioned at the funds of the agencies which permit wrong to happen. On tortuous liability the Sovereign was immune but it is not that the citizen was without a remedy on the harm which was done to him. 82. This theory connects itself with the decision of the Supreme Court A. Sanjeevi Naidu, etc. Vs. State of Madras and Another, AIR 1970 SC 1102 , where defences were taken to explain circumstances of wrong acts of the Government or a Cablinet Minister or the President of India The Supreme Court held that a Minister is responsible to the legislature for every action taken in his Ministry but in well planned administration most of the decisions are taken by the civil servants who are likely to be experts and not subject to political pressure. When a civil servant takes a decision, the Supreme Court said, he does not do it as a delegate of his Minister, but he does it on behalf of the Government and these officers are the limbs of the government and not its delegatees. The Supreme Court followed that and took this proposition further to hold that the Secretary to a government being a senior administrative officer should have taken the appropriate course to strictly comply with the directions of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court further said that any contemptuous action which the Secretary to the Government pleads ignorance of, the court could not find any extenuating circumstances that the Secretary can be discharged with the obligation in carrying out the directions of the court and that he would be imputed with the knowledge of the consequences of failure and compliance of the orders of the court. (emphasis) 83. A secretary to a Ministry of the Government of India was also held guilty of contempt when the (sic) be could not plead ignorance of the directions of the Supreme Court. (emphasis) 83. A secretary to a Ministry of the Government of India was also held guilty of contempt when the (sic) be could not plead ignorance of the directions of the Supreme Court. Thus, the Supreme Court held in re M.L. Sachdeva v. Union of India (1991) 1 SCC 603 that "he should be Imputed with the knowledge of the consequence of failure of compliance. (emphasis) 84. The High Court in administration, the law is settled does not cease to be court. There are set spheres, in which, for the furtherance of the judicial administration of justice the High Court is obliged to take decision. Like in the present case to select a judge from the subordinate judiciary to man the Family court, which appointment cannot be made without the High Court. The Supreme Court called this facet of High Court, acting as a court in its judicial parametrics. The judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer, a judicial officer, can ill afford to ignore the decisions of the High Court, in administration not excluded, as in it, the High Court Is Court also But, the opposite party chose to ignore and impliedly question the High Courts Administrative Committee, acting for the Court, la the State Government taking a contrary decision, the opposite party considers the decision of the Court, taken by its Administrative Committee on 21 December, 1989 as one which can be ignored In favour of' the decision taken by the State Government until a judicial verdict arrives and the State Government in not obliged to carry out the direction conveyed to him by the Court. This is criticism of the High Court in administration of justice. A criticism which affects the status and dignity of the Court. It is not the business of opposite party & a Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer and District Judge not excluded, to question the directions of the Court and sit in judgment over the validity of the order of the High Court In the appointment of a judicial officer, on his qualifications and credentials otherwise in accordance with law, to courts established under the law of the land to impart public justice. If the parameters and boundaries of the High Court as Courts, not ignoring as Superior Courts, or Records' also, have already been spelled out by the Supreme Court, the High Court does not cease to be a Court In the arrangement of public justice, the administration of public justice and the dispensation of public justice. 85. A suggestion, repeat even a suggestion, to belittle the High Court In its administration of justice is contempt, Judicial Officers or subordinate courts are obliged to carry out the directions of the High Court, and they were cautioned by the Allahabad High Court that it was not their business to sit upon their validity and were obliged to execute them. This was laid down In the matter of Emperor Vs. Benjamin Guy Horniman, AIR 1945 All 1 by their Lordships Collister and Allsop. JJ in 1943. 86. A decade later, another, two Hon'ble Judges, in Division, unaware of the decision in re : Emperor v. Benjamin Guy. Horniman (Supra), reiterated the tame view but with more detail. A city Magistrate (under the old Code of criminal procedure of 1598) In a case u/s 324, of the Indian Penal Code (voluntary causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means) declined to seal, the material exhibit on the application of convicted man. The Magistrate rejected their application with a short order: "The state of the garments has received mention in the judgment. No need to seal them now" Before the Sessions Court, the accused pressed his request that the exhibits be sealed in the interests of justice and equity. The Sessions Court directed the Magistrate "to place these clothes material Exs. 1 and 2 under a sealed cover. He must get them placed under a sealed cover after fully examining and noting their condition and in his own presence". The learned Magistrate did not comply with this order and returned the order with the following remark: R I.O. (returned in original) with the request that the law under which this directive is issued may kindly be communicated. It is respectfully submitted that the conditions of these material exhibits has already received specific mention in the judgment passed by this Court. The accused has also had an order on this very subject from this Court. So far as this Court is aware no revision has been moved against this order". It is respectfully submitted that the conditions of these material exhibits has already received specific mention in the judgment passed by this Court. The accused has also had an order on this very subject from this Court. So far as this Court is aware no revision has been moved against this order". The learned Magistrate was looking for a judicial verdict out of a judicial proceeding. The Division Bench expressed that the action of the Magistrate "in writing the note to the order of the Additional Sessions Judge and in not carrying out that order undoubtedly makes him guilty of contempt of that court. He had no business to enquire about the law under which the order was passed" The Division Bench of this issue of questioning the authority of a superior court in giving directions, no matter whether a revision was pending or not. said "The learned Additional Sessions Judge was seized of the appeal against the order convicting the accused and sentencing him to Imprisonment, and as such had perfect jurisdiction to pass the order which he did not revision against the order of the Magistrate of the 5th of May 1954, was necessary to give the learned Additional Sessions Judge jurisdiction to pass the order of the 6th of May, 1954 ft was the clear duty of Sri Fanthome to comply with that order" "It is not for the superior courts to say under what law they have issued the directive. The subordinate courts should presume for the time being, unless the contrary appears, that the order is without jurisdiction, they may not comply with it but that will be at their own peril. If it turns out that the order was passed within jurisdiction they will be disobeying it at the cost of being punished for contempt of court. Even when they refuse compliance with in order passed without jurisdiction, they must do so in courteous language. Any discourtesy shown by them to a superior court is again bound to involve them In proceedings for contempt. No subordinate court is entitled to demand of the superior court the law under which the order has conc. passed before complying with It. They must find the law for themselves if they intend to" question the order: otherwise they should strictly comply With it both in letter and in spirit. No subordinate court is entitled to demand of the superior court the law under which the order has conc. passed before complying with It. They must find the law for themselves if they intend to" question the order: otherwise they should strictly comply With it both in letter and in spirit. It must be understood by all concerned that any discourtesy of disobedience shown to the orders of superior courts will be visited by this Court with the severest penalties We hope that no such disobedience of orders of superior courts, as has been shown in this case, will occur in future. We would have taken a very serious view of the case but for the fact that Sri Fanthome has expressed his regret before us for what he did in the present case and has also held out a promise that he will not repeat the mistake in future. We, therefore, consider that a warning to him to behave properly in future would meet the ends of Justice. We, therefore, discharge the notice with the aforesaid warning. Sri Fanthome will, however, pay the costs of the Assistant Government Advocate which we assess at Rs. 80/- (emphasis). Sessions Judge Meerut v. F.S. Fonthome, City Magistrate, Meerut 1953 ALJ 148. 87. The opposite party, as a District Judge on deputation as Judicial Secretary and legal Remembrancer, questioned the effectiveness of the High Court In administration in the discharge and dispensation of public justice. He either treated the High Court in administration as erroneous, capable of being ignored or a dangling puppet on a string, caught between the State Government and its Law Secretary, who would not implement: the order of the Court on a pretext that they were waiting for yet another order. This is nothing but questioning the superior court. As long as an order of a court exists, those who are obliged to carry it out cannot question it, unless it ceases to exist under a system of law provided to wipe out the order itself. On this proposition the Punjab and Harayana High Court: in the matter of Narain Singh v. Hardayal Singh AIR 1958 P&H 189 (DB), laid down the law as: 14. On this proposition the Punjab and Harayana High Court: in the matter of Narain Singh v. Hardayal Singh AIR 1958 P&H 189 (DB), laid down the law as: 14. An argument raised on behalf of the Respondent is that the order of the civil court was erroneous in so far as the site in question had vested in the Municipal Committee of Patiala and the Petitioner had encroached upon it. This argument is entirely without merit. So long as the injunction cannot be excused on the ground, that though the court acted within its jurisdiction but the order that it passed was erroneous. The order granting injunction might have been erroneous, or granted improvidently, or obtained irregularly, that will not excuse the person violating it. The only question open for consideration in proceedings for contempt for violating an Injunction are, whether the court had jurisdiction to award the Injunction and whether it had in fret been violated. Further inquiry as to its advisability or legality is not called for. The Court, in contempt proceedings, will not inquire into the merits of the case in which the injunction was issued. That is the function of the Court granting the injunction and if that order is challenged in appeal, then of the court of appeal. If the question has been determined wrongly by the trial court, it can be re-examined only on appeal. So long as the Court has an authority to determine the issue, its order has to be obeyed, no matter how clearly it may be erroneous : Sets the People, Ex. Eel Davis and Palmer v. Sturtevant 9 NY 263 (F). 88. The decision of the Supreme Court Shri Baradakanta Mishra Vs. The Registrar of Orissa High Court and Another, (1974) 1 SCC 374 was again reiterated in another decision. Baradakanta Misra, (a judicial' officer) in his petition and pleadings before the Supreme court made objectionable statements against the High Court of Orissa. On this, the High Court issued to him notice to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt for causing such statements in his petition before the Supreme Court. Baradakanta Misra was held guilty of contempt. He faced disciplinary proceedings in addition. He moved the High Court for initiating contempt proceedings against Judge for holding the inquiry on its Administrative tide at the Full Court with the Chief Justice presiding. Baradakanta Misra was held guilty of contempt. He faced disciplinary proceedings in addition. He moved the High Court for initiating contempt proceedings against Judge for holding the inquiry on its Administrative tide at the Full Court with the Chief Justice presiding. Baradakanta Misra contended that the Full Court on the Administrative side was prejudicing the issue when some mattes were commode and pending on the judicial side The contempt action sought against the Full Court was dismissed by the Full Bench of the High Court Baradakanta Misra sought an appeal u/s 19(1) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 which was dismissed. This decision of the Supreme Court Baradakanta Misra v. Mr. Justice G. Misra, CJ of Orissa High Court AIR 1974 SC 2155, lays down the law on another aspect of the law of contempt of the court, to the effect that Judges of the High Court in administration are court, and as a collegiate with no less powers to initiate proceedings for contempt and judge them too Further, that the High Court can sue motu initiate proceedings for contempt on a prima facie case, the trial on the punishment aspect of it to be carried out before a particular division of the Court. Third, if the High Court were to drop the action intended to be initiated on pre-trial without going into the question whether it is civil or criminal. and only examining initially whether there is contempt or not and then should the High Court drop the proceedings if there be no contempt without determining its category then there is no appeal under the Act against an order dropping the proceedings An appeal is maintainable against an order after trial leading to a conviction. An appeal by special leave petition, before the Supreme Court, is at the discretion of the Supreme Court and not as of right. 89. On behalf of the opposite party |in this case a proposition was raised by Mr. S.N. Verma, Senior Advocate that if the Court is to consider that the action of the opposite party which amounts to due interference in the administrates of justice within the meaning of the sub Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Sub-section (2)(c) of the Act, then, it is criminal contempt and not civil contempt and the hearing on this contempt will take place before a Bench. 90. 90. It is at this stage that the court considered the totality of the argument of the opposite party in defence, no matter what, that there is no contempt. As such, whether the contempt is civil or criminal will come later. 91. First, the Court has to come to a conclusion that an action, as discernible from the record, is contemptuous. Compartmentalisation or categorisation into species of contempt, civil or criminal, will be at a subsequent stage. Because if the court comes to the conclusion that no contempt has been committed, there will be no hearing either of, civil or criminal contempt. Yet contempt’s in the face of the court are dealt with summarily notwithstanding any categorisation between civil and criminal. 92. If no contempt is committed and the court does not take the proceedings further then it is settled law that no appeal lies against an order dropping a proceeding for contempt by the High Court as an action for contempt is a matter between the contemnor and the court Learned Counsel for the opposite party on this point was not at issues with the court. Implying thereby, if the contempt proceedings were to be dropped by this Court by having noticed whatever was alleged to be contemptuous by the opposite party, that would be the end of the matter. It was in this context, that the indulgence to make an apology was sought from the Court, though by counsel so that the perspective could be explained to the opposite party by his learned Counsel. It is on record that the court permitted the indulgence to consider and offer regret and apology for having made certain remarks in the counter affidavit, both in the writ petition as well as the contempt petition which could have been avoided. What the Court would have done if the apology and regret had been pleaded from the offending expressions against the High Courts as an institution, is another matter. But should the court have considered the apology and discharged the notice or not taken the proceedings further, contemptuous action against the opposite party would have stood closed. 93. If the record before a court of Record is such that contempt glares et the court on the face of it or action is contemptuous in the face of the Court, a contemnor can be proceeded with summarily. 93. If the record before a court of Record is such that contempt glares et the court on the face of it or action is contemptuous in the face of the Court, a contemnor can be proceeded with summarily. Then again, if upon a consideration of action for contempt, the court: come to the conclusion that though granted an opportunity or an indulgence sought by counsel for or on behalf of the contemnor, no response is forthcoming, the opportunity to drop the matter is lost. Truly then what resalable is that the contemnor desires to be at issues trait, firstly, there is no contempt and secondly, if there is it may be civil or criminal unless, both. These, then have become issues in this case. If the matter is civil then it will be before the court which ordinarily considers this category of contempt. If the matter be that the species of contemptuous action partakes the nature of criminal contempt, then the question which is to be considered is on the venue of the hearing. In an far as the action is concerned it can be taken by the High Court on its own motion or on motion by the Advocate General or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General or in relation to High Court of a union territory by such law officer as the Central Government may specify. Even if the argument on behalf of the opposite party is to be accepted it would not save him for an action of contempt being considered as the hearing of it will be before the Bench as prescribed u/s 18 of the Act and the matter will be "heard and determined by a Bench of not less than two Judges". But it is implied that the action will be initiated u/s 15 for the natures of contempt which the opposite party draws the attention of the court to, according to his suggestion, is criminal contempt. 94. The High Court being a court of record each court is a Bench with sittings in a division and a court of Independent jurisdiction. Each court in division, Is the High Court. 94. The High Court being a court of record each court is a Bench with sittings in a division and a court of Independent jurisdiction. Each court in division, Is the High Court. So let it not be misunderstood that any action which can be initiated by a law officer of the Central Government or any person with the consent of the Advocate General or the Advocate General, can preclude any court of record i.e. High Court from initiating an action for contempt. An apology may be considered and any action which may be initiated can be dropped by any Court which initiated the action, whether relating to civil contempt or criminal contempt. Once the matter is dropped, an adversary party to a litigation has no right of appeal An appeal u/s 19 is only against an order or a decision of the High Court to punish for contempt. This implies that there is no appeal against the order to drop proceedings for contempt on an apology nor to initiate an action for contempt. This is clear from Section 19. The only appeal which may lie and this Court refers to the expression 'contempt, from any order of the High Court will be an appeal under Article 136 to the court under the Constitution of India. Ibid. 95. It is for this reason that learned Counsel for the opposite party, Mr. S.N. Verma, Advocate, may have sought indulgence that anything said reflecting upon the dignity and statue of the High Court, could be and ought to be avoided and took prior permission of the court that if an apology was given, though late, it may be reflected upon and considered by the Court. Of course to submit a regret or make an apology was not in the hands of the learned Counsel as the decision to do so was upon the opposite party. The advantages were all his. At the expense of repetition this Court reiterates that should this Court have dropped the proceedings for contempt, then there can be no debate that criminal contempt could not be dropped. This again is a situation different from a matter relating to hearing a matter for the punishment of a contemnor on charges of criminal contempt. At the expense of repetition this Court reiterates that should this Court have dropped the proceedings for contempt, then there can be no debate that criminal contempt could not be dropped. This again is a situation different from a matter relating to hearing a matter for the punishment of a contemnor on charges of criminal contempt. An occasion to go into proceedings in depth would not have arisen if the opposite party had weighed and sought advice of his counsel on regret and apology. The Court waited for the apology till the last minute when it reserved judgment on 14. August, 1991, and again when the matter was before the Court on 22 August, 1991 for further hearing, on arrival of the original record, after a special mention had been made on behalf of the opposite party on 26 July, 1991. This order has been entered on a contemptuous action noticed from the record and the situation is entirely of the making of the opposite party. The statements he has made on record are his and no one else's. 96. The Court accepts the submission of counsel for the opposite party that the expressions referred to in the affidavit which appeared to the court to offend the dignity and status of the court, may come within a species known as 'criminal contempt'. If that be so, the opposite party is under notice of motion that a prima facie case for contempt glares from the record which declares him as a person who demeans the status and dignity of the High Court with an intent to obstruct the administration of justice. 97. The opposite party is familiar with the record created by him and what he has said and done. 98. In the State of Uttar Pradesh and the annals of the Allahabad High Court a precedent ii not available that a Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer has had to face proceedings for contempt. Members of the then Indian Civil Service have also held this post and regard for the High Court has been explicit. The opposite party is the first Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer not only to face proceedings for contempt but to defend his actions as he took a stance as if he is an authority in juxtaposition to the High Court. This misunderstanding springs from not understanding what a Court of Record is. The opposite party is the first Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer not only to face proceedings for contempt but to defend his actions as he took a stance as if he is an authority in juxtaposition to the High Court. This misunderstanding springs from not understanding what a Court of Record is. Article 215 is very precise in saying that the High Court shall be a Court of Record and shall have the power to punish contempt of itself. The High Court exercises, under the Constitution, judicial power of the State 99. That the Constitution designates the High Court as a Court of Record is one aspect of the matter. The Supreme Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, AIR 1967 SC 1 treats the High Court as a superior Court of Record. The opposite party had an argument submitted challenging the jurisdiction of the Court. This submission has been made in two parts, one on the basis of his pleadings and the other in arguments. On record the opposite party contends that there is no contempt whichever species it nay be, as any decision of the High Court in administration is not a decision of a Court, and thus not a judicial verdict, which alone can be honoured for compliance or implementation Following from this, the opposite party submits, that if the High Court in the due administration of justice be treated as Court, contempt, if any, is a criminal contempt, and outsides the jurisdiction of this Court and a matter for hearing of a Division Court of two Judges. 100. The submission as made questions the jurisdiction of the High Court that in administration it is not the Court. This is the first misunderstanding of the opposite party. 101. Further, the opposite party as a District Judge by rank and otherwise as judicial -Secretary and Legal Remembrancer questions this Court that it cannot consider the matter whether the High Court in administration is a Court or not. impliedly, the opposite party questions the jurisdiction of this Court that the order of the High Court in administration, notwithstanding that it is violated, the action to violate to cannot be made an issue by the High Court. This is the second misunderstanding of the opposite party. 102. impliedly, the opposite party questions the jurisdiction of this Court that the order of the High Court in administration, notwithstanding that it is violated, the action to violate to cannot be made an issue by the High Court. This is the second misunderstanding of the opposite party. 102. If the opposite party had clearly understood the attributes of a Court of Record, which no judicial officer should forget, there would be no occasion for this Court to reflect on the pleas of jurisdiction raised by the opposite party. 103. One of the first attributes of a court of record and especially a superior court of record it that it determines its own Jurisdiction. Only a superior court of record can consider whether any matter falls within its jurisdiction or not. Until such a superior court of record considers a matter of jurisdiction, it cannot be said that the mater is beyond its jurisdiction Thus, it is not that this Court cannot consider the matter that the Administrative Committee acts as a court and it is within its jurisdiction to take decisions on matters within its sphere Likewise it cannot be said that while Article 215 declares the High Court as a court of record, the High Court does not have the jurisdiction to notice a matter of contempt in so far as the court in administration is concerned. The decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Dibakar Satpathy v. Hon'ble the Chief Justice, Orissa High Court (supra) cannot be ignored by this Court. In short, the High Court in administration, in effect, at its Judges' meeting or the Administrative Commutes the Supreme Court said, acts for the Court and is a decision by the High Court Baradakanta Mishra Vs. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, AIR 1974 SC 2255 . 104. In some High Courts it would not be out of place to mention that a report by a subordinate Court to consider a motion for contempt is part of the process of due administration of justice, and the matter is laid before the Administrative Judge or the Court in administration, initially, for considering a prima facie cue and, thereafter put into Court. These are the attributes of a Court of Record having the jurisdiction to assess for itself and be satisfied that a person against whom an allegation is made for contemptuous action be proceeded with. This power is, only conferred on the High Court as a Court of Record not the Courts subordinate to it. 105. A faint plea of jurisdiction was being suggested by learned Counsel for the opposite party, Mi G.L. Tripathi, Advocate, on occasions when learned Senior Advocate was not at the Bar. Learned Senior Advocate for the opposite party, Mr. S.N. Verma, did not raise this issue. But, as the matter has been raised the Court will answer this aspect also. The Court's attention was drawn that there is no cause of action on the writ petition of the Petitioner which has been sent by the Court which heard it on a preliminary point that the jurisdiction is not at the Allahabad High Court but before its Bench at Lucknow. The Court's attention was drawn to the judgment in this very matter in the writ petition in Krishan Gopal Rastogi v. State of U.P. 1991 AWC 295 . This Court has considered the judgment carefully. There arc certain apsects, and this is a matter of record which are not considered in the judgment, aforesaid. The judgment docs not take into consideration the status of the Court as a Court of Record. This is not a status which has been assumed by the High Court but carries its sanction from the Constitution of India, under Article 215 of the Constitution, The Article is very short. It says: 215. High Courts to be Courts of record: Every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the Powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt "of itself" Cause of a don before a Court of Record or for that matter before any Court begins from the genesis of the dispute. The contention of the opposite party acting as the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer is that the cause of action arose in Lucknow for any orders which the opposite party passed on behalf of the government as a Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer to deny the continuation of the Petitioner on his term as a Judge, Family court, until 62 years. The came of action is not personal to the opposite party. The came of action is not personal to the opposite party. The answer is simply without the High Court the opposite party would not be a Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer. And, simultaneously, without the concurrence of the High Court, as stipulated in no uncertain terms in the Family Courts Act, 1984, the State cannot even make an appointment of a Judge, Family Court It is because the High Court is a Court of Record and whatever its' functions are under the Constitution on control over the transfers and postings of judicial officers and their placing as judges of the subordinate courts or the subordinate judiciary on deputation with the Stats Government, are ail functions of the High Court The opposite party has neither the capacity nor the power to create causes of action much less jurisdiction. The opposite party has a misconception on what the High Court is as a Court of Record. Litigation was created by the opposite party, not by the Petitioner. On the day when the Administrative Committee acting for the Court took a decision in the Chambers of the Chief Justice with the collegium of Judges, who constitute the Administrative Committee, to act for and on behalf of the Court, any intention to violate the decision of the Administrative Committee was the cause of action. The cause of action for any decision which the Administrative Committee takes will always continue to be in Allahabad The Chief Justice chairs the Administrative Committee at Allahabad because the charter of the High Court says so Chapter III of the High Court Rules, 1952; particularly makes it absolutely clear that the Administrative Committee shall meet at Allahabad The Administrative Committee cannot meet any where else except at Allahabad. So the cause of action at Allahabad for he purposes of the writ petition in this matter always did arise out of the decision of the Court whether at a Judges' Meeting (English Meeting as it was called) or the Administrative Committee and will continue to arise, if it is ever violated, at Allahabad. The record of the Allahabad High Court in administration lies at its English office at its principal seat at Allahabad. This is on record, which the Allahabad High Court as Court of Record has the inherent capacity to retain and preserve. The record of the Allahabad High Court in administration lies at its English office at its principal seat at Allahabad. This is on record, which the Allahabad High Court as Court of Record has the inherent capacity to retain and preserve. It is the decision of the Administrative Committee which has been violated and the cause of action arose at Allahabad when the decision was put under interference to be violated by the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer. If the previous petition filed at the Lucknow Bench will be of academic value, another petition which may be sent to Lucknow, in this matter, will also remain of academic value. The Allahabad High Court as a Court of Record under the Constitution took the decision as a Court, which it was obliged to, according to its Charter, without which decision the Judge, Family Court, cannot be appointed. This Court of Record saw its decision demeaned at the hands of the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer. Thus, the decision of the Court through its Administrative Committee rusts and gathers dust amongst the many records of (his Court of Record frustrated in implementation or subjected to repeated violation. 106. A notice for contempt to the opposite party even without filling of the petition could have gone straight from the Court which is constituted as an Administrative Committee. This would have been a notice under Article 215 of the Constitution of India as contempt ex facie, as when the decision of the Administrative Committee was violated, it was in the face of the Court. And, this has nothing to do, as civil or criminal contempt. 107. Thus, when the Administrative Committee took the decision on 21 December 1989, whatever it may be and this decision was conveyed to the opposite party by the Joint Registrar by his letter of 27 December 1989 in this regard, it became part of the record as a Court of Record which is the High Court. As long as nothing covert was done to contradict this decision, no cause of action arose. But, the day when a covert act was done and it does not matter who did it, the cause of action arose and was kept alive and will continue to be alive until the record is set right and it will be where the record lies, i.e., at Allahabad. But, the day when a covert act was done and it does not matter who did it, the cause of action arose and was kept alive and will continue to be alive until the record is set right and it will be where the record lies, i.e., at Allahabad. The cause of action was appointment of Judge, Family Court, deliberated and decided by the Court through its Administrative Committee. The occasion was these accept the decision. As, this is what the expression concur or concurrence means: comply, consent, cooperate, harmonise, join, meet, unite As a Court of Record, the cause of action is not personal to one Krishan Gopal Rastogi and the other Katan Lal Sharma. It is the breakdown of machinery in the framework within which the High Court has to function. For Mr. Karan Lal Sharma, the Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer, to, in effect, return the writ of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is an effort accomplished and an obstruction to administration of justice. Contempt of the grossest kind has been committed if the contention of the opposite party is that the State Government is responsible for its action and it is beyond his power to remedy the situation, then, this Court has no hesitation in stating that the State Government is also in contempt. But on the analogy which the Court has given with reasons based on the decisions of the Supreme Court, it is the opposite party who acted and abutted the power of the State as Secretary to the Government. He is answerable for violating the decision of the Administrative Committee. The conduct of the State Government, in a parliamentary democracy where the ministerial accountability of the cabinet is concerned is a stock that has to be taken by the legislature unless any Minister has personally violated the order of the Court. 108. He is answerable for violating the decision of the Administrative Committee. The conduct of the State Government, in a parliamentary democracy where the ministerial accountability of the cabinet is concerned is a stock that has to be taken by the legislature unless any Minister has personally violated the order of the Court. 108. What the opposite party has done in permitting the decision of the Administrative Committee to be frustrated and thwarted, is not a circumstance which can be encouraged to become a precedent and an example for the members of the subordinate judiciary when they man their desks as Judicial Secretaries to the State Government, or are on deputation on other assignments in aiding the functions of implementation of justice for the State The remain judicial officers on their jobs with the government as part of the State Government to facilitate the administration of justice. Every function which is of the judicial department of the State and for every function which is mentioned in the Legal Remembrancer's manual, each and every aspect deals with the administration of justice Beyond facilitating and coordinating the business of the administration of justice, judicial officers on deputation have no other function They have not been sent by the High Court on deputation to play hovoc with the decisions of the High Court. Their job is to advise the State Government for the better functioning of the business of the administration of the public justice system. When the High Court takes decisions as a Court whether they are judicial decisions or they are decisions by Court In administration violation is not contemplated through Judicial officers. The opposite party cannot be absolved of being a party to breaking the delicate balance of the Constitution for violating the orders of the Court and not advising the government accordingly and choosing to act at the dictates of the government and succumbing to these pressures when his status Is that of a judicial officer and it does not lend credibility to a judicial officer to raise a point of jurisdiction and that also when the point of jurisdiction is directly connected with the orders of the High Court in administration. The opposite party has taken an institutional clash with the High Court to suggest that' he can create a cause of action and yet the High Court may continue to rest with any action which it may have taken on the cause for appointment of Judge. Family Court The opposite party was not sent to Lucknow as a Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer to act in collision with the High Court. This Court cannot subscribe to the view that the cause of action in a matter like this can be an authority Infused In, and at the will of the opposite party. If it can be then the opposite party is prima facie in contempt of the High Court as a Court of Record and he has violated and disturbed the decision of the Constitution. 109. Then there is another aspect to the matter which shows the opposite party's temperament in the regard he has for the High Court. This matter is on record and it is not that this Court's attention has been drawn to something which is alien to the record in trying to explain how much regard the opposite party has for the High Court and its Judges. He has made a statement on personal knowledge in paragraph 12 of his counter affidavit in the writ petition, from the record of which the present contempt petition arises. He says as follows: In fact the deponent has always made a concerted and all out effort to maintain the dignity and vanity of the Court as well as the judiciary as a whole. (Emphasis by Court). 110. Before the High Court examines this statement it is difficult to ignore that the opposite party as a judicial Officer one of the senior-most in the State otherwise a Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrancer from amongst the ranks of the District Judges, though on deputation with the State Government, had not ceased to be a judge. Judges when they write their judgments, or when they speak, or write, whatever be the forum, are to be careful in what they express and formal in whit they writ e. The formality of expression by a Judge is an obligation and the more educated a person Is there Is more responsibility in making precise expressions especially at the Bar of the Court; whether he is Judge or lawyer. 111. 111. The opposite party says that "he has always made concerted and all out efforts to maintain the vanity of the Hon'ble Court at well as the judiciary as a whole. 112. This expression, which no one has suggested to the opposite party, he chose to make on his own. Does he know what the word "vanity" means? Let the dictionary unfold the meaning of this word. 113. Standard dictionaries give the following meanings: VANITY CHAMBERS 20TH CENTURY THESAURUS 1986 EDITION: In affection, airs, arrogance, bigheadedness, conceit, conceitedness, egotism, emptiness frivolity, fruitlessness, fame futility, hollowness, idleness. Inanity, narcissism, Ostentation, peacockery, pointlessness, pretension, pride, self-admiration, self-conceit, self-love, self-satisfaction, swollen-headedness, triviality, unreality, insubstantiality, uselessness, vainglory, worthlessness, antonyms modesty, worth. THE NEW LEXICON WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE DELUXE ENCYCLOPEDIC EDITION: In the fact or quality of being vain, something of no real worth, a source of self-satisfaction. THE RANDOM HOUSE WC NONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE COLLEGE EDITION: In 1.excessive pride in cue's appearance, qualities, achievements, etc. conceit 2. an instance or display of this 3. Something about which one is vain. 4. Lack of real value; triviality or winglessness: the vanity of selfish life. 5. Something worthless, trivial or particles vanities, adj.-Syn I. egotism ostentation See pride-Ant. I. humility. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED, VOLUME III: 1. a. Something that is empty, vain, or valueness; something idle, objectless, or unprofitable the powerlessness of man before the blind hurry of the universe from-1-to Bertrand Russell (sic) or unprofitable activity; blind frittering away of time c. the quality of being vain or empty: hollowness, worthlessness (knew the of her own attainments G.B. Shaw) 2. a exaggerated self-love: inflated pride in oneself or in one's appearance, attainments, performance, possessions, VAINGLORY (Love of the good opinion of others (which we may call) is a desire which man shares with many animals Bertand Russell)(the epitome of maleness with all its and self importance Carl Ven Vechten)(this wounded-turned and turned upon itself J.C. Powys) b. an instance or example of such vanity : something of which one is proud or which exhibits his self-love (one of his hidden vanities was to be the first man on the subscription paper with the largest donation W.A. White) 3. The ostentation of fashion, wealth or power regarded as an occasion of empty pride or a vain show (takes for granted. The ostentation of fashion, wealth or power regarded as an occasion of empty pride or a vain show (takes for granted. AH the privileges and appurtenances of wealth, and there emerges the 16 years old boy caught up in vanities Gene Baro). 114. The synonyms which follow the word vanity read as terms of abuse. It implies that the opposite party suffers the High Court. A layman reading this statement of the opposite party, which statement has travelled through the secretariat of the State Government, the Bar of the Court, the lawyers of the opposite party and the lawyers of the Petitioner and' the registry of the High Court as composed of other judicial officers and clerks, the impression conveyed from this statement is that the opposite party suffers the excessive pride of the High Court which is without significance, without value, without importance or that he High Court is archaic, senseless, foolish or Irrelevant, unimportant, trivial, trifling, nugatory, egotistical. 115. The opposite party clearly did not weigh hit words before printing them in his counter affidavit. 116. There may be another side to it which the Court can consider. It is possible that the opposite party never knew what he was saying, that the opposite party by mistake used the wrong word, that the opposite party did not consult the dictionary before using this description for the High Court, that the opposite party does not understand the language in which he chore to express himself. All these possibilities can be considered by this Court. 117. This Court would have understood that mistakes happen and that such mistakes' can be rectified in a statement which may have been wrongly or inadvertently made but can be retracted, under the very opposite of the quality which the opposite party has used, "vanity". The antonym is humility. It needs humility to realise a mistake, it needs humility to retract a wrong expression, it is humility to seek forgiveness, for anyone who seeks forgiveness those who consider it also forgive. On a matter relating to seeking forgiveness the Supreme Court has gone into the question that there is a time to do it. But this apart one has to seek it to receive it. Now let the record be seen. 118. The opposite party cannot say that be was not given an opportunity to realise his mistake. On a matter relating to seeking forgiveness the Supreme Court has gone into the question that there is a time to do it. But this apart one has to seek it to receive it. Now let the record be seen. 118. The opposite party cannot say that be was not given an opportunity to realise his mistake. The Court granted him an opportunity and at every given time and stage of the proceedings. The senior counsel sought indulgence on his behalf so that the opposite party could rind would ponder over the state of his record and the expressions made by him, whether in the writ petition or in this contempt matter. No merits of the case would have been affected which if he had retracted the statements and regretted for having made them, which if they continue to lie on record, shall play havoc as a bad precedent to judicial officers subordinate to the High Court under the' Constitution for the judicial administration of justice. Towards the close when the defence of the opposite party had been concluded in these proceedings, and before augments in rejoinder on behalf of the Petitioner bead learned Counsel far the opposite party sought an indulgence from the Court that certain statements which are on record, it would have been better, to put it mildly, If they had not been made. 119. Learned Counsel who appeared for the opposite party is one of the most respected and senior members of the Bar of this Court and the State. He may have made this request on his initiative and he was totally conscious of the fact that the request which was made should be made at the earliest opportunity' but was being volunteered after the defence was over. But, a hearing of the case is a dialogue of defence and the perspective emerge only when the record seen in depth no matter which case it is. The Court granted the indulgence as it was embarrassed to ignore it more so when made by one of the most respected senior counsel at the Bar, who had rightly and appropriately considered permitting his client to think over the matter while he could. And, this was not all. The Court granted the indulgence as it was embarrassed to ignore it more so when made by one of the most respected senior counsel at the Bar, who had rightly and appropriately considered permitting his client to think over the matter while he could. And, this was not all. The Court also observed in it order, while acceding to the request of the opposite party's Senior Advocate that "the doors of this Court will always be open to consider any request of retraction or apology, Order of the Court dated 26 July 1991; So, it is not that the opposite party was without the giant of an indulgence or an opportunity to retract whatever according to the conscience, he said on record of this very case, was offensive and insulting to the status and dignity of the Court whose function is administration of justice under the sanction of the Constitution of India. The opposite party chose to permit the hearing of the case to conclude. Not only that, when the matter was being closed for hearing on 22 August, 1991 he had another occasion to regret any expression which he had made. He did not seize the opportunity: this was the day when the original record of the writ petition was made available to the Court. 120. The opposite party by vocation has been a judicial officer for the-best part of his adult' life. Thus, he needs no counsel on what the attributes of a Court, or a Superior Court of Record, are. Long judicial experience should also guide the opposite party on what he ought not and ought to express on or about the High Court. A long spell at the secretarial and on deputation postings should not have permitted the opposite party to forget that he remained a judicial officer subordinate to the High Court, or to forget that he was obliged to carry out the directions of the Court to the letter and not make counter or be party to contrary directions. The opposite party acted contrary to the directions of the High Court and then made disparaging and indignant remarks against the High Court and its Judges. The opposite party would thus be liable to be considered for an action for contempt--criminal contempt, which he has himself mentioned. The opposite party acted contrary to the directions of the High Court and then made disparaging and indignant remarks against the High Court and its Judges. The opposite party would thus be liable to be considered for an action for contempt--criminal contempt, which he has himself mentioned. Any division of this Court, a Superior Court of Record, can take cognizance of, and initiate proceedings on, a contemptuous situation and consequential action, n. matter whether it is civil or criminal contempt. To initiate action of criminal contempt, not only the Advocate General but the High Court suo motu can also Initiate action. The opposite party is answerable to the High Court on an action of criminal contempt. 121. But the opposite party is a High Court Judge today of that very Court whose directions he belittled as a Legal Remembrancer and Judicial Secretary: he has become one of the Judges of this High Court whose 'vanitys he earlier claimed to have satisfied to the best of his ability. 122. Nothing which the opposite party may have done or said, however, was done during his tenure as a Judge of a Superior Court of Record-in which case, no proceedings in contempt would lie. Shri Harish Chandra Mishra and Others Vs. The Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Ali Ahmed, AIR 1986 Patna 65. The conduct of the opposite party under consideration took place during his tenure as a District and Sessions Judge, on deputation. The opposite party did not cease, then, to be a judge of a Court subordinate to the High Court. As all the actions of the opposite party are not connected with nor anything to do with his actions In administering justice as a Judge of the High Court, but that of a subordinate court, his actions are answerable to this Superior Court. 123. Let the record of this matter be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice. The record shall be the decisions of the High Court of its Administrative Committee when it passed resolutions to give a tenure to the Principal Judge. Family Court (re Mr. K.G. Rastegi H.J.S.) which tenure the opposite party would not permit to be kept and justified his actions in the pleadings and submissions of this contempt case (Contempt. No. 508 of 1990) by saying that the decision of the Court in administration, not being a judicial verdict, could surfer avoidance. Family Court (re Mr. K.G. Rastegi H.J.S.) which tenure the opposite party would not permit to be kept and justified his actions in the pleadings and submissions of this contempt case (Contempt. No. 508 of 1990) by saying that the decision of the Court in administration, not being a judicial verdict, could surfer avoidance. The opposite party was not prepared to accept the High Court as judicial authority in the administration of justice. Thereafter, in explaining his defence, the opposite party ridiculed the Court as an Institution whose 'vanity' he indulged in satisfying this; he said in his sworn statement in his counter affidavit in writ Petition No. 12782 of 1990 : Sri K.G. Rastogi v. State of U.P. and Ors. in paragraph 12 of his counter affidavit. The opposite party has ignored a caution observed by the Supreme Court (Reference order dated March 19, 1991) in SLP No. 375 of 1990) that the decision or the High Court in administration was liable to be enforced. In every aspect, the opposite party not only attempted to, but his intention is on record, by which he ridiculed the High Court in its judicial function of the administration of justice. 124. The opposite party, thus, set a bid precedent for all future Judicial Secreatry and Legal Remembrancers in this State, The opposite party was deputed by the High Court to act as a solicitor to the State of Uttar Pradesh, but. he wag subservient to the High Court as a judicial officer He should have~-and all future persons in bit position should -remember the following observation of a great Statesman And Chief Minister of that State, the Hon'ble Govid Ballah Pant. The occasion, also was apt 1948 ALJ 117 (JS) being the amalgamation of the Court of Chief Judicial Commissioner and the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The Premier said that Government was accused of encroaching upon the independence of justice. That idea, be said, was never in their mind. They wanted justice to be free; he wanted them to fake a charitable view of their conduct. The Premier said that Government was accused of encroaching upon the independence of justice. That idea, be said, was never in their mind. They wanted justice to be free; he wanted them to fake a charitable view of their conduct. He appealed to them not to look to their faults but to have a full appreciation of the difficulties which we have before us and I ask you to join hands in building this free India...The Premier realised that the existence of a well ordered civilized society depended on an able impartial and independent judiciary. There was, he reiterated, no desire on the part of the Executive to interfere with the work of the Judiciary On his part, the Premier said, he wanted to be under the thumb of the Judiciary So long as he was Premier, he wanted that the Executive should have full respect and awe for the Chief Justice and the Judges of the High Court. 125. As in the above instance, key to rectifying the situation gracefully lies In an apology. The opposite party, at the relevant time was a judicial officer subordinate to the High Court in administration, yet he misguided himself to judge the High Court. The controversy thus created is unpleasant. and a damaging example for the judicial officers of the State The key to rectifying the situation is in the hands of the opposite party An apology could be the end of the matter. 126. This Court, on 26 July 1991, adjourned the matter only to enable the opposite party to ponder over it and apologies. The opposite party did not, and, thus, invited these comments. 127. The question may arise in the minds of some: why now say anything at all? It is true that a hundred years from today it will he unimportant that one Krishan Gopal Rastogi. H.J.S., a District Judge did not keep his full term as a Presiding Officer as a Principal Judge Family Court; a term given to him by the High Court. But, this small Issue will remain fundamental to the dignity, status and respect which judicial officers ought to have for the High Court. H.J.S., a District Judge did not keep his full term as a Presiding Officer as a Principal Judge Family Court; a term given to him by the High Court. But, this small Issue will remain fundamental to the dignity, status and respect which judicial officers ought to have for the High Court. It will go into the annals of this Superior Court of Record that a judicial officer, acting as a Judicial Secretary and Legal Remembrance permitted and then justified actions against the decisions of the High Court in the administration of justice. In judging this action to be in contempt, this Court has decided strictly on the record and the pleadings in a Court of Record. The Court has guided itself on binding precedents of the highest Court acid the rule of state devises cannot be ignored. It would have made no difference in a Court of Record if this decision were given a hundred years from today in 2094; the academics would have been the same, unless the concept of a Court of record as enshrined In the Constitution, were to be eroded. 128. An issue, remaining on the records, must be resolved. 129. It must be admitted that the pressure on this Court to deliver this decision earlier was equal to that not to deliver it at all but to deliver this opinion earlier may have harmed the opposite party He was within an ace of a judgeship of the High Court. The intention of the Court was not fast he must receive any personal harm; indeed, he must receive whatever is rightfully due to him. But, issues never abate when a Court of Record is itself threatened. It is not this Court, but the Court in administration and the Court as a whole which the Supreme Court referred to in Barada Kant Misra's case as "the judicial parametrix of administration of a High Court." What the opposite party, thus, has said or done, rightly or wrongly, is not the issue, but what is on record, cannot be rubbed out. 130. Any Legal Remembrancer must now accept the High Court as the Constitution has structured it, and be warned not to rely on a faulty precedent which will bring him into a position of contempt of Court--perhaps even of criminal contempt The concept should be clear and the warning explicit. 131. 130. Any Legal Remembrancer must now accept the High Court as the Constitution has structured it, and be warned not to rely on a faulty precedent which will bring him into a position of contempt of Court--perhaps even of criminal contempt The concept should be clear and the warning explicit. 131. Thus, as a prima facie contempt has been made out, the report to the High Court on an action for contempt succeeds. 132. While fully aware of the extent of action the law permits in this case, this Court is also fully aware that the opposite party has now become a Judge of the High Court himself, and to proceed against a Judge for contempt could cause the Court embarrassment. The opposite party is thus, now protected to a certain extent by the very Court, the authority of which he had taken it upon himself to question. 133. It has also become a possibility that he may himself become a member of the Administrative Committee of Judges and have the opportunity to see from the Committee's point of view, what a decision to simply ignore its decisions may mean. 134. Should the opposite party feel that an apology is due, that would gracefully set the matter ac rest. Let his affidavit be placed in the hands of the Hoa'ble the Chief Justice. Should the Hon'ble the Chief Justice find the contents of the affidavit a simple apology, then, let nothing be done, and this older and the affidavit which may come, which it may within one month, be on record and the proceedings be consigned, as being understood that the opposite party has redressed the situation with grace. 135. But, if the opposite party has reservations on this, he may indicate nothing, and present his alternate defence in whatever forum the Hon'ble trio Chief Justice after waiting for one month to receive an apology, should it be forthcoming, may decide is appropriate to lay this matter at rest, with dignity. 136. A copy of this decision may be forwarded to the present incumbent In the office as Legal Remembrancer and Judicial Secretary to the Government of (U.P with the firm warning that it should be kept in mind and brought to the attention of all future incumbents, so tint such contempt of this Court in its administrative role may be avoided in the future.