JUDGMENT : G.D. Kamat, J. 1. This appeal challenges the award dated 31.3.1989, made in Claim Petition No. 10 of 1986. The claim petition was instituted by Sushila V. Hirve, present respondent No. 1, who was a young girl anywhere about seven years old at the time of the accident. The story of the accident is that on 28.10.1985, she got out of the school at about 18 hours and came in the open and while waiting for her brother to come out from the school, a truck bearing registration No. MWV 8577 driven and owned by the appellant came in a reverse and collided against her, as a result of which Sushila suffered injury to her left leg. 2. The Tribunal, based on the evidence led, came to a clear-cut finding that the appellant was negligent while reversing his truck, as a result of which Sushila suffered fracture injury to the ankle of her left foot. Upon consideration that Sushila was required to be hospitalised for surgical intervention, etc., by way of compensation, a sum of Rs. 60,000/- was awarded in her favour with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of claim petition till complete satisfaction and costs of Rs. 2,500/-. 3. The compensation awarded was directed to be paid by the appellant only and the respondent No. 2, insurance company, was absolved on the ground that insurance cover was not in force as the cheque presented by the appellant to the insurer for renewal of the policy covering the truck in question had bounced. The Tribunal also came to hold that upon bouncing of the cheque the insurer had informed the registering authority that the appellant's truck is not covered by an insurance policy. 4. The grievance in the present appeal is that regard being had to Section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, respondent No. 2, the insurer, could not have been exonerated inasmuch as the insurer had issued cover note upon acceptance of the cheque. Relying upon Section 96 of the old Act, it was urged that as long the insurer had not cancelled the cover note by notifying the appellant insured personally, the contract of insurance was subsisting, and, therefore, the insurance company is liable to indemnify. Relying upon Section 96 of the old Act, it was urged that as long the insurer had not cancelled the cover note by notifying the appellant insured personally, the contract of insurance was subsisting, and, therefore, the insurance company is liable to indemnify. The other grievance made in the appeal is that the compensation awarded is excessive and in any event there is no justification for grant of compensation of Rs. 25,000/- on two subheads which are in fact duplication of each other. 5. Coming to the first grievance it must be mentioned that the fact that the cheque had bounced is not disputed by the appellant. The second aspect is that the appellant has not disputed the evidence tendered on behalf of the respondent No. 2, insurer, that the registering authority was notified. The sole question is whether in the absence of notice to the insured, the insurance company is yet to be held liable to indemnify the insured. In our view, not much effort is necessary to answer this question and the learned Counsel for the respondent are right when they point out that this position is no longer res Integra as held in the decision of the Supreme Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ayeb Mohammed, 1991 ACJ 650 (SC) In a short judgment, the Supreme Court held upon granting special leave as sought for by the insurance company there, that the High Court of Delhi was in error in making the insurers liable to pay the compensation of Rs. 15,000/- when the cheque forwarded by the insured to get the policy of insurance renewed, had bounced. It was also found that insurer had issued notice to the registering authority that the cheque had bounced and the liability had ceased. While viewing the contention that notice of cancellation had not been served on the insured, the Supreme Court held that absence of notice to the insured will make no difference, because, at any rate, there is a presumption that the insured knew the circumstances in which his cheque had bounced. In our view, the present case is fairly covered within the ratio of this judgment. It is indeed true that Mr. In our view, the present case is fairly covered within the ratio of this judgment. It is indeed true that Mr. S.D. Lotlikar, learned Counsel for the appellant, made an attempt to distinguish the facts of that case by saying that the claim had been made there by the insured and not by a third person. We have already elaborated the facts from the decision. In our view, it is not possible to make any distinction whether the claim is made by the third party or by the insured. The result is there is no substance in the first grievance. 6. We now come to the second grievance. The Tribunal in the impugned award granted by way of special damages for meeting hospital expenses, travelling, medicines, etc., a sum of Rs. 1,500/-. The Tribunal thereafter granted a sum of Rs. 25,000/- on the grounds that Sushila suffered pain and shock and a further sum of Rs. 25,000/- was given on the ground that Sushila suffered inconvenience and discomfort. In our view, there is enough justification for the learned Counsel for the appellant to contend that the second compensation of Rs. 25,000/- on the grounds of inconvenience and discomfort is not justified as it has already been included in the subhead of pain, suffering and shock and for which, in our view, a reasonable compensation has been given. 7. Mr. Lotlikar then pointed out that having regard to the medical evidence tendered by Dr. Anil J. Sardesai, AW 4, it is clear that Sushila did not suffer any permanent disability, though indeed she had suffered compound fracture of talus bone, i.e., ankle bone and of calcareous and has an injury on the ankle of the size 3" x 3". When Sushila was examined before the Tribunal, the Tribunal made a note while recording her evidence that the left foot of the witness near ankle is slightly crooked or twisted. (This is found at page 37 of the paperbook). There is no difficulty in accepting the medical evidence that there is no permanent disability but it is difficult to brush aside the observation of the Tribunal when it found for itself that the left ankle appeared to be crooked to the naked eye. Admittedly, Sushila is a young girl and probably she has to go with such a scar throughout her life. Admittedly, Sushila is a young girl and probably she has to go with such a scar throughout her life. Though there is nothing to indicate how big is the deformity, the fact remains that there is some visual deformity in the left leg. This being so, in our opinion, she will have to be compensated by another sum of Rs. 10,000/-for that deformity. 8. We have already held earlier that in the absence of contract of insurance, respondent No. 2 has been rightly absolved in the matter and this finding will have to be maintained. During the course of the hearing it transpires that the appellant is a resident of Bombay and we are told that presently he is not even amenable to his Counsel in Goa. A great doubt has indeed crept in our minds whether young Sushila will possibly get the award satisfied in her favour from the appellant. This being the position, it may be nearly possible that the young victim of the accident will have to go without any compensation and will have to be satisfied with a paper award in her hand. We find, therefore, no difficulty in giving a direction to the respondent No. 2, insurance company, to make an ex gratia payment of Rs. 7,500/- to the respondent No. 1, Sushila, original claimant, with a further direction that it is open to the insurer to recover the said amount from the appellant. This direction for ex gratia payment we made in view of the fact that this is not the first time appellant's trucks had been insured by respondent No. 2, insurance company, but they had also done it in the past, 9. In this view of the matter, appeal partly succeeds. The impugned award dated 31.3.1989 shall stand modified. A sum of Rs. 37,500/- is awarded in favour of the original claimant, respondent No. 1, together with interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum from the date of the claim application till its satisfaction. Costs of Rs. 2,500/- as awarded by the Tribunal maintained. Respondent No. 2, insurance company, is directed to make ex gratia payment of Rs. 7,500/- to the respondent No. 1, original claimant, within eight weeks from today. Parties are, however, left to bear their own costs in this appeal.