JUDGMENT - A.V. SAVANT, J.:-This petition along with the companion matter, being Writ Petition No. 5964 of 1986, was heard on the 7th July, 1994 since both the petitions were tagged on together. The reason seems to be that the landlords in both the premises are common, though the tenant-petitioner is different. Moreover, the facts of both the petitions are more or less identical. The matter was adjourned on the last occasion in order to enable Shri Murthy and Shri Pradhan to prepare the synopsis and the statement of the dates of payment of rent, as was done in Writ Petition No. 5964 of 1986. The synopsis alongwith the statement of dates of payment of rent, which is now produced before me, is taken on record and marked "X" for identification. It must be stated in fairness to Shri Pradhan that he did not dispute the correctness of the said synopsis and the statement of the dates of payment of rent. 2. This is a petition filed by the original defendant/tenant against the judgments and decrees passed by the two courts below decreeing the suit of the respondents-landlords on the ground that the petitioner-tenant was in arrears of rent for a period of more than 6 months and assuming that his case fell under the un-amended provisions of Clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 12 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (for short, the Bombay Rent Act), the tenant had not "regularly" paid or tendered in Court the rent that had fallen due during the pendency of the proceedings. 3. Having heard Shri Murthy and Shri Pradhan, a few facts necessary for the disposal of the petition may be stated as under. The premises are Room No. 3 in a chawl known as Tarabai Nivas, Municipal Lane No. 55, House, No. 128, Kalyan. The premises were let out to the petitioner with effect from 1st August, 1966 at a contractual rent of Rs. 43/-. It appears that the petitioner had given a loan of Rs. 3,225/- to the respondents mother on condition that Rs. 20 per month was to be adjusted towards the repayment of the loan and the balance of Rs. 23/- was to be paid by the petitioner. This seems to be the devise common in both the petitions. 43/-. It appears that the petitioner had given a loan of Rs. 3,225/- to the respondents mother on condition that Rs. 20 per month was to be adjusted towards the repayment of the loan and the balance of Rs. 23/- was to be paid by the petitioner. This seems to be the devise common in both the petitions. The landlady had obviously obtained some money from each of the tenants under the garb that it was a loan. The date of advance of the loan is 17th July, 1966. On the 16th September, 1966 an agreement was executed between the parties under which it was agreed that Rs. 20/- per month would be adjusted towards repayment of loan of Rs. 3,225/-. This agreement is at Exh. 18. It appears that the loan amount was adjusted by December, 1979. There is some dispute about the dates on which the rent was paid and/or tendered immediately thereafter. This is understandable because of some confusion relating to the exact mode of payment after the loan of Rs. 3,225 was adjusted. 4. On the 10th June, 1981 money order for Rs. 184/- was sent by the petitioner and the M.O. Coupon is at Exh. 38. This money order was refused by the respondent. Subsequently, money orders were sent, in respect of which the coupons are at Exhs. 39, 40 and 41. They are all refused by the respondent. 5. On the 2nd November, 1981 the respondent issued a demand notice under section 12(2) of the Rent Act demanding arrears of rent from January, 1980 to July, 1980 totalling to Rs. 135/- and for the period August, 1980 to October, 1981 totalling to Rs. 645/-. Thus, a total amount of Rs. 780/- was demanded under the notice dated 2nd November, 1981 - Exh. 19. The petitioner gave his reply on 23rd November, 1981, which is at Exh. 20, contending that the money orders sent earlier were wrongly refused by the respondent. 6. On the 24th November, 1981 i.e. within 30 days of the date of receipt of the Notice - Exh. 19, the petitioner filed Misc. Application No. 104 of 1981 for fixation of standard rent of the suit premises. Soon thereafter, i.e. to say on the 16th December, 1981 the respondent filed the suit for eviction, being Civil Suit No. 563 of 1981. 19, the petitioner filed Misc. Application No. 104 of 1981 for fixation of standard rent of the suit premises. Soon thereafter, i.e. to say on the 16th December, 1981 the respondent filed the suit for eviction, being Civil Suit No. 563 of 1981. The grounds alleged were : (i) wilful default; (ii) carrying out permanent construction; and that (iii) the petitioner had committed an act contrary to the provisions of section 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act. I am not concerned with the other two grounds, excepting the ground of default, since both the courts have concurrently found that the respondents have not made out any case on the other two grounds of eviction. 7. On the 2nd March, 1982, the petitioner made a deposit of Rs. 919/- in the trial Court, whereas by that date the arrears of rent payable were only Rs. 909/-. Thus, the petitioner had made an excess deposit of Rs. 10/-. Between 2nd March, 1982 and 23rd February, 1983, the day on which the issues were framed, the petitioner had made 6 deposits (including the deposits made on 2nd March, 1982 and 23rd February, 1983). The statement at Exh. "X" would show that on the date of each of these deposits, the amount due from the petitioner was less than amount deposited by the petitioner. Thus, today there is no dispute before me that the amount deposited by the petitioner was always in excess. On the date on which the issues were framed viz. 23rd February, 1983, as against the arrears of Rs. 1,468/-, deposit of Rs. 1972.80/- was made, resulting in excess deposit of Rs. 504.80. This is clear from Item No. 6-A in the statement at "X" showing the deposits of rent. 8. The suit was decreed on the 11th October, 1983. On this date, the arrears were Rs. 1,812, whereas the deposit by that date was Rs. 2,287/-, resulting in excess deposit of Rs. 475.80. This is clear from Item No. 8 in the statement at "X". 9. Despite the above position, however, the learned trial Judge by his judgment and decree dated 11th October, 1983 decreed the suit of the respondents on an erroneous construction of the provisions of section 12(3) of the Rent Act. 10. Being aggrieved by the said Judgment Decree, the petitioner preferred an appeal, being Civil Appeal No. 450 of 1983. 9. Despite the above position, however, the learned trial Judge by his judgment and decree dated 11th October, 1983 decreed the suit of the respondents on an erroneous construction of the provisions of section 12(3) of the Rent Act. 10. Being aggrieved by the said Judgment Decree, the petitioner preferred an appeal, being Civil Appeal No. 450 of 1983. Pending the appeal also, the petitioner went on making deposits, as is clear from Items 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the statement at "X". When the appeal was dismissed on 27th October, 1986, as against the arrears of Rs. 3,432/-, the petitioner had deposited Rs. 3,677 resulting in excess deposit of Rs. 245/-. The statement at "X" further shows that even thereafter the petitioner had been depositing the rent in advance and the deposits are in excess than the amount due. 11. The appeal Court, however, on a wholly erroneous construction of section 12(3)(b) of the Rent Act dismissed the appeal erroneously relying upon the judgment of this Court, reported in 16, Bombay Rent Cases, 1986, where it was observed by the learned Single Judge that if a tenant had not applied for interim order in his application for fixation of standard rent, he alone was to be blamed. However, in my view, the said observations cannot be construed de hors the facts of the case which shows that at all the relevant times, it was the petitioner who was depositing the amount in excess of the amount due from him. 12. Mr. Murthy for the petitioner has invited my attention to the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of (Mohan Laxman Hede v. Noormohamed Adam Shaikh)1, reported in A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1111. After having considered the earlier Supreme Court decision in the case of (Mranalini Shah v. Bapalal Mohanlal Shah)2, reported in A.I.R. 1980, Supreme Court, 954, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that if the tenant had deposited the rent with reasonable punctuality, he can be said to have deposited the rent regularly as contemplated by Clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 12 of the Bombay Rent Act. It was held in the case of Mohan Laxman Hede that the courts below were in error in taking the view that exact or mathematical punctuality was required in the deposit of rent by tenant to take advantage of the provisions of section 12(3(b) of the Rent Act. Even in the case Mranalini Shah v. Bapalal Shah, reported in A.I.R. 1980, S.C. 954, what the Supreme Court has observed has been reproduced in para 6 of the judgment in Mohan Laxman Hedes case, at page 1114 of A.I.R. 1988 S.C. It has been observed that the word regularly in Clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 12 has a significance of its own and it enjoins a payment or tender characterised by reasonable punctuality i.e. to say made at regular times or intervals. The regularity contemplated may not be a punctuality, of clock-wise precision and exactitude, but it must reasonably conform with substantial proximity to the sequence of times or intervals at which the rent falls due. 13. I need not elaborate on this point further because, in my view, the chart at Exh. X, summarised by me above, clearly shows that the tenant had not only deposited the amount regularly but at all relevant times, he had deposited the amount in excess of what he was required to deposit. The tenant was thus never in arrears of rent after the initiation of the proceedings for fixation of standard rent. As stated earlier he had initiated the proceedings within the statutory period of 30 days from the date of receipt of notice. The judgements and decrees passed by the two courts below are, therefore, wholly erroneous in law and are contrary to the admitted position regarding the payment made by the tenant. The said two decisions are clearly contrary to the ratio of the Supreme Court decisions in Mohan Hedes, case and Mranalini Shahs, case referred to above. In my view, the tenant is clearly entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 12 of the Rent Act and no decree for eviction can be passed against him on the ground of arrears of rent in the present case. 14. It must, however, be mentioned in fairness to Shri Pradhan that he tried to urge an additional contention based on the alleged act of subsequent subletting. 14. It must, however, be mentioned in fairness to Shri Pradhan that he tried to urge an additional contention based on the alleged act of subsequent subletting. Unfortunately, there are no pleadings on record in that behalf. Subletting was not one of the grounds on which eviction was sought in the courts below. The petition which has been pending in this Court since 1986 has not been amended. Shri Pradhan no doubt contended that the Supreme Court has all along taken a view that in proceedings for reasonable and bona fide requirement or for eviction on certain grounds under the Rent Act, if subsequent events having a bearing on that ground viz. the ground alleged in the suit, come to the notice of Court during the pendency of the proceedings, such subsequent events be taken into account so that the relief can be moulded in the light of the subsequent events. He tried to place reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of (Pasupaleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders)3, reported in A.I.R. 1975, S.C. 1409. There can be no doubt about the proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court. However, in my view, the ratio of the said decision can have no application to the facts of the present case. It is one thing to say that if a ground of default is alleged in the original proceedings, a subsequent event having a bearing on that ground can be taken into account as was done in the case of Pasupuleti Venkateshwarlu. However, in my view, it is quite a different proposition to contend that a ground not alleged in any of the two courts or even in the petition can be taken into consideration for the first time during the hearing of a writ petition without there being any pleadings or evidence on record. What is alleged before me is, only an oral submission. It is however, stated that in the application for fixation of this petition for hearing - early, some reference to it was made, in the affidavit filed by the respondents - landlords. I do not think, in the facts of the present case, the ratio of the decision in the case of Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu can have any application. 15. In the result, the petitioner is entitled to succeed. I do not think, in the facts of the present case, the ratio of the decision in the case of Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu can have any application. 15. In the result, the petitioner is entitled to succeed. He is entitled to the protection of the provisions of section 12(3)(b) of the Rent Act. The judgments and decrees passed by the two courts below are quashed and set aside and the suit filed by the respondents - landlords is hereby dismissed with no orders as to costs. Rule made absolutely accordingly. Petition succeeded. *****