JUDGMENT 1. Although, the question involved in this writ application relating to appointment on compassionate grounds had been considered even very recently both by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the various High Courts, it is apparent that certain stay arose still exist, which require further consideration. 2. The petitioner's father died while serving as a teacher in a local primary school. On his death, his elder son, namely, the petitioner's elder brother, was appointed as a teacher in his place on 22nd May, 1987, on compassionate grounds. While serving in the said school, the petitioner's elder brother also died a premature death on 25th October, 1993, just about six years after his appointment. Being a bachelor, the petitioner's elder brother did not leave behind any wife or children, but his widowed mother and the petitioner, as his only near relations. 3. According to the petitioner, both the petitioner's widowed mother and the petitioner were wholly dependent on the income, firstly of the petitioner's father, and, thereafter, of the petitioner's elder brother, for their very existence, as they were the sole bread-earners of the family. 4. It is the petitioner's case that after the death of his elder brother, his mother applied to the Chairman, Ad hoc Committee, Birbhum District Primary School Council, to appoint the petitioner in place of his elder brother, also on compassionate grounds, since the purpose for which such appointment had been given to the petitioner's elder brother remained unfulfilled as a result of his untimely death. 5. Not having received any response from the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, the petitioner has moved this writ application for a direction upon the Chairman, Ad hoc Committee, Birbhum District Primary School Council, to appoint the petitioner as a primary school teacher in place of his late elder brother, also on compassionate grounds. 6. Appearing in support of the writ petition, Mr. L.C. Bihani contended that in view of the various Government Circulars which had been considered and interpretated by the Supreme Court and the other High Courts, the concerned authorities were bound to provide the petitioner with employment on compassionate grounds in place of his elder brother. 7. Mr. Bihani urged that the intention both of the Central Government and the State Government in making appointments on compassionate grounds is to provide immediate economic assistance to the family of a person who dies in service. Mr. 7. Mr. Bihani urged that the intention both of the Central Government and the State Government in making appointments on compassionate grounds is to provide immediate economic assistance to the family of a person who dies in service. Mr. Bihani urged that it was with such object in view that the petitioner's elder brother was given appointment on compassionate grounds on the death of the petitioner's father. On the untimely death of the petitioner's elder brother, the only bread-earner of the family was removed, and the family was once again faced with the economic crisis that it had been faced with at the time of the death of the petitioner's father. 8. Mr. Bihani urged that having regard to the different Government Circulars on the question of appointment on compassionate grounds and the various decisions of the Supreme Court and the different High Courts, the concerned authorities should have provided employment to the petitioner on compassionate grounds on the death of his elder brother, since the very object with which the petitioner's elder brother bad been appointed remained unfulfilled. 9. In support of his aforesaid contention Mr. Bihani firstly referred to the decision of the. Supreme Court in the case of (1) Smt. Sushma Gosain & Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., reported in AIR 1989 SC at Page 1967, wherein it was emphasised that the purpose of providing appointment on compassionate grounds was to mitigate the hardship faced by a family due to the death of the sale bread-earner and that such appointment should, therefore, be made immediately to help the family in distress. Mr. Bihani urged that while making the aforesaid observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not restrict the appointment to be given on compassionate grounds to a particular class of dependents, but referred to the distress in the family as a whole. Mr. Bihani pointed out that the Supreme Court went even to the extent of observing that if no suitable post for appointment was immediately available, then a supernumerary post should be created to accommodate the applicant. 10. Mr. Mr. Bihani pointed out that the Supreme Court went even to the extent of observing that if no suitable post for appointment was immediately available, then a supernumerary post should be created to accommodate the applicant. 10. Mr. Bihani submitted that the aforesaid decision was followed in the case of (2) Smt. Phoolwati v. Union of India and Drs., reported in AIR 1991 SC at Page 49, wherein while referring to Smt. Sushma Gosain's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court directed the Union of India to take immediate steps for employing the second son of the appellant in a suitable post commensurate with his educational qualifications, within one month from the date of the order. 11. Mr. Bihani also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (3) State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. v. Ramesh Kumar Sarma, reported in AIR 1994 SC at Page 845 and the (4) Auditor General of India and Ors. v. G. Ananta Rajeswara Rao, reported in AIR 1994 SC at Page 1521. 12. In the first of the said two cases, the Supreme Court observed that a person whose father died in harness could only claim to be considered for appointment on compassionate grounds, but he did not have any choice to a particular post. In the latter case the Supreme Court while construing the meaning of the term "near relations", observed that appointment on compassionate grounds would not only be confined to a son, daughter or widow but also to a near relative, which expression was vague and undefined. 13. Mr. Bihani urged that while considering as to whether appointment on compassionate grounds amounted to violation of Article 16(2) of the Constitution, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that if the appointments are confined to the son, daughter, or widow of the deceased Government employee who died in harness and who needed immediate appointment on grounds of immediate need of economic assistance, in the event of their being no other earning member in the family to supplement the loss of income from the bread earner to relieve the economic distress of the members of the family, it is unexceptionab1e. 14. Mr. Bihani urged that the Supreme Court had held that appointments made on compassionate grounds are exceptions which do not violate Article 16(2) of the Constitution. 15. Mr. 14. Mr. Bihani urged that the Supreme Court had held that appointments made on compassionate grounds are exceptions which do not violate Article 16(2) of the Constitution. 15. Mr. Bihani urged further that what the Supreme Court had in mind is that while making appointments on compassionate grounds, the concerned authorities are required to consider the immediate need of the family whose sole bread earner died while in service and whose death causes great economic hardship to the members of his family who were dependent on his income for their livelihood. 16. Mr. Bihani also referred to another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (5) Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana and Ors. reported in 1994(2) SCC at page 138, where more or less the same sentiments have been expressed. 17. Referring to two other decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of (0) Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Ramchandra Ambekar (Mrs.) and Another reported in 1994(2) SCC at page 718 and (7) State of Haryana v. Naresh Kumar Bali reported in 1994(4) SCC at page 448, Mr. Bibani submitted that the Supreme Court had in the said cases held that instead of giving directions to the concerned authorities to appoint a family member of the deceased, directions should have been given to the authorities to consider the claim of the person concerned. 18. In support of his aforesaid contentions, Mr. Bihani also referred to three decisions of the Allahabad High Court, namely, (8) Sunil Saxena v. State of U.P. and Ors. reported in FLR 1994(68) at page 283 ; (9) Smt. Malti Devi Malviya and Another v. The Director of Education (Secondary) U.P. and Ors. reported in FLR 1994(68) at page 377 ; and (10) Vinod Kumar v. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in FLR 1994(68) at page 384. 19. In the first of the said three decisions, a learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court was of the view that there could be no question of limitation in making appointments under the Rules relating to appointment on compassionate grounds. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Sushma Gosain's case (supra), the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to appointment on compassionate grounds of attaining majority. 20. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Sushma Gosain's case (supra), the learned Judge held that the petitioner was entitled to appointment on compassionate grounds of attaining majority. 20. In the next case, which incidentally was disposed of on the same day, another learned Judge, of the Allahabad High Court took a different view and held that there should be a definite time limit within which an application for appointment on compassionate grounds should be made. In the opinion of the learned Judge, a period of five years after the death of the employee was sufficient time for making an application for appointment on compassionate grounds. . 21. In the third case, which was decided earliear, another learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court felt that refusal to make appointment on compassionate grounds on technicalities would frustrate the very purpose of making such appointments and would cause a serious miscarriage of justice. 22. Mr. Bihani lastly relied on two other decisions of the Supreme Court in he case of (II) Kumari (Smt.) v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. reported in 1992(2) SCC at Page 223, and (12) Gujarat Steel Tubes Limited v. Its Mazdoor Sabha and Ors. reported in AIR 1980 SC at page 1896, wherein while considering the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that although restraints like availability of alternate remedy hold back the Courts the Courts should not refuse to interfere where glaring injustice demands some positive and affirmative action. 23. Relying on the aforesaid observations made by the Supreme Court, Mr. Bihani urged that technicalities should not be allowed to stand in the way of granting relief, where such relief was in the opinion of the Court required to be given in the interest of justice. 24. Mr. Bihani also contended that the Supreme Court had considered the matter from various angles and had felt that the concept of family and/or near dependant should not be given a restrictive meaning, but should include the members of the family of the deceased employee who were in immediate need of economic assistance owing to the death of the sole bread earner in the family. 25. Mr. 25. Mr. Bihani concluded by submitting that since both the petitioner and his mother were dependent on the income firstly of the petitioner's father, and, thereafter, of his elder brother, there should be no reason for not appointing the petitioner also on compassionate grounds, since the economic crisis faced by the petitioner and his widowed mother at the time of the death of the petitioner's father, resurfaced after the death of the petitioner's elder brother. 26. Opposing the writ application, Mr. A.P. Sircar, learned advocate, submitted that appointment on compassionate grounds was a departure from the normal rules of recruitment and should, therefore, be resorted to strictly in accordance with the rules providing for such appointment. Mr. Sircar urged that the whole object of granting appointment on compassionate grounds is to enable the family or the deceased to tide over the immediate economic crisis caused by the death of the sole bread earner in the family. 27. Mr. Sircar urged that as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Anil Malik v. State of Haryana & Ors. (supra) the object of giving compassionate employment is not to accommodate a member of such family and that the mere death of an employee in harness does not entitle his family to such relief. Mr. Sircar pointed out that the Supreme Court had held that the concerned authority has to examine the financial condition of the family of the deceased and only after it is satisfied that the family will not be able to meet the immediate economic crisis caused by the death of the employee, is such a job to be Offered to an eligible member of the family. 28 Mr. Sircar pointed out that in the said case the Supreme Court had also observed that appointment on compassionate grounds could not be made after the lapse of a reasonable period and that such appointment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in the future, since its object is to enable the family of the deceased to get over the immediate financial crisis faced by it at the time of the death of the sole bread earner in the family. 29. Mr. 29. Mr. Sircar relied to a great extent on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Smt. Malti Devi Malviya (supra), where the learned Judge had laid down a proposition that an application for appointment on compassionate grounds should not be made beyond a period of 5 years from the death of the bread earner in the family. 30. Mr. Sircar urged that the intention of even employment on compassionate grounds is to provide immediate assistance to the members of the family of the deceased, which is left without any bread earner, but there is no intention to create a rule of succession. 31. Mr. Sircar urged that since the elder brother of the petitioner had been provided with employment on compassionate grounds on the death of their late father, the purpose of giving appointment on compassionate grounds had been exhausted and having regard to the definition of "ward" in Circular No. 457-Edn (P)/4A-50/83 dated 12th October, 1987, issued by the Education Department, Primary Branch. Government of West Bengal, except for a son a dependent daughter, widow or husband of the deceased, no other person would be entitled to ask for appointment on compassionate grounds. 32. Mr. Sircar submitted that since the petitioners elder brother had died a bachelor, and had not left behind any person who came within the definition of the term "ward" as defined in the aforesaid Circular, it was not open to the petitioner to claim appointment on compassionate grounds on the death of his elder brother. 33. Mr. Sircar submitted that in view of the above, the writ application was liable to be dismissed, since the petitioner did not come within the definition of the term "ward", as mentioned in the aforesaid Circular. 34. In reply to Mr. Sircar's submissions, Mr. Bihani pointed out that Smt. Malli Devi Malviya's case has to be considered in the light of the other judgments referred to by him and could not be considered in isolation, without taking into consideration the other decisions in this regard. 35. Mr. Bihani urged that upon an ultimate analysis of the various judgments cited in the case, the respondents were under an obligation to provide the petitioner with appointment on compassionate grounds in place of his elder brother. 36. 35. Mr. Bihani urged that upon an ultimate analysis of the various judgments cited in the case, the respondents were under an obligation to provide the petitioner with appointment on compassionate grounds in place of his elder brother. 36. On an analysis of the policy, both of the Central Government and the State Governments, to provide immediate economic assistance to a family of a deceased employee in the form of appointment of a member on compassionate grounds, it must be held that such appointments cannot follow as a matter of course on the death of the concerned employee, but are dependent on several factors to be taken into consideration by the concerned authorities before such appointment can be made. The object of making appointments on compassionate grounds is not merely to provide a family member of the deceased employee with a job but to provide a family member of the deceased employee with employment to help the family to tide over the economic crisis caused by the death of the sole bread-earner in the family. 37. In other words, appointment on compassionate grounds cannot be impelled by sympathetic considerations alone, but it would have to be seen whether such appointment could be made in a particular case in accordance with the circumstances and the rules framed in that behalf. 38. Broadly speaking, the following factors will generally have to be taken into consideration by the appointing authority while making an appointment on compassionate grounds, namely: i) whether the deceased was the sole bread earner in his family; ii) Whether the family of the deceased employee is in need of immediate economic assistance to tide over the crisis caused by the death of the said employee; iii) Whether any eligible member of the family of the deceased, as defined in the rules, is available for such appointment on compassionate grounds; iv) 'Whether' the rules relating to appointment on compassionate grounds are to be given a narrow construction and such appointments are to be confined to certain specified members of the family of the deceased only; and v) Whether in a given case, in order to give effect to the intended object; the rules could be relaxed to give appointment to a member of the family of the deceased employee, even if such member did not come within the categories provided for in the rules. 39. 39. The last of the aforesaid factors does not appear to have received much attention in the various decisions cited by the parties and contemplates a situation which is a little different from the run of the mill cases involving appointment on compassionate grounds, 40. For example, since the object of making appointments on compassionate grounds is to provide immediate economic relief to the family of the deceased employee, can it be said, as argued by Mr. Sircar, that on the appointment of a dependent, such power to make appointments on compassionate grounds becomes exhausted and the authority concerned is bereft, of any further authority to make further appointments in respect of another member of the family of the said deceased in unusual circumstances. It may so happen that a member of the family of the deceased who is provided with employment on compassionate grounds also expires soon after his appointment. Since the object of appointing such member is to provide economic assistance to the members of the family of the first deceased employee, would it be legally proper to say that having regard to the definition of the term "ward" in the above-mentioned Circular No. 457-Edn (P) dated 12th October, 1987, the other members of the family of the first deceased employee could not be considered for further appointment on compassionate grounds. 41. In my view, such an interpretation would negate the very object with which such compassionate appointment was made in the first place. Such appointment was made to provide immediate economic assistance not to the immediate family of the appointee but to the family of his predecessor. To apply the definition of the term "ward" in the aforesaid Circular in such a case, will not only be wholly unreasonable and illogical, but, as mentioned hereinbefore, would, defeat the very purpose for which the appointment was made in the first place. 42. In my view, the stand taken by Mr. Sircar is highly technical and carried to an extremity would negate the very object of the Notification dated 12th October. 1987, which is to provide immediate economic assistance to the family of the first deceased employee and not the family of the person who is appointed in his place. 42. In my view, the stand taken by Mr. Sircar is highly technical and carried to an extremity would negate the very object of the Notification dated 12th October. 1987, which is to provide immediate economic assistance to the family of the first deceased employee and not the family of the person who is appointed in his place. In cases of this nature, the concerned authorities will have to act according to the exigencies of the situation in each individual case and any attempt to lay down strait jacketed and inflexible rules may defeat the object with which the policy of making appointment son compassionate grounds was formulated. 43. As far as the other factors are concerned, there can be no controversy that in making appointment on compassionate grounds, it w0uld be necessary to consider the time gap between the death of the employee and the application made, the economic condition of the family of the deceased, and also to see whether he was the only bread earner of the family, since appointment on compassionate grounds is a departure from the normal rules of recruitment and would otherwise be hit by the provisions of Article 16(2), of the Constitution. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of (13) State of Rajasthan v. Chandra Narayan Verma, reported in 1994 (4) SCC at page 752, it is one thing to say that a family member of the deceased is entitled to appointment on compassionate grounds, but it is altogether a different thing to say that his appointment should be made regardless of the rules. It, therefore, follows that appointment on compassionate grounds cannot be made for the mere asking, simply on account of the death of a deceased employee. 44. Another factor which will also have to be taken into consideration is the eligibility of member of the family of the deceased to be considered for appointment. 45. Accordingly, it is upon such consideration that an appointment may ultimately be made by the authorities on compassionate grounds. 46. In the present case, although, I am not inclined to accept the rigid and inflexible interpretation sought to be given by Mr. Sircar to the term "ward" as defined in the aforesaid Circular No. 457-Edn(p) dated 12th. 45. Accordingly, it is upon such consideration that an appointment may ultimately be made by the authorities on compassionate grounds. 46. In the present case, although, I am not inclined to accept the rigid and inflexible interpretation sought to be given by Mr. Sircar to the term "ward" as defined in the aforesaid Circular No. 457-Edn(p) dated 12th. October, 1987, and I am inclined to hold that the same is capable of different interpretations in different situations, I am also not inclined to hold that the petitioner is entitled to appointment on compassionate grounds in place of his elder brother. 47. In the facts of this case, the claim of the petitioner has to be disallowed, inasmuch as the immediate economic crisis faced by the family of the petitioner was mitigated by the appointment of the petitioner's elder brother, who worked for about seven years before he too died an untimely death. 48. In my view, with the appointment of the petitioner's elder brother in place of his father, the object of providing immediate economic assistance to the petitioner's family was achieved and the petitioner cannot claim the same indulgence of appointment on compassionate grounds after so many years of the death of his father. Too long a period has elapsed since his father's death. Had it been that the petitioner's elder brother had died within a few months of his appointment and the petitioner was eligible to be appointed in his place, the position, in my view, would have been different, but the situation has undergone change with the passage of time and the petitioner, who is now an educated adult, cannot also claim the benefit of appointment on compassionate grounds. 49. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ application must fail and is, accordingly, dismissed. 50. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Let a xerox copy or this judgment be made available to the learned advocates of the respective parties on the usual undertaking.