JUDGMENT - Dr. E.S. DA SILVA, J.:---The challenge in this writ petition is the judgment of the Administrative Tribunal dated 10th May, 1990 in Eviction Appeal No. 6 of 1985 which has affirmed the judgment and order of the Rent Controller, Goa North Division, Panaji, dated 23rd April, 1984 in Case No. Rent/122/82. By the aforesaid order the Rent Controller granted an application filed by the respondent No. 1 (hereinafter called the respondent) under section 32(4) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968 (hereinafter called the Act) and directed the petitioners to vacate the suit premises within thirty days from the receipt of the order and hand over peaceful possession of the premises to the respondent. 2. The case of the petitioners is that the petitioner No. 1 is a registered partnership firm and the petitioner No. 2 is one of its partners. The petitioner is a lessee of the respondent in respect of one of the divisions of the building situated at Swami Vivekanand Road, Panaji, consisting of two divisions and which bears Municipal House No. 23 in Ward No. 11 of Panaji City. The said division was leased to the petitioner by the respondent exclusively for residential purpose. On 9-11-1982 the respondent filed an application before the Rent Controller for eviction of the petitioner under section 22(2)(b)(ii) and (c) of the Act on various grounds, namely, on the ground of change of user and acts of damage. The petitioners filed their reply to the application on 4-3-1983. Thereupon on 24-3-1983 the petitioners filed an application to the Rent Controller which is dated 18-3-1983 seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent from January and February, 1983 as well as future rents. On 23rd April 1983 the respondent moved an application before the Rent Controller under section 32(4) of the Act alleging that the petitioners had made default in the payment of rents due for the months of January, February and March, 1983. The petitioners replied to this application by their application dated 18-11-1983. In the meantime the respondent filed his reply to the petitioners application to deposit arrears of rents by his application dated 25-6-1983. In his application to deposit the rents the petitioners had stated that rent for the month of January, 1983 was paid on or about 4--2-1983. The petitioners replied to this application by their application dated 18-11-1983. In the meantime the respondent filed his reply to the petitioners application to deposit arrears of rents by his application dated 25-6-1983. In his application to deposit the rents the petitioners had stated that rent for the month of January, 1983 was paid on or about 4--2-1983. However when the petitioners approached the respondent with the rent of February, 1983 on or about 5th March, 1983 the respondent refused to accept the same. Thereafter as the rent for the month of February, 1983 had been refused the application was made on 24-3-1983 to deposit the rents in respect of both February and January, 1983. The rent of January, 1983 was sought to be paid again inspite of the fact it had already been paid earlier because no receipt has been issued to the petitioners by the respondent in respect of the premises. In reply to the petitioners application to deposit the rent in arrears the respondent stated that the rent for December, 1982 had been paid to him in cash in January, 1983 and rent for January, 1983 had not been paid at all neither the rents for January and February, 1983 offered by the petitioners and refused by him as alleged. The Rent Controller by the impugned order dated 23-4-1984 held that the rents of January and February, 1983 were not paid and as such the petitioners had forfeited their right to contest the proceedings. The Rent Controller further held that the excuse given for non-payment of rents could not be accepted and therefore they were liable to be evicted. The petitioners then approached the administrative Tribunal in appeal wherein several contentions were raised. However the Tribunal by the impugned judgment dated 10th May, 1990 dismissed the petitioners appeal by holding that there was a default in the payment of rents for the months of January and February, 1983 without sufficient cause shown by the petitioners. 3. On behalf of the petitioners, Mr. However the Tribunal by the impugned judgment dated 10th May, 1990 dismissed the petitioners appeal by holding that there was a default in the payment of rents for the months of January and February, 1983 without sufficient cause shown by the petitioners. 3. On behalf of the petitioners, Mr. Rebello, learned Counsel has submitted that both the impugned judgments were delivered by the courts below without any material available on record to show that there has been a persistent or wilful default committed by the petitioners in respect of payment of rents for the months of January and February, 1983, The petitioners had made a case before the Rent Controller that they had paid rent of January, 1983 and taken steps also to pay to the respondent rent of February, 1983 which was refused to be accepted by the respondent. Neither the Rent Controller nor the Tribunal in appeal considered this aspect of the petitioners case and it appears that the impugned orders were passed on the assumption that the power to be exercised by them under section 32(4) of the Act was just a mandatory one without taking into consideration that the petitioners had shown sufficient cause in delaying payment of rents of January and February, 1983. The learned Counsel invited my attention to the petitioners application dated 18-3-1983 which came to be filed by them only on 24-3-1983. It was submitted that in this application the petitioners had stated that after the institution of the application for eviction by the respondent the petitioners had paid to him the rent in respect of the month of December, 1982 by cheque and the rent for the month of January, 1983 was paid in case on or about 4th February, 1983. But when the respondent was approached by the petitioners with the rent for the month of February, 1983 on or about 5th March, 1983 the respondent refused to accept the same on the ground that the proceedings for eviction were pending against the petitioners. In the said application the petitioners had stated that the respondent was not issuing receipts in respect of the payment of rent every month but instead a consolidated receipt for 2, 3, 4 or 5 months together was being passed depending upon the respondents convenience. In the said application the petitioners had stated that the respondent was not issuing receipts in respect of the payment of rent every month but instead a consolidated receipt for 2, 3, 4 or 5 months together was being passed depending upon the respondents convenience. As such no receipt for the payment of rents for the month of December, 1982 and January, 1983 was issued by the respondent and since the respondent had refused to accept the rent in respect of February, 1983 they were constrained to make this application to allow them to deposit the rents in the Court during the pendency of the proceedings. Since in respect of the payment of rent for December, 1982 by cheque there was documentary evidence to show that the rent had been paid but in respect of January, 1983 which has been paid in cash no receipt has been issued by the respondent. The petitioners had no evidence to show the said payment and therefore they prayed that they should be allowed to deposit the rent in respect of the month of January, 1983 also in Court. The learned Counsel also invited my attention to the respondents reply to this application dated 25-6-1983 in which it is contended by the respondent that the rent of December was paid by the petitioners by cash only on 19-1-1983; that no rent was paid by the petitioners to him in respect of the months of January and February, 1983 and that the petitioners application for deposit of rents had been also made beyond time. My attention was also drawn by the learned Counsel to the respondents application under section 34 dated 24-3-1983 and the petitioners reply dated 18-11-1983 wherein the petitioners sought to explain the delay in paying the rents as alleged by the respondent. It was submitted by learned Counsel that the petitioners had filed their application in the month of March, 1983 to deposit rent due on the ground of the respondents refusal to accept rents and/or issue receipts of the rent already paid even before the respondent filed his application under section 32(4) of the Act in the month of April 1983. It was submitted by learned Counsel that the petitioners had filed their application in the month of March, 1983 to deposit rent due on the ground of the respondents refusal to accept rents and/or issue receipts of the rent already paid even before the respondent filed his application under section 32(4) of the Act in the month of April 1983. It was urged by learned Counsel that the Rent Controller while passing his order has grossly misdirected himself on the question as to whether under section 32(4) of the Act the power conferred to the Rent Controller was compelling was compelling him to stop the proceedings or was only an enabling power to do so i.e. whether the power to be exercised by the Rent Controller under section 32(4) of the Act was a mandatory power or a directory one. It was also contended by the learned Counsel that the order of the Tribunal also has overlooked that in the month of December, 1982 the petitioners have alleged although the payment had been made by cheque the respondent did not issue any receipt to them. According to the learned Counsel the expression shall in section 32(4) of the Act has been interpreted by the Court as may. Besides the Tribunal has overlooked that the alleged default was for a short period of two months only i.e. January and February, 1983 as well as the fact that the application for eviction was filed by the respondent not on the ground of non-payment of rents but on a different ground which has nothing to do with any delay in paying the rents. The learned Counsel also urged that nowhere and at no time the respondent has stated that the petitioners have acted in the past in a contumacious manner or their conduct has caused hardship to the respondent by failing to pay rents regularly to him in this respect. The learned Counsel has drawn my attention to the case of (Rogue Antonio Judas Tadeu Caetano Ribeiro v. Angelo Cassiano Nevese Souza and 4 others)1, 1989(2) Goa Law Times 313. The learned Counsel has drawn my attention to the case of (Rogue Antonio Judas Tadeu Caetano Ribeiro v. Angelo Cassiano Nevese Souza and 4 others)1, 1989(2) Goa Law Times 313. This was for the purpose of showing that it was not mandatory for the Rent Controller to stop all further proceedings and to direct the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the leased premises in case of every default on the part of the tenant and that the tenant was entitled to satisfy the Court that circumstances exist in view of which the Court ought not to make an order under sub-section (4) of section 32 against him. Thus the power vested in the Rent Controller as per the said ruling to stop proceedings and direct the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building was just a directory power and not a mandatory one. In the said decision some factors were mentioned which would be relevant for exercising this power namely whether the default was for a short period or for a long period, whether the default is wilful or unintentional, whether the default is stray or persistent, whether payment was made at the earliest opportunity or after cantankerous contest, whether the default was bona fide or to harass the landlord. The learned Counsel urged that applying the test of this ruling it could not be said that in the instant case the petitioners have not made the payment of delayed rent at the earliest opportunity or that this payment was done after cantankerous contest or that the default was a persistent or mala fide meant to harass the respondent and/or even that the default was for a long period. According to the learned Counsel if each of these tests had been considered by the courts below no doubt that the petitioners prayer that the delay should be condoned and respondents application rejected ought to have been allowed . It was urged in this respect that after the service of the notice of eviction proceedings the petitioners had paid the rent of December in the month of January and even prior to the respondent filed his application under section 32(4) of the Act had sought permission of the Controller to deposit the rents due in the month of January and February as well as future rents. Thus, the learned Counsel said, there was no case of cantankerous contest on the part of the petitioners. My attention was drawn by the learned Counsel on another case of (Shri Joao Xavier Pinto v. Shri Oswald J.C. Velho and 2 others)2, 1990(1) Goa Law Times, 116 : 1987(1) Bom.C.R. 113 . This was for the purpose of showing that section 32 has been enacted to protect the interest of the landlord to secure rent from cantankerous tenants who fail to pay or deposit before the Rent Controller or the Appellate or Revisional authorities so that landlords are not driven to file different proceedings for recovery of rents in another forum. Learned Counsel has drawn my attention to one more decision in the case of (Satyavijay Anna Tandel v. Administrative Tribunal of Goa, Daman and Diu)3, 1990(XCII) Bom.L.R. 580. This was for the purpose of showing that section 32(4) of the Act must be resorted to sparingly because its provision is applicable in terrorem to check and correct contumacious conduct on the part of the tenants and that it is applicable in such cases where the tenant despite opportunities being given to him and despite the order to deposit, refuses or neglects to deposit the rent then due in Court. In the said judgment it has been held that if on the date of the application the tenant has deposited all the rent due, there is no question of the Rent Controller passing any further order, virtually evicting a tenant without a trial. Learned Counsel contended that the petitioners are fully covered by this judgment because the petitioners had made their application to deposit the arrears of the alleged rent due even before the respondent filed his application to stop the proceedings for their failure to pay rents for the months of January to March, 1983. Learned Counsel contended that the petitioners are fully covered by this judgment because the petitioners had made their application to deposit the arrears of the alleged rent due even before the respondent filed his application to stop the proceedings for their failure to pay rents for the months of January to March, 1983. Therefore the question of the petitioners showing cause as to why the proceedings should not be stopped on this ground need not subsist because from their own application to deposit the rents it was clear that on the date the respondent has filed his application under section 32(4) of the Act there was no default on the part of the petitioners and only technically it could be said that such default could exist since till that time no order had been passed on the petitioners application to make the deposit of the arrears of rents due. It was therefore contended by the learned Counsel that in this background the order of the Rent Controller and for that matter of the Tribunal also would show that none of the tests which was bound to be applied by them as per the rulings cited while entertaining an application under section 32(4) of the Act were even considered by the courts below. Thus, learned Counsel urged, once the record would show that there could not be said that there was any act on the part of the petitioners which could be held as contumacious or that their conduct would be held as cantankerous there was no reason not to hold that the petitioners had shown sufficient cause for any delay in the payment of rent due. 4. As against this Mr. Usgaoncar, learned Counsel for the respondent, has invited my attention to section 17 of the Act which provides that a receipt should be given for rent paid and reads thus :--- "(1) Every tenant shall pay rent within the time fixed by contract or, in the absence of such contract, by the fifteenth day of the month next following the month for which it is payable. (2) Every tenant who makes a payment of rent or advance to his landlord shall be entitled to obtain forthwith from the landlord or his authorised agent a written receipt for the amount paid to him, signed by the landlord or his authorised agent. (2) Every tenant who makes a payment of rent or advance to his landlord shall be entitled to obtain forthwith from the landlord or his authorised agent a written receipt for the amount paid to him, signed by the landlord or his authorised agent. (3) If the landlord or his authorised agent refuses or neglects to deliver to the tenant a receipt referred to in sub-section (2), or does not accept any rent tendered by a tenant, the tenant shall remit the rent to the landlord by money order after deducting the money order commission and continue to remit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building in the same manner until the landlord signifies by a written notice to the tenant his willingness to accept the rent and deliver a receipt as required by sub-section (2)." The learned Counsel submitted that admittedly the petitioner No. 1 is a partnership firm and the petitioner No. 2 is alleged to be one of its partners. The lease was executed by the respondent with the partnership firm. Being so it was unbelievable that the petitioner No. 2 being its managing partner might have accepted the refusal of the respondent/landlord to issue any receipt to the petitioners after the alleged payment of rents made without any objection or without taking legal steps in this respect. Learned Counsel therefore contended that in such circumstances it was difficult to accept that the respondent was not issuing regularly receipts to the petitioners every month on they paying rent to him as contended by the petitioners. It was urged by the learned Counsel that receipts are necessarily required for everyone namely for a partnership firm for income tax purposes and also for the sake of record and therefore were required to be secured by the petitioners regularly. The lease agreement was executed in the month of May, 1972 and the since then the petitioners were expected to see to it that regular receipts were issued always by respondent in respect of the rents paid. It was submitted that the petitioners could not be said as being illiterate parties, not knowing the implication of law and that too when eviction proceedings were pending between them and the respondent, so much so the petitioners were very much represented by an Advocate. It was submitted that the petitioners could not be said as being illiterate parties, not knowing the implication of law and that too when eviction proceedings were pending between them and the respondent, so much so the petitioners were very much represented by an Advocate. The learned Counsel commenting on the conduct of the petitioners in this whole affair has drawn my attention to the petitioners application seeking permission to deposit the rent wherein they say that the rent for the month of January, 1983 was paid by them on or about 4th February. According to the learned Counsel this shows that the petitioners themselves are not sure when the payment was actually done by them. With regard to the month of February the case of the petitioners is that they had sought to make this payment to the respondent on or about 5th March and that the respondent refused to accept this payment on the ground that eviction proceedings had been instituted by him against them. The learned Counsel contended that if this was the case nothing could prevent the petitioners from sending the rent by money order to the respondent as per sub-section (3) of section 17. It is also not the case of the petitioners that on the respondents refusal to accept rent of February, they have made an application to deposit this rent immediately thereafter and within the prescribed time. Admittedly the said application was made only on 24-3-1983 in clear violation of section 17(1) of the Act read with Rule 7 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Rules (hereinafter called the Rules). The learned Counsel has also referred to other instances which according to him was reflecting on the petitioners conduct. He has invited my attention to the main application of the respondent for petitioners eviction, namely its paras 11 and 12, wherein it has been stated that prior to the application the respondent had sent a notice to the petitioners on 7th September, 1982 on the ground of nonpayment of rent from April, 1982 and on the ground of storage of construction material on the mazanine floor and that the petitioners although choose to put a defence of denial, had mad payments of arrears of rent, electricity, water charges and Municipal tax from April 1982 to August, 1982. However in reply to this application the petitioners have not specifically denied either the contents of paras 11 or 12. Learned Counsel has also urged that the ruling in the case of Roque Antonio Caetano Ribeiro, 1989(2) G.L.T. 313, to the extent that it holds that the work shall in section 32(4) should be read as may should not be considered as laying down an absolute proposition. According to the learned Counsel the whole perusal of the judgment clearly suggests that according to the ruling itself this reading would be justified only if there was sufficient cause for the delay and therefore in such situation the power to be exercised by the Rent Controller was a directory power. In all other situations the power to evict was to be manadatorily exercised. The learned Counsel submitted that in the instant case both the courts below had come to concurrent findings of fact that there was no sufficient cause for the delay on the part of the petitioners to pay rents of the months of January and February. On the basis of the material on record it could not be said that such findings are perverse. Learned Counsel also urged that the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution did not permit the writ Court to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact and although the petitioners have styled the present petition as being under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution all the grounds alleged by the petitioners in this case would show that the same fall strictly within the purview of the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. It was thus urged by the learned Counsel that the writ Court should not convert itself into a Court of appeal for the purpose of interference for a writ of certiorari unless when the findings of fact were found to be perverse. According to learned Counsel no reasonable man would reach to this conclusion in the facts and circumstances of this case and interference would be justified only when there is violation of law and breach of the principles of natural justice or total misdirections on the facts or in law. According to learned Counsel no reasonable man would reach to this conclusion in the facts and circumstances of this case and interference would be justified only when there is violation of law and breach of the principles of natural justice or total misdirections on the facts or in law. The learned Counsel urged that both the courts below had examined the evidence on record, the pleadings of the parties and had concurrently come to the conclusion that there was no sufficient cause for the petitioners to delay in paying the rents of January and February within the prescribed time. With regard to the judgment in the case of Satyavijay Anna Tandel, 1990 Bom.L.R. 580, it was submitted by the learned Counsel that this decision has been turned on its peculiar facts and the learned Judge has given various reasons as to why he had come to the conclusion that the consequences of section 32(4) of the Act were not attracted. As such the learned Counsel urged on the strength of different factors which had influenced the learned Judge to come to the conclusion that the said ruling could not be used by the petitioners as laying down a general proposition to hold that if the tenant on receipt of a show cause notice under section 32(4) pays the entire arrears then due and assures further payment regularly there can be no order of eviction just because he had delayed in the past. This, according to the learned Counsel, appears to be the argument advanced by Mr. Rebello while relying on this ruling to contend that the case of the petitioners who admittedly filed their application to deposit arrears of rent even before the application of the respondent to stop proceedings under section 32(4) squarely falls within the purview of this judgment. 5. In my view the concurrent findings given by the Rent Controller and for that matter by the Administrative Tribunal as well to the extent that both the courts below have held that no sufficient cause had been shown by the petitioners to justify the delay in paying the arrears of rents in respect of January and February, 1983 appears to be based on facts and in accordance with the spirit of the law being therefore not required to be interfered with. It is true that any of the impugned orders are quite sketchy in its elaboration but inspite of that it cannot be said that on the facts and circumstances of the case the same disclose non-application of mind or absence of any foundation on the legal principles enshrined in the Act namely on its section 32(4). 6. As rightly pointed by Mr. Usgaoncar, when the main grievance of the petitioners is that the respondent was not regularly issuing receipts regarding the rents which, according to them, were being regularly paid by the petitioners it is difficult to accept that the petitioners have kept quiet and allowed the respondent to give them receipts which were so much required for the petitioner No. 1, which is admittedly a partnership firm, for the purpose of record, namely, for income tax purpose once every four or five months as contended by them. Thus the allegation of the petitioners that inspite of the rent of January having been paid no receipt was issued by the respondent in that regard cannot be believed being thus to be rejected. It thus follows that if the rent of January was not paid once no documentary evidence is available with the petitioners to show that such payment was actually done the petitioners further failure to timely pay to the respondent the rent in respect of the month of February does not appear to find any justification either on facts or in law so much so it was always open to the petitioners to make this February payment through a money order as per the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 17. Inspite of that it is shown that both with regard to the months of January and February the petitioners chose to deposit these rents in the Court by belatedly filing an application to this effect. However, this application which is said to be dated 18-3-1983 has been filed only on 25-3-1987 which is much beyond the prescribed time and the justification sought to be given for this delayed filing on the ground that the petitioner No. 2 had to go to Bombay and could not contact his Advocate for that purpose has not been substantiated by the petitioners by any evidence on record. This being the position the Rent Controller and the Tribunal appear to be justified in refusing to accept an unsatisfactory explanation for this delay by declining to condone their failure to effect on time the payment of the rents due for the months of January and February without a sufficient cause within the meaning of section 32(4) of the Act. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, reliance placed by the petitioners learned Counsel on the ruling in 1989(2) G.L.T. 313 seems to take their case nowhere. Admittedly the said decision is a binding authority only insofar it holds that the eviction power under section 32(4) is not always mandatory but only a directory one when sufficient cause is shown and that it enables the concerned authority to exercise its judicious discretion on the question of being satisfied whether there is sufficient cause or not for the delay. The aforesaid ruling was evidently given in the peculiar facts of that case which appear to indicate that the failure on the part of the lessee in paying the rents in time could not be held either as wilful and or persistent or that the default of the lessee in this regard was mala fide and meant to harass the landlord. So far the ruling in the case of Satyavijay Anna Tandel, 1990 Bom.L.R. 580, is concerned there is again no doubt that the said decision was similarly passed in the special facts of that case also and that the learned Judge has taken into consideration various circumstances, namely, the fact that even at the time of the making of the application under section 32(4) one of the applicants filed an affidavit in which it was stated that the eviction proceedings had been instituted without her consent and that when evidence was given in those proceedings she herself admitted the receipt of rents from the lessee upto March, 1981. The ruling also proceeds on the basis that it appears that the lessee continued to pay the rents to one of the co-lessors during the pendency of the eviction proceedings and thus the rents were actually paid by him upto December, 1982. However, when thereafter the lessors refused to accept further rents the lessee began sending the due rents by money order from January, 1983 onwards which again were refused by the lessor. However, when thereafter the lessors refused to accept further rents the lessee began sending the due rents by money order from January, 1983 onwards which again were refused by the lessor. There upon only in November, 1983 that the lessors filed the eviction application in the Court of the Rent Controller on certain grounds being one of them the ground of arrears of rents. It is in this context that the learned Judge has held that section 32(4) should be resorted to sparingly since the same was aimed to check contumacious conduct on the part of the tenant. Further the said decision was also given on the particular fact held by the Court that on the date of the application under section 32(4) the tenant had already deposited all the arrears of the rents due and therefore there was no question of the Rent Controller passing any further order. Besides, various other considerations were referred to by the learned Judge namely the fact that there was nothing on record to show as to what type of inquiry has been held by the Rent Controller under section 32(3) when the tenant disputed the amount of the rents due and also the circumstances of the record showing that thereafter the tenant continued to deposit the rents from time to time. The other consideration which was borne in mind by the learned Judge was that the delay complained of was only of 9 days. As such Mr. Usgaonkar appears to be right when he contends that this ruling could not be said as covering the case of the petitioners in the special facts and circumstances which are shown to have occurred therein and that the principle laid down by the learned Judge cannot be used as a general proposition applicable in all cases in which the lessee inspite of having defaulted in paying the arrears of rent has expressed his willingness to effect this payment after the filing of the application by the lessor under section 32(4). Mr. Rebello is disputing the submission of the learned respondents Counsel with regard to the availability for the petitioners of the remedy of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Mr. Rebello is disputing the submission of the learned respondents Counsel with regard to the availability for the petitioners of the remedy of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. According to the learned Counsel on the point of so called concurrent findings of fact of the courts below the question is not as to whether there is a default on the part of the petitioners but whether there was sufficient reason for the petitioners to default in the light of the tests laid down by him. The learned Counsel submitted in this regard that neither the Rent Controller nor the Tribunal has applied either of these tests and the orders are quite cryptic on its reasoning. The petitioners grievance is therefore that both the courts below by failing to apply the required tests as per the rulings relied by their learned Counsel have manifestly erred in wrongly arriving at the finding that the petitioners did not make a sufficient cause to justify the delay in paying the due rents for the months of January and February, 1983. 7. With due regard I am of the view that this argument is not available to the petitioners because in my judgment the facts of this case do not appear to be covered either by the spirit or the ratio of any of the rulings relied by the petitioners. As already said above the aforesaid rulings have been given on facts which are quite distinguishable from the facts in the present case and being so the grievances of the petitioners that both the courts below have erred in failing to apply the tests laid down by the said rulings is to be rejected. 8. Nothing therefore survives in this petition which is thus bound to be dismissed. 9. Accordingly rule made is hereby discharged with, however, no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. ***** (