D. K. Jain, J. ( 1 ) THE following question has been referred to this Court foropinion, at the instance of the assessee, under Section 256 (1) of the Income-tax Act,1961 (for short the act ): "whether the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the transfer of capitalasset takes place when the property or asset, belonging to the assessee (partner) is brought in or introduced by the partner into a firm?" ( 2 ) IT may be stated that keeping in view the factual background of the case, thequestion referred does not clearly bring out the controversy and, therefore,requires to be re-framed as under: "whether the Tribunal was right in law in holding that contribution in theform of plot of land by the assessee to the partnership firm amounted to atransfer within the meaning of Section 2 (47) of the Act, resulting in capitalgains chargeable to tax? ( 3 ) AT the out set, Mr. Anoop Sharma, learned Counsel for the assessee pointedout that answer to the question stands concluded by the decision of the Supremecourt in Sunil Siddharthbhai v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1985) 156 ITR 509. Mr. Rajendra, learned Standing Counsel for revenue, though candidly admittedthat it was so but strenuously urged before us that in view of certain observationsof the Supreme Court in the same decision, we should go into the question whetherthe contribution of plot of land by the assessee as his capital contribution in the firmwas merely a device to convert the said asset in to money, which would beavailablefor his benefit without attracting any liability to Income-tax on capital gains and forthis purpose, he suggested that we should now require the Income-tax Appellatetribunal to submit a supplementary statement of the case. The observations of thesupreme Court sought to be relied upon are as follows: "if the transfer of the personal asset by the assessee to a partnership in whichhe is or becomes a partner is merely a device or ruse for converting the assetinto money which would substantially remain available for his benefitwithout liability to Income-tax on a capital gain, it will be open to the Income-tax authorities to go behind the transaction and examine whether thetransaction of creating the partnership is a genuine or a sham transaction and,even where the partnership is genuine, the transaction of transferring thepersonal asset to the partnership firm represents a real attempt to contributeto the share capital of the partnership firm for the purpose of carrying on thepartnership business or is nothing but a device or ruse to convert the personalasset into money substantially for the benefit of the assessee while evading taxon a capital gain. The Income-tax Officer will be entitled to consider all therelevant indicia in this regard, whether the partnership is formed between theassessee and his wife and children or substantially limited to them, whetherthe personal asset is sold by the partnership firm soon after it is transferred bythe assessee to it, whether the partnership firm has no substantial or realbusiness or the record shows that there was no real need for the partnershipfirm for such capital contribution from the assessee. All these and otherpertinent considerations may be taken into regard when the Income-taxofficer enters upon a scrutiny of the transaction, for, in the task of determining whether a transaction is a sham or illusory transaction or a device or ruse,he is entitled to penetrate the veil covering it and ascertain the truth. " ( 4 ) THERE can be little dispute that the jurisdiction of the High Court undersection 256 of the Act is not in the nature of an appellate or revisional orsupervisory jurisdiction but is purely advisory. It has only to spell out its opinionon legal aspects on the facts as found by the Tribunal. Therefore, the advisoryjurisdiction can be exercised only in respect of the question for which advice hasbeen sought by the Tribunal. It has only to spell out its opinionon legal aspects on the facts as found by the Tribunal. Therefore, the advisoryjurisdiction can be exercised only in respect of the question for which advice hasbeen sought by the Tribunal. However, on a particular question of law referredby the Tribunal for its opinion, it is open to the High Court to consider anotheraspect of the same question of law and it may even re-frame or amplify the questionin order to bring out the real controversy between the parties but at the same timein these proceedings it cannot address itself to an entirely new controversy whichhad neither been raised before the Tribunal nor considered by it nor was it raisedon an application under Section 256 (1) of the Act. The question which can beanswered must be the question which was raised before the Tribunal and wasdecided by it. It must not be an entirely different question which the Tribunal neverconsidered. This is the legal position settled by a catena of decisions of the Supremecourt. Conscious of this legal position, Mr. Rajendra has not pleaded for reframing or modification of the question but urges to obtain a supplementarystatement so as to bring out the other aspect of the controversy now raised by him,viz. , whether the transaction of contribution to land as capital is a genuinecontribution to a real partnership or merely a ruse to avoid capital gains. ( 5 ) THE question which arises for consideration is whether the issue now raisedby the Standing Counsel for the revenue could be considered as another aspectof the question referred to us, entitling us to go into it. For it, it would benecessaryto travel beyond the statement of the case drawn by the Tribunal (not a normalpractice) and bring out some material facts from the annexures forming part of thestatement of the case not included therein. ( 6 ) DURING the course of assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1974-75 the Income-tax Officer noticed that in his return of income the assessee hadclaimed that the surplus generated on account of contribution of his land to thefirm M/s. Nirmal Construction and Finance Company as its partner, was not taxablein his hands as no transfer or sale of the land had taken place. The Income-taxofficer traced out the history of various transactions involving the land and cameto the conclusion that the assessee had created a legal facade by reconstituting thesaid firm in admitting his second son as partner and showing as contribution bythe partners three plots of land as capital at highly inflated price with the clearintention to evade huge tax liability resulting from the said land transactions. Relying on two decisions of the Supreme Court in G. Venkataswami Naldu and Co. v. Commr. of Income-tax, (1959) 35 ITR 594 and Khan Bahadurahmed Alladin andsons v. C. I. T. , (1968) 68 ITR 573, he treated the difference between the purchaseprice and the enhanced value at which the land was transferred to the said firm asassessee s business profit from an adventure in the nature of trade. In thealternative, he also held that it was a clear case of transfer of land by the assesseewithin the meaning of Section 2 (47) of the Act to the said firm and as such theassessee was liable to short term capital gains. Accordingly while framingassessment, he made an addition on account of short term capital gains in respectof the land in question. In the first appeal preferred by the assessee, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) went deeply into the question as to whether the ,transaction was a transfer within the meaning of Section 2 (47) of the Act andconcurred with the Income-tax Officer in taxing short term capital gains in thehands of the assessee. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), however, did not go into the question asto whether the entire exercise by the assessee was a facade created for evading tax. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hind Construction Ltd, (1972) 83 ITR 211, he disagreed with the Income-tax Officer that the resultantsurplus could be treated as assessee s profit from business. The assessee carried thematter further in appeal to the Tribunal but the revenue, it seems, kept quiet. Thetribunal merely relied on a decision of the Gujarat High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kurtikeyv. Sarabhai, (1981) 131 ITR 42 and dismissed the assessee s appeal. ( 7 ) FROM the above brief narration of facts, it is evident that the Tribunal dealtwith only the legal proposition of law viz. Thetribunal merely relied on a decision of the Gujarat High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kurtikeyv. Sarabhai, (1981) 131 ITR 42 and dismissed the assessee s appeal. ( 7 ) FROM the above brief narration of facts, it is evident that the Tribunal dealtwith only the legal proposition of law viz. , whether the transaction in questionamounted to a "transfer within the meaning of Section 2 (47) of the Act, resulting incapital gains chargeable to tax. The point now raised before us by the learnedcounsel for the revenue was not set up before the Tribunal or dealt with by it, nor was any such question sought to be referred on the basis of which this alternativesubmission could be made. It cannot be permitted to be urged in these proceedings. ( 8 ) IT cannot, therefore, besaid to arise out of the order of the Tribunal. In thatview of the matter, there is no ground for us to call upon the Tribunal to submit asupplementary statement of the case, as pleaded by the learned Counsel for therevenue. ( 9 ) ACCORDINGLY we decline to reopen the issue, now raised, at this stage, andshall confine ourselves to the consideration of the above mentioned question,which has been referred to us at the instance of the assessee. Having reached thisconclusion, in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court insunil Siddharthbhai s case (supra), wherein the decision of the Gujarat High Courtin Kartikey V. Sarabhai case (supra), relied upon by the Tribunal, has been partlyreversed, answer to the refrained question has to be that the Tribunal was rightin holding that the handing over of the capital asset to the firm by the assessee didamount to "transfer" but no capital gains chargeable to tax accrued to the assessee. ( 10 ) THE reference is accordingly answered. Before parting we may also note that under identical circumstances, similarview has been expressed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case ofanother partner of the same firm, since reported as Ved Parkash Aggarwal v. C. I T. , (1989) 179 ITR 378 . There will, however, be no order as to costs.