Kanti Tarafdar v. S. K. Chaudhury, Collector of Customs (Preventive) W. B.
1994-12-06
Ajoy Nath Ray
body1994
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment Ajoy Nath Ray, J. 1. This is an application for contempt filed by the writ petitioner for violation of my order dated 7th March, 1994 passed in the main writ petition. I had passed an order on 7.3.94 for relesae of the goods to the writ petitioners after consideration of s. 110 of the Customs Act. I find no defence to the contempt application save and except that a stay application is pending disposal in the appeal court in aid of the appeal sought to be preferred from my order. But even though the said application is pending" there is no stay of operation of my order. One would have thought that since, according to a well-known principle, the pendency of an appeal does not automatically imply a stay, such pendency of the stay application before an appeal court would be no answer whatsoever to a contempt application already initiated for breach and disobedience of the first court's order, i.e., my order. 2. Mr. Prantosh Mukherjee, learned Council for contemner respondent, has drawn my attention to a recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court which does call for a reasoned decision. In the said case reported in 1994 AIR sew 460 (Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd. & Anr. vs. Sachidanand Dass & Anr.), the learned Judges of the Supreme Court observed as follows : "If, without considering the prayer for stay, obedience to the Single Judge's order was insisted upon at the pain of committal for contempt, the applicants may find, as has now happened, the very purpose of appeal and the prayer for interlocutory stay infructuous. It is true that a mere filing of an appeal and an application for stay do not by themselves absolves the appellants from obeying the order under appeal and that any compliance with the learned single Judge's order would be subject to the final result of the appeal. But then the changes brought about in the interregnum in obedience of the order under appeal might themselves be a cause and source of prejudice. Wherever the order whose disobedience is complained about is appealed against and stay of its operation is pending before the Court, it will be appropriate to take up for consideration the prayer for stay either earlier or at least simultaneously with the complaint for contempt.
Wherever the order whose disobedience is complained about is appealed against and stay of its operation is pending before the Court, it will be appropriate to take up for consideration the prayer for stay either earlier or at least simultaneously with the complaint for contempt. To keep the prayer for stay stand-by and to insist upon proceeding with the complaint for contempt might in many conceivable cases, as here, cause serious prejudice. This is the view taken in State of J & K vs. Mohammad Yakoob Khan, 1992 (2) Scale 424 ." 3. The above paragraph and the proposition contained therein have to be given effect to by me. That is the simple law of precedent. I notice that it has been repeatedly mentioned that mere filing of an appeal or an application for stay do not by themselves absolve the respondent from the duty of obedience : It has also been said that where a stay application is pending in the appeal court, it will be appropriate to take up the stay application either earlier than or simultaneously with the application for contempt. 4. With the greatest of respect I am unable to understand how a contempt application which is pending before a single Judge like me can be taken up simultaneously with the stay application which is pending before a Division Bench. Should I then stay my hands from dealing with the contempt application and wait until the stay application is over? I cannot do that as a matter of inflexible principle because, in that event, I would be going against the other law laid down by the Supreme Court that mere filing of an application does not operate as a stay. 5.
I cannot do that as a matter of inflexible principle because, in that event, I would be going against the other law laid down by the Supreme Court that mere filing of an application does not operate as a stay. 5. I would venture to read the above paragraph of the Supreme Court's judgment as laid down this, that, in an appropriate circumstance, a single Judge before whom a contempt application is brought fur breach of his own order and to whose notice it is also brought that a stay application and an appeal from his order are pending (although no stay order from the appeal court has yet been passed), that single Judge, me, in the instant case, would have both a duty and the jurisdiction to weight the facts and circumstances of the entire case and refuse to pass an order in the contempt application immediately even though the order has been violated and even though the order has been violated and even though the appeal court has not yet passed any order of stay. Similarly, Single Judge would also have jurisdiction to proceed with the contempt application and impose penalty sentence notwithstanding pendency of the appeal or the stay application before the appeal court. 6. What principle should guide the single Judge in such a dilemma? A single Judge has no control over the business of the single Judge's court. Thus, the learned single Judge should ask himself whether the contempt application has been filed and pressed with such undue haste as to expose it as at least one of the purposes of the application that the applicant wishes to win the battle without having to fight it before the appeal court. The onus to show this is on the person in breach. He must establish undue haste on the part of the applicant proceeding with contempt application. He must establish that the contempt application is pressed with such urgency as to defeat the rights of appeal and also of applying for stay before the appeal court. Unless this onus is discharged, at least, to a reasonable degree, the trial court would be wrong in staying its won hands and taking away all effect from the order which has been passed by itself at the instance of a petitioner who, according to the court, deserves relief. 7.
Unless this onus is discharged, at least, to a reasonable degree, the trial court would be wrong in staying its won hands and taking away all effect from the order which has been passed by itself at the instance of a petitioner who, according to the court, deserves relief. 7. I am sure that the respondents have tried to move the appeal court. What they have done in the appeal court is no business of mine but 1 find nothing from the records whereby it can be said that the respondents in the contempt application have established before me that the petitioner is proceeding with undue haste or urgency in the present contempt application so as to bypass the appeal court and so as to obtain relief without having to wage the battle in the higher court. My order was passed more than six months ago. If the respondents have been unable to obtain the interim order in the meantime, they must suffer the consequences. 8. In view of the aforesaid facts, 1 hold that the alleged contemner respondent is guilty of contempt for not returning the goods to the petitioner, as directed by me in my order dated 7th March, 1994. 9. Sri S. K. Choudhury, Collector of Customs (Preventive), W. B. Collectorate House, 15/1, Strand Road, Calcutta-700 001, is directed to be apprehended and produced before me on 9th January 1995, when this matter will appear at the top of the list as a part-heard matter for imposition of penalty. 10. The Learned Registrar, A.S. is directed to take steps for transmission of this order to the concerned police authorities, to the Commissioner and also to the Sheriff of Calcutta for due compliance. 11. A compliance report be forwarded, if needed by the learned Registrar, A.S., to this Court on or before the next date of hearing. Application allowed.