GIRIDHAR MALAVIYA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 9-4-1993 passed by an Hon. Single Judge of this Court in Civil Misc. Contempt Petition No. 647/1992 finding that the appellant had wilfully disobeyed the order dated 9-12-1991 passed by the High Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 8602/1987. The apology tendered by the appellant was not accepted in view of the statement made by the appellant before the Court and due to his indifferent attitude. Consequently appellant Lakhan Singh was awarded the punishment of simple imprisonment for two weeks and a fine of Rs. 500. 00. ( 2 ) WE have heard Sri. J. N. Tewari and Shri D. S. Tewari learned counsel who argued this case on behalf of the appellant. ( 3 ) THE first contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the judgment under appeal so far it relates to simple imprisonment for two weeks is not in conformity with the provisions of S. 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. In this connection he has relied on S. 12 (3) of the said Act which reads as under :-"12 (3 ). Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary, shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit. " ( 4 ) IN view of the above mentioned provision it seems that the order directing simple imprisonment had in any case to be modified as, at the best, the appellant should have been directed to have been detained in a civil prison. However we will consider this aspect at the stage as and when the question of punishment and sentence arises. ( 5 ) BEFORE dealing with the question involved in this appeal it would be proper to briefly refer to the facts giving rise to this contempt appeal. ( 6 ) ONE Ram Bahadur Srivastava, Gram Vikas Adhikari, Vikas Khand-Kabrai, District-Hamirpur had filed Civil Misc. writ Petn. ( 5 ) BEFORE dealing with the question involved in this appeal it would be proper to briefly refer to the facts giving rise to this contempt appeal. ( 6 ) ONE Ram Bahadur Srivastava, Gram Vikas Adhikari, Vikas Khand-Kabrai, District-Hamirpur had filed Civil Misc. writ Petn. No 8602/1987 in the High Court against Zila Vikas Adhilari (District Development Officer), Hamirpur seeking the relief, inter alia, that the order dated 31-1-1987 by which Ram Bahadur Srivastava had been removed from service be quashed. On 29-4-1987 a Bench of this Court had granted three weeks time to the Standing Counsel to file a counter affidavit with a direction to put up the matter immediately three weeks thereafter. A perusal of the judgment dated 9-12-1991 in the said petition indicates that on 17-9-1991 last chance to file a counter affidavit within two weeks was granted. As no counter affidavit was filed the High Court in the said petition, after examining the facts narrated in the writ petition, opined that it appeared that since there was nothing wrong against the petitioner, hence the respondents were evading to file the counter affidavit. Relying on the judgments of the Supreme Court it was found that there was nothing on the record to justify the petitioners forced (premature) retirement, with the result that the impugned order of retirement was quashed. The court directed reinstatement of the petitioner and payment of arrears of his salary to him within a month together with the interest on the arrears at the rate of 13% per annum. The Court also directed the costs of the petition to be paid to the petition. ( 7 ) THEREAFTER Civil Misc. Contempt Petition No. 647/1992 was filed in the High Court by Ram Bahadu Srivastava against appellant Lakhan Singh with the allegation that although the copy of the order dated 9-12-1991 in writ Petition No. 8602/1987 mentioned above had been served on the officer concerned the respondent had not complied with the said order and he was rather disobeying the same and as such had committed contempt of Court Consequently the Court was requested to punish the appellant under the Contempt of Courts Act. ( 8 ) AFTER the notice had been issued to the appellant to show cause through counsel by filing a counter affidavit as to why he should not be punished, the appellant filed his counter affidavit on 20-7-1992. ( 8 ) AFTER the notice had been issued to the appellant to show cause through counsel by filing a counter affidavit as to why he should not be punished, the appellant filed his counter affidavit on 20-7-1992. The stand taken by the appellant was that the directions contained in the orders dated 9-12-1991 were not complied as the officer was not aware of the pendency of the writ petition or any order passed therein. It was stated in the counter affidavit that only when the order dated 9-12-1991 was served on him on 20-1-1991 that he came to know about it. It was thereafter contended that since the former District Development Officer who had passed the order of compulsory retirement was not posted there, the appellant had to obtain instructions from the Head of the Department i. e. the Commissioner, Rural Development. Uttar Pradesh for reinstatement in service of the petitioner and payment of arrears of his salary to him. It was stated by the appellant that he had written various letters requesting the Commissioner to issue necessary instruction. However the Government decided to get a review petition filed in the case against the order dated 9-12-1991 which could not be filed as the certified copy of the order dated 9-12-1991 was not made available from the officer of the Chief Standing Counsel. It is, therefore, stated in the counter affidavit that the appellant had not wilfully disobeyed the order of the court and hence the notice for contempt was liable to be discharged. ( 9 ) FINDING the explanation offered by the appellant to be not satisfactory the appellant was directed to appear in person before the learned single Judge on 22-3-1993. In his statement before the Court the appellant said that since reinstatement of the petitioner was possible only after receiving instructions from the State at was not possible for him, to comply with the order of the Court in this regard. He emphasized the point that since the order was ex parte, without any contest from the side of the department, he had to obtain instructions from the higher authorities. However the appellant stated before the learned single Judge that whether he received instructions from the State Government or not the direction of this court had to be complied by him. He emphasized the point that since the order was ex parte, without any contest from the side of the department, he had to obtain instructions from the higher authorities. However the appellant stated before the learned single Judge that whether he received instructions from the State Government or not the direction of this court had to be complied by him. ( 10 ) CONSIDERING all the facts and explanation of the appellant which he had made before the court the learned single Judge came to the conclusion that there was serious misconception in the mind of the officer regarding the position so far as the compliance of the order of the High Court was concerned. The Court further observed that the explanation furnished by the officer reflected the casual manner in which the High Courts proceedings and orders were taken into account for compliance. The court found the action at the level of the Commissioner, Rural Development, Uttar Pradesh as also the Law Department of the U. P. Government to be reprehensible by observing that in spite of the time bound direction and repeated requests made by the appellant, instructions were issued only to file a review petition as late as on 28-3-1993 without caring that the order required compliance within a month from the date of presentation. In the ultimate analysis finding from the statement of Lakhan Singh by which he had made it quite clear that he would not comply with the directions of this court unless he received instruction from the government and finding that he treated the instructions from the government to be over and above the final order passed by the High Court, the learned single Judge found that the appellant had wilfully and deliberately violated the order of the Court which resulted in the interference in due course of justice rendering him liable for contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act. Accordingly the appellant was found guilty and sentenced as has been mentioned above. ( 11 ) THE contention of Sri J. N. Tewari learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellant being a government servant had to be very cautious in the matters of compliance of orders, more particularly, if the proceedings were ex prate in the court. Accordingly the appellant was found guilty and sentenced as has been mentioned above. ( 11 ) THE contention of Sri J. N. Tewari learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellant being a government servant had to be very cautious in the matters of compliance of orders, more particularly, if the proceedings were ex prate in the court. His contention is that if the appellant had straightway complied with the directions of the court and if he had reinstated the appellant, he could have been charged to have acted in undue haste and shown bias in favour of the petitioner for which he could be proceeded with departmentally. In other words his contention is that although the petitioner wanted to comply with the orders yet he could not comply as by doing so he could have entailed punishment from his superior officers thereby risking his own service. Sri Tweari has further stated that in any case the amount of arrears of salary could not be paid to the petitioner as Rule 74 (3) of Financial Hand Book, Vol. V makes it clear that the payment being old could be made only after pre-audit. His contention is that accordingly payment of arrears of salary within a month was an impossible task and since law never contemplates impossible to be achieved it would be wrong to say that the petitioner had wilfully not complied with the directions of the Court. ( 12 ) WE have considered the submissions of Sri Tewari carefully. Although we agree with Sri Tewari that so far as the payment of arrears of salary is concerned that could not be done as the matter had become old and required pre-audit. We may also agree with the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant may never really have intended to disobey the orders passed by the Court but found himself almost helpless to pass any such order as such an order probably could be passed by him only on the risk of inviting an order in the nature of punishment against him from his superior authorities. What still is important to note is that the appellant had expressed his inability to comply with the orders of the court till he had received instructions from Commissioner Gram Vikas U. P. Simultaneously the appellant stated that he was aware of the fact that whether he received the instructions from the government or not he had to comply with the directions of the Court. This makes it clear that the officer was aware of the situation that the Courts order had to be complied by him. Since the order of the Court was a clear order requiring compliance within a specified period. If the officer thought that it was not possible for him to comply with the directions the least that was expected of the appellant was that immediately on getting the order he should have approached the High Court bringing the fact, to the knowledge of the Court, of his helplessness and seeking some time by informing the Court that he had moved the higher authorities to ensure compliance of the Courts order. If he had done so he would have absolved himself of his liability so far as the compliance of the order of the Court was concerned. This having not been done, we have no option but to say that the appellant knowing very well that he had no option but to comply with the directions of the Court had still not complied with the orders, as to him, the order of his superior was more important than the order passed by the High Court. Consequently it has to be held that the action of the appellant in not complying with the order amounts to wilful default on his part. ( 13 ) SRI. J. N. Tewari learned counsel for the appellant then contended that the appellant had no intention to disobey the order and as such he cannot be found to have wilfully disobeyed the orders of this Court. This point was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Charan v. Debi Dayal Dubey reported in AIR 1955 All 483 : (1955 Cri LJ 1223 ). After dealing with the question whether the contemner was aware of the existence of the order in paragraph 8, the Division Bench further considered whether absence of mens rea included ignorance of law. After dealing with the question whether the contemner was aware of the existence of the order in paragraph 8, the Division Bench further considered whether absence of mens rea included ignorance of law. In this connection it would be relevant to quote certain passage of this paragraph here :-"absence of mens rea does not include ignorance of law. He would be guilty of contempt even though he did not have an actual intention of disobeying the order or committing contempt of court. "in has been held repeatedly that a person may be guilty of contempt even though there was no intention to commit contempt. The question in such case is not what was the intention of the offender but what was the effect of the publication. "per Bhandari, J. in emperor V. v. Khushal Chand, AIR 1945 Lah 206 at p. 209 (F) : (1946 (47), Cri LJ 115 ). In superintendent and Remembrancer v. Murali Maother Prasad, AIR 1941 Pat 185 (G) : (1942) Cri LJ 225), Harries. C. J. pointed out at page 194 that,"it has always been laid down in England, and indeed in this country, that the writer of an article can be guilty of contempt without intending to interfere with the due course of justice. An article written with the deliberate intention of interfering with the due course of justice would be an extremely serious matter meriting very serious punishment. He can however be guilty of writing an article which tends to interfere with the course of justice without intending so to interfere. The test has always been not what the writer intended but what effect the words would have upon readers. "whatever mens rea is required to constitute the offence of contempt of court is present in the deliberate doing of an act which, the contemne knows, he is forbidden to do. If the did not know that he was forbidden to do, there is not means rea in his doing the act. If the act was done by him accidentally, then also there is no mens rea. Sri A. P. Pandey referred us to the dictum that wilful disobedience of injunction is contempt. The dictum only means that if there is a wilful disobedience of injunction, contempt is committed; it does not mean that contempt cannot be committed in any other manner. If the act was done by him accidentally, then also there is no mens rea. Sri A. P. Pandey referred us to the dictum that wilful disobedience of injunction is contempt. The dictum only means that if there is a wilful disobedience of injunction, contempt is committed; it does not mean that contempt cannot be committed in any other manner. Moreover, what is meant by wilful disobedience is nothing but deliberate disobedience and not disobedience with a particular motive. It is the act of disobeying the injunction that must be done wilfully or deliberately; it is not the requirement that it must be done with a criminal intention or motive. It is never practicable to prove the actual intention behind an act; a court can approach the question only objectively and is forced to presume the intention from the act done on the maxim that every man is presumed to intend the probable consequences of his act. In lal Behari v. State (E), it was held by a Bench of this court that no mens rea is required for an offence of contempt of court; what was meant is that no criminal intention or motive behind the deliberate doing of an act is required. If accidentally a person disobeys injunction, it can be said that there is no wilful disobedience by him and he cannot be committed for contempt. The expression "wilful disobedience" was explained by Warrington, J. in - stancomb v. Trowbridge Urban Council, 1910-2 Ch 190 (H ). on page 194 he observed :"if a person or a corporation is restrained from doing a particular act, that person or corporation commits a breach of the injunction, and is liable for process for contempt, if he or it in fact does the act, and it is no answer to say that the act was not contumacious in the sense that, in doing it, there was no direct intention to disobey the order. I think the expression wilfully in O. XLII, R. 31, is intended to exclude only such causal or accidental and unintentional acts____. "in - emperor v. Devi Prasad Sharma , 1942 Oudh NW 6 (1), a Bench of this Court approved of the statement in Tek Chands Law of Contempt that "motive of the contemner cannot be considered in determining his guilt. " In - Mccomb v. Jacksonville Paper Co. "in - emperor v. Devi Prasad Sharma , 1942 Oudh NW 6 (1), a Bench of this Court approved of the statement in Tek Chands Law of Contempt that "motive of the contemner cannot be considered in determining his guilt. " In - Mccomb v. Jacksonville Paper Co. , (1949) 339 US 187 (J), Douglas J. said at page 191 :"the absence of willfulness does not relieve from civil contempt. Since the purpose is remedial, it matters not with what intent the defendant did the prohibited act. An act does not cease to be a violation of a law and of a decree merely because it may have been dondonedone innocently. "we are in respectful agreement with the observations made by the Division Bench in Ram Chandras case and consequently would find that even if it could be said that the appellant had no intention to disobey the orders passed by this court, yet by not demonstrating that he did everything within his powers to give effect to the order, it has to be held that the petitioner was guilty of wilfully disobeying the orders passed by this Court and as such made him liable to be punished under the Contempt of Courts Act. ( 14 ) SRI J. N. Tewari relied on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Tapan Kumar Mukherjee v. Heromoni Mondal, 1991 Cr LJ 390 : ( AIR 1991 SC 281 ). In the case of Tapan Kumar Mukherjee the question was whether the appellant Tapan Kumar Mukherjee had signed the memo willfully which had given rise to the contempt matter or whether it had been signed by him inadvertently. Examining the facts and circumstances of the case Hon. Judges of the Supreme Court found as follows :-"having regard to all these circumstances we find ourseleves unable to conclude beyond all doubt that the appellant had acted wilfuly in this regard. We think that we should give the appellant the benefit of doubt in the circumstances of the case. " ( 15 ) ON the strength of this case Sri Tewari contended that the appellant before us should also be given the benefit of doubt as it cannot be said that he had wilfully disobeyed the orders passed by this court. However we find that the fact of Tapan Kumar Mukherjees case cannot be compared to the facts of the present case. However we find that the fact of Tapan Kumar Mukherjees case cannot be compared to the facts of the present case. Before the Supreme Court the compelling question for decision was whether Tapan Kumar Mukherjee had signed the memo inadvertently or not and consequently the Supreme Court had given the benefit of doubt to him. In the instant case the appellant admits that he knew that he had to obey the orders passed by the High Court and yet he did not obey the orders as he was awaiting instructions from his bosses in that regard. As discussed by us earlier this leaves no room to doubt that the action of the appellant in not obeying the order was clearly a wilful action. Thus the appellant cannot get any benefit from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Tapan Kumar Mukherjee. ( 16 ) SRI. J. N. Tewari then referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar reported in the AIR 1992 SC 407 : 1992 Cri LJ 284. Ashok Kumar Singh was working as a primary teacher in the State of Bihar. On the services of some of the teachers being terminated, termination order was challenged before the Patna High Court. Thereafter the matter had also gone to the Supreme Court and the Court thereafter found that there was acute shortage of teachers in primary schools of Santhal pargana of Bihar with the result that many schools had been closed down. As qualified teachers were not available the Court had directed that even the untrained teachers were entitled to be selected provided trained teachers were otherwise qualified without putting the bar of age against them. ( 17 ) THE question to be considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar (supra) was whether the explanation offer by the contemner for not complying with the order was acceptable or not. In that background Honble Judges of the Supreme Court in paragraph 11 observed as follows : -"from the material on record and after hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are not satisfied that it is a case in which it can conclusively be said that the respondents have wilfully or deliberately or contemptuously flouted or disobeyed the orders of this Court dated 7-2-1991. It appears to us to be a case of misinterpretation of the executive directions and order of this Court dated 7-2-1991 and is, therefore, not a fit case in which contempt proceedings need to proceed any further. We, accordingly drop the contempt proceedings and discharge the Rule issued against the respondents. " ( 18 ) SRI Tewari on the strength of this case wanted us to drop proceedings of contempt against the contemner. We are afraid that even the case of Ashok Kumar does not help the appellant. As would be noticed the Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar had found that the appellants before them had mis-interpreted the executive directions and the order of the Court and had not really wilfully disobeyed the orders. Such is not the case with the appellant before us. Consequently we are of the view that the appellant can not claim that he had not wilfully disobeyed that order dated 9-12-1991 passed by this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 8602/1987. ( 19 ) IT was then contended by learned counsel for the appellant that on the facts and circumstances of this case the Court should have accepted the apology tendered by the petitioner as the appellant even in his statement before the High Court had said that he had no option but to comply with the directions of this Court. ( 20 ) WE have given our anxious consideration to this aspect of the matter. We do feel that the appellant had really no intention to disobey the orders passed by this court but he was suffering from a fear psychosis that if he complied with the orders passed by the High Court that might have incurred wrath on him from his superior officers who may even go to the extent of feeling that the appellant was colluding with the petitioner in the High Court. We feel that although the petitioner wilfully disobeyed the order of the High Court yet it was this fear psychosis which prompted him to refer the matter to the superior officers of his department. However as has been observed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Charan (supra), the absence of intention does not take away the wilful disobedience of the order by the appellant from the purview of the contempt proceedings. However as has been observed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Charan (supra), the absence of intention does not take away the wilful disobedience of the order by the appellant from the purview of the contempt proceedings. Therefore, while we would hold the appellant to be guilty of wilful default we would still feel that in this case it would be desirable to accept the apology of the petitioner tendered by him before this Court. ( 21 ) HOWEVER before parting with this case we would again emphasize that all the officers of the State Government must be clearly apprised of the legal position that whenever there is an order passed by any court directing some particular officer to comply with that order the officer has no option but to carry out the said order. There can be cases where the officer can genuinely feel that the order issued by the Court was not the correct order or that the order has been obtained from the Court by mis-representing certain facts with the result that the compliance of the order would really jeopardise the public interest and as such the exigency of the situation may demand that such an order should really be not complied with. Even in such cases it will not be open to the officer himself to assume the role of a superior court and to overrule or not comply with the said order. The officer, in such a situation, should immediately approach the Court and inform that for the reasons mentioned in the application moved by him the Court may reconsider the question whether the order should be immediately complied with or not. The only care which has to be taken is that such an exercise has not been made with any mala fide intention but with the real object of securing social justice in the public interest. If such an exercise is undertaken by the officer, he would never be guilty of acting arbitrarily or contumaciously. The Court, thereafter, can be requested to suspend the implementation of its order. However if the court, despite such an application, insists compliance of the order then the officer will have no option but to obey the order even if he has to invite wrath of his superior officer, for which, the doors of the Court would always be open to him. However if the court, despite such an application, insists compliance of the order then the officer will have no option but to obey the order even if he has to invite wrath of his superior officer, for which, the doors of the Court would always be open to him. ( 22 ) SIMILARLY where any officer feels that it is impossible for him to straightaway comply with a time bound direction as certain procedural formalities had to be completed before the compliance of the order, as in the case of payment of arrears where a pre-audit is required, the officer must immediately approach the Court and inform that he has set in motion the machinery for compliance of the order and since compliance would be beyond his control the Court may extend the period within which the order may be complied with. ( 23 ) WE further make it clear that if the officer on account of departmental instructions has to seek approval from his superior officers before fully implementing the order passed by the Court, then even in the cases of ex prate orders the officer must set in motion the process for compliance of the order and must inform the Court well within time that although he has started the process by which the order of the Court had to be complied with yet the process being some-what time consuming some latitude may be granted so that the order of the court may be complied with. However no such latitude would be possible in case where the superior officers have also been a party to the proceedings in the Court as then it is presumed that all the officers in the proceedings are bound by the order of the Court. ( 24 ) WITH these observations, in this appeal, while upholding the order of the learned single Judge of this Court finding the appellant guilty of contempt of Court we intend to accept his plea of apology. ( 25 ) THIS appeal is accordingly allowed in part. While the appellant is found guilty under the Contempt of Courts Act, his apology is accepted and the sentence imposed on him by the learned single Judge is set aside. ( 26 ) WE direct the Registrar of this Court to send a copy of this judgment to the Chief Secretary, U. P. Govt. While the appellant is found guilty under the Contempt of Courts Act, his apology is accepted and the sentence imposed on him by the learned single Judge is set aside. ( 26 ) WE direct the Registrar of this Court to send a copy of this judgment to the Chief Secretary, U. P. Govt. , Lucknow with the direction that the portion of this judgment relating to the mode of compliance of the courts order by the officers of the Government should be circulated to its officers throughout the State. Appeal partly allowed. .