JUDGMENT : 1. This second appeal has been filed against the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge No. 3, Jodhpur dated February 1, 1993 by which the defendant's first appeal has been dismissed and the judgment of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur dated June 1, 1991, decreeing the suit for the recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits and ejectment of the defendants has been confirmed. 2. The facts of the case giving rise to this second appeal may be summarised thus. On September 27, 1982, the plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for the recovery of arrears of rent and memo profica and ejectment of the defendants with the allegations, in short, that his mother Mst. Chhota Devi let out the suit premises on monthly rent of Rs. 150/-, rent was paid by the defendants upto August 31, 1979 and his mother Chhota Devi has died on April 12, 1980. It has further been averred that the suit premises are reasonable and bonafide required by him for the resident of the members of his family. The defendants filed their written-statement admitting that the Government Upper Primary School is being run in it, it is on rent, rent has been paid @ Rs. 150/- per month upto August 31, 1979 and Mst. Chhota Devi died on April 12, 1980. It has also been averred that the plaintiff Narain Singh was repeatedly requested to produce succession certificate entitling him to recover rent from them but he failed to do so. The remaining averments have been denied. After framing necessary issues and recording the evidence of the parties, the trial court held that the defendants have committed default in payment of rent of more than six months, the suit premises is reasonably and bonafide required by the plaintiff for the residence of the members of his family which includes two married sons and one grown up son and accordingly decreed the suit. The appellate court confirmed these findings and dismissed the appeal. 3. It has been contended by the learned Government Advocate that the lower courts have seriously erred to decree the suit without succession certificate. There is no force in this contention. Section 214, Indian Succession Act, 1975 runs as under:- "214. Proof of representative title a condition precedent to recovery through the Courts of debts from debtors of deceased persons. 3. It has been contended by the learned Government Advocate that the lower courts have seriously erred to decree the suit without succession certificate. There is no force in this contention. Section 214, Indian Succession Act, 1975 runs as under:- "214. Proof of representative title a condition precedent to recovery through the Courts of debts from debtors of deceased persons. - (1) No Courts shall- (a) pass a decree against a debtor of a deceased person for payment of his debt to a person claiming on succession to be entitled to the effects of the deceased person or to any part thereof, or (b) proceed, upon an application of a person claiming to be so entitled, to execute against such a debtor a decree or order for the payment of his debt, except on the production by person so claiming of, (i) a probate or letters of administration evidencing the grant of him of administration to the estate of the deceased, or (ii) a certificate granted under Section 31 or Section 32 of the Administrator-General's Act, 1913, and having the debt mentioned therein, or (iii) a succession cerfificate granted under part X and having the debt specified therein, or (iv) a certificate granted under the Succession Certificate Act, 1889, or (v) a certificate granted under Bombay Regulation No. VIII of 1827, and, if granted after the first day of May, 1889, having the debt specified therein. 2. The word "debt" in sub-section (1) includes any debt except rent, revenue or profits payable in respect of land used for agricultural purposes." It is clear from the above quoted provisions that they are not applicable in suits in respect of ejectment or recovery of possession of immovable properties. It is also clear that these provisions apply to suit claiming amounts which were payable to the deceased and the same are claimed in the suits by the plaintiffs on the basis of succession. The rent of the suit premises accruing after the death of Mst. Chhota Devi was payable to the plaintiff in his own right as the adopted son of Mst. Chhota Devi. He became the owner of the suit premises after the death of Mst. Chhota Devi under Section 15, Hindu succession Act. The defendants have admitted in their letters Ex. 10 dated July 27, 1982 (also Ex. A/1), Ex. 9 dated August 14, 1982 and Ex. Chhota Devi. He became the owner of the suit premises after the death of Mst. Chhota Devi under Section 15, Hindu succession Act. The defendants have admitted in their letters Ex. 10 dated July 27, 1982 (also Ex. A/1), Ex. 9 dated August 14, 1982 and Ex. 11 dated July 27, 1982 that the plaintiff Narain Singh is the adopted son of their landlord Mst. Chhota Devi. When this fact was admitted by them, they were bound to pay the rent of the suit premises to him (Narain Singh) after the death of Mst. Chhota Devi. It is not in dispute that the rent from the month of May, 1980 was not paid by the defendant to the plaintiff Narain Singh and the suit was filed on September 27, 1982. Both the lower courts have correctly held that the defendants have committed default in payment of rent of more than six months. It may also be mentioned are that by order dated April 1, 1983, rent was determined under section 13(3), Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter to be called 'the Act'). There is nothing on the record to indicated that the amount so determined was deposited in the court or paid to the plaintiff. 4. It was next contended by the learned Government Advocate that both the lower courts have seriously erred to hold that the suit premises is reasonably and bonafide required by the plaintiff for the residence of the members of his family. This contention has no force. Both the lower courts have rightly held that the suit premises is reasonably and bonafide required by the plaintiff for the residence of his family consisting of 3 married sons and that children besides the plaintiff and his wife particularly when the present accommodation at the disposal of the plaintiff is one room and one 'ora' only. It is a finding of fact. It is not open to challenge in second appeal. Reference of Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, AIR 1974 SC 1596 , Bhairab Chandra Nandan v. Randhir Chandra Dutta, AIR 1988 SC 396 , Pal Singh v. Sunder Singh, AIR 1989 SC 396 and E. Mehboob Saheb v. N. Subbarayan Choudhary, AIR 1982 SC 679 may be made here. It is not open to challenge in second appeal. Reference of Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, AIR 1974 SC 1596 , Bhairab Chandra Nandan v. Randhir Chandra Dutta, AIR 1988 SC 396 , Pal Singh v. Sunder Singh, AIR 1989 SC 396 and E. Mehboob Saheb v. N. Subbarayan Choudhary, AIR 1982 SC 679 may be made here. It has also been held in Ranappa v. Bajjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633 that sufficiency or adequacy of evidence to support a finding of fact cannot be a ground for interference in second appeal. Gross error cannot also be a ground for interference. Reference of Shanker Gopinath Apthe v. Gangabai, AIR 1976 SC 2507 may be made here. 5. Both the lower courts have rightly held that the plaintiff would suffer greater hardship than the defendants if the suit for ejectment is not decreed. This finding cannot he said to be perverse or contrary to record. It is again a finding of fact. It is also not open to challenge in the second appeal. It is correct that a school is being run in the suit premises and the fate of the students would be in perial if the defendants are required to vacate the suit premise immediately. This difficulty can be over-come by giving sufficient time to the defendants to vacate the suit premises and during this period the defendants may find out suitable accommodation or construct a building to run the school. 6. It was also contended by the learned Government Advocate that the plaintiff has averred in para No. 3 of his plaintiff that he was adopted by Mst. Chhota Devi and her husband in the year 1940 but it has not been averred in it that a registered adoption-deed was executed and without such a deed adoption was void in view of the law prevailing in those days in Marwar State. He relied upon Ram Prasad v. Pann Lal, ILR (3) Raj. 739 and Bhanwari Lal v. Mangi Bal, ILR (5) Raj. 625. There is no great force in this contention also. In the written-statement, the contents of para No. 3 have simply been denied. It has nowhere been stated in it that the adoption of plaintiff by Mst. Chhota Devi and her husband was void for want of a registered adoption-deed. 739 and Bhanwari Lal v. Mangi Bal, ILR (5) Raj. 625. There is no great force in this contention also. In the written-statement, the contents of para No. 3 have simply been denied. It has nowhere been stated in it that the adoption of plaintiff by Mst. Chhota Devi and her husband was void for want of a registered adoption-deed. If this averment would have been made in the written-statement, the plaintiff would have produced the original adoption-deed or its certified copy. No such plea was raised either before the trial court or before the first appellate court. This plea is not purely legal and as such cannot be allowed in the second appeal to be raised for the first time. 7. On October 12, 1993, the defendants moved an application in this Court along with two affidavits stating that during the pendency of the second appeal the tenements in occupation and possession of Chhagan Lal Mathur and Bankat Lal Beni Gopal have been vacated by them, the same have been let out to Roop Ram Darji and Pukh Raj Prajapat, the plaintiff's third son Sumer Singh, Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Electricity Board has constructed a big house near Rajhans Factory and New Power House, Jodhpur and he has shifted there. It has been prayed that the defendants be allowed to amend the written-statement to incorporate these new subsequent events and to prove them. On January 18, 1994, the plaintiff Narain Singh filed his reply, traversing all these averments. In support of his reply, he has filed affidavits of Sumer Singh (his son), Hari Kishan son of Bankat Lal, Rupa Ram Darji, Chhagan Lal Mathur, Pukh Raj Prajapat and Beni Gopal besides his own affidavit. These deponents have controverted the averments made in the said application of the defendants. It may also be mentioned here that the Officer-Incharge Shyam Singh filed his affidavit in support of the said application and in his affidavit he has averred that paras No. 1 to 6 of the said application have been drafted on the basis of the record. No such record has been produced. Under these facts and circumstances, it can be well said that the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has great force the application has simply been moved to further delay the disposal of the case. As such the application deserves to be rejected. 8. No such record has been produced. Under these facts and circumstances, it can be well said that the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has great force the application has simply been moved to further delay the disposal of the case. As such the application deserves to be rejected. 8. No other point was raised in the second appeal. As a Upper Primary School is running in the suit praises, it would be just and proper to grant time of three years to the defendants to vacate it. 9. Accordingly, the second appeal is summarily dismissed. 10. The defendant-appellants are given time upto June 30, 1997 to vacate the suit premises and to deliver its actual and physical possession to the plaintiff-respondent provided the defendants deposit the entire amount of arrears of rent and mesne profits upto June 30, 1994 with costs of both the lower courts by July 31, 1994 in the plaintiff's bank-account whose particulars will be furnished by him within one month from today to the defendant appellant No. 2 through registered A.D. post and continue to deposit the mesne profits every month in the said bank-account. The amount deposited by the defendants in the post-office or court may be withdrawn by them. During this period, the defendants will not part with the possession of the suit premises and will deliver its actual and physical possession to the plaintiff by or on June 30, 1997.Appeal dismissed