ORDER : J.N. Bhatt, J. The sole question in focus in this petition is as to whether the order superseding Kotharia Gram Panchayat passed on 9-7-1993 by the Development Commissioner, Gujarat State, respondent No. 1, is legal and valid or not. 2. Firstly, the spectrum of relevant factual scenario leading to rise of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be enumerated at this juncture. Kotharia Gram Panchayat's election lastly came to be held in the month of August 1991 where in 12 members and one Sarpanch of the said gram panchayat came to be elected. The petitioner is the Sarpanch of the said gram panchayat. A notice dated 31-5-1993 was served on the said panchayat by respondent No. 1 (Commissioner) exercising powers under Section 297 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961 ('the Panchayats Act' for short) calling upon the panchayat to show cause as to why the panchayat should not be dissolved as the said panchayat is incompetent to perform the duties imposed on it. 3. The petitioner as Sarpanch responded to the said show cause notice on 15-6-1993 inter alia pointing out that the show cause notice is too vague and ambiguous and that the gram panchayat has not committed any illegality or irregularity warranting dissolution or supersession thereof. It was specifically denied that the gram panchayat has not made any persistent default in performance of its duties. The charges mentioned in the show cause notice which is produced at annexure A to the petition, were replied and the reply is produced at annexure B. Respondent No. 1 passed an order dated July 9, 1993 superseding the said gram panchayat for a period; of one year and accordingly, a notification in the official gazette was published on July 19, 1993. The Administrator came to be appointed for the said panchayat by the Commissioner in exercise of powers conferred under Section 297(4) of the Panchayat Act. Therefore, the petitioner who is the sarpanch of the Kotharia Gram Panchayat has knocked the doors of this Court for justice. 4. The respondents have appeared and resisted the petition by filing a common affidavit-in-reply inter alia contending that the impugned order of super-session for a period of one year of the Kotharia gram panchayat is legal, valid and justified. The averments made in the petition are controverted. 4. The respondents have appeared and resisted the petition by filing a common affidavit-in-reply inter alia contending that the impugned order of super-session for a period of one year of the Kotharia gram panchayat is legal, valid and justified. The averments made in the petition are controverted. It is contended that the show cause notice is also legal and there is no vagueness or ambiguity. Thus, the impugned order is defended. 5. Before the merits of this petition are examined in greater detail, the material undisputed aspects with their dates may be mentioned: 1. Show cause notice under Section 297 31-5-1993 2. Reply to show cause notice. 15-6-1993 3. Impugned order. 9-7-1993 4. Notification in official gazette. 19-7-1993 5. Intimation to the petitioner. 27-7-1993 6. Mr. Padival, learned advocate for the petitioner has questioned the impugned order on the following grounds: 1. That it suffers from non-application of mind. 2. That it suffers from non-observance of principles of natural justice. 3. That the impugned order is not a speaking order. 7. The aforesaid grounds of attack on the impugned order are countenanced by Mr. Mehta, learned Asstt. Government Pleader. He has fully supported the impugned order contending that there is no violation of principles of natural justice or any statutory provisions. According to his contention, the impugned order is reasonable, just and valid. 8. The aforesaid three grounds of attack are interconnected and interwoven. Therefore, it would be expedient to discuss them simultaneously. The contention that some of the grounds in the show cause notice served upon the petitioner under Section 297 of the Panchayats Act are vague and ambiguous appears to be justified. The show cause notice dated May 31, 1993 produced at annexure A enumerates as many as 14 charges against the gram panchayat. The substance of the charges against the gram panchayat is that, has acted beyond its jurisdiction and it has failed to perform its duties. Therefore, show cause notice is issued under Section 297 of the Panchayat Act. 9. Since attack is also made upon the said show cause notice, it would be necessary to, narrate the substance of 14 charges and applies given by the petitioner to each of the charges. Therefore, show cause notice is issued under Section 297 of the Panchayat Act. 9. Since attack is also made upon the said show cause notice, it would be necessary to, narrate the substance of 14 charges and applies given by the petitioner to each of the charges. The reply dated 15-6-1993 given by the petitioner is produced at annexure B. The sum and substance of the charges against gram panchayat and the reply to each of the said charges can be tabulated as follows: Charge No. 1: - Kotharia gram panchayat in its meeting held on 31-3-1992 passed resolution No. 3 resolving not to collect octroi from Kotharia Gamtal and to collect the octroi side Gamtal within the revenue limits that, the gram panchayat in its meeting held on 20-2-1992, as per resolution No. 2 has solved to collect octroi from all the places of Kotharia village. Despite that, vide resolution No. 3 dated 31-3-1992, the gram panels, has by its own agency, recovered octroi. Charge No. 2: - The Kotharia panchayat vide its resolution No. 3, dated 31-3-1992, resolved not to recover the octroi in the Gamtal and the same is not in consonance with the Panchayats Act and the rules. Therefore the Taluka Development Officer was directed on 8-4-1992 to collect the octroi both from Gamtal and revenue limits. Still, the same snot implemented. Common reply to charges Nos. 1 rand 2 :- As per the instructions of the taluka development officer dated 8-4-1992, the Kotharia gram panchayat has implemented the same and till dale, the gram panchayat has collected the octroi both from Gamtal and revenue limits. Thus, the gram panchayat has complied with the directions of the taluka development officer and, therefore, on both the charges, it cannot be said that the gram panchayat is acting outside the purview of the Panchayats Act. Charge No. 3: With regard to octroi rules, the gram panchayat has not acted in consonance with the tax and fee rules. Reply: The gram panchayat in its resolution for recovery of octroi has clearly resolved that octroi should be recovered at the rate on he basis of the schedule and for prescribing the said rate, the gram panchayat is empowered under Section 178 of the Panchayats Act. Reply: The gram panchayat in its resolution for recovery of octroi has clearly resolved that octroi should be recovered at the rate on he basis of the schedule and for prescribing the said rate, the gram panchayat is empowered under Section 178 of the Panchayats Act. Therefore, this charge is not true to the effect fiat the gram panchayat is not following the provisions of Tax and Fees Rules while fixing the rate of octroi. Charge No. 4: The gram panchayat has committed breach of the provisions of Section 8 of the Panchayat Act with regard to octroi. Reply: Under Section 87 of the Panchayat Act panchayat cannot modify or cancel the resolutions, once passed, for a period of three months. It is not clear from the show cause notice as to which resolution has been modified cancelled or changed within the period of three months. Therefore, unless it is clarified with reference to which resolution, the illegality has taken place and unless it is further clarified as to which resolution and the date of the said solution, it is not possible to give the reply and as and when further details are furnished, we reserve our right to give a detailed reply. It is further stated that even within the period of three months, with two third majority, the resolutions can be modified, changed or cancelled. Charge No. 5: With regard to resolution from octroi, the gram panchayat has frequently changed the resolutions and has caused loss to the gram panchayat. Reply: Depending on the exigency and circumstances, the gram panchayat has modified the resolutions as and when the same was required to do so. However, by such a change, no loss is caused to the gram panchayat. It is not clear in the show cause notice as to which resolution is modified and how the same has caused loss to the gram panchayat. Charge No. 6: On 8-4-1992, although there was no meeting of the gram panchayat, on 19- 4-1992, at 12 noon, from the residence of the members, signatures are obtained. Reply: On 18-4-1992, the meeting of the gram panchayat has in fact taken place and the charge in question is denied that on 19-4-1992, at 12 noon, signatures were obtained from the residence of the members. Reply: On 18-4-1992, the meeting of the gram panchayat has in fact taken place and the charge in question is denied that on 19-4-1992, at 12 noon, signatures were obtained from the residence of the members. Charge No. 7: The taluka development officer has directed not to implement a resolution and the order of the said direction was received by the gram panchayat on 24-2-1992. Yet, no steps are taken to cancel the Ijara and the Ijardar is permitted to go to the Court of law. Reply: Before the order dated 24-4-1992 of the taluka development officer came to be received by the gram panchayat, the decision to give the Ijara was already completed and executed. In the order dated 24-4-1992, there, is no direction to cancel the octroi Ijara. It is also denied that the Ijardars are permitted to go to Court of law since on 6-6-1992, the Ijardar has instituted the suit in the Court. At the time when the order dated 24-4-1992 was received by the gram panchayat, the gram panchayat bona fide believed that since the prohibited resolution having been already implemented and executed by giving the contract of Ijara to Ijardar, no steps are taken, since the order of taluka development officer has not given any direction to cancel the Ijara. Charge No. 8: - The taluka development officer has given directions to the gram panchayat to grant and cancel the octroi Ijara in accordance with the provisions of law and rules. Yet, the same has not been done so. Reply: In the order dated 24-4-1992 given by the taluka development officer, there is no instruction to cancel the Ijara. Ijara has been granted as per the order of taluka development officer dated 18-4-1992. Therefore, the taluka development officer has instructed to cancel the Ijara. However, at that time, when there was stay from the Civil Court against the cancellation of Ijara, the Ijara was not cancelled as otherwise, the same would amount to contempt of Civil Court. Immediately, on vacating the stay of the trial Court, the Ijara has been cancelled. Charge No. 9: The gram panchayat has issued the contract of octroi Ijara for the period of two years by providing a private contract to Arsibhai Naranbhai Padera without considering the demands of other applicants Reply: - For grant of Ijara, number of applications were made. Immediately, on vacating the stay of the trial Court, the Ijara has been cancelled. Charge No. 9: The gram panchayat has issued the contract of octroi Ijara for the period of two years by providing a private contract to Arsibhai Naranbhai Padera without considering the demands of other applicants Reply: - For grant of Ijara, number of applications were made. However, amongst those applicants, demand for Ijara of Arsibhai Naranbhai being the highest one, he has been given the Ijara. Therefore, the demands of other Ijardars/applicants are duly considered. Charge No. 10: The gram panchayat has not taken the steps with regarded to octroi Ijara although the order dated 24-4-1992 passed by the taluka development officer is approved by the order dated 23-10-1992 passed by the additional development commissioner. Reply: Immediately on receipt of the order dated 23-10-1992 of the additional development commissioner, the gram panchayat has moved necessary application for vacating the stay granted in the suit filed by the Ijardar being civil suit No. 499/92 and has requested the Court for early hearing of application for stay and the Court vacated the stay in the said suit on 22-3-1993 and immediately on 23-3-1993, Ijara has been cancelled. Charge No. 11: - Kotharia gram panchayat has not informed the higher office about the filing of suits in different Courts with regard to octroi Ijara. Reply: Only once, the taluka development officer has asked for the details of the suits, filed against the gram panchayat and the details in that regard have been already furnished. Charge No. 12: - The gram panchayat in buts meeting held on 18-4-1992, as per resolution No. 10, granted the octroi Ijara and on the same day, work order is also given. However, the agreement was done on 21-4-1993. Looking to the details of the agreement, the gram panchayat has done its activities which are in favour of the Ijardar and are against the interest of the gram panchayat. Reply: The agreement dated 21-4-1992 is in no way favouring the Ijardar and is not against the interest of the gram panchayat The agreement dated 21-4-1992 is done as per the resolution dated 18-4-1992. Reply: The agreement dated 21-4-1992 is in no way favouring the Ijardar and is not against the interest of the gram panchayat The agreement dated 21-4-1992 is done as per the resolution dated 18-4-1992. Charge No. 13: Within the limits of Kotharia despite frequent representations from the industrialist's factory owners and traders for compliance of rate of octroi and exemption of octroi and despite directions sought from the higher office for compliance of the law and rules no steps are taken. Reply: The question of considering the representations with regard to octroi rates from the industrialists, factory owners and traders would arise, if the same is in consonance with the law and rules. However, the traders with a view not to pay octroi or to pay less octroi have represented. However, as the same was against the interest of the gram panchayat, the same were not implemented As and when instructions are issued from the higher office, accordingly, actions are taken This charge in the show cause notice is not clear as to which instructions are not complied with. Charge No. 14: - Instructions of the higher office is not complied and as per the provisions of Section 179 of the Panchayat Act the decision to impose lump sum tax on different factories is not sent to the taluka development officer, till date. Reply: Instructions of the higher office are complied with. Decision to impose lump sum contribution in lieu of octroi on different factories cannot be implemented for the period during which the Ijara is in operation. 10. It would be seen from the aforesaid charge No. 4 that it is alleged that the gram panchayat has infracted the provisions of Section 87 of the Panchayats Act. It is true that is not mentioned as to how and when the provisions of Section 87 are violated. It would be necessary so that the petitioner could meet with the allegations property. Despite a specific request to supply further and better particulars in connection with charge No. 4, respondent No. 1 has not supplied such information for the reasons best known to them. Its therefore, true that charge levelled at serial No. 4 in the aforesaid table is ambiguous and vague and it was not possible for the petitioner to reply properly without further particulars and information. 11. Its therefore, true that charge levelled at serial No. 4 in the aforesaid table is ambiguous and vague and it was not possible for the petitioner to reply properly without further particulars and information. 11. Likewise, the charge No. 5, it was alleged that the gram panchayat has frequently changed the rates of octroi and thereby has caused loss to its revenue. This charge also is apparently very vague. Despite asking a clarification and further information, respondent No 1 has kept quiet. In view of the aforesaid charges 4 and 5, it could very well be seen that they are vague and ambiguous and it was not possible for the gram panchayat to meet with without further information and better particulars. Therefore, the aforesaid charges mentioned in the show cause notice suffer from the vice of ambiguity and vagueness. 12. The impugned order came to be passed exercising powers conferred on the State Government under Section 297 of the Panchayat Act. It would, therefore, be necessary at this stage to refer to the provisions incorporated in this section. The State Government is empowered for dissolution or supersession of a panchayat for default. A provision is also made in this section as to what procedure should be followed before passing an order under Section 297 of the Act. Section 297 reads as under: - "297. (1) If, in the opinion of the State Government, a panchayat exceeds or abuses its powers or is incompetent to perform or makes persistent default in the performance of, the duties imposed on it or functions entrusted to it under any provisions of this Act or by or under any other law for the time being in force, or fails to obey an order made under this Act by the panchayat superior thereto or by the State Government or any officer authorised by it, under this Act or persistently disobeys any of such orders the State Government may, after consultation with the district panchayat in the case of a panchayat subordinate to it and after giving the panchayat an opportunity of rendering an explanation, by order in the official gazette. (i) dissolve such panchayat, or (ii) supersede such panchayat for the period specified in the order; such period may be longer than the term for which the members of the panchayat would have held office under Section 17 if the panchayat had not been superseded under this section: Provided that the State Government may from time to time after making such inquiry as it may consider necessary by an order published in the official gazette extend the period of supersession of such panchayat until such date as may be specified in the order or by like order curtail the period of supersession. (2) When a panchayat, is dissolved or superseded, all members of the panchayat shall from the date specified in the order, vacate their office as such members. (3) When the panchayat is dissolved or superseded it shall be reconstituted, in the manner provided in this Act. (4) If a panchayat is dissolved or superseded: - (a) all the powers and duties of the panchayat shall, during the period of dissolution or supersession, as the case may be, the exercised and performed by such person or persons as the State Government may, from time to time appoint in that behalf; and (b) all property vested in the panchayat shall during the period of dissolution or supersession as the case may be, vest in the State Government; and (c) on the dissolution, or, as the case may be, on the expiry of the period of supersession, the panchayat shall be reconstituted in the manner provided in this Act, and the persons vacating office shall be eligible for re-election." 13. It is very evident from the aforesaid provisions that the State Government is empowered to dissolve such panchayat or supersede it for a period to be specified in the order but not longer than the term for which members of the panchayat would have held the officer under Section 70 if the panchayat had not been superseded, after observing the procedure prescribed therein. Thus, the State Government is empowered to perform its statutory power on the happening of any of the following events: 1. That the panchayat exceeds its power; 2. that the panchayat abuses its power; 3. that it is incompetent to perform statutory duties. 4. that is makes persistent default in performance of such duties. 5. Thus, the State Government is empowered to perform its statutory power on the happening of any of the following events: 1. That the panchayat exceeds its power; 2. that the panchayat abuses its power; 3. that it is incompetent to perform statutory duties. 4. that is makes persistent default in performance of such duties. 5. that it fails to obey an order by the superior panchayat or State Government; 6. that it persistently disobeys any of such orders. 14. If any one of the events occurs, the State Government after consultation with the district panchayat in case of a panchayat subordinate to it and after giving the panchayat an opportunity of rendering explanation, may pass an order dissolving or superseding the panchayat. 15. The main thrust raised in the present petition is that principles of natural justice and the mandate of the statutory provision of Section 297 are not observed. Therefore, it will be necessary to examine as to whether principles of natural justice and the statutory provisions are observed in their due spirit or not. More so, when an elective representative body in a democratic set up like ours is sought to be dissolved or superseded, the adjudicating authority is obliged to strictly observe the principles of natural justice statutory provisions and reasonable and fair exercise of powers under the Act. 16. One of the essential conditions for exercise of statutory power is to consult the district panchayat in case of a panchayat subordinate to it. It appear as from the record of the case that there is no as such, envisaged consultation made with the district panchayat concerned. It is true that the impugned order states that recommendation of the district panchayat to supersede Kotharia Gram Panchayat was made by passing resolution No. 2967 dated April 20, 1993 and it was considered by the State Government. However, there is no dispute about the fact that consultation was not done after the show cause notice dated 31-5-1993 was served on the gram panchayat. The gram panchayat had tendered its reply on June 15, 1993. 17. Consultation contemplated in Section 297(1) ought to take place after the stage of service of show cause notice so that the district panchayat can consider the nature of allegations and reply, if any, given by the gram panchayat and recommend or advise the State Government or tender its views. 17. Consultation contemplated in Section 297(1) ought to take place after the stage of service of show cause notice so that the district panchayat can consider the nature of allegations and reply, if any, given by the gram panchayat and recommend or advise the State Government or tender its views. Of course before consultation in a given case either views, recommendation or advice may not be tendered for variety of reasons. But the question which is required to be resolved at this juncture is as to at what stage, consultation is contemplated. Having regard to the underlying purpose and spirit of provisions of Section 297(1), it can safely be concluded that consultation ought to be after the stage of service of show cause notice and not prior thereto so that the State Government can take appropriate decision. Since there is net-work of as many as 13,000 gram panchayat, as reported to me, in the State of Gujarat, with a view to enabling the State Government to reach to a positive and clear conclusion before resorting to a drastic and extraordinary measure of dissolution or supersession, as advice could be availed of from the district panchayat under which the gram panchayat is functioning. In fact, it is this authority which can substantially throw light on certain aspects when the Government is seized of the topic for dissolution or supersession of a gram panchayat. Therefore, the intention of the legislature ought to be that consultation should take place not prior to initiation of proceedings but before the conclusion. So, it is pending proceeding-consultation and not pre-consultation as conceived by the legislature. Of course, it may happen at times that the district panchayat may ventilate its grievance or draw attention of the State Government about the defaults or lapses committed by a gram panchayat. But the contemplation of consultation appears to be pending proceeding. That means, it may be after initiation of the proceedings so that the district panchayat can effectively aid and throw substantial light on the charges against the gram panchayat and also at time reply given by the gram panchayat. 18. Again, in view of settled proposition of law, the word 'consult' implies conference of two or more persons or impact of one or two minds in respect of charge sheet or topic with a view to enabling them to evolve a resolution or decision if not say solution. 19. 18. Again, in view of settled proposition of law, the word 'consult' implies conference of two or more persons or impact of one or two minds in respect of charge sheet or topic with a view to enabling them to evolve a resolution or decision if not say solution. 19. In a case that arose under similar provisions in the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act, the Madras, High Court has in case of K. Thangavelu v. Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, reported in, AIR 1978 Madras 280, had occasion to consider the t nature and occasion of consultation with financing bank. The aspect in focus in this case was highlighted in this decision. At the stage of the issue of the above show cause notice no one knows as to what is going to happen ultimately. It is only the first respondent makes up his mind after due enquiry in relation to the irregularities referred to in the show cause notice that the financing bank has to be consulted with regard to the action proposed to be taken. If the consultation is before the issued show cause notice and if the first responded ultimately finds that the irregularities referred to in the show cause notice have not been established, the consultation earlier obtained will become a mere formality and it would be a sheer waste of time." The principle laid down in the said decision is quite correct and justified and this Court, therefore, is in full agreement with the said decision. It may be stated at this stage that the ratio the said decision of the Madras High Bull was again followed by the division bench of the Kerala High Court in Jose Juttivani v. Registrar, Cooperative Societies, AIR 1982 Kerala 12. Respondent No. 1 is obliged to hate effective and meaningful consultation with the district panchayat before passing an order of dissolution or supersession of a Panchayat subordinate to the district Panchayat. It will also be necessary for respondent No. 1 before forming any opinion under Section 297(1) of the Panchayats Act to send all relevant particulars and information to with copies of documents so that envisaged statutory consultation could be carried effectively and meaningfully. Any order for solution or supersession of a panchayat without such consultation will be invalid and legal. It will also be necessary for respondent No. 1 before forming any opinion under Section 297(1) of the Panchayats Act to send all relevant particulars and information to with copies of documents so that envisaged statutory consultation could be carried effectively and meaningfully. Any order for solution or supersession of a panchayat without such consultation will be invalid and legal. In the present case, no consultation is carried out as contemplated by the provisions of Section 297(1) of the Panchayats Act and, therefore, the impugned order passed by the late Government is evidently invalid and legal on this count itself. 20. Again, the impugned order of supersession of the gram panchayat shows non-application of mind. Even a person who is likely to be visited with civil or evil consequences has to be informed not only about the Charges against him but also reasons on which p order is based. A mere look at the impugned order shows that respondent No. 1 tolled to apply his mind and has passed the impugned order mechanically. In the penultimate para, of impugned order no reasons are mentioned. In the previous paras of impugned order, there is reproduction of charges and mention of reply given by the petitioner. In one para, details are mentioned as to who remained present on the date when Haring took place and when and how, and before passing the final order, only in one para, five to six lines are mentioned wherein it sonly stated that reply is not satisfactory and considering the recommendations of the district panchayat to supersede the gram panchayat, final order is passed which cannot be said to be a reasoned order. It is true that elaborate order like a judgment of Court need cite passed by the statutory authority. However, at least, some reasons on which the m of supersession is based ought to be disclosed. The resolution of the district panchayat before initiation of the proceedings to supersede is considered and relied on, as the main basis for passing the impugned order. It is an admitted fact that copy of the said resolution is never furnished to the petitioner. The resolution of the district panchayat before initiation of the proceedings to supersede is considered and relied on, as the main basis for passing the impugned order. It is an admitted fact that copy of the said resolution is never furnished to the petitioner. When serious charges as many as 14 in the present case are levelled and reply is submitted and an order culminating into political dissolution that of a panchayat is passed, it is expected of the authority which is functioning as quasi-judicial, to mention reasons on which the order is founded upon and the grounds which weighed with the authority concerned in a case where neither an appeal or revision provision is made in the statute. Therefore, a higher duty is cast on the authority to assign reasons for basing such a conclusion. 21. Again, when the question is to be tried and decided is as to whether such order is legal and valid or not with the aid of provisions of Article 226, it will be necessary for the Court to ascertain as to whether the authority concerned has observed the principles of natural justice and also the required statutory provisions or not. One of the important tests for observance of principles of natural justice is proper application of mind to the facts. A mere glance at the impugned order manifestly indicates that there is total non-application of mind on the part of respondent No. 1 before passing a drastic and extraordinary order of supersession of an elective body in a democratic set up like ours. Therefore, on his count also, the impugned order cannot be sustained. It has got to be quashed. 22. It is seen from the facts of the present case that a drastic remedy contemplated in the provisions of Section 297 of the Panchayats Act is resorted to by the State Government lightly. It is stated in the impugned order that the gram panchayat has failed to carry out statutory obligations and duties cast on it under the statute and the charges levelled in the show cause notice are found proved. It could very well be seen from the provisions of Section 297 that the State Government can pass an order dissolving or superseding a panchayat on one or more events stated above. It could very well be seen from the provisions of Section 297 that the State Government can pass an order dissolving or superseding a panchayat on one or more events stated above. However, mere irregularity or non-observance of some of the provisions of law without any allegation of malice would not constitute or cannot be said abuse or exercise of power exceeding the provisions of the statute for rendering it incompetent to perform or making persistent default in performance of duties. The main thrust of allegations in the show cause notice appears to be that the concerned panchayat has failed to carry out the provisions of law and thereby abusing its powers and making persistent default in performance of its duties imposed by the statute. Prima facie, out of 14 charges in the show cause notice, as observed above, two charges are found to be totally vague and ambiguous and four charges are levelled without proper application of mind. Such charges are referred in the impugned order. Apart from the fact that it is non-speaking order, the show cause notice would not be sufficient to give an opportunity to a gram panchayat to meet with the charges levelled against it. It was not possible to precisely or even broadly meet with serious charges levelled against it in the show cause notice issued against it. When some of the charges are vague and some of them show non-application of mind, principles of natural justice are not observed, apart from non-observance of statutory provisions of Section 297(1). 23. In case of some defaults or irregularities in performance of duties, the district panchayat itself is empowered under the provisions of Section 296 to see that such defaults or irregularities are rectified. Even the district panchayat is also authorised to appoint a person temporarily for due performance at the cost of the defaulting panchayat. It is an admitted position that the provisions of Section 296 were never invoked before resorting to the drastic remedy contemplated under Section 297. 24. Function can be classified in the following three categories: (i) administrative, (ii) quasi-judicial and (iii) judicial. In any one of the aforesaid functions, it is incumbent upon the adjudicating authority to exercise powers observing the principles of natural justice. What would be the scope and extent of the doctrine of natural justice obviously would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In any one of the aforesaid functions, it is incumbent upon the adjudicating authority to exercise powers observing the principles of natural justice. What would be the scope and extent of the doctrine of natural justice obviously would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A person was is going to be visited with civil or evil consequences must know what are the charges against him and what is the material to be used against him. He must have sufficient opportunity so that he could meet with such charges and material which may be documentary or oral. In short, in rule of law, the basic principles of natural justice ought to be observed before passing any adverse order against any person. 25. Case of a statutory authority and that too while resorting to a drastic and extraordinary remedy culminating into dissolution or supersession of an elective body in a democratic set up like ours stands on a higher pedestal. When a statutory authority in such a situation is empowered and conferred a right to dissolve or supersede an elective body, it must address itself to its duties and also observe principles of natural justice so that a person against whom an adverse order is passed cannot make a grievance that he did not precisely know as to what were the charges and material against him. In a situation like the present one, the statutory authority must keep the following guidelines before their mental reader before resorting to a drastic action of dissolution or supersession of an elective body: - (i) the statutory power ought to be exercised reasonably; (ii) the statutory power ought to be exercised bona fide; (iii) such authority must apply its mind; (iv) such authority is bound to give reasons for a statutory order; (v) statutory power must be exercised by the authority itself in whom it is vested; (vi) it must not exercise drastic and extraordinary powers rightly; (vii) it must also consider as to whether; other provisions of law will sub-serve the purpose in a given situation; (viii) it is bound to make clear and unambiguous charges; (ix) it must supply materials relied on for passing a statutory order; (x) it must see that statutory powers are observed strictly; (xi) it is also bound to observe the principles of natural justice in true spirit; (xii) it has to give reasons in support of passing such drastic order; (xiii) it must consult the district panchayat after initiation of the proceedings so that statutory consultation would be effective and meaningful. 26. In short, the statutory authority while passing a drastic order under Section 297 of the Panchayat Act, must address itself to the aforesaid questions and points before passing such order of dissolution or supersession. Of course these are illustrative and not exhaustive. 27. It would be interesting to refer to a Full Bench Decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court rendered in the case of Municipal Committee, Kareli v. State or M. P., reported in AIR 1988 M. P. 323. There was almost an identical before the Full Bench. In that case, re municipal committee, Karali was superseded by an order of the State Government. Certain charges were framed and explanation of the municipal committee was called for. The State Government, after calling for the report tom the Deputy Commissioner, decided to supersede the municipal committee and passed an order to that effect. The action of the Slate Government was questioned. 28. The learned Single Judge who dealt prate petition, following the decision of the too Bench held that it was not open to the Court to question the decision of the State Government. Correctness of the division bench ruling was doubted by another division bench Utah made a Reference. 29. The action of the Slate Government was questioned. 28. The learned Single Judge who dealt prate petition, following the decision of the too Bench held that it was not open to the Court to question the decision of the State Government. Correctness of the division bench ruling was doubted by another division bench Utah made a Reference. 29. it was held by the Full Bench that undoubtedly, the High Court can interfere in its wit jurisdiction if order superseding the municipality under Section 57 of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act is mala fide, arbitrary, without jurisdiction or in utter violation of the principles of law or natural justice. 30. In that case, the State Government had framed certain charges against the municipal committee and the latter submitted a detailed explanation giving facts and figures refuting the charges. The State Government, however, accepting the report of the sub-divisional officer which was not only vague but did not take into account the documents emanating from the Government and its officers superseded Ice municipal committee without verifying the detailed explanation submitted by it in respect of each and every charge. It was, therefore, held that the action of the State Government superseding the municipal committee was not reasonable and legal. Therefore, the impugned order in that case of supersession came to be quashed. The ratio of the full bench decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case. 31. It is settled proposition that an elective body or representative institution in a democratic set up where rule of law is not the ratio of the past but living force of the day should not be observed lightly and on uncertain and ambiguous charges, without observing principles of natural justice and statutory provisions. In a democratic society, effective institutions are heard and they should be allowed to function. Such an institution should not be dissolved or superseded on trumpery and vague charges and without giving an opportunity of being heard. It is, therefore, necessary for the Courts to be more cautious and vigilant to see that such over-reaching powers are kept within the four corners of the statute granting them. A reasonable opportunity of being heard has been made a condition precedent even in a statute to the exercise of drastic powers. No care is taken by respondent No. 1 to see that such essential requirements are observed properly. A reasonable opportunity of being heard has been made a condition precedent even in a statute to the exercise of drastic powers. No care is taken by respondent No. 1 to see that such essential requirements are observed properly. It is an admitted fact, apart from certain charges being vague and uncertain and non-application of mind emenating from a plain perusal of the impugned order, that copy of the resolution of the District Panchayat was also not furnished to the Gram Panchayat. Therefore, the material on which reliance was placed by the adjudicating authority was not furnished to the Gram Panchayat before passing the impugned order. This aspect is also fatal warranting quashing of the impugned order. 32. It is not in dispute that the entire record of the Gram Panchayat was seized by the Development Commissioner (respondent No. 1) and thereafter, show cause notice came to be served on the Gram Panchayat. It is averred in the petition that the Gram Panchayat had not been able to properly meet with the charges levelled in the show cause notice dated 31-5-1993 on the ground that the entire record was seized and the Panchayat had no access to it when a reply was required to be filed. It is also averred that the charges in the said notice are uncertain and vague. No specific denial about the averments made in the reply is made as regards seizure of the record before service of the show cause notice on the Gram Panchayat 33. Having regard to the facts and circumstances emerging from the record of the present case, this Court has not the slightest hesitation in finding that the impugned order is invalid and illegal and therefore, it merits quashing. 34. In the result, the impugned order of superseding Kotharia Gram Panchayat and the resultant notification and also the order of appointment of Administrator passed by respondent No. 1 are quashed and set aside. Petition is allowed with costs accordingly. Rule made absolute. Petition allowed.