B. N. KRISHNAN, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner herein was the respondent in Cr1. MIs. No. 47 of 1982 on the file of Addi. J. M. F. C. , Bhadravathi. That was a case instituted by the respondent herein for grant of maintenance to her and her son under Sec. 125 Cr. P. C. The learned Magistrate held that she was entitled to claim separate maintenance and directed the petitioner herein to pay a monthly maintenance of Rs. 400/-, with effect from January, 1989. This order of the learned Magistrate was challenged by the petitioner herein in Criminal Revision Petition No. 28 of 1990 and by the party in whose favour the order of maintenance was passed in Cr1. Rev. Petition No. 166/1989. Both these revision petitions came to be disposed of by the Addi. Sessions Judge, Shimoga, by a common order dated 1. 2. 1992. The learned Sessions Judge dismissed Cr1. Rev. Petition No. 28 of 1990 and allowed in part the other (Cr1. R. P. No. 166/1989) revision petition and directed that the maintenance of Rs. 400/- per month awarded should be paid with effect from 6. 9. 1982. It is being aggrieved by these orders of the Courts below, that the petitioner herein has filed this petition under Sec. 482 Cr. P. C. invoking the inherent powers of this Court to quash the orders of the two Courts below. ( 2 ) FOR the sake of convenience, the parties shall here after be referred to by virtue of the ranks they had occupied before the learned Magistrate. The petitioner sought for grant of separate maintenance on the following grounds: She was married to the respondent on 8. 7. 1975, the marriage having been solemnized as per Hindu Customs. At that time the respondent falsely represented to her that he had not married anyone and after her marriage to the respondent she came to know that respondent had illicit connection with one Sulochana daughter of Ganapathy Rao, a nurse working in Meghan Hospital, Shimoga and that he had entered into a registered marriaget with her at Davanagare. Despite the fact that he continued his association with Sulochana, she somehow managed to live with him, but he ill-treated her and forcibly sent her to her parents house on 22. 4. Despite the fact that he continued his association with Sulochana, she somehow managed to live with him, but he ill-treated her and forcibly sent her to her parents house on 22. 4. 1976 and later he never heeded to her request to take her back and at that time she was pregnant and later she gave birth to a male child on 10. 11. 1976 and the child was named Anil. The respondent filed a false matrimonial case in M. C. No. 11 of 1977 on the file of Civil Judge, Shimoga and later it came to be dismissed for default on 18. 4. 1980. The petitioner pleads that she is unable to maintain herself and respondent has sufficient means and therefore he should be directed to pay her minimum maintenance of Rs. 400/- per month towards her maintenance and that of her son. ( 3 ) THE respondent admitted that he did marry the petitioner, but he stated that the marriage was not on 8. 7. 1975 as alleged in the petition, but it was on 6. 7. 1975. That petitioner came to know after marriage that he was having illicit connection with Sulochana has been denied by him. That he entered into registered marriage with the said Sulochana was also denied by him. The illtreatment alleged by the petitioner was also denied. The fact that petitioner was unable to maintain herself was not disputed. That he has sufficient means has also not been disputed. Therefore, he pleaded that petitioner was not entitled to claim separate maintenance from him. ( 4 ) THE petitioner examined herself and four witnesses and respondent examined himself and three more witnesses. ( 5 ) THE learned Magistrate pointed out that though the petitioner had stated that the respondent had entered into registered marriage with Sulochana, respondent in clear and unequivocal terms had denied the factum of registered marriage as also his illicit connection with the said Sulochana. He also pointed out that if the respondent had admitted his marriage with Sulochana, the matter would have been entirely different. He also pointed out that if the respondent had admitted his marriage with Sulochana, the matter would have been entirely different. Though the learned Magistrate rightly noted that before he could decide the validity or otherwise of the 2nd marriage, the solemnization of the first marriage in due form had to be established, but nevertheless, the learned Magistrate held that it had to be established that the first marriage was performed according to Hindu customs and rites and as it had not been established that the marriage of respondent with Sulochana Jadhav was performed as required by the Hindu customs and that all ceremonies had been observed, it was not possible for him to hold that respondent had married Sulochana and therefore he came to the further conclusion that it would not in any way invalidate the marriage of the petitioner with the respondent. The learned Sessions Judge though proceeded to examine the aspect whether the respondent had been married to Sulochana also came to a conclusion that to invalidate the second marriage both the marriages must have been performed according to Hindu rites and then only the 2nd marriage would be null and void and as the marriage with Sulochana was a registered marriaget the decision in AIR. 1988 S. C. 644 was not attracted and therefore he held that the marriage of the petitioner with the respondent was a valid marriage and therefore he also concurred with the other findings of the learned Magistrate and affirmed the award of maintenance of Rs. 400/- per month, but held that it ought to have been awarded from the date of petition and modified the order to that extent as adverted to already. ( 6 ) IN the, course of this petition, the respondent has taken up two grounds. The first is, that the learned Sessions Judge had committed a serious mistake by holding that a registered marriage could not be recognised as a Hindu Marriage and that the reasoning adopted by the learned Sessions Judge in this regard is opposed to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court and further it has been stated that there was no scope for the learned Sessions Judge to have directed payment of maintenance from the date of petition. ( 7 ) THAT both the parties are Hindus is not in dispute. ( 7 ) THAT both the parties are Hindus is not in dispute. That the marriage between them was solemnized according to Hindu customs is also not in dispute. That, to pronounce on the validity of the said marriage it should be satisfied all the conditions in Sec. 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 is also not in dispute. One of the conditions imposed by Sec. 5 (i) of the Hindu Marriage Act (for short the Act) is neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage. If at the time of the marriage of the petitioner with the respondent, Sulochana could be construed as a spouse within the meaning of the said section, then, there could be no doubt that the marriage of the petitioner with the respondent does not conform to this essential ingredient of a valid Hindu marriage. Bearing in mind this aspect of the matter, the learned Advocate for the petitioner was questioned whether it had been made out that there was a valid marriage between his client and Sulochana and to that he replied that it was not for him to prove that there was such a valid marriage. Nevertheless it may be noticed that to hold that the condition imposed by Sec. 5 (i) of the Act is not fulfilled, it has to be held that Sulochana was a spouse within the meaning of the words as on the date of the marriage of respondent with the petitioner. ( 8 ) THE learned Advocate for respondent is perfectly justified in his criticism that both the Courts below were not right in their reasoning that in order to invalidate the second marriage the first marriage must be performed in accordance with the Hindu rites. The learned Advocate Sri H. G. Ramesh who appears for petitioner did not dispute the correctness of this contention advanced. He is also right in not challenging the said contention because there is nothing in the decision of the Supreme Court reported in A. I. R. 1988 S. C. 644 (supra) to the effect that in order to invalidate the second marriage, it must be established that a man with whom the second marriage was performed married the first wife as per Hindu rites. The head note in this decision is quite misleading and probably the two Courts below must have been guided mainly by head note (B) of the report and have come to a conclusion as adverted to already. As was pointed out, the Supreme Court in this decision has held that the point involved in the appeal was whether a Hindu woman who is married after coming into force of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 to a Hindu male having a living lawfully wedded wife can maintain application for maintenance under Sec. 125 of Cr. P. C. 1973? This necessarily presupposes that the Supreme Court has interpreted the word spouse occurring in Sec. 5 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act as a lawfully wedded wife spouse. Though the word spouse has not been defined in the Hindu Marriage Act, the meaning given to it in the dictionary is a husband and wife and having regard to the fact that we are concerned with the conditions under Sec. 5 of the Act, it is obvious that the husband or wife must be a lawfully wedded husband or wife and that is implied in the very first sentence in the judgment of the Supreme Court adverted to above. In a decision of the Kerala High Court in Narayanan v. Rajalakshmi, it has been observed as hereunder: Thus in proof of the non-existence of condition (i), it should be established that at the time when the ceremonies were conducted one of the parties to the marriage had a spouse living. The word in the context it is used can have reference only to a person lawfully wedded to the party concerned. Therefore, in order to disentitle a woman who has undergone the ceremony of marriage with a man, it should be proved that there was a legal marriage between either of the parties to the ceremony and another person which was subsisting at the time of such solemnization These observations go to support the conclusion that in order that a person could take advantage of non existence of condition 5 (i) of Hindu Marriage Act, it must be made out that there was legal marriage of that person with another lady and therefore this condition had not been satisfied. ( 9 ) THEREFORE, the next aspect that has to be examined is, whether it could be said that there was a legal marriage between the respondent and Sulochana and whether therefore she could be called a spouse of the respondent within the meaning of Section 5 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act as on the date of his marriage with the petitioner. On this aspect of the matter, it is rather a curious feature of this case that at the stage of the pleadings, the parties tookt exactly the opposite contentions than the ones advanced at a later stage of the proceedings. If the petitioner has pleaded in her petition that there was a registered marriage between the respondent and Sulochana, the respondent has denied in the course of his objection the said statement. But, for negativing the claim of the petitioner, the respondent now wants the Court to hold that there was a legal marriage between him and Sulochana and the petitioner wants to demolish such a case. As has been rightly pointed out by the learned Magistrate, if the respondent had accepted the case of the petitioner in this regard at the stage of the pleadings, the matter might have been altogether different. As the said aspect was disputed at the stage of the pleadings and as a finding on that question is necessary to conclude on the aspect whether the marriage of petitioner with respondent has not satisfied condition No. 1 adverted to already, I shall briefly refer to the material in this regard. As pointed out already, the respondent has denied in the course of his objection that there was a registered marriage between him and Sulochana and also denied even in the course of his examination before Court. He has categorically denied the correctness of the statement, that prior to his marriage with the petitioner he had a registered marriage with Sulochana. It may also be noticed that it is not the case of anyone that respondent had married. Sulochana in accordance with the Hindu customs and rites. The only documents which surprisingly come on record at the instance of the petitioner herself are Exs. P-li and P-12 in respect of the alleged registered marriage of the respondent with Sulochana. If we have to take that respondent is a party to Ex. Sulochana in accordance with the Hindu customs and rites. The only documents which surprisingly come on record at the instance of the petitioner herself are Exs. P-li and P-12 in respect of the alleged registered marriage of the respondent with Sulochana. If we have to take that respondent is a party to Ex. P11 and that it has been proved according to law, the recitals are to the effect that respondent and Sulochana had love and affection towards each other and they had also developed intimacy on that ground and they had decided to marry. It is to be seen whether execution of a document like this would amount to registered marriage. When the learned Advocate for the respondent was questioned as to w hat are the valid requisites of a marriage recognised under the Special Marriage Act, he stated that it was unnecessary for him to refer to those requirements in this proceeding. It may be noticed that Chapter II of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 refers to solemnization of Special Marriages, Sec. 5 contemplates issue of notice of the intended marriage and Sec. 6 refers to the job of the marriage officer to keep all the notices given under Section 5 and. to enter a true copy of such notice in the prescribed register and to give due publication to the said notice. Section 7 (1) of the said Act refers to the right of any person to object to the said marriage and Section 7 (2) refers to the case when the marriage may be solemnized if no objections are preferred before expiry of thirty days. The other sections refer to the procedure to be followed on receipt of objections by the marriage Officer. Sec. 11 refers to the declaration to be signed by the parties in the presence of the three witnesses and counter signature of the same by the marriage Officer and Section 13 refers to issue of certificate of marriage. Chapter III refers to registration of marriages celebrated in other form and registered under Chapter III. The document Ex. P-Il cannot be a substitute for the various formalities that are expected to be undergone either under chapter II or chapter III. Chapter III refers to registration of marriages celebrated in other form and registered under Chapter III. The document Ex. P-Il cannot be a substitute for the various formalities that are expected to be undergone either under chapter II or chapter III. If respondent who is the best person to state that he was in fact married to Sulochana has chosen to deny in his objection that there was a registered marriage between him and Sulochana and has also stood by that statement in the course of examination before Court and if Ex. P-li does not answer the requirements of either of the two chapters adverted to above, the mere statement of the petitioner in the course of her petition that there was registered marriaget between the respondent and Sulochana or the document Ex. P-li could by no means be sufficient to hold on that point that there was a valid marriage between the respondent and Sulochana or that therefore it should be construed that Sulochana was a spouse living within the meaning of Section 5 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act at the time of the marriage of petitioner with respondent. If that be so, it cannot be said that the condition of Section 5 (1) of the said Act has not been fulfilled in respect of the marriage of the petitioner with respondent. Hence, the decision of the Supreme Court cannot be pressed into service to hold that the marriage of the petitioner with respondent is a void marriage and therefore petitioner is not a wife within the meaning of Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code to claim maintenance from respondent. Though the reasoning given by the two Courts below regarding the validity of the marriage of the petitioner with respondent cannot be accepted the final conclusion arrived at by them has to be affirmed for the reasons adverted to above. ( 10 ) THE only other point taken up in the course of the petition filed before this Court by the respondent is, that there was no scope for the learned Sessions Judge to have directed appellant to pay maintenance from the date of petition. It may be noticed that sub section (2) of Section 125, Cr. P. C. enables the Court to direct payment of maintenance from the date of order or from the date of application for maintenance. It may be noticed that sub section (2) of Section 125, Cr. P. C. enables the Court to direct payment of maintenance from the date of order or from the date of application for maintenance. The learned Sessions Judge has given reasons as to why the maintenance should be awarded from the date of petition and I do not find any illegality in the grounds advanced by the learned Sessions Judge to modify the order of the learned Magistrate so far as the effective date from which the amount should be paid. Under the circumstances, I am satisfied that there is absolutely no scope for this Court to interfere, in exercise of the inherent powers of this Court, with the orders passed by both the Courts below. Therefore, petition is devoid of any merit. ( 11 ) IN the result, the petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.