JUDGMENT - A.A. HALBE, J. :---The important question posed in this writ petition is whether seeking permission by the school for opening higher classes of secondary stage tentamounts to opening a new school and that the conditions laid down in Rule 31 of the Goa, Daman and Diu School Education Rules, 1986 can be enforced in that process. 2. The petitioner Vidya Prasarak Samaj is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and is running a school known as Vidya Prasarak High School, Morjim, Pernem, Goa. The grievance made by the petitioner society is that the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 - respectively Chairman and Head Master of Shramik Sudharak Shikshan Sanstha which runs Peter Alvares Memorial High School at Morjim - sought for permission to open new standards VIIIth, IXth and Xth at various times inspite of the fact that the High School of the petitioner is existing in that locality namely Morjim, Pernem, Goa since last several years, and further that the Director of Education was pleased to accord those permissions although the said school is situated within the periphery of 5 kms. This has been patently prohibited under Rule 31(3) Proviso (iii) wherein it is clearly laid down that :-- "No secondary school of that category shall be opened within a radius of 5 kms. from the existing schools, unless the Director of Education is satisfied that the existing school is overcrowded and there is no scope for further expansion or there is no easy excess to the existing school due to natural barriers like forest area, rivers with running water or the proposed school is entirely for the benefit of backward class community, scheduled caste or Tribal pupils." This action on the part of the Director of Education has been the main bone of contention in this writ petition. 3. This has been countered by the respondents on the ground that the respondents society has been running a school upto Vth Standard and that the said school is a recognised school and further that the permission granted for opening higher classes is a permission granted under Rule 32, providing for opening of new classes in the school and the question of pressing into service Rule 31 does not at all arise. Heavy reliance is placed for the purpose on the case of (Harmal Panchkroshi Shikshan Mandal v. The State of Goa others)1, reported in 1990(1) Goa Law Times 22. According to the respondents, a clear ratio is laid down in this ruling that opening of higher classes amounts to opening new classes in an existing school and that the provisions of Rule 31 cannot be brought into operation for such permission. 4. In order to understand this controversy, the facts set out in the petition and resisted in the affidavits of the respondents shall have to be referred in somewhat more details. The petitioner runs the above High School since 1972 in the above area. That high school imparts education from V to X standard. On 4-6-1990, respondent No. 1 permitted Peter Alvares School to open new standard VIII from 1990. This permission was in contravention of the principles of natural justice as also Rule 31 of the said Rules. The petitioner, therefore, preferred Writ Petition No. 130 of 1990 before this Court and this Court, by its order dated 4-6-1990, quashed that permission and remanded the matter to respondent No. 1 - Director of Education - for fresh decision keeping in mind the provisions of the above Rules. 5. On remand, the respondent No. 1 issued order dated 6th January, 1990 inter alia permitting the petitioner to open one additional division for standards VIII, IX and X with effect from June, 1992 and further accorded permission to the petitioner to requisition the required number of students from school run by the respondent No. 3. It was also provided that in the event of students joining the petitioners school, the retrenched teachers shall have to be absorbed by the petitioners school. However, in addition to this, respondent No. 3 was permitted to continue VIII, IX and X standards by retaining only such number of students in such classes over and above the number of students requisitioned by the petitioners school. Sequel to this, the petitioners school wrote various letters dated 25-5-1992 and 25-6-1992 requisitioning the respondents school to send the students. However, the respondents did not pay any hint to these letters inspite of the order by the Director of Education dated 6th January, 1992. 6. Sequel to this, the petitioners school wrote various letters dated 25-5-1992 and 25-6-1992 requisitioning the respondents school to send the students. However, the respondents did not pay any hint to these letters inspite of the order by the Director of Education dated 6th January, 1992. 6. The petitioner, therefore, filed another Writ Petition No. 511 of 1992 praying therein that the respondent - Director - should enforce his order dated 6th January, 1992 and further prayed that in the event of disobedience by respondent No. 3 school, its recognition should be withdrawn in respect of standards VIII, IX and X. The judgment in this Writ Petition No. 511 of 1992 was delivered on 14th July, 1993 wherein this Court was pleased to observe that in the order dated 6th January, 1992, the findings given by the Director were based on extraneous consideration and accordingly, quashed the order dated 6-1-1992. This Court again remanded the matter to the respondent No. 1 for fresh consideration having regard to the relevant factors and provisions of Rule 31. 7. The respondent No. 1 - Director called for a meeting of the Heads of the petitioner and the respondent Societies, considered several aspects of the problem and passed the order dated 30th September, 1993 wherein the respondent No. 3 was granted permission to run standards VIII, IX and X. In substance, therefore, the order of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 511 of 1992 was not given due effect. There was complete disregard to Rule 31 of the Rules. According to the petitioner, the respondent Director lacks jurisdiction to grant permission to a school for standards VIII, IX and X within a radius of 5 kms. from the existing school of the petitioner. It was also alleged that there was no over crowding in petitioners school nor the school of respondent was meant for the benefit of backward class community or Scheduled Caste and in that light, the order dated 30th September, 1993 also deserves to be quashed, the same being arbitrarily passed. The petitioner, therefore, prayed for a writ of certiorary or a writ in the nature of certiorary or any other appropriate writ for quashing and setting aside the order dated 30th September, 1993 and further injuncting respondent No. 3 from admitting students to standards VIII, IX and X for the academic year 1994-95. 8. The petitioner, therefore, prayed for a writ of certiorary or a writ in the nature of certiorary or any other appropriate writ for quashing and setting aside the order dated 30th September, 1993 and further injuncting respondent No. 3 from admitting students to standards VIII, IX and X for the academic year 1994-95. 8. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent society, the Secretary Pereira averred that Rule 31 is not attracted since Peter Alvares Memorial High School is an existing school under the new Education Act. He has also contended that relying on the permissions granted by the Director, the respondent society has raised loan and has invested sizable amount in construction of the building and hence the permission should not be quashed. This seems to be the sum and substance of the affidavit submitted by the respondents secretary. 9. Our attention is also drawn to the affidavit filed by the Director of Education in Writ Petition No. 511 of 1992. The same is annexed to this petition and has been relied upon. In that affidavit, the Director has stated on oath that the population of village Morjim was more than 10,000 and that the second high school was viable in that area and in view of this, the permission was granted to the respondent society to open higher classes. In the affidavit filed by the Director of Education Shri Desai in Writ Petition No. 131 of 1990, it is contended that the school of the petitioner society was started in 1972 and that it is unable to cope up with the requirement of students at the present juncture, and further starting the new school would not affect the existing school of the petitioner and then the permission was granted to respondent society to open the above classes. 10. It is also necessary to take into consideration the affidavit filed by Pereria, the Secretary of respondent society in Writ Petition No. 511 of 1992, wherein it is submitted that the respondent Peter Alvares Memorial School was granted permission to start V, VI and VII standard prior to coming into force the Goa Education Act and in granting permission for higher classes, there was simply upgrading of this school and not opening of new school. These averments are reproduced here in order to understand the problem posed in this writ petition. 11. These averments are reproduced here in order to understand the problem posed in this writ petition. 11. The undisputed facts are that the Goa, Daman and Diu School Education Act, 1984 came into force on 22-11-1986. The Goa, Daman and Diu School Education Rules, 1986 were made in accordance with the above Act. The respondent society was granted permission to open V standard class on 16-6-1983; VI standard class on 27-6-1984 and VII standard class on 18-7-1985. It would be thus obvious that these permissions have been granted prior to coming into force of the above Act of 1984. The respondent school was thus running classes upto VII standard before the Act and the Rules came into force. The permission to start VIII standard class was granted on 4-6-1990; IX standard class on 17-5-1991 and X standard class on 10-3-1992 by the Director of Education. These permissions are indeed granted after the Act came into force. 12. The learned Advocate for respondent society has contended that Rule 32 shall have to be considered instead of Rule 31, as canvassed by the petitioner because admittedly, the respondent school is an aided school as well as recognised school. It has been in operation before the Act came into force and under section 5(5) of the Act, the respondent school shall be deemed to be the recognised school. This position is also not disputed. The clear position, which thus emerges is that, the respondent school running classes upto VII standard, has been recognised school. The learned Advocate for the respondents, relying on this proposition, has contended that opening of higher standards in an existing school would not tantamount to an intention to open new school, even though the permission relates to a standard falling in another stage, and as indicated, the ratio laid down in the above Harmal Panchkroshi Mandal, (supra) is heavily relied upon. 13. Now in order to understand this proposition, the facets of the Act of 1984, which came into force in November 1986, shall have to be taken into consideration. In order to provide better organisation and development of school education in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, the Legislative Assembly of Goa, Daman and Diu passed the above Act which, as indicated, came into force on 22-11-1986. In that Act, the school has been defined in section 2(u). In order to provide better organisation and development of school education in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, the Legislative Assembly of Goa, Daman and Diu passed the above Act which, as indicated, came into force on 22-11-1986. In that Act, the school has been defined in section 2(u). The said provision reads as under :--- "School includes a pre-primary, primary, middle, secondary and higher-secondary school and also includes any other institution which imparts education or training below the degree level but does not include an institution which imparts technical education." It would be thus obvious that school would include all types of schools except technical schools. It would include pre-primary, primary, middle, secondary, higher-secondary schools and also other training institutions. 14. Under section 5 of that Act, the procedure is laid down for recognising the school. Coming to the Rules, more particularly Rule 4, it is provided therein that the schools shall be classified by the Director of Education into pre-primary schools, primary schools, middle schools, secondary schools and higher-secondary schools. The reference to other part of this Rule is not necessary. It would be pertinent to note that middle school shall be a school imparting middle stage of education whether or not in addition to any education below the middle stage. Secondary school likewise is meant for secondary stage of education whether or not in addition to any stage of education below the secondary stage. Dwelling on the definition, middle stage means stage of education from classes V-VII (both inclusive). Secondary stage of school education having VIII-X classes or V-X classes, as the case may be and school is given the same definition as provided in the Act. 15. Relying on these definitions, the learned Advocate for the petitioner has contended that when there is a classification provided under the Rules, what is envisaged is existence of middle school imparting education from classes V to VII; secondary school imparting education from VIII to X standard. He has urged that when classification is provided, it should be clearly construed that asking permission for secondary school classes is nothing short of opening a new secondary school. He has urged that when classification is provided, it should be clearly construed that asking permission for secondary school classes is nothing short of opening a new secondary school. He has also relied on sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 which lays down that where the Administrator is of the opinion that, as a result of a school falling in one category, ceasing to fall in that category or the acquisition by a school of a status justifying its re-classification to a higher or lower category, it is necessary so to do, he may re-classify such school into such category as he may think fit. According to him, this also means that separate schools exist for separate stages of education namely middle stage, secondary stage, primary stage etc. 16. He has also relied on Rule 7 Proviso which also, according to him, contemplates existence of middle school. In that light of the matter, according to him, when the respondent society asked for permission to open classes of secondary stage namely VIII, IX and X, there was clear case of the respondent society asking for opening a new school and as soon as that stage is reached, the third proviso to Rule 31(3) would come into operation. The same has been patently breached in this case and hence the permission granted by the Director of Education should be quashed in respect of standards VIII, IX and X. 17. As against this, the learned Advocate for the respondents has contended that the above classification itself provides for existence of a secondary school wherein any stage of education below the secondary stage would be included. He has urged that secondary schools can exist for classes V to X. He has also placed reliance on definition of secondary stage given in Rule 2(i) which includes a secondary school having classes from V to X standard. In this case, the school runs classes upto VII standard and it is, therefore, a secondary stage and asking permission for higher classes would be asking permission under Rule 32, which relates to opening of new classes in the school. 18. The school defined in the Act included all types of schools and it would be evident that if the school opens various classes from stage to stage i.e. from middle school to secondary school it cannot be said that permission is for opening new school. 18. The school defined in the Act included all types of schools and it would be evident that if the school opens various classes from stage to stage i.e. from middle school to secondary school it cannot be said that permission is for opening new school. Even if reliance is placed on Rules, the classification clearly includes secondary school including middle school; middle school including primary school and primary school including pre-primary school. The higher secondary school would also include classes where education is imparted for lower classes. Hence on no reckoning it can be said that opening of classes for higher standards can be said to be opening a new school. Even under the provisions relied upon by the learned Advocate for the petitioner, namely Rule 4(2)(b), it is clearly implied that the same school could be either upgraded or down-graded. Upgrading does not tantamount to opening a new school. 19. The learned Advocate for petitioner has relied on Grant-in-aid Code for secondary schools etc. He has drawn our attention to Rules 1, 3 and 5. In regard to this Grant-in-Aid Code, it will have to be stated that it is a Code of Rules for granting aid to secondary schools, colleges, etc. It is the Code passed by the Administrator. It relates only to secondary school and the conditions of recognition. In Rule 3, it is stated that new school should not encourage an unhealthy competition with the existing institution. There is also provided Rule 5 for opening higher standards. The secondary stage seems to include both standards V to VII and VIII to XI, which can correspond with the present standards V to X in the 10+2 pattern of education. 20. From the above Rules, of Grant-in-aid Code, it can be easily gathered that secondary school would include all standards from V to XI. Possibly keeping this view in mind, there is a similar provision in the Rules of 1986. The secondary stage is shown as a stage of school education from VIII to X standards or from V to X standards. It, therefore, follows that classes from V to X would come within the secondary stage. Possibly keeping this view in mind, there is a similar provision in the Rules of 1986. The secondary stage is shown as a stage of school education from VIII to X standards or from V to X standards. It, therefore, follows that classes from V to X would come within the secondary stage. If the school chooses to classify itself as a middle stage school, imparting education for classes V to VII, the same can be done but nothing prevents the same school from deeming it as a secondary stage school by virtue of the above definition. We have indicated that Rule 4 provides for secondary school imparting education below the secondary stage as well. The reverse anology would be that the school seeking permission to open higher standards shall be the secondary school. 21. In the Harmal Panchkroshi case, (supra), this Court, on the detailed reasoning, found that under the definition in section 2(u) of the Act and Rule 2(j) of the Rules, the word school would include middle and secondary school as well. The following observations can be noted for facility :-- "It is true that classes VIII and IX were started after the coming into force of the New Act and Rules. The school run by the petitioner society was, we have already held, an `existing school with permission to open classes upto VII standard. Further question that arises for consideration is whether for the purpose of opening standards VIII and IX the school was intending to open a new school or it was only a case of an existing school opening new classes. In our judgment, mere fact that section 2(u) of the New Act and Rule 2(j) of the New Rule inclusively define the word `school as meaning pre-primary, primary, middle, secondary, high secondary schools etc. does not lead to a necessary inference that each stage of the school amounts to opening of a new school. On the other hand, it only means that if there is a school even having middle classes, it is a school so long as it is a recognised school. In this view of the matter, we are afraid that Rule 31 is not applicable in this case at all. On the other hand, it only means that if there is a school even having middle classes, it is a school so long as it is a recognised school. In this view of the matter, we are afraid that Rule 31 is not applicable in this case at all. As regard Rules 37(ii) and 27(xx) of the New Rules, assuming they apply to schools entitled to protection under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, their application will have to be examined from the point of view of the minority religious community. Moreover, it has not been established by the petitioners that their school was in any way affected adversely by the opening of the school run by the respondent society. The Government in its affidavit has not even made an averment that the rules are violated." 22. The learned Advocate for petitioners, disputing those observations has contended that this was not the grievance made before the Court and this cannot be termed as a deducible ratio. The controversy was with regard to minority school under Article 30 of the Constitution and it is in the background of this constitutional provision that the Court held that opening higher classes cannot amount to opening a new school. We are afraid that this argument cannot sustain in view of the fact that the problem has been scrutinised from all angles namely under Article 30 of the Constitution and also under the provisions of new Act and Rules. The correspondence was relied upon and that is why the Court also viewed the matter from another angle in the background of New Rules. 23. Generally speaking, illiteracy has been baneful to the Nation at large and Governments have made all out efforts to promote education amongst illiterate masses. Various State legislations have been enacted to infuse sense of acquiring education and knowledge. Hence interpretation of laws relating to spread of education should be towards advancement of that aim and object. Provision should not be so construed as to put obstacles in achieving that purpose. On the other hand, interpretation should be inharmony with the above object. If the argument of the petitioner has to be accepted, it would be difficult for the middle schools to open secondary schools in case Rule 31 has to be brought into force. Provision should not be so construed as to put obstacles in achieving that purpose. On the other hand, interpretation should be inharmony with the above object. If the argument of the petitioner has to be accepted, it would be difficult for the middle schools to open secondary schools in case Rule 31 has to be brought into force. Ultimately, students seek admission for completing their secondary school course in one school and not wish to confine themselves to middle school course. It will be rather hazardous to say that as soon as permission is sought for higher standard classes, Rule 31, which lays down several restrictions for opening a new school, shall have to be pressed into service. We may indicate that Rule 31 lays down geographical limitations to the opening of a new school. No secondary school can be opened within the radius of 5 kms. and if these restrictions are to be enforced in opening higher classes, there will be virtually a permanent bar for the middle schools to open higher classes. 24. Rule 32, on the other hand, lays down provisions for opening new classes in the school. Again a safeguard is provided in Rule 32 that when a school desires to open new classes, the previous permission of the Director of Education would be necessary. This can be construed as an implied obligation on the Director to scrutinise all aspects about opening new classes. However, before parting with this matter, we may refer to the permissions granted by respondent No. 1 - Director of Education for Standards VIII, IX and X in the year 1990-91, 1991-92 and 1992-93. The learned Advocate for respondent No. 3 has submitted that they shall abide by the conditions mentioned in these permissions, but respondent No. 3 school should be allowed to go ahead with the secondary school classes upto X. In this behalf, we also observe that respondent No. 1 should see that conditions in the permissions and in Rule No. 32 are scrupulously implemented by respondent No. 3 school. With these observations, we affirm that Rule 32 and not Rule 31 will come into play in this matter and the grievance of the petitioner in this behalf does not survive. Accordingly, petition deserves to be dismissed. 25. Rule discharged. Writ petition dismissed with no order as to costs. Interim orders stand vacated. Petition dismissed. *****