DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned single Judge (K. G. Shah, J.) in Civil Appeal No. 695 of 1977 decided on 5th April 1993. Thereby the learned single Judge affirmed the judgment and the decree passed by the learned Judge of Court No. 6 of the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad on 28th February 1977 in Civil Suit No. 1517 of 1970. The learned trial Judge decreed the suit for possession of the premises in occupation and possession of the appellant herein (the suit premises for convenience ). ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this appeal are not many and not much in dispute. The suit premises were taken on lease for and on behalf of the appellant. It is a club carrying on cultural and recreational activities. It has certain members using the premises taken on lease for the appellant club (the club for convenience ). The respondent served to the appellant what is popularly known as quit notice on 24th october 1969 terminating the appellants tenancy and calling upon it to hand over the possession of the suit premises as mentioned therein. The appellant did not vacate the suit premises. Thereupon, the respondent herein filed one suit in the City Civil court at Ahmedabad against the appellant inter alia for recovery of possession of the suit premises. It came to be registered as Civil Suit No. 1517 of 1970. The appellant herein filed its written statement at Exh. 11 on the record of the case and resisted the suit on various grounds. It inter alia contended that the club was not a registered entity and it cannot be sued in that capacity. The respondent herein thereupon amended its plaint and styled its suit as the one under a representative capacity to attract the provisions of Order I Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (the Code for brief ). The suit thus came to be filed against memebrs of the club as well. The main contention of the appellant herein before the trial Court was that it was a tenant of the suit premises and it was, therefore, entitled to protection of the Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (the Act for brief ). In that view of the matter, according to the appellant in its written statement at Exh. In that view of the matter, according to the appellant in its written statement at Exh. 11 on the record of the case, the suit will have to be filed in the forum named in Sec. 28 of the Act, that is, the Rent Court, as is popularly known in the litigants parlance. The suit appears to have been assigned to Court No. 6 for trial and disposal. The necessary issues arising from the pleadings of the parties were raised at Exh. 47 on the record of the case. After recording evidence and hearing the parties, by his judgment and decree passed on 28th February 1977 in Civil Suit no. 1517 of 1970, the learned Judge of Court No. 6 of the City Civil Court at ahmedabad decreed the suit inter alia for possession. That aggrieved the appellant herein. He, therefore, preferred an appeal against it before this Court. It came to be registered as Civil Appeal No. 695 of 1977. It came up for hearing before our learned brother K. G. Shah, J. By his judgment pronounced on 5th April 1993, the aforesaid civil Appeal came to be dismissed. It may be mentioned at this stage that the present appellant had moved two Civil Applications bearing Nos. 3787 and 3788, both of 1982, in the aforesaid Civil Appeal. One application was for amendment of the written statement. The other application was for an order of remand permitting the parties to adduce evidence with respect to the amended plea in the written statement. By his order passed on 5th April 1993, the learned single Judge rejected both the applications. That aggrieved the present appellant. It has, therefore, preferred this letters Patent Appeal before this Court questioning the correctness of the aforesaid judgment pronounced by the learned single Judge on 5th April 1993 in the aforesaid civil Appeal and also the common order passed in the aforesaid two applications rejecting the same. ( 3 ) THE submission urged by Shri R. K. Shah for the appellant to the effect that the demised premises consisted inter alia of the land appurtenant to the building deserves no consideration at this stage for the simple reason that what was the extent of the demised premises would be a question of fact. ( 3 ) THE submission urged by Shri R. K. Shah for the appellant to the effect that the demised premises consisted inter alia of the land appurtenant to the building deserves no consideration at this stage for the simple reason that what was the extent of the demised premises would be a question of fact. The learned trial judge, on careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the demised premises did not include the appurtenant land. The learned single judge again, on careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, affirmed that finding. It is a pure finding of fact. It is not shown to be perverse in any manner. It is not found to be so. This Letters Patent Appeal would be in the nature of a second appeal. This Court need not, therefore, go into any question of fact which is concluded by the first appellate Court. ( 4 ) RELYING on the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Haji ismail v. Sports Club, reported in AIR 1992 SC 1855 , the learned single Judge has come to the conclusion that the Act is not applicable to the suit premises as it does not fall within the purview of Sec. 6 thereof. In that case, the premises were let out to a club. In a suit for eviction, the contention of the Club therein was that the premises would be governed by Sec. 6 of the Act in view of the fact that the Club was carrying on educational activities. In that context, the Apex Court has held :"the activities of the Club are more in the nature of cultural activities or recreational activities. They are certainly not for education. In our view, in the context in which the term education appears, it does not refer to such cultural activities or recreational activities as amounting to education. The basic purpose of the Club activities relate to fraternising among the members by playing indoor or outdoor games or otherwise. Such activities cannot lead the conclusion that the premises were let for purposes of education and consequently the respondent-tenant was not entitled to the protection of the Act. "we are bound by the aforesaid dictum of law pronounced by the Apex Court. Such activities cannot lead the conclusion that the premises were let for purposes of education and consequently the respondent-tenant was not entitled to the protection of the Act. "we are bound by the aforesaid dictum of law pronounced by the Apex Court. In that view of the matter, the learned single Judge was right in coming to the conclusion that Sec. 6 of the Act was not applicable to the suit premises. ( 5 ) IN the order to get out of the clutches of the aforesaid binding ruling of the supreme Court, Shri Shah for the appellant has submitted that the Club has been carrying on business activities in the suit premises and it would, therefore, fall within the purview of Sec. 6 of the Act. ( 6 ) AT this stage it would be quite proper to mention that, in the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Haji Ismail (supra), the trial Court had passed the decree for possession on the ground that the Act was not applicable but the first appellate Court upset that decree by holding that the Act was applicable as the suit premises was let to the tenant/club for purposes of business. Before the high Court, that plea was subsequently given up as mentioned in para 14 of the aforesaid ruling at page 1857. It was not reiterated before the Supreme Court at the time of hearing. Perhaps that might not have been found worthwhile doing so. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the Supreme Court was aware of such contention having been taken before the first appellate Court. And yet, the Supreme court chose not to deal with it. In that view of the matter, it can be presumed that the Supreme Court might not have found that plea worth considering for the purpose of deciding the fate of the matter before it. It would not, therefore, be necessary for us to consider the submission urged before us by Shri Shah for the appellant to the effect the suit premises would fall within the purview of Sec. 6 of the Act on the ground that the club carries on business activities. ( 7 ) WE are fortified in our view by the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of B. M. Lakhani v. Malkapur Municipality, reported in AIR 1970 SC 1002 . ( 7 ) WE are fortified in our view by the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of B. M. Lakhani v. Malkapur Municipality, reported in AIR 1970 SC 1002 . It has been held therein that a binding ruling of the Supreme Court cannot be ignored on the ground that a particular relevant provision was not brought to its notice. It thus becomes clear that a binding ruling of the Apex Court cannot be distinguished on the ground that it is sub silentio. ( 8 ) TO the same effect is the ruling of this Court in the case of Jivanbhai v. Gulam Mohmed, reported in 1979 (20) GLR 726. It has been held therein :"it is not open to the High Court to sit in judgment over the Supreme Courts judgment on the ground that some such provision was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court or the Lordhsips of the Supreme Court had not addressed themselves to that particular provision. The ultimate presumption in such cases should be that such a provision was brought to the notice of the Supreme Court and still they did not think it worthwhile to deal with the same". We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid statement of law found in the aforesaid ruling of this Court in the case of Jivanbhai (supra ). Simply because the case in Haji Ismail (supra) was not examined from the angle whether or not the club could be said to be carrying on any business activities would not be a ground for distinguishing the said binding ruling of the Supreme Court for the purpose of this appeal, more particularly when the Supreme Court was aware of the fact that such point was taken before the first appellate Court and it found favour in its decision, and yet, the Supreme Court did not think it fit to deal with it in the case under reference. If there was any merit in the said plea, the Supreme Court would have certainly thought it fit to deal with it and to decide the fate of the appeal before it by accepting such contention. If there was any merit in the said plea, the Supreme Court would have certainly thought it fit to deal with it and to decide the fate of the appeal before it by accepting such contention. ( 9 ) IN view of our aforesaid discussion, it would not be necessary for us to deal extensively with the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of S. Mohanlal v. R. Kondiah, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1132 relied on by Shri Shah for the appellant in support of his aforesaid submission. In that case, the expression "business" came to be interpreted by the Supreme Court in the context of the andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (the AP act for brief ). In that case, a practising Advocate had taken some premises on lease for his professional purpose. The question arose whether or not the Advocates profession could be said to be business for the purposes of the applicability of the ap Act. In that context, the Supreme Court held that the legal profession as practised by an Advocate would fall within the purview of "business" for the purpose of the applicability of the AP Act. It transpires from the aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court that it has been found that the legal profession has in it an element of commerical activity. Any commercial activity would take within it some money spinning activity. An Advocate renders his services to his clients for and against some consideration. It may be that, in a given case, he might render gratuitous service. However, in pursuit of his profession, he would certainly keep his eye on his earnings by way of professional fees or charges. So far as the club is concerned, its activities are more in the nature of cultural and recreational. Even if it renders catering services to its members, it cannot be said to be by way of business in any manner. The appellant-Club does not carry on any restaurant in the Club premises for the purposes. ( 10 ) BESIDES, in the instant case, the Club is an unregistered body. It can, therefore, be said to be an unregistered association of persons. If the Club renders any catering services to its members, the transaction in that case can be said to be between members and members. ( 10 ) BESIDES, in the instant case, the Club is an unregistered body. It can, therefore, be said to be an unregistered association of persons. If the Club renders any catering services to its members, the transaction in that case can be said to be between members and members. The Club is not an entity different or separate from its members. Any transaction between the members within the Club inter alia would not by itself partake any character of any commercial activity. The activities of the Club can, therefore, be said to be not in the nature of any business activities even from this angle. The premises taken on lease by the Club for its members would not, therefore, fall within the purview of Sec. 6 of the Act on the ground that it carries on business activities. ( 11 ) IT is difficult to accept the submission urged before us by Shri Shah for the appellant to the effect that the controversy arising in the present litigation would fall within the purview of Sec. 28 of the Act and Rent Court alone will have jurisdiction to try the suit. The reason therefore is quite simple. It is true that the relationship between the parties is that of the landlord and the tenant. It is also not in dispute that the suit relates to the recovery of possession of the rented premises. The third essential ingredient for applicability of Sec. 28 of the Act to the effect that the claim or question should have arisen under the Act is found missing. Applicability of Sec. 6 of the Act to the rented premises can by no stretch of imagination be said to be a claim or question arising under the Act. It is an independent question de hors the section. It can always be examined by a civil Court exercising jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit. If the Court comes to the conclusion that the Act applies to the rented premises, any claim or question arising thereunder will have to be decided by the Rent Court and none else. But the basic question whether or not the Act applies to the rented premises is always a question traible by a competent civil Court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit. But the basic question whether or not the Act applies to the rented premises is always a question traible by a competent civil Court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit. ( 12 ) WE are unable to accept the submission urged before us by Shri Shah for the appellant to the effect that, since the defendant raised an issue regarding applicability of the Act to the rented premises, the matter should have been decided by the Rent Court in view of Sec. 28 thereof. In this connection, the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Topandas v. Gorakhram, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1348 provides a complete answer. The jurisdiction of the ordinary civil court is not lost simply because the defendant raises a plea of tenancy governed by the Rent Act. In the aforesaid binding ruling in the case of Topandas (supra), the Supreme Court has held : "section 28, no doubt, gives exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of Small Causes to entertain and try a suit or proceeding between a landlord and a tenant relating to recovery of rent or possession of any premises to which any of the provisions of Part ii apply ; it also gives exclusive jurisdiction to decide any application under the Act and any claim or question arising out of the Act or any of its provisions - all this notwithstanding anything contained in any other law. But the section does not say or intend to say that the plea of the defendant will determine or change the forum. It proceeds on the basis that exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on certain Courts to decide all questions or claims under the Act as to parties, between whom there is or was a relationship of landlord and tenant. It does not invest those Courts with exclusive power to try questions of title, such as questions as between the rightful owner and a trespasser or a licensee, for such questions do not arise under the Act. If, therefore, the plaintiff in his plaint does not admit a relation which would attract any of the provisions of the Act on which the exclusive jurisdiction given under Sec. 28 depends, the defendant by his plea cannot force the plaintiff to go to a forum where on his averments he cannot go. " (Emphasis supplied ). If, therefore, the plaintiff in his plaint does not admit a relation which would attract any of the provisions of the Act on which the exclusive jurisdiction given under Sec. 28 depends, the defendant by his plea cannot force the plaintiff to go to a forum where on his averments he cannot go. " (Emphasis supplied ). The aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court is in all fours applicable in the present case. The respondent as a plaintiff has filed a suit on the basis of relationship between the parties governed by a Transfer of Property Act. 1889. The appellant as the defendant has raised a plea that the suit premises were governed by the Act. It was for the respondent herein as the plaintiff to choose its own forum. If the court upheld the contention of the defendant to the effect that the suit premises were governed by the Act, the respondent as the plaintiff would have been nonsuited. simply because the appellant herein as the defendant raised the plea that the act would be applicable to the suit premises would not change the forum for trial of the suit in view of the aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Topandas (supra ). ( 13 ) IT is not necessary extensively to deal with the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Sushila Kashinath Dhonde v. H. G. Bhogani, reported in AIR 1971 sc 1495 relied on by Shri Shah for the appellant in support of his submission that sec. 28 of the Act would govern the proceedings. In that case, the claim arose under sec. 18 (3) of the Act. In that context, the Supreme Court has held that the proceedings would be governed by the Act. The question whether or not the Act was applicable to the suit premises did not airse in that proceeding. In that view of the matter, the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Sushila Kashinath (supra) would not come to the rescue of the appellant in the present appeal. ( 14 ) SHRI Shah for the appellant has then made grievance about the order passed by the learned single Judge on 5th April 1993 rejecting both the applications made by the present appellant in its Civil Appeal before this Court. ( 14 ) SHRI Shah for the appellant has then made grievance about the order passed by the learned single Judge on 5th April 1993 rejecting both the applications made by the present appellant in its Civil Appeal before this Court. As pointed out hereinabove, one application was for amendment in the written statement and the other application was for an order of remand for permitting the parties to adduce evidence on the amended plea. The learned single Judge rejected the application for amendment on the ground that the appellant herein tried to introduce an absolutely new case about 22 years after filing of the suit and the written statement and about 16 years after the date of the trial Courts judgment and decree. We think the learned single Judge has rightly rejected the application for amendment. ( 15 ) IT is not in dispute that by amendment the appellant herein wanted to contend that it was carrying on business activities in the rented premises. That plea was never taken in the written statement as it was originally filed. There was no basis in the written statement for such plea. The said plea involving investigation into facts was taken up for the first time about 22 years after filing of the written statement and about 16 years after the date of the decree passed by the trial Court without any basis in the written statement as originally filed. ( 16 ) IN this connection, a reference deserves to be made to the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham, reported in AIR 1965 SC 1008 . In that case, plea of fraud was sought to be introduced by way of amendment. In that context, while justifying refusal of leave to amend, the Supreme Court has held :"that ground is where the plaintiffs are making out a case of fraud for which there is not the slightest basis in the plaint as it originally stood. " ( 17 ) IN view of the aforesaid binding dictum of law, we are of the opinion that the learned single Judge has rightly rejected the present appellants application for amendment in the Civil Appeal in question. " ( 17 ) IN view of the aforesaid binding dictum of law, we are of the opinion that the learned single Judge has rightly rejected the present appellants application for amendment in the Civil Appeal in question. ( 18 ) THE binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Ishwardas v. State of M. P. , reported in AIR 1979 SC 551 as relied on by Shri Shah for the appellant deserves to be distinguished on the ground that in that case some material justifying amendment was found on record. Besides, what was sought to be introduced by way of amendment was a plea of res judicata. A plea of res judicata would go to the root of the matter. As pointed out hereinabove, by amendment, the appellant herein wanted to introduce a new case without any basis in the original written statement to the effect that the Club was carrying on business activities. That would involve investigation into facts. As rightly held by the learned single Judge, the present appellant could not be permitted to introduce such a new case involving investigtion into facts afresh after a lapse of 22 years from the date of the filing of the written statement and 16 years from the date of the decree passed by the trial Court. ( 19 ) ACCEPTANCE of the other application for seeking remand of the matter was dependant upon grant of the first application seeking amendment in the written statement. Since the application for amendment in the written statement was rejected, the other application for seeking remand could not have met any other fate except its rejection. No fault can, therefore, be found with the order also rejecting the said application seeking remand of the matter for permitting the parties to adduce evidence on the amended plea in the written statement. ( 20 ) THESE were the only submissions urged before us in support of this appeal. We have found no merit or substance in any of the aforesaid submissions. This appeal therefore, deserves to be dismissed. . ( 21 ) IN the result, this appeal fails. It is hereby dismissed with costs. ( 20 ) THESE were the only submissions urged before us in support of this appeal. We have found no merit or substance in any of the aforesaid submissions. This appeal therefore, deserves to be dismissed. . ( 21 ) IN the result, this appeal fails. It is hereby dismissed with costs. ( 22 ) SHRI Shah for the appellant orally prays for stay of the operation of this judgment for a period of 4 (four) weeks from today to enable the aggrieved appellant to approach the Supreme Court against this judgment of ours. We have not found this request worthy of favourable consideration. It is, therefore, rejected. .