H. N. TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) THIS application is under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The office has reported that the Appeal is barred by time by 16 days. The suit has been dismissed by the Trial Court by judgment and decree dated 28-3-1994. It appears that the application for copy of the judgment and decree had been moved on July 12, 1994. The office report prima facie is correct that the Appeal is barred by 16 days. I am surprised to find that in the Memo of Appeal it has been written "this appeal has been filed within time" under the signature of the Counsel for the appellant. In the application for condonation of delay, it has been again stated in para 3 "i submit that I have filed the R. F. A. in time". According to him, there is no delay in approaching this Court. However, it is prayed that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to condone the delay, if any, in preferring this R. F. A. , and that he has got an excellent case on merits, and according to the deponent, the order passed by the Court below is totally erroneous and there was no substantial and complete adjudication of all the issues involved in the original suit. It was further alleged in paragraph 4 that if delay is not condoned and if the appeal is not decided on merits, he will be put to hardship and irreparable injury which cannot be compensated or evaluated in terms of money. The balance of convenience fully lies in favour of allowing the accompanying interlocutory application. On the other hand, no prejudice or inconvenience will be caused to the respondents if the accompanying application is allowed. ( 2 ) UNDER Section 5 of the Limitation Act, no doubt the Court has got jurisdiction to can done the delay provided there appears to be sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time. Section 5 of the Limitation Act reads as under:"extension of prescribed period in certain cases: any appeal or any application other than an application under any of the provisions of Order 21 of C. P. C. , 1908 may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such time". The limitation for filing the Appeal is 90 days. The condition precedent for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 5 of the limitation Act is that the appellant or applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the Appeal within time. In other words, the satisfaction of the Court that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within time, it is sine qua non for exercise of jurisdiction to condone the delay and to admit or accept the appeal which has been filed even after expiry of the period prescribed thereof. It means, in other words, until and unless the sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within time is shown and established, the court before which appeal or application is filed has got no jurisdiction to condone the delay and Section 3 of the Limitation act imposes the duty on the Court to dismiss the suit instituted, the appeal preferred or application made after the prescribed period, even if the limitation has not been set up as a defence. Section 3 (1) of the Limitation Act reads as under:"subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 inclusive every suit instituted, appeal preferred, an application made after the prescribed period, shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as defence". A reading of Section per se shows that by use of expression 'shall be dismissed' fastens the duty on the Court to dismiss the suit or appeal or other proceedings instituted if the same has been instituted or filed after expiry of the period of limitation prescribed irrespective of the fact that the plea of limitation may not have been set up in defence. When I so observe, I find support for my view from the decision of their Lordships of Privy council in the case of Maqbul Ahmad and Others v Onkar pratap Narain Singh and Others. In Maqbul Ahmad's case, their Lordships observe:"in their Lordship's opinion it is impossible to hold that in the matter which is governed by an Act, an Act which in some limited respects gives the Court the statutory discretion, there can be implied in the Court, outside the limits of the Act, a general discretion to dispense with its provisions. In Maqbul Ahmad's case, their Lordships observe:"in their Lordship's opinion it is impossible to hold that in the matter which is governed by an Act, an Act which in some limited respects gives the Court the statutory discretion, there can be implied in the Court, outside the limits of the Act, a general discretion to dispense with its provisions. It is to be noted that this view is supported by the fact that Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and that the duty of Court is to notice the Act and give effect to it even though it is not referred to in the pleadings". ( 3 ) SECTION 5 of the Limitation Act no doubt operates as an exception and under it only in the matters of appeals and applications, the discretion or power has been given to the Court to admit an appeal after the prescribed period but that power is exercisable on the appellant's or applicant's satisfying the Court that there existed sufficient cause for not filing the appeal or making the application within time. The principle under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as well explained by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramlal and Others v Rewa coalfields Ltd. . The burden levied on appellant-applicant to show and explain sufficient cause for delay and for not filing the appeal in time, i. e. , on the last day of limitation and thereafter each day till the date on which it is filed. ( 4 ) IN the present case I have perused the application for condonation of delay and I do not find any allegation in the application nor any averments in the application for condonation of delay, explaining the cause for delay or showing sufficient cause. Instead the assertion has been made that appeal has been filed in time and there is no delay in approaching this Court - vide paragraph-3. I have examined this aspect of the matter as mentioned earlier. It appears that the application for copy of the judgment and decree was given on 12-7-1994 and the copy became ready and was delivered on 12th July, 1994 when the period of 90 days for filing the appeal had already expired. I may mention it here, though it may be repetition, that the plaint was rejected on 28-3-1994. It appears that the application for copy of the judgment and decree was given on 12-7-1994 and the copy became ready and was delivered on 12th July, 1994 when the period of 90 days for filing the appeal had already expired. I may mention it here, though it may be repetition, that the plaint was rejected on 28-3-1994. 90 days period no doubt expired on or before 28-6-1994. As such, even the application for copy had been given beyond time and as such, in my opinion, the office report had been correct and the assertion made either in the Memo of appeal or in the affidavit to the application for condonation of delay is incorrect, if I may not use strong word to be false. As no cause for delay has been shown and an assertion made by the appellant appears to be incorrect and re-assertion made also appears to be incorrect. I am of the opinion there is no case made out by the appellant-applicant for condonation of delay. The appeal is hereby dismissed as being barred by limitation after dismissing the application of condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act herewith. --- *** --- .