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1994 DIGILAW 373 (BOM)

Shailesh Vinayaka Shekhande and others v. State of Maharashtra and others

1994-07-26

B.P.SARAF, M.L.DUDHAT

body1994
JUDGMENT - M.L. DUDHAT, J.:---By this writ petition the petitioners have mainly challenged Government Resolution dated 23rd March, 1994. Few facts which are necessary to dispose of this petition are a under: Petitioner No.1 herein passed his MBBS (Degree) Examination in November, 1992. Petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 passed their MBBS (Degree) Examination also in November but in 1993. They are presently doing their internship in various medical colleges. Petitioner No.1 will be entitled to apply for post graduate course in July, 1994 term. The other petitioner would be eligible to apply for the said course in January, 1995 term. The State of Maharashtra (respondent No.1 herein) by a Resolution dated 23rd March, 1994 increased the reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes to 50% tothe post gradutuate course. The Muncipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (respondent No. 2 herein) adopted 50% reservation as per the said Resolution. The Corporation thereafter framed rules increasing the reservation to 50% in respect of admission to post graduate courses at its colleges. The said Resolution (Ex-F to the petition), Circular dated 5th May, 1994 issued by respondent No.1 (Ex-E to the petition) and the rules framed thereunder are subjected matter of challenge in this writ petition principally on the ground that they are in violation of the directions given by the Supreme Court in the case of (Indira Sawhney v.Union of India)1, 1992 Supp. (3) S.C.C. 210. 2. Mr. Bharucha, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, contended that once benefit is given to the backward class candidates at the initial stage of 1st MBBS level and are brought on par with other candidates from the open category, no further benefit in the initial reservation should be granted at the stage of admission to the post graduate courses. It is further contended on behalf of the petitioners that a helping hand should be given to a citizen of backward class at the initial stage but it would be a serious unfair and unacceptable inroad into the rule of equality of opportunity to say that such helping hand should be provided at every stage throughout the career of a reserved candidate. According to learned Counsel reservation at the initial stage could be made in favour of a citizen of backward class but once he enters into the main stream, no further distinction can be made thereafter with reference to his caste and subsequent admission to the post graduate course can only be on the basis of merit. At this stage we may also point out that it was also contended on behalf of the present petitioners that respondent Corporation is an autonomous and an independent body and respondent No. 1 has no authority to impose its rules on the 2nd respondent. This contention was, however, not pursued and the matter was not argued before us on merits of the said controversy. 3. In order to support the aforesaid contentions learned Counsel for the petitioners heavily relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Indira Sawhneys case and the observations made therein. As against this it was strongly contended on behalf of the respondents by learned Counsel Miss Anklesaria and by Mr. Siodia that the observations of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case have no application to the facts of the present case inasmuch as admission from MBBS course to post graudate course does not amount to promotion - the aspect with which Supreme Court was concerned in Indira Sawhanys case. It was further contended on behalf of the respondents that the respondents have not committed any breach of the directions given by the Supreme Court in Indira Sawhneys case. 4. The whole dispute before us is narrow. We have only to consider whether the respondents by issuing/passing circulars/Resolutions and/or framing rules thereunder have violated any of the directions of the Supreme Court in Indira Sawhneys case. 5. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it will be appropriate to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court relied upon by Mr. Bharucha, learned Counsel for the petitioners in Indira Sawhneys case. The Supreme Court in the said case at para 623 observed: "Constitutional, legal or moral basis for protective discrimination is redressing identifiable backward class for historical injustice. That is they are today, what they would not have been but for the victimisation. Remedying this and to balance the unfair advantage gained by others is the constitutional responsibility. The Supreme Court in the said case at para 623 observed: "Constitutional, legal or moral basis for protective discrimination is redressing identifiable backward class for historical injustice. That is they are today, what they would not have been but for the victimisation. Remedying this and to balance the unfair advantage gained by others is the constitutional responsibility. But once the advantaged and disadvantaged, the so-called forward and backward, enter into the same stream then the past injustice stands removed. And the length of service, the seniority in cadre of one group, to be specific the forward group, is not as a result of any historical injustice or undue advantage earned by his forefather or discrimination against the backward class, but because of the years of service that are put by an employee, in his individual capacity. This entitlement cannot be curtailed by brining in again the concept of victimisation." Again in para 376 (at page 488) the Supreme Court said : "The reservation permissible under Article 16(4) can only be "in favour of any backward class of citizens" and not for individuals. Article 16(1) guarantees a right to an individual citizen whereas Article 16(4) permits protective discrimination in favour of a class. It is, therefore, mandatory that the opportunity to compete for the reserve posts has to be given to a class and not to the individuals. When direct recruitment to a service is made the "backward class" as a whole is given an opportunity to be considered for the reserve posts. Every member of the said class has a right to compete. But that is not true of the process of promotion. The backward class as a collectivity is nowhere in the picture; only the individuals, who have already entered the service against reserve posts, are considered. In the higher echelons of State services - cadre strength being small - there may be very few or even a single `backward class candidate to be considered for promotion to the reserve post. An individual citizens right guaranteed under Article 16(1) can only be curtailed by providing reservations for a `backward class and not for backward individuals. The promotional posts are not offered to the backward class. Only the individuals are benefited. An individual citizens right guaranteed under Article 16(1) can only be curtailed by providing reservations for a `backward class and not for backward individuals. The promotional posts are not offered to the backward class. Only the individuals are benefited. The object, context and the plain language of Article 16(4) makes it clear that the job reservation can be done only in the direct recruitment and not when the higher posts are filled by way of promotion." Relying on the aforesaid observations it was contended on behalf of the petitioners that after granting reservation at the initial stage of MBBS degree course classification as a backward class gets exhausted. In other words after passing the MBBS (Degree) examination backward class individuals cannot be given the reservation. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioners as well as for the respondents placed strong reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court in para 860. Referring to them it was contended on behalf of the petitioners that in effect respondents Nos. 1 and 2 cannot reserve the seats for post graduate course. On the other hand it was contended on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2 that the observations made therein are applicable to promotion. In the present case, according to the respondents, we are not concerned with promotion. Admission of the petitioners to the post graduate course cannot be equated to promotion. 7. It is true that the Supreme Court has in para 860 observed that reservation of appointments or posts under Article 16(4) is confined to initial appointment only and cannot extend to providing reservation in the matter of promotion. In our opinion admission to the MBBS degree course cannot be equated to appointment and admission to post graduate course cannot be equated to promotion. That being so, the observations of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. We are fortified in our view by a recent decision of the Supreme Court in (Ajay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar)2, J.T. 1994(2) S.C. 662. In para 16 of that judgment the Supreme Court observed: "We see absolutely no substance in the third submission of Sri Singh. The argument taxes ones credulity. We are fortified in our view by a recent decision of the Supreme Court in (Ajay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar)2, J.T. 1994(2) S.C. 662. In para 16 of that judgment the Supreme Court observed: "We see absolutely no substance in the third submission of Sri Singh. The argument taxes ones credulity. We are totally unable to appreciate how can it be said that admission to post-graduate medical course is a promotional post just because such candidate must necessarily pass M.B.B.S. examination before becoming eligible for admission to post-graduate medical course or for the reason that some stipend - it is immaterial whether Rs. 1,000/- or Rs. 3,000/- p.m. is paid to post-graduate students. Admission to such course cannot be equated to appointment to a post and certainly not to an appointment by promotion. The argument is accordingly rejected." 8. The above observations of the Supreme Court squarely apply to the present case. In that view of the matter we dismiss the petition but make no order as to costs. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. Petition dismissed. *****