Judgment :- SRINIVASAN, J. 1. This revision arises out of a petition for eviction filed under S. 10(2)(ii)(a) and S. 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, hereinafter referred to as the “Act’. The petition premises forms part of 27, Harris Road, Puthupet, Madras, which belonged to one Ranganayaki. The respondent herein was a tenant under her. She filed H.R.C. No. 2227 of 1963 for eviction under S. 14(1)(b) of the Act for demolition and reconstruction of the building. The Rent Controller made a personal inspection of the building on 14-4-1964 and gave a finding that the building did not require immediate demolition and it would last for 10 or 15 years if repaired properly. On that basis, he dismissed the petition on 16-4-1964. An appeal against the same in H.R.A. No. 499 of 1964 was dismissed on 11-9-1964. A revision to this court in C.R.P. 656 of 1965 ended in dismissal on 29.4.1964. Thereafter, the said Ranganayaki sold the building to Kovai Tanned Leather Company, a partnership firm comprising of four partners on 27-1-1967. The said firm filed H.R.C. 2373 of 1967 for eviction on the ground of requirement for owners occupation and unauthorised sub letting. While that petition was pending, there was a suit for dissolution of the firm in C.S. No. 156 of 1968 on the original side of this Court. A decree was passed on 18-7-1969 by which the building was allotted to certain persons who formed themselves into a registered partnership under the name and style of A. Majeed Mohamed & Co. It is the said firm which filed the petition for eviction out of which this revision arises. 2. In view of the decree passed in the suit for dissolution, Kovai Tanned Leather Company withdrew H.R.C. No. 2373 of 1967 with liberty to file a fresh petition on the same cause of action. The order was passed on 29-9-1969. On the 21st January, 1970 the present proceedings were initiated in H.R.C. No. 268 of 1970. The two grounds of eviction are, unauthorised subletting by the first respondent in favour of respondents 2 and 3 of portions of the premises and requirement for demolition and reconstruction. An order of eviction was passed by the Rent Controller on 26-2-1973. On the 21st January, 1970 the present proceedings were initiated in H.R.C. No. 268 of 1970. The two grounds of eviction are, unauthorised subletting by the first respondent in favour of respondents 2 and 3 of portions of the premises and requirement for demolition and reconstruction. An order of eviction was passed by the Rent Controller on 26-2-1973. On appeal, in H.R.A. No. 209 of 1973, the Appellate Authority reversed the conclusion of the Rent Controller by order dated 11-1-1974 and dismissed the petition for eviction. A revision petition was filed in this Court in C.R.P. No. 2256 of 1976. 3. In November 1975, there were heavy rains with gusty winds in the City of Madras, and a good portion of the petition premises fell down. The first respondent attempted to raise a fresh construction thereon and the petitioner filed O.S. No. 9518 of 1975 for permanent injunction restraining the first respondent from erecting a superstructure. An order of interim injunction was passed and an advocate was appointed as Commissioner to inspect the premises and note the physical features. The Commissioner file d his report dated 17-12-1975. The order of interim injunction was made absolute on 27-4-1976. However, the first respondent was permitted to reconstruct the oven on his undertaking that he would abide by the order of interim injunction in other respects and he would not claim compensation for the reconstruction of the oven under any circumstances. The suit was ultimately decreed on 12.3.1979 on the basis of a joint endorsement, the terms of which are as follows:— “The defendant shall not put up any further permanent construction or renovate the building and maintain the status quo as on the date of the Commissioners report. The defendant must, however, white-wash and paint the same. The parties shall bear their own costs.” 4. The Civil Revision Petition which was pending in this Court was allowed on 9-8-1979 and the matter was remanded to the file of the Rent Controller for fresh disposal. The defendant must, however, white-wash and paint the same. The parties shall bear their own costs.” 4. The Civil Revision Petition which was pending in this Court was allowed on 9-8-1979 and the matter was remanded to the file of the Rent Controller for fresh disposal. The Court directed the Rent Controller to find expressly: “(1) whether, after taking into account the relevant considerations which ought to be taken into consideration in a petition under S. 14(1)(b), the petition of the landlord for eviction under that section lies or not; and (2) whether there has been a subletting by the respondent without authority within the meaning of S. 10(2)(i)(a) of the Act.” The Court said that the parties were at liberty to adduce fresh evidence if they chose. The Court also said; “I may, in passing, note that the tenant is not raising the plea of res judicata which was touched upon by the Appellate Authority and appears to have been accepted by him.” 5. After remand, further evidence was adduced on both sides. The Rent Controller upheld the bona fide requirement of the landlord for demolition and reconstruction and also found that the tenant was guilty of unauthorised subletting. He passed an order on 19-7-1980 for eviction as prayed for. On appeal by the tenant, the Appellate Authority has, by its judgment dated 19-9-1981, reversed the finding of the Rent Controller and dismissed the petition for eviction. It has found against the landlord on both the grounds. Aggrieved by the said order, the landlord has preferred the present revision petition. 6. One of the partners of the petitioner firm by name Sultan Mohideen died. His legal representatives have not been brought on record. The petition is continued by the other two partners, as representing the firm S. Majeed Mohammed & Co. The tenant/respondent has filed an affidavit raising an objection to the maintainability of the revision petition. According to the affidavit, on the death of the partner Sultan Mohideen, the firm stands dissolved as per the provisions of the Partnership Act and there is no indication that a new firm has been constituted subsequently. It is further stated that the position of partners cannot be equated to that of co-owners and, therefore, the revision is not maintainable without bringing the legal representatives of the deceased partner on record and that the revision petition is abated. It is further stated that the position of partners cannot be equated to that of co-owners and, therefore, the revision is not maintainable without bringing the legal representatives of the deceased partner on record and that the revision petition is abated. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the petitioner setting out the facts and circumstances under which the revision petition is being continued by the remaining two partners. It is stated that the surviving partners have agreed to manage the firm and continue the proceedings and as such they are entitled to continue the revision petition. I accept the contents of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner and proceed on the fading that the surviving partners are entitled to continue the business and these proceedings. Even otherwise, it is not necessary to decide whether the surviving partners are entitled to carry on the business of the firm for the purpose of this case. Even if it is assumed that the partnership stood dissolved on the death of one of the partners as per the provisions of the Partnership Act, the proceedings for eviction do not abate. Under S. 47 of the Partnership Act, the authority of each partner to bind the firm, and the other mutual rights and obligations of the partners, continue notwithstanding the dissolution, so far as may be necessary to wind up the affairs of the firm and to complete transactions begun but unfinished at the time of the dissolution. It is certainly open to the surviving partners to realise the assets of the firm so that the accounts may be settled as between them and the legal representatives of the deceased partner. It is a matter which has to be worked out as between the legal representatives of the deceased partner and the surviving partners. The petition for eviction will not abate and it can be continued to a finish. Hence, the preliminary objection raised by the first respondent is overruled. 7. It is next argued by learned counsel for the respondent that the present petition for eviction is barred by S. 19 of the Act in view of the dismissal of H.R.C. 2267 of 1963 filed by the previous owner Ranganayaki. It is contended by him that the issue raised in that proceeding was the same as the one raised in the present proceeding. It is contended by him that the issue raised in that proceeding was the same as the one raised in the present proceeding. According to him, the Rent Controller found categorically that the building was in a good condition and did not require demolition and, therefore, the present proceeding is not maintainable. In support of his contention, he places reliance on the judgment of this Court in Yamuna Bai v. Rangaswamy (1977) I M.L.J. 223 = 90 L.W. 355). In that case, an application for eviction on the ground of demolition and reconstruction was dismissed in 1964 and a fresh petition was filed in 1974 on the same ground. The Court held that the case fell under S. 19 of the Act and observed: “It is clear that if any order has been passed under S. 14 of the Act between the same parties, then the same issue which has been finally decided cannot be raised again in a laterly instituted action on the ground that circumstances have allegedly changed. The purpose of the request on the first occasion and on the later occasion was the same. That was to evict the tenant for the purpose of demolishing the building and reconstructing the same. These essential prerequisites for approaching the Rent Cont roller for an order could not have changed. They remained the same. In such circumstances only S. 19 operates and the well known principle of res judicata prevents the landlord or the landlady as the case may be from pursuing, but at a belated stage, an application for the grant of a similar relief. It is this that is prevented by law under S. 19 of the Act.” 8. Obviously, the judgment turned on the facts of that case. The learned Judge found that the materials on record did not prove any change in the circumstances and, therefore, he held that the case was covered by S. 19 of the Act. It is this that is prevented by law under S. 19 of the Act.” 8. Obviously, the judgment turned on the facts of that case. The learned Judge found that the materials on record did not prove any change in the circumstances and, therefore, he held that the case was covered by S. 19 of the Act. The very same learned judge had occasion to consider the principle of res judicata enshrined in S. 19 of the Act in R.J. Mehta & Co., v. Proctam Singh (1979) II M.L.J. 19 = 92 L.W. 404 and said thus:- “It is very well known that in the doctrine of res judicata no magic is involved, but it is essentially a pragmatic principle which has to be applied on the facts and circumstances of each case” (Underlining mine). Therefore, the question whether a particular proceeding is barred under S. 19 of the Act has to depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. 9. It has been held in several cases that if the circumstances which prevailed at the time of the prior proceeding had changed, a fresh proceeding could be instituted for the same relief based on the changed circumstances. In Balasubramaniam v. Gulab Jan (1981) I M.L.J. 354 = 94 L.W. 102 this Court held that a proceeding for eviction on the ground of demolition and reconstruction could be maintained on the basis of a new contingency. In that case, the petition by a prior landlord was dismissed in 1972. Thereafter, in 1974 a notice was issued by the Executive Officer of the Panchayat calling upon the landlord to demolish the building as it was in a dangerous condition. The Court held that it would amount to a change in circumstances and a fresh petition for eviction could be filed. The learned judge also referred to an earlier judgment of this Court in M.K. Abdul Majid Sahib v. T. Mohammed Ismail (C.R.P. No. 665 of 1976 dated 18th August 1976) in which the facts were similar. 10 In Natarajan v. V.M. Sundaran (1990-2-L.W. 595 = 98 L.W. 26 (SC) a petition for own occupation for the purpose of business was dismissed on the ground that the landlord was not carrying on any business. Thereafter, the landlord commenced business and applied for eviction. The Court held that the petition was maintainable as the circumstances had changed. 11. 10 In Natarajan v. V.M. Sundaran (1990-2-L.W. 595 = 98 L.W. 26 (SC) a petition for own occupation for the purpose of business was dismissed on the ground that the landlord was not carrying on any business. Thereafter, the landlord commenced business and applied for eviction. The Court held that the petition was maintainable as the circumstances had changed. 11. It is by now well settled that the Court is bound to take subsequent change of circumstances, even during the pendency of the proceedings. Vide Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad (A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1711), Variety Emporium v. R.M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina ( AIR 1985 S.C. 207 = 98 L.W. 26 (S.C.)) and Shadi Singh v. Rakha ( AIR 1994 S.C. 800 ). 12. Hence, the question in the present case has to be decided on the facts. It has to be found whether there is a change in circumstances. Apart from that, it has to be noted that when this Court remitted the matter to the Rent Controller by allowing C.R.P. No. 2256 of 1976 it directed him expressly to decide two issues. It had also noted that the plea of res judicata was not raised by the tenant. If the tenant had pressed his plea of res judicata, the Court would have considered the same here itself and if it had been upheld, there would have been no necessity for a remand of the matter. When the Court chose to remand after observing that the plea of res judicata was not raised and also directed the Rent Controller to decide two issues specially, it is not open to the tenant now to contend that the proceeding is barred by res judicata and the merits of the claim cannot be considered. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that even if the counsel who had appeared for the tenant had given up the plea of res judicata before this Court on the prior occasion, that would not be binding on his client as a concession on a question of law by counsel will not bind his client. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.M.B. Catholicos v. M.P. Athanasius (A.I.R. 1954 SC 526) and a judgment of this Court in Vedachala v. Rangaraju (AIR 1960 Madras 457 = 73 L.W. 315. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.M.B. Catholicos v. M.P. Athanasius (A.I.R. 1954 SC 526) and a judgment of this Court in Vedachala v. Rangaraju (AIR 1960 Madras 457 = 73 L.W. 315. There is no force in this contention as the plea of res judicata is not a pure question of law. It is a matter which depends on the facts of the case. For the purpose of considering the plea of res judicata , it is necessary to look into the pleadings and orders in the prior proceedings. Hence, the proposition of law aid down in those two cases will not apply here. In any event, I do not rest my decision on the basis that the plea of res judicata is not available to the tenant in this revision petition. I propose to consider the question whether there is a change in the circumstances of the case. 13. I have already referred to the fact that in H.R.C. No. 2227 of 1963, the Rent Controller relied on the Notes of his Inspection of premises and held that the building did not require immediate demolition. The relevant part of the Notes of Inspection has been incorporated by him in his order, which is marked as Ex. R8. It reads as follows:— “1. The building is an old country tiled one having a zinc sheet covered portion in the front. 2. Immediately behind the front zinc sheet portion, used as a bakery show room, there is a small Madras terraced portion resting on one side of two masonry pillars in the middle and on walls on the extremities. The upper portion of the wall on the other rear side of the terraced portion is bent towards the front zinc sheet covered portion. 3. There is a small gap between the superstructure of the terraced portion and its beam resting on the pillars. 4. The tiled roof of the oven room is bent. But it is due to the middle wall being shorter as a result of which the sloping could not be straight. 5. The beam of the verandah (resting on pillars) sloping from the oven room is slightly damaged by white ants at one end, but it is quite strong. 6. Two palmyrah rafters of another verandah adjacent to the above verandah are completely damaged, and require replacement. 7. 5. The beam of the verandah (resting on pillars) sloping from the oven room is slightly damaged by white ants at one end, but it is quite strong. 6. Two palmyrah rafters of another verandah adjacent to the above verandah are completely damaged, and require replacement. 7. There is a vertical crack to a length of about 2. 1/2 feet in the outer side of the south eastern residential portion and it appears to have been plastered recently, and the building has been white washed and colour washed within about a month. 8. A small portion of the cable (about 1 foot in length) on the road side is cracked and it has been plastered. 9. The tiles of two shop portions on the road side require shifting. 10. The condition of the walls and flooring is not bad.” It is to be noted that even then the building was only in bad shape though there was no danger of falling down immediately. On the basis of his Notes of Inspection, the Rent Controller rejected the evidence of both the Engineers examined by the parties and observed that the building may stand for 10 or 15 years more as stated by R.W. 2 if the repairs are effected. That order was passed on 16-4-1964. By the time the matter was remitted by this Court in C.R.P. 2256 of 1976 to the Rent Controller, the period of 15 years had already elapsed. There is no evidence to show that repairs were effected after the order of the Rent Controller in the aforesaid proceeding in 1964. 14. But, on the other hand, there is ample evidence to show that on account of heavy rains in 1975, a good portion of the building fell down. I have referred to the suit filed by the landlord for injunction restraining the tenant from raising a new construction and also to the appointment of a Commissioner in that case and the report filed by the Commissioner. The report of the Commissioner is marked as Ex. P-22 in these proceedings. It is seen therefrom that two new supporting walls had been constructed, which had even become dry at the time of the Commissioners visit. He found the latrine in the premises in a dilapidated condition. The entire residential portion was old patterned with country bricks. The plastering was damaged. There was no roof over the latrine. P-22 in these proceedings. It is seen therefrom that two new supporting walls had been constructed, which had even become dry at the time of the Commissioners visit. He found the latrine in the premises in a dilapidated condition. The entire residential portion was old patterned with country bricks. The plastering was damaged. There was no roof over the latrine. The Commissioner was prevented from visiting the non-residential portion. However, with the help of a ladder, the Commissioner claimed the upstairs of another portion of the building, wherefrom he saw the entire portion occupied by the tenant. He found that the portion in which oven was situated had completely fallen down. The back portion of the wall assuring about 15 feet had fallen down. The reapers and rafters had fallen down and that portion was open to sky. The remaining portion of the wall was in a dilapidated condition. The rooms situated on the eastern side without cement plaster had been constructed afresh. Another room, which was used as shop, facing the road, had completely fallen down. This was the situation on 10th of December, 1975 when the Commissioner visited the place. 15. There can be no doubt whatever that the condition of the building had considerably changed after the inspection by the Rent Controller in 1964. Even according to his Notes of Inspection, the building was not in a sturdy condition. What all he held was only that it did not require immediate demolition and that it would last for ten or fifteen years. Hence, there is absolutely no merit in the contention that the present proceeding is barred by res judicata. 16. Admittedly, the building was in existence even prior to 1902. It is in the evidence of the first respondent that his uncle occupied the premises in 1902 for the purpose of doing business. Relying on the same, the Rent Controller held that the building is a very old one. But, the Appellate Authority has taken the view that the building will be only about 40 to 60 years bid. He has completely ignored the evidence given by the first respondent. The petitioner has produced ancient documents which are marked as Exs. P-24 to P-30 to show that the building was in existence even prior to 1902. But, the Appellate Authority has taken the view that the building will be only about 40 to 60 years bid. He has completely ignored the evidence given by the first respondent. The petitioner has produced ancient documents which are marked as Exs. P-24 to P-30 to show that the building was in existence even prior to 1902. The Appellate Authority has chosen to reject the same observing that they did not mention that the building had a zinc sheet roofing. According to him, the zinc sheet roofing came into existence only recently. It is not known wherefrom the Appellate Authority got that idea when there is no such version in the evidence. 17. The reasoning of the Appellate Authority is, to say the least, perverse. He has at the outset said that he is not placing any reliance on the Engineers examined by the parties. He ought to have considered as to which Engineers evidence is more probable and acceptable. He cannot reject both of them simply because one is contradicting the other and both are qualified Engineers. He has referred to the photograph produced by the petitioner and marked as Exs. P-35 to P-40 and P-42 to P-44, but rejected the same holding that they were taken in 1975 seen after the rains when the building fell down. The photographs only support the version given by the landlord that the building had substantially fallen down on account of the heavy rains and the remaining portion is in such a dangerous condition that it would fall down at any time. I find that P.W. 3 and P.W. 4, the photographers have given evidence respectively that Exs. P-35 to P-40 were taken on 2-12-1975 and Exs. P-42 to P-44 were taken on 2-5-1976. A look at the photographs and a perusal of Ex. P22,-the report of the advocate-Commissioner prove beyond doubt that the building is in ruins. The evidence of P.W. 5, the Engineer who inspected the premises on 20-2-1980 and his report Ex. P-47 are fully corroborated by the other evidence. Hence, they ought to have been accepted by the Appellate Authority. There is no dispute that the building is constructed with brick and mud mortar. The roofing is partly country, tiled and partly zinc. The evidence of P.W. 5, the Engineer who inspected the premises on 20-2-1980 and his report Ex. P-47 are fully corroborated by the other evidence. Hence, they ought to have been accepted by the Appellate Authority. There is no dispute that the building is constructed with brick and mud mortar. The roofing is partly country, tiled and partly zinc. Having regard to the fact that the building has been in existence from even before 1902, there can be no doubt that it requires to be demolished immediately. Though the Appellate Authority has referred to Ex. P-22, he has observed that a perusal of the same does not show that damages were such as to render living or carrying on business impossible in the said premises. Obviously, the Appellate Authority has closed his eyes to the contents of the said report. 18. The Appellate Authority has been carried away by the opinion expressed by the Rent Controller who decided H.R.C. 2227 of 1963, probably by the fact that the said Rent Controller came a Supreme Court Judge later. He has accepted his opinion as to the age of the building. He has staled that the said Rent Controller found the building to be in a sturdy condition overlooking the contents of the Notes of Inspection as incorporated in his order.- 19. One of the reasons given by the Appellate Authority is that filing of H.R.C. 2373 of 1969 by Kovai Tanned Leather Company for own occupation would itself show that the building was not dilapidated. The Appellate Authority has overlooked the explanation given by P.W. 1 for filing the said petition. It is stated by P.W. 1 that the said firm Kovai Tanned Leather Company was under threat of eviction from the owner of the building which was occupied by it for rent end it had to find out an alternative premises immediately and that was the reason why he had filed H.R.C. 2373 of 1967 for own occupation. That would not by itself negative the bona fide of the claim for demolition and reconstruction. It would not show that the building was in such a good condition that it would not require demolition. It has been held by this Court in several cases that even in the same petition there can be a prayer for own occupation and also for demolition and reconstruction. It would not show that the building was in such a good condition that it would not require demolition. It has been held by this Court in several cases that even in the same petition there can be a prayer for own occupation and also for demolition and reconstruction. Vide Ponnuswami Naicker v. K. Anandan (1988) II M.L.J. 262 = 1988-1-L.W. 31. In the former case, a reference has been made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in R.P. Mehta v. I.S. Seth 1965-2-S.C.J. 608, and relied upon. 20. Yet another reason of the Appellate Authority is that the Corporation Authorities have been issuing licence year after year to the tenant for carrying on business in the premises and if the building is in a dilapidated condition, they would not have issued licence. Here again, the Appellate Authority has completely ignored the evidence on record. It is admitted by the tenant in his deposition that the Corporation Authorities did not inspect the premises and he did not show the portion which had fallen down to the concerned authorities. In the face of such express admission; it cannot be presumed that the authorities would have inspected the premises and found the building to be in good condition before issuing licence. 21. The Appellate Authority has erroneously held that the plan obtained for demolition and reconstruction by the landlord is not for the petition premises, only because some portions occupied by the other tenants have already been vacated, demolished and reconstructed. The most absurd part of the reasoning of the Appellate Authority is that the very fact that the estimated expenditure for the new building is only Rs. 38,000/- proves the mala fides of the landlord. According to him, he is taking judicial notice of the fact that the building is situated within 200 yards from Mount Road. It is preposterous on the part of the Appellate Authority to take the view that anybody having property near Mount Road can afford to spend huge amounts for construction of new buildings. The landlord can certainly prepare an estimate only within his means. The Appellate Authority has himself accepted the claim of the landlord that he has got sufficient mens to demolish and reconstruct the building in accordance with the estimate. 22. The landlord can certainly prepare an estimate only within his means. The Appellate Authority has himself accepted the claim of the landlord that he has got sufficient mens to demolish and reconstruct the building in accordance with the estimate. 22. Yet another reason given by the Appellate Authority is that the tenant would not continue to reside in the building and do business if it is in such a dilapidated condition so as to fall down immediately. This is really begging the Question. The tenant wants to contest the matter and prolong it as much as possible. The very fact that he has evaded acceptance of notice in this revision petition and entered appearance after substituted service by paper publication and by affixture on the door of the premises will show that the tenant is keen on protracting the proceedings. His aim is only to see that the petition for eviction is defeated. Just because he continues in the premises, it does not mean that the building is in a good condition. If the reasoning of the Appellate Authority is accepted, no petition for eviction on the ground of demolition and reconstruction can be ordered if the tenant continues to occupy the same after receipt of notice and contests the proceeding. 23. Thus, the reasons given by the Appellate Authority for reversing the conclusion of Rent Controller are wholly unsustainable. After perusing the documents available on record, I find that there is ample evidence to prove that the building is in such a dilapidated condition that it requires immediate demolition and reconstruction. Otherwise, it is likely to fall down at any time. 24. As regards the other ground of eviction vi., subletting, the Rent Controller has placed reliance on the admission of R.W. 1 and R.W. 2 that there has been unauthorised subletting. But, the Appellate Authority has reversed the same holding that the plea is barred by res judicata . In view of the fact that Ranganayaki did not press the case of subletting in her petition H.R.C. 2227 of 1963 for eviction. The Appellate Authority has relied upon the statement contained in Ex. R8 that the case of subletting was abandoned at the enquiry. In view of the fact that Ranganayaki did not press the case of subletting in her petition H.R.C. 2227 of 1963 for eviction. The Appellate Authority has relied upon the statement contained in Ex. R8 that the case of subletting was abandoned at the enquiry. What is overlooked by the Appellate Authority is that the said petition H.R.C. 2227 of 1963 for eviction was on only one ground viz, demolition and reconstruction of the building under S. 14(1)(b) of the Act. Eviction was not sought on the ground of subletting. In the course of stating the facts in the petition, a reference was made to unauthorised subletting of a portion of the building to the fourth respondent therein. But, no evidence was let in regarding the same. That was pointed out by the Rent Controller. The question whether there was unauthorised subletting or not was wholly unnecessary for the purpose of that petition. It cannot, therefore, be said that it was a ground for eviction and it was not pressed by the petitioners therein. 25. Further, the fourth respondent in that petition was one Abdul Kadar, who is not a party to this proceeding. The persons who are impleaded as sub-tenants in these proceedings are Khader Bai and Ashraf Ali. They have nothing to do with the fourth respondent in H.R.C. 227 of 1963. In the evidence, as pointed out by the Rent Controller, R.W. admits that both Abdul Kader and Khader Bai became his sub-tenants and they were paying rent to him. They were sub-tenants for about ten years. The exact year in which he became a sub-tenant is not remembered by him. However, he says that, there is account which would show as to when he became a sub-tenant. But, the accounts are not produced. R.W. 2 also has admitted that the sub-tenants are there for 15 years. Thus, it is clear from the admissions made by the witnesses that the sub-tenancy commenced only after 1945. It is not the case of the first respondent that the sub-tenancy was authorised by the owner of the premises. At any rate, there is absolutely no evidence to prove the same. In the circumstances, the Rent Controller was justified in holding that the first respondent is guilty of unauthorised subletting. The finding of the Appellate Authority on this count is also wholly unsustainable. 26. At any rate, there is absolutely no evidence to prove the same. In the circumstances, the Rent Controller was justified in holding that the first respondent is guilty of unauthorised subletting. The finding of the Appellate Authority on this count is also wholly unsustainable. 26. In the result, I have no hesitation to hold that the petitioners have made out both the grounds of eviction and they are entitled to get the order of eviction as prayed for by them. The revision petition is allowed. The order of the Appellate Authority in H.R.A. No. 1495 of 1980 is set aside and the order of the Rent Controller in H.R.C. No. 268 of 1970 is restored. The petitioner will have its costs from the first respondent. 27. Respondents counsel prays for grant of time for vacating the premises. Learned counsel for the petitioner agrees for grant of two months time, on condition of the respondent filing an affidavit. Hence, time is granted to the respondent to vacate the premises till 30th June, 1994 on condition that he files an affidavit in this Court on or before 28-4-1994 undertaking to vacate the premises on or before 30-6-1994 without driving the landlord to execution proceedings. If the affidavit is not filed, the respondent will not have the benefit of grant of time.