JUDGMENT Prabir Kumar Majumdar. J. This application taken out by the plaintiff is for stay of the operation of the judgment and order dated June 4, 1993, passed by a learned Judge of this Court taking interlocutory motions. This judgment and order was made on an application of the plaintiff/appellant Turnkey International Limited. In the suit filed by the plaintiff for an injunction restraining the respondent No.3, the Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa Limited as also the respondents No. 1 and 2, Boque National de Paris and Standard Chartered Bank, from invoking and enforcing the bank guarantee and for other reliefs. The learned Judge by the said judgment and order dismissed the said application taken out by the plaintiff/ appellant. 2. It is agreed by the parties that both the appeal as also this application may be heard together and disposed of by the same judgment. 3. The case of the plaintiff/appellant is that in 1986, the respondent No.3, floated a Global Tender for 9.5M.W. capacity diesel power station. On 9th May, 1988 a formal agreement was executed between the plaintiff/appellant and the respondent No.3 and by the said agreement, the plaintiff was to furnish unconditional irrevocable contract performance bank guarantee for an amount equivalent to 5% of the contract value as security deposit to perform the contract. 4. Pursuant to such agreement, the plaintiff/appellant furnished three bank guarantees, one for Rs. 21,93,100/- with Banque Nationale de Paris, the respondent No. 1 against the mobilisation advance, another for Rs. 10,96,550/- furnished by the Banque National de Paris against the 5% security deposit against the contract and the third one for Rs. 6,00,0000/furnished by Standard Chartered Bank, the respondent No.2. 5. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiff before the Trial Court that the amount covered by the bank guarantee for Rs. 21,93 100/- and Rs. 10,96,550/- against the mobilisation advance and security deposit had been adjusted and paid and the respondent No.3, Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa Limited had no claim whatsoever against the plaintiff and as such, the respondent No 3 has no right to invoke the bank guarantees and again such invocation is fraudulent. 6. 21,93 100/- and Rs. 10,96,550/- against the mobilisation advance and security deposit had been adjusted and paid and the respondent No.3, Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa Limited had no claim whatsoever against the plaintiff and as such, the respondent No 3 has no right to invoke the bank guarantees and again such invocation is fraudulent. 6. The next submission made on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff before the Trial Court was that on 1st March 1992 the Government of West Bengal by a notification bearing No. 2791-IR issued at Writers' Buildings, within the jurisdiction of this Court declared the plaintiff/appellant as the State Industrial Undertaking by virtue of the provision contained in the West Bengal Act of 1992. Thereafter, a notification dated 2nd March, 1992 was issued by the Government of West Bengal, inter alia, providing that operation of all contracts, assurance of property agreements settlements awards standing orders and other instruments in force (to which the said relief undertaking is a party or which may be applicable to the said relief undertaking) immediately before the date on which the said relief undertaking was declared on such, together with all the rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities accruing or arising thereunder before the said date, but excluding contracts, assurances of property and agreements in force immediate before the said date, between the said relief undertaking and the Government, the industrial Reconstruction Bank of India, any Bank or other financing institutions shall be deemed to have remained suspended during the period of the validity of the said notification. The validity of the said notification declaring the plaintiff/appellant as relief undertaking has been extended from time to time and the plaintiff/appellant is still a relief undertaking by virtue of the relevant notification issued by the Government of West Bengal. 7. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiff/appellant before the Trial Court that in view of such notification declaring the plaintiff appellant as relief undertaking, the respondent No.3, cannot enforce the bank guarantee. It was also argued that the bank guarantees were a part and an outcome of the performance of the original contract between the plaintiff and the respondent No. 3 and thus, the same fall within the purview of the relevant notification. 8. It was also argued that the bank guarantees were a part and an outcome of the performance of the original contract between the plaintiff and the respondent No. 3 and thus, the same fall within the purview of the relevant notification. 8. It was argued before the Trial Court on behalf of the respondent No.3, the Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa Limited that to a bank guarantee the bank and the beneficiary are the two parties and the said contract of guarantee is independent of the original contract between the plaintiff and the respondent No. 3 and as such, any notification declaring the plaintiff/appellant as relief undertaking together with the said provisions has no bearing so far as the bank guarantee is concerned. It was further submitted on behalf of the respondent No. 3 before the Trial Court that the said notification related to the contracts relating to the plaintiff with other parties and did not relate to bank guarantee where the plaintiff/ appellant was not a party. 9. The learned Trial Judge after considering the respective submissions of the parties held that the concerned bank guarantee did not fall within the purview of the notification and it was an independent contract and as such, the respondent No. 3 has every right to enforce the contract in terms of the said bank guarantee. The learned Trial Judge also held that no case of fraud even prima facie was made out by the plaintiff/appellant before the Trial Court. The learned Trial Judge accordingly by the said judgment and order under appeal, dismissed the application of the plaintiff/appellant. 10. Mr. Bhaskar Gupta, learned Senior Advocate appearing with Mr. Abhijit Chatterjee, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant has argued before us that it is true that the plaintiff/appellant was not a party to the said bank guarantee which was a contract really between the concerned bank and the respondent No.3. 10. Mr. Bhaskar Gupta, learned Senior Advocate appearing with Mr. Abhijit Chatterjee, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant has argued before us that it is true that the plaintiff/appellant was not a party to the said bank guarantee which was a contract really between the concerned bank and the respondent No.3. But the said bank guarantee was furnished by the bank at the instance of the plaintiff/appellant and that was applicable to the plaintiff/appellant, a relief undertaking within the meaning of West Bengal Relief Undertaking (Special Provisions) Act 1972 inasmuch as the said guarantees were furnished under the terms of the contract entered into between the plaintiff/appellant and the respondent No. 3 by way of performance bank guarantee for an amount equivalent to 5% of the contract value as also security deposit to perform the guarantee. 11. Mr. Gupta, on behalf of the appellant has submitted before us that clause (b) on the said relevant notification dated 2nd March 1992 would have effect of suspending the contracts in force to which the plaintiff/appellant was a party for "which may be applicable" to the plaintiff/appellant immediately before the date on which the said relief undertaking was declared as such together with all the rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities accruing or arising thereunder from the said date. It is the submission of Mr. Gupta that since the concerned bank guarantees are applicable to the said relief undertaking as they would come within the expression' 'which may be applicable." It is the further submission of Mr. Gupta on behalf of the appellant that the provisions relating to excluding the contracts in clause b) between the plaintiff/appellant and any bank would not come into operation since the said bank guarantees would come under the coverage of the first part of clause the and as such, the operation of the said bank guarantees would remain suspended during the validity of the relevant notification issued by the Government of West Bengal declaring the plaintiff/appellant as relief undertaking. Mr. Gupta, therefore, submits that the appellant is entitled to an order of injunction restraining the respondent No. 3 from invoking or enforcing the said bank guarantees which were sought to be invoked by the letters of invocation. 12 Mrs. Mr. Gupta, therefore, submits that the appellant is entitled to an order of injunction restraining the respondent No. 3 from invoking or enforcing the said bank guarantees which were sought to be invoked by the letters of invocation. 12 Mrs. U. B. Mukherjee, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondents has submitted that admittedly the plaintiff/appellant is not a party to the said bank guarantee, and secondary the said bank guarantees being contracts independent of the contract entered into between the plaintiff/ appellant and the respondent No.3. were executed by the concerned bank and the respondent No.3. It is her submission that the said bank guarantees have no manner of application to the plaintiff/appellant and it cannot be said that those are applicable to the plaintiff/appellant, as sought to be argued on behalf of the appellant. It is the argument of Mrs Mukherjee on behalf of the respondent No.3. in this appeal that it is now a proposition that bank guarantees stand on a different footing and the contract of guarantees furnished by the concerned banks are entirely independent of the underlying contracts between the plaintiff/appellant and the respondent No. 3 and thus, the notification issued by the Government of West Bengal declaring the plaintiff/appellant as relief undertaking has no bearing whatsoever on the said contracts of guarantee, and further, the plaintiff/appellant cannot rely upon such provisions in clause, b of the relevant notification which suspended the contracts in force between the plaintiff/appellant and other parties, cannot ask for restraint order restraining the respondent No. 3 from enforcing the bank guarantees being contracts altogether independent of any other contract that may have been entered into between the plaintiff/appellant and the other parties including the respondent No.3. 13. Mrs. Mukherjee further argues relying on several decisions of the Supreme Court as also of our Court that the rights and liabilities of the parties, namely, the concerned banks and the respondent No. 3 are to be governed by the concerned bank guarantees themselves and not by the terms and conditions of the original contract between the plaintiff / appellant and the respondent No.3, although in terms of a condition in the said original contract a bank guarantee may have been provided by the concerned bank at the instance of the plaintiff/appellant in favour of one of the parties to the original contract, here the respondent No.3. It is further argued on behalf of the respondent No 3. that the plaintiff/appellant, at whose instance such bank guarantees were furnished is admittedly not a party to such contracts of guarantee. It is the further submission of Mrs. Mukherjee on behalf of the respondent No.3. that the bank guarantee was to be enforced if it complied with the terms and conditions of the bank gmrantee itself and not whether there was any default or breach of the terms and conditions of the main contract, the underlying contract. It is argued by Mrs. Mukherjee that if the conditions for payment under the bank guarantee is fulfilled, the bank is obliged to pay the amount covered by the bank guarantee upon proper invocation by the beneficiaries of the bank guarantee in terms of the bank guarantee. 14. Mrs. Mukherjee has cited several decisions of this Court as also the Supreme Court. The first case cited is a decision of this Court reported in 82 CWN 266 (Dhanraj vs. Sri Durga Cotton Mills, then 1990 (1) CLT 200 (Hindusthan Paper Corporation vs. Kenalhouse Angami and third 94 CWN 33 (Scrap Molds vs. Metal Scrap Trade Corporation Limited) Mrs. Mukherjee has also referred to a few Supreme Court decisions AIR 1932 SC 1997 (Maharashtra State Electricity Board, Bombay VS. Official Liquidator), AIR 1991 SC 1994 (General Electric Company vs. Punja and Sons) and AIR 1914 S.C. 626 (Svenska Hande'sbanken vs. M/s Indian Charge Chrome and Ors. 15. Mrs. Mukherjee on behalf of the respondent No 3 has also taken another point as to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain and try the suit filed by the plaintiff/appellant against the respondent No. 3 for enforcement of the bank guarantee, although it appears such point of jurisdiction has not been taken before the Trial Court and the Trial Court did not have any occasion to deal with that. It is, however, submitted by Mrs. Mukherjee that since any objection as to jurisdiction is a point of law, the same can be agitated in any stage including the appeal state. 16. The law relating to enforcement of bank guarantee has now been well settled by a series of decisions of Supreme Court as also the decisions of other High Courts including our Court. 17. Mukherjee that since any objection as to jurisdiction is a point of law, the same can be agitated in any stage including the appeal state. 16. The law relating to enforcement of bank guarantee has now been well settled by a series of decisions of Supreme Court as also the decisions of other High Courts including our Court. 17. In AIR 1991 SC 1994 , the Supreme Court on the interpretation of the terms of bank guarantee held that bank could not b~ restrained by Court from making payment as per undertaking given by it in the absence of fraud or special equities in the form of preventing irretrievable injustice between the parties The Supreme Court further observed that the encashment of the bank guarantee could not be refused on the ground that the contractor has failed to make a reference to mobilisation advance in the letter seeking encashment of the bank guarantee and it amounted to suppression of material facts, in the sense that the mobilisation advance was under the contract to b~ recovered from the running bills. It is further held by the Supreme Court that the bank is not concerned with the outstanding amount payable by the contractor under the running bills and the right to recover the amount under the running bills has no relevance to the liability of the bank under the guarantee. 18. Similar view has been reiterated in a recent decision of Supreme Court, reported in AIR 1994 SC. 626 . 19. All the said three bank guarantees contain similar terms and conditions. The concerned banks guaranteed as follows : "We, Banque Nationale de Paris, 4A, B. B. D. Bag (East) Calcutta 700 00/- having its head Office, at Paris, France (hereinafter referred to as the 'Bank' which expression shall, unless repugnant to the context or meaning thereof, include its successors, administrators, executors and assigns) do hereby guaranteed and undertake to pay the owner immediately on demand any or all monies to the extent of Rs. 21,93,100- (Rupees twenty one lacs ninety three thousand one hundred only) as aforesaid at any time upto 31st January, 199; without any demur, reservation, contest, recourse of protest and, or without any reference to the contractor. 21,93,100- (Rupees twenty one lacs ninety three thousand one hundred only) as aforesaid at any time upto 31st January, 199; without any demur, reservation, contest, recourse of protest and, or without any reference to the contractor. Any such demand made by the Owner on the Bank shall be conclusive and binding notwithstanding any difference between the owner and the contractor or irrespective of any dispute pending before any Court, Tribunal, Arbitrator or any other authority. The Bank undertakes not to revoke this guarantee during its currency without previous consent of the Owner and further agree guarantee herein contained shall continue to be enforceable till the owner discharges this guarantee." 20. The other guarantee by the Standard Chartered Bank also contain similar undertaking. 21. It will appear from the condition as set out above that the concerned bank guaranteed and undertook to pay the owner (the respondent No.3) immediately on demand any or all monies to the extent of the same mentioned therein without any demur, reservation, contest, recourse or protest or without any reference to the contractor (meaning the plaintiff/ appellant). It will also appear further that any such demand made by the Owner on the bank shall be conclusive and binding notwithstanding any difference between the owner and the contractor or irrespective of the dispute pending before any Court, Tribunal, Arbitrator or any other authority. The guarantee, therefore, appears to be unconditional and if there is any proper invocation the bank is obliged to honour the bank guarantee on demand without any demur, protest and irrespective of any dispute between the parties to the underlying or original contract. 22. It, therefore, appears that in a guarantee of this nature the bank's obligation to pay is absolute. The only recognised exceptions are that if there is any case of fraud committed by the beneficiary of the guarantee or if there is any special equity or if there could be any case for irretrievable injustice. No such exceptional case has been made out before the Trial Court nor was there attempt on behalf of the plaintiff/appellant to make out any such case before us. 23. No such exceptional case has been made out before the Trial Court nor was there attempt on behalf of the plaintiff/appellant to make out any such case before us. 23. As we have stated that the only contention made on behalf of the plaintiff/appellant is that the said contracts of guarantee would come under the first part of clause (b) as indicated above, namely, that all contracts to which the relief undertaking was a party or which may be applicable to the relief undertaking immediately before the date of the notification on which the said relief undertaking was declared as such, shall remain suspended during' the validity of the notification. Mr. Gupta has submitted, as stated above, that the contracts of guarantee are applicable to the relief undertaking i.e. the said guarantees were furnished for due performance of the contract and also by way of security deposit in terms of a condition in the underlying contract between the plaintiff/appellant and the respondent No 3. 24. We are unable to accept this contention made on behalf of the appellant. There is no dispute that such contracts of guarantee were made between the concerned bank and the beneficiary, namely, the respondent No.3 and such contract by law is independent of any underlying contract: It may be true that such guarantee had been furnished at the instance of the plaintiff / appellant pursuant to a condition in the original contract between the plaintiff / appellant and the respondent No.3, but from this it cannot be concluded that this guarantee can be said to be applicable to the plaintiff / appellant being the relief undertaking. As from the conditions of the guarantee, as set out above, it clearly appears that the bank unconditional1y guaranteed and undertook to pay the beneficiary on demand irrespective of any dispute between the parties under the underlying contract and without any demur, reservation, protest and without any reference to the contractor. On such condition if the invocation is proper and in terms of the bank guarantee, the bank would straightway arrange for payment of the amount covered by the bank guarantee. On such condition if the invocation is proper and in terms of the bank guarantee, the bank would straightway arrange for payment of the amount covered by the bank guarantee. Further considering the nature of the contracts of guarantee executed by the bank, the bank's obligation is not fattered by any provisions in the contract originally executed between the party at whose instance the bank has furnished the guarantee and the party for whose benefit the said guarantee was furnished. As has been firmly laid down by the series of decisions of various Courts including the Supreme Court, the bank guarantees being contract independent of any other contract, cannot be referable to any other contract that may have been entered into by the party at whose instance such guarantee was furnished by the bank and the party for whose benefit such guarantee had been furnished by the bank. 25. We are, therefore, of the view that the learned Trial Judge rightly dismissed the application for grant of injunction restraining the defendants including the defendant No.3 from invoking and enforcing the bank guarantee. 26. As stated above, the point of jurisdiction has been raised before us on behalf of the respondent No.3 in this appeal. It is submitted on behalf of the respondent No.3 that the respondent No.3. is carrying on the business outside the jurisdiction of this Court and no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court and, therefore, no suit can be instituted by the plaintiff / appellant against the respondent No.3 before this Court. It appears from the cause title of the plaint that the respondent No.3 carries on business both at Bhubaneswar in the State of Orissa, outside the jurisdiction of this Court as also at 10, Middleton Row, Calcutta, within the jurisdiction of this Court. Further, it has been pleaded that, all the bank guarantees were executed at Calcutta within the jurisdiction of this Court. However, we need not go into the question of jurisdiction in this appeal which point may be 'agitated at the trial of the suit, if the suit is put to trial. Further, the respondent No.3 may also take out an application before the Trial Court for revocation of the leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent and also by invoking Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Further, the respondent No.3 may also take out an application before the Trial Court for revocation of the leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent and also by invoking Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We, however, do not make any observation on the point of jurisdiction in this judgment. 27. For the reasons a foresaid, this appeal being treated as on day's list as also the application for stay of the operation of the Trial Court's order are dismissed. All formalities regarding filing of appeal, preparation of Paper Book are dispensed with Undertaking given by the plaintiff / appellant at the time of moving of this appeal is also discharged. 28. There will be no order as to costs. 29. The Counsel for the appellant prays for stay of operation of this judgment and order, such prayer is refused. 30. All parties to act on a signed copy of the minutes of the operative part of this judgment and order on the usual undertaking. Arun Kumar Dutta, J: I agree. Appeal and Application dismissed