A. N. DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) ). The decision rendered by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad (the Tribunal for convenience) on 12th August 1994 in Review Application No. TEN. C. R. 2 of 1989 is under challenge in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Thereby the Tribunal rejected the present petitioners application for review of its decision of 29th January 1985 in Revision Application No. TEN. A. R. 9 of 1984. ( 2 ) ). The facts giving rise to this petition are not many and not much in dispute. The dispute centres round one property bearing Survey No. 28/2 situated in Jamnagar (the disputed property for convenience ). By his order passed on 22nd January 1970, respondent No. 3 inter alia held the disputed property to be belonging to Sumer Sports Club (the Club for convenience) represented by respondent No. 1 herein. Its copy is at Annexure-A to this petition. Respondent No. 2 took the order at Annexure-A to this petition in suo motu revision in exercise of his powers under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 (the BLR Code for Brief) after about 12 years from its date. ( 3 ) ). By this order passed 25th August 1982 in Revision Application No. 2 of 1982, respondent No. 2 set aside the order at Annexure-A to this petition and remanded the matter to respondent No. 3 for his fresh inquiry and decision. A copy of the aforesaid order passed by respondent No. 2 is at Annexure-B to this petition. The Club carried the matter in revision before the Tribunal. It came to be registered as TEN. A. R. 9 of 1984. By its decision rendered on 29th January 1985 therein, the Tribunal set aside the order passed by respondent No. 2 at Annexure-B to this petition. A copy of the aforesaid decision of the Tribunal is at Annexure-C to this petition. The present petitioner was never a party to any of the previous proceedings upto Annexure-C to this petition. It appears that in some suit proceeding between him and the Club, he was confronted with the order at Annexure-A to this petition as practically came to be affirmed to revision by the Tribunal by its decision at Annexure-C to this petition. The present petitioner was never a party to any of the previous proceedings upto Annexure-C to this petition. It appears that in some suit proceeding between him and the Club, he was confronted with the order at Annexure-A to this petition as practically came to be affirmed to revision by the Tribunal by its decision at Annexure-C to this petition. He therefore thought it fit to get the decision of the Tribunal at Annexure-C to the petition set aside. He therefore moved an application for review under Section 17 of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957 (the BRT Act for brief ). It came to be registered as Review Application No. TEN. C. R. 2 of 1989. It appears that it was strongly resisted at the stage of its preliminary hearing. By the order passed on 18th August 1989 in the aforesaid Review Application, the Tribunal decided to admit the Review Application for final hearing. Its copy is at Annexure-D to this petition. After hearing the parties, by its decision rendered on 12th August 1994 in the aforesaid Review Application, the Tribunal rejected it. Its copy is at Annexure-E to this petition. The aggrieved petitioner has therefore invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for questioning the correctness of the aforesaid decision of the Tribunal inter alia at Annexure-E to this petition. The petitioner has also incidentally questioned the correctness of the order passed by respondent No. 1 at Annexure-A to this petition and the decision rendered by the Tribunal at Annexure-C to this petition. ( 4 ) ). It may be noted that the decision at Annexure-C to this petition was rendered by a Member of the Tribunal, named, Shri J. A. Shekhava. It is not in dispute that, when an application for its review was sought, the said Member had retired and was no longer its Member. The question would therefore arise whether or not any other Member of the Tribunal could review an order passed by its retired Member. If the answer to this question is in the negative, a further question might arise as to what the remedy the aggrieved party would have in such a case. ( 5 ) ). The question would therefore arise whether or not any other Member of the Tribunal could review an order passed by its retired Member. If the answer to this question is in the negative, a further question might arise as to what the remedy the aggrieved party would have in such a case. ( 5 ) ). In this connection, a reference deserves to be made to the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Devaraju Pillai v. Sellayya Pillai reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court at page 1160. In that case, one Second Appeal was decided by one learned Judge of the High Court of Madras. The said learned Judge had retired thereafter. An application for review was made by the losing party. That application was heard by another learned Single Judge of the said High Court. The judgment rendered by the retired Judge was reviewed. In that context, it has been held: on an application being filed for review of the judgment of the learned Single Judge, another learned Single Judge of the High Court the judge who heard the Second Appeal not being available -, virtually sitting in Judgment over the decision of the learned Judge who decided the Second Appeal construed the document differently and held that it was a will and not a deed of settlement. This the learned Single Judge was not entitled to do. If the party was aggrieved by the judgment of the Single Judge sitting in Second Appeal the appropriate remedy for the party was to file an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge. A remedy by way of an application for review was entirely misconceived and we are sorry to say that the learned Single Judge who entertained the application totally exceeded his jurisdiction in allowing the review and upsetting the judgment of the learned Single Judge. ( 6 ) ). It cannot be gainsaid that the aforesaid dictum of law pronounced by the Apex Court is binding to this Court. By analogy, the aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court will be applicable in the instant case. As pointed out hereinabove, the decision at Annexure-C to this petition was rendered by its Member, named, Shri J. A. Shekhava. It cannot be gainsaid that the aforesaid dictum of law pronounced by the Apex Court is binding to this Court. By analogy, the aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court will be applicable in the instant case. As pointed out hereinabove, the decision at Annexure-C to this petition was rendered by its Member, named, Shri J. A. Shekhava. It is not in dispute that the said Member was not a Member of the Tribunal when an application for review of the decision at Annexure-C to this petition was made. In view of the aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court, that application would not be maintainable. In that view of the matter, I do not think that any interference is called for with respect to the decision at Annexure-E to this petition though on a different ground. ( 7 ) ). I have not found any merit in the submission urged before me by Shri Nanavati for the petitioner to the effect that the powers of the Tribunal under Section 17 of the BRT Act are much wider than the powers of the Court under Section 114 read with Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the CPC for brief ). . . . It may be that the powers of review enjoyed by the Tribunal in respect of its own decision have wider scope than those enjoyed by the Court in respect of its own judgment. However, in view of the language used in Section 17 of the BRT Act and Section 114 read with Order 47, Rule 1 of the CPC, it cannot (sic. May) be gainsaid that the power of review has to be exercised by the same author of the judgment or the decision, review of which is sought. No successor Judge of the Court or no successor Member of the Tribunal, as the case may be, may review the judgment or the decision of his predecessor in view of the aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court. ( 8 ) ). Regulation 31 of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Regulations Act, 1958 framed under Section 17 of the BRT Act will not come to the rescue of the petitioner in this case. ( 8 ) ). Regulation 31 of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Regulations Act, 1958 framed under Section 17 of the BRT Act will not come to the rescue of the petitioner in this case. It reads as under: where a single member or the members of a Bench who decided the case or made the order, a review of which is applied for, or one of such members, continue or continues to be a member or members of the Tribunal at the time when the application for such review is to be heard, such member or a Bench consisting of such member or members, as the case may be, shall hear the application and no other Bench shall hear the same. The language thereof clearly indicates that. . . if a Member of the Tribunal has decided a case and is no longer available, a review application can be heard by no other Member of the Tribunal. The remedy in that case would lie to the higher forum as indicated in the aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court. ( 9 ) ). In view of my aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the Tribunal has rightly rejected the petitioners Review Application by its decision at Annexure-E to this petition though on a different reasoning. The decision at Annexure-E to this petition calls for no interference by this Court in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The challenge to the impugned order at Annexure-A to this petition and to the decision at Annexure-C to this petitoin is given up at this stage. ( 10 ) ). In the result, this petition is summarily rejected. .