M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a very sad case presented by the widow of a deceased driver of the ksrtc. Basically, the petitioner has approached this court with the grievance that pursuant to the death of her husband, which took place in march, 1993, that she made an application to the corporation to consider the case of her son for employment on compassionate grounds and that the application was turned down by the corporation on the ground that the husband of the petitioner was not an employee of the corporation on the date of his death. The exact date of the death of the petitioner's husband happens to be 9-3-1993 and, the corporation was obviously relying on the fact that on 9-1-1993, the divisional controller, hubli, had passed an order removing the petitioner's husband from service of the corporation. This order was not challenged by him, but, it is material to record that since the petitioner has prayed for a relief by way of compassionate appointment for her son, that she has also challenged the validity of the order of removal dated 9-1-1993. ( 2 ) THIS is an unusual case for more than one reason and the before, the petitioner her self has anticipated the possibility of the respondents questioning her locus standi to challenge the order dated 9-1-1993. The petitioner has sought to rely on a division bench decision of the Calcutta high court in the case of neela devi, rai and others v state of West Bengal and others, wherein, some of the similar cases the Calcutta high court permitted the legal heir of a deceased employee to challenge a removal order. The court in that instance was placed reliance on bhagat rain v state of Himachal Pradesh and ranjit thakur v union of India and others. It is true that the respondents have not seriously questioned the locus of the present petitioner to challenge the termination order passed against her late husband, but, the question will have to be gone into as a preliminary issue because if this court is to consider that order or interfere with it, then the locus of the person challenging it will have to be determined. The law with regard to the question of locus standi has now been considerably expanded and the grounds on which a writ court will shut out a party are extremely restricted such as in instances where the petitioner has no nexus with the cause of action or where it is mischievous, frivolous or motivated. Particularly after the asiad workers case and the decision of the Supreme Court in the judge's case , the right of a widow to challenge an order of punishment passed shortly before the death of her late husband can hardly be questioned. In the present instance, the order was passed when the petitioner's husband was almost on his death bed and since that order is being pressed into service against the present petitioner, to my mind, she has every right to challenge the order in question. More so, the challenge in the present case proceeds on a pure point of law. ( 3 ) THE Supreme Court, in ranjit thakur's case referred to supra, has once again enunciated the principle laid down by lord diplock in council of civil service unions v minister for the civil service wherein the house of lords had occasion to consider the question as to whether judicial interference was permissible, in a case where the question was limited to the issue as to whether the punishment was disproportionate with the gravity of the charges that were proved. It is now well-settled law, that such power does exist and can be exercised by a writ court under article 226 of the constitution. ( 4 ) IN the present instance, the petitioner's learned counsel has assailed the order of removal from service on the ground that the strict procedural requirement of law was not followed. The corporation counsel has submitted that the record indicates that there is proper compliance. I do not desire to interfere with the validity of the enquiry procedure on such technicalities because to my mind, even if the enquiry is supposed to have been validly held on the material placed before the enquiry officer, had he somuch as correctly applied his mind to what had been stated before him, the condition of the petitioner and the documents produced by him, he could never have passed an order of removal from service. It is true that the petitioner had remained absent from service and that this continued over a reasonably long period of time, but the documents produced by him cumulatively indicated that he was suffering from serious ailments, the first of them being tuberculosis and thereafter, cancer. In the light of this medical background, to conclude that the evidence is an after thought and that it is a fabrication, clearly indicates that the enquiry officer was acting mechanically and that he was equating this. Case with several others where admittedly bogus certificates are produced. The record of this case at the highest would have justified the disciplinary authority in holding that the petitioner was not entitled to receive any emoluments or benefits for the entire period of absence because on the record, there were some lapse on his part in so far as he had not obtained prior sanction for some of the periods in question. The disciplinary authority ought to have bestowed some elementary degree of human consideration while evaluating that material on the special facts of this case realising that it was a quasi judicial function that he was discharging while deciding the matter in question. A fair decision would have required that even if the petitioner was liable to be penalised the punishment awarded to him could have been loss of emoluments for the entire period, but this was not a case in which an order of termination could have been passed. That the punishment awarded was excessive is clearly borne out by the record of this case and therefore, to my mind, the order dated 9-1-1993 will have to stand modified to the extent that it will have to be held that the petitioner's husband was liable to the punishment to the extent of loss of all his emoluments and benefits for the entire period of his absence from duty. The order of removal from service to that extent is legally untenable and is liable to be set aside. As a necessary consequence if the corporation has withheld any of the arrears terminal benefits of the deceased, the same will have to be paid to the present petitioner within two months. The order of removal from service to that extent is legally untenable and is liable to be set aside. As a necessary consequence if the corporation has withheld any of the arrears terminal benefits of the deceased, the same will have to be paid to the present petitioner within two months. ( 5 ) THE solitary ground on which the corporation has refusedto consider the application submitted on behalf of the son is that the petitioner's husband was no longer in employment on the date of his death i. e. , 9-3-1993. By virtue of the order of removal from service having been set aside, it will have to be deemed that he was still an employee on 9-3-1993, which is the date on which he died and the application submitted on behalf of his son will therefore qualify for consideration. The respondents are accordingly directed to consider the application in question strictly in keeping with the rules and bearing in mind principles of fairness and to take a decision with regard to the same within an outer limit of two months from this date. The decision taken shall be indicated to the petitioner or to her learned advocate. ( 6 ) HAVING regard to the aforesaid findings, the petition succeeds. Rule is made absolute to this extent. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .