MAHINDER NARAIN ( 1 ) THE plaintiff has filed the present suit for declaration, stating that she was born on 06. 11. 1969, and that she is a Hindu by religion. It is also stated that the plaintiff was studying in Maharaja Siyaji Rao University, Baroda in the 1st year of Law when she met the defendant in August, 1992, who was also studying in 1st year of law. It is asserted by the plaintiff that she came under the undue influence of the defendant while studying in the LL. B. 1st year course. The plaintiff wants to dissolve the marriage which, according to the plaintiff, was performed on 11. 08. 1992 between the plaintiff and the defendant according to muslim rites at New Delhi. ( 2 ) IT is also asserted by the plaintiff that no specific ceremonies or rites were performed. Nor her free consent was obtained. It s also asserted that she was required to sign a "nikahnama" which she signed under the influence of the defendant and in the presence of a Qazi Bismil Nizami at 105, Fana Manzil, Basti Hazrat Nizamuddin, New Delhi. It is also asserted that at the time of performance of the marriage, some friends of the defendant were present, but none was present from the side of the plaintiff. It is also asserted that the "nikahnama" did not bear the photographs of the parties, and the same was got attested from the Sub Divisional Magistrate. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff further asserts that the attitude of the defendant, however, changed when the defendant met the plaintiff again at Baroda where she had gone to take her final year LL. B. examination. ( 4 ) THE plaintiff also asserts that immediately after the marriage, the plaintiff went to her parents house, and the defendant separated from the plaintiff by going with his friends and leaving for Baroda the next day. It is also asserted that no time was spent by the plaintiff with the defendant after the marriage. The plaintiff lived with her parents, and the defendant went away to Baroda after the marriage was performed on 11. 08. 1992. ( 5 ) THE plaintiff further asserts that the aforesaid marriage and conversion to Islam, she continued to stay with her parents. She did not disclose about the marriage with the defendant for a long time. The plaintiff lived with her parents, and the defendant went away to Baroda after the marriage was performed on 11. 08. 1992. ( 5 ) THE plaintiff further asserts that the aforesaid marriage and conversion to Islam, she continued to stay with her parents. She did not disclose about the marriage with the defendant for a long time. She further asserts that when she went back to Baroda, she stayed with her maternal uncle, while the defendant was staying in the hostel, and that at no time after the marriage, did the parties live together as husband and wife. At Baroda, the plaintiff found the attitude of the defendant towards her, and the defendant insisted that the plaintiff should observe "ramzan" fast for 30 days, and she should not pray Hindu gods, and should take and cook non-vegetarian food. The plaintiff asserts that it became apparent to her that she had got converted to Islam on false assertions and assurances of the defendant that she would be permitted to worship Hindu deities, and to perform Hindu festivals and keep the Hindu way of life, including wearing Hindu and western dresses, which she was use to. ( 6 ) FINDING the attitude of the defendant changed, the plaintiff came back to Delhi after finishing her examination, and converted herself to Hinduism on 28. 07. 1993 at Arya Samaj Temple, Hanuman Road, New Delhi. It is asserted in the plaint that in view of the change of the plaintiffs religion from Hinduism to Islam for the purpose of marriage, and then apostasy from Islam back to Hinduism on 28. 07. 1993, there is an automatic dissolution of marriage in accordance with the provisions of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, and that in view of the dissolution by operation of law, the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of dissolution of marriage. ( 7 ) SUMMONS in the suit were issued by this Court on 11. 10. 1994. Fresh summons were sent on 13. 12. 1993, as also on 10. 01. 1994. The defendant was served on 12. 02. 1994. The fact that despite service the defendant did not appear in Court on 12. 04. 1994, on that date ex parte proceedings were ordered to be taken against the defendant. ( 8 ) THE plaintiff led ex parte evidence, and her statement was recorded on 20. 05. 1994. 01. 1994. The defendant was served on 12. 02. 1994. The fact that despite service the defendant did not appear in Court on 12. 04. 1994, on that date ex parte proceedings were ordered to be taken against the defendant. ( 8 ) THE plaintiff led ex parte evidence, and her statement was recorded on 20. 05. 1994. In her statement the plaintiff has reiterated most of the facts which have been asserted by her in the plaint. She has also asserted that the name "anjum Begum" was given to her. She has deposed about the behavior of the defendant towards her and his insistence upon adoption of muslim way of life at Baroda, and non- observance of Hindu festivals and deities, which led her to realise that the assurances given to her were false, and that her consent to conversion in the first place, was induced as a result of the wrong representation made to her, and on her return to Delhi, she got herself converted to Hinduism at Arya Samaj Temple, Hanuman Road, New Delhi. She has filed certificate of conversion Ex. P. W. 1/1, which is evidence of her conversion back to Hinduism from Islam. ( 9 ) THE plaintiff has also filed newspapers cuttings of Veer Arjun Ex. P. W. 1/2 and of National Herald Ex. P. W. 1/3, showing that she has changed her name "anjum Begum", which was given to her, to her original Hindu name "ranjini Moorthy". She has also proved a letter which was received by her under registered cover from the defendant, and the registered cover which contains some endorsement made by the defendant in his own hand, as Ex. P. W. 1 /4 and Ex. P. W. 1 /5 respectively. On the envelop it is clearly written by the defendant that the enclosed letter is the "release" given by the defendant. ( 10 ) PRIOR to the coming into force the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, the Muslim Law is stated to be as follows: ( 11 ) ASAF A. A. Fyazee in his book "outline of Muhamman Law", Third edition (1964), relying upon the judgments in Amin Beg v. Salman (1910) 33 All. 90 (Conversion to Christianity); Mst. ( 10 ) PRIOR to the coming into force the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, the Muslim Law is stated to be as follows: ( 11 ) ASAF A. A. Fyazee in his book "outline of Muhamman Law", Third edition (1964), relying upon the judgments in Amin Beg v. Salman (1910) 33 All. 90 (Conversion to Christianity); Mst. Resham Bibi v. Khuda Baksha (1937) 19 Lahore 277 (apostasy simpliciter, wife says she has no religion), says that "according to the older law, as laid down by the classical jurists of Islam, apostasy on the part of the wife operated as an immediate and absolute dissolution of marriage". He further goes on to say that, "in India this rule was used for the purpose of dissolving a marriage which had grown irksome to the wife, as there was no other way open to her to get rid other husband". He further says that, "by the Dissolsution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, statutes provides in effect that unless the Muslim woman was a convert to Islam, her apostasy from Islam to her former faith, would not operate as an immediate dissolution of marriage". The views expressed in the aforesaid book, in my view, appear to correctly interpret the provisions of the Dissolution of the Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. ( 12 ) NEIL B. E. Baillie in the Digest of Moohumman Law, 1965 Edition at page 182, says as follows: Apostasy from Islam by one of the married pair, is a Cancellation of their marriage, which takes effect immediately without requiring the decree of a judge, and without being a repudiation, whether the occurrence is before or after consummation;. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 13 ) MUHSIM Tayyibji in Muslim Law. Fourth Edition 1968, at page 189 states as follows:- A marriage between Muslims becomes under Islamic law null and void on either party apostatizing from Islam; a woman converted to Islam from another faith who marries as a Muslim woman and then re- embraces her former faith remains subject to this rule;. . . . . . . . . . . . . ;. ( 14 ) IN AIR 1938 Lahore 482 = (19137)19 Lahore 482, Addison and Din Mohd. . . . . . . . . . . . . ;. ( 14 ) IN AIR 1938 Lahore 482 = (19137)19 Lahore 482, Addison and Din Mohd. JJ held that where the plaintiff declared not only in the plaint, but even in the statement in Court, as her own witness that she did not believe in God, the Quran, and Prophet of Islam, she at once went out of the pale of Islam and the marriage with her husband was dissolved. ( 15 ) FOR the purposes of the instant case, it is necessary to reproduce the relevant provisions of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, which are contained in section 4 of the Act:- 4. Effect of conversion to another faith.---- The renunciation of Islam by a married Muslim woman or her conversion to a faith other than Islam shall not by itself operate to dissolve her marriage: Provided xxxx xxxxx xxxxx Provided further that the provisions of this section shall not apply to a woman converted to Islam from some other faith who re-embraces her former faith. ( 16 ) READING the aforesaid section and the proviso, it becomes clear that by virtue of the second proviso the bar of dissolution of marriage by apostasy from Islam by a Muslim woman is not applicable to a woman who had converted herself from anotherreligion to Islam. ( 17 ) IN this view of the matter, the plaintiff having proved that she was a Hindu; that she had converted herself to Islam, and then re-converted to Hinduism by certificate Ex. P. W. 1/1, it is clear that the plaintiff as a Muslim woman has become an apostasy from Islam, and as the Dissolution of Muslim Marriagesact is applicable to a muslim woman, the act of apostasy results in immediate divorce. ( 18 ) IN the instant case, as the plaintiff herself was a Hindu before she converted herself to Islam, and as an apostate from Islam by virtue of the second proviso to section 4 of the Dissolution of the Muslim Marriages Act, she is entitled to the decree of divorce which she has prayed for. ( 19 ) IN the aforesaid circumstances, the plaintiff having proved that she was a Hindu; she having proved that she was converted to Islam; she having proved that she became an apostasy from Islam by re-conversion on 28. 07. ( 19 ) IN the aforesaid circumstances, the plaintiff having proved that she was a Hindu; she having proved that she was converted to Islam; she having proved that she became an apostasy from Islam by re-conversion on 28. 07. 1993, as evidenced by certificate EX. P. W. 1/1, her marriage to the defendant stands dissolved. She is, therefore, entitled to the declaration that the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant on 11. 08. 1992 according to muslim rites stands dissolved from 28. 07. 1993, the date when the plaintiff re-embraced Hinduism; and that she has ceased to be "anjum Begum" and further is known as "ranjini". ( 20 ) I need not for the purposes of this case, to deal with the effect of the "release" (granted by the defendant to the plaintiff by his letter dated 29. 09. 1993), and whether the same can operate as consensus divorce. ( 21 ) A decree be prepared accordingly. ( 22 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not think that the plaintiff is entitled to costs.