H. N. TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) BY this petition the petitioner has sought the relief of issuance of writ of certiorari quashing the impugned order bearing No. GIN. 6/81-82 dated 21-6-1986, Annexure-E to the writ petition and has further prayed for issuance of such other writ or direction as the Court deems fit. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case in brief are that the petitioner moved an application, on 18-8-1981 to the respondent-Licencing authority, under the Karnataka Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1964 and the Rules framed thereunder, for the grant of No Objection certificate to construct and to locate a sound-proof permanent cinema theatre on the land bearing Sy. Nos. 65/1, 85/1 and 85/3 of Kushalnagar Town owned by her i. e. , the petitioner. According to the petitioner's case vide order dated 29-9-1982 in form D the authorities concerned granted the 'no Objection certificate' Annexure-A to the writ petition. This Certificate was granted under Rule 28 of Karnataka Cinemas (Regulation) rules, 1971 framed under the Act. For some reason or other and specially for the reasons mentioned in the writ petition, the construction work could not be commenced before 29-3-1983 i. e. , within a period of 12 months from the date of grant of No objection Certificate and so the petitioner made an application for extension of time. According to the petitioner's case as well as it appears from the record produced before the Court, that the petitioner, on her moving an application for extension of time to commence the construction of theatre was granted time up to 29th of March, 1984 and it was mentioned therein that petitioner should commence the construction work by or before 29-3-1984. According to the petitioner's case, petitioner promptly commenced the construction work of the theatre on 15-3-1984. ( 3 ) FOR the present this Court is not required to take any decision on that aspect of the matter. The petitioner's further case is that on 21-1-1986 to the utter surprise of the petitioner and without issuing any notice to the petitioner and behind the back of the petitioner the District Magistrate-respondent in the writ petition straightaway passed the order impugned dated 21-1-1986 cancelling the No Objection Certificate which had been issued under Rule 28 (1) of the Rules framed under the Act. Feeling aggrieved from the order dated 21-1-1986, the present petitioner has filed this petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India seeking the reliefs as mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment. A counter has been filed on behalf of the opposite parties. In the counter affidavit it has been admitted by the opposite parties that as the work of construction could not be commenced before 29-3-1983, and the petitioner moved an application for extension of time to commence the construction, the said request of the petitioner was accepted and the time to commence the construction work was extended upto 29-3-1984. It has further averred, in the courier affidavit and as per the allegations made therein as per the case of the respondent that even after the expiry of extended period, the petitioner did not commence the work nor did she apply for extension of further time. The respondent-District Magistrate, madikeri who in turn conducted enquiry and submitted a report on 7-11-1985 to the effect that the petitioner has not commenced the work. After considering the report of the Sub-divisional magistrate, respondent 1 was convinced that petitioner had failed to commence the work and there being no further request for extension of time, he cancelled the "no Objection Certificate'. In paragraph 4 of the writ petition it has been specifically averred that the order impugned had been passed by the respondent straightaway cancelling the 'no Objection certificate' without any notice to the petitioner and without his being afforded any opportunity of hearing. I find that this allegation has not been countenanced or denied by the respondent. This Court had summoned the record of Nos. CIN. 18/81-82 and CIN. 6/81-82. A perusal of the record of the authority-respondent, per se reveals that the District magistrate, Kodagu District issued instructions to the sub-divisional Magistrate to make inspection and enquiries regarding the matter whether the petitioner had started construction work of theatre on or before 29-3-1984, and it was directed that inspection should be made confidentially and report be submitted. It is material to note that in the letter it has been written 'please inspect the spot and enquire the matter confidentially and furnish the report'. This indicates that the enquiry and report was made without any information and notice to the petitioner. It is material to note that in the letter it has been written 'please inspect the spot and enquire the matter confidentially and furnish the report'. This indicates that the enquiry and report was made without any information and notice to the petitioner. This further indicates that sub-divisional Magistrate who made the inspection was directed to make it in such a manner that not the least information of inspection or report should be made available to the petitioner. The Sub-divisional Magistrate while (as per page 275 of the authority's record) submitted confidential report on 5-11-1985, as per page 277 and he has mentioned that "as per your instructions I have confidentially enquired about the construction". Page 278 of the record is blank and at page 279 it appears that the impugned order of cancellation of 'no Objection certificate' had been passed and it is contained therein. The record does not show that any notice was issued to the petitioner by the Additional District Magistrate/district Magistrate who passed the order dated 21-1-1986. Thus from the failure to meet the allegations made by the petitioner in paragraph 4 of the writ petition as well as the record of the authority which had been summoned by this Court per se it stands proved and established that before the order dated 21-1-1986 had been passed by the respondent-District Magistrate, no show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner nor was the petitioner provided an opportunity of challenging the correctness of the report made by the sub-divisional Magistrate, nor was the petitioner given any opportunity of hearing. Instead, violating all norms/rules of procedure and principles of natural justice and fairplay, the district- Magistrate passed the order cancelling the 'no Objection certificate' wherein the petitioner had been granted approval and permission to construct a cinema theatre. Under Rule 28 that No Objection Certificate had been granted, whereunder a right had accrued to the petitioner to construct and build the cinema theatre and to run the same under law. The cancellation of such a No Objection Certificate vide order impugned dated 21-6-86 definitely in my opinion, has the tendency of affecting civil rights which had accrued under No Objection Certificate in favour of the petitioner. The cancellation of such a No Objection Certificate vide order impugned dated 21-6-86 definitely in my opinion, has the tendency of affecting civil rights which had accrued under No Objection Certificate in favour of the petitioner. ( 4 ) IT is the trite principle of law has been laid down in very many cases by their Lordships of Supreme Court to the effect that the orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature including the orders of administrative nature having civil consequences have got to be passed, keeping pace with the principles of natural justice and fairplay, after giving due opportunities of hearing to the parties likely to be adversely affected thereby. ( 5 ) IN the case of State of Orissa v Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and Others, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in paragraph 12, have been pleased to observe as under:"we think that such an enquiry and decision were contrary to the basic concept of justice and cannot have any value. It is true that the order is administrative in character, but, even an administrative order which involves civil consequences as already stated, must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice, after informing the 1st respondent of the case of the State, the evidence in support thereof after giving an opportunity to the 1st respondent of being heard and meeting and explaining the evidence. No such steps were admittedly taken, the High Court was, in our judgment, right in setting aside the order of the State". ( 6 ) IN the case of Smt. Maneka Gandhi v Union of India and Another, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have been pleased to observe in paragraph 58 of the judgment as under:"natural justice is a great humanising principle intended to invest law with fairness and to secure justice and over the years it has grown into a widely pervasive rule affecting large areas of administrative action. Their lordships referred also in this regard to the recital portions of the address of Lord Morris". Their lordships referred also in this regard to the recital portions of the address of Lord Morris". ( 7 ) LORD Denning, M. R. in the case of Schmidt v Secretary of State of Home Affairs, observes and lays down as under:"where a public officer has to deprive the person of his liberty or his property, the general principle is that it has not to be done without his being given an opportunity of being heard and of making representations on his own behalf. This rule has gained access to the United Nations vide American journal of International Law, Vol. 67, page 479, where Magarry, j. , describes the principles of natural justice as "a distillate of due process of law". ( 8 ) IN the Maneka Gandhi's case, supra, in paragraph 59 of the decision, their Lordships of the Supreme Court had further been pleased to observe after having referred to a test, namely, that the inquiry must, therefore, be: does fairness in action demand that an opportunity to be heard should be given to the person affected and that the test adopted by every law Lord is that fairplay in action required that an opportunity should be given and observed as under:"now, if this be the test of applicability of the doctrine of natural justice, there can be no distinction between a quasi-judicial function and an administrative function for this purpose. The aim of both administrative inquiry as well as quasi-judicial inquiry is to arrive at a just decision and if a rule of natural justice is calculated to secure justice, or to put in negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is difficult to see why it should be applicable to quasi-judicial inquiry and not to administrative inquiry. It must logically apply to both". It must logically apply to both". ( 9 ) IN the present cases as I find that the allegation made in the writ petition that the order impugned dated 21-1-1986 which has got civil consequences as mentioned above has been passed without issuing or giving any notice of show-cause to the petitioner as well as without giving the petitioner an opportunity of meeting those allegations contained in the report of the Sub-divisional Magistrate to the effect that no construction has been commenced as well as to show that the report was not correct and if correct why he could not commence the construction and thereby itself rendered the order impugned to be illegal or null and void on account of violation of principles of natural justice, and renders it liable to be quashed. ( 10 ) HAVING thus considered, I am of the opinion that the order impugned dated 21-1-1986 contained in Annexure-E is liable to be quashed and the writ petition deserves to be allowed. ( 11 ) IN view of the above, the writ petition is hereby allowed by issuing a writ of certiorari as well as quashing the order impugned bearing No. CIN. 6/81-82, dated 21-1-1986 the copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-E to the writ petition. This order dated 21-1-1986 shall always be deemed to be inoperative and ineffective. The petition is allowed with costs. --- *** --- .