B. N. KIRPAL, R. K. ABICHANDANI, J. ( 1 ) ). In this group of matters the petitioners have challenged the action of the respondent-Municipal Corporation in removing cabins/rekdis/larri-gallas of the members of the petitioner-Association and other prtitioners claiming that they should be allowed to carry on their business at the original places. The validity of Section 231 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act. 1949 is also challenged on the ground that it is violative of Articles 14 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. ( 2 ) ). The members of the petitioner Association and other petitioners have contended that they have a right to continue their trade at the same site where they have been doing their business. Most of these persons have been doing their business in rekdis/larri-gallas and a few of them in cabins by the roadside. According to the petitioners their carrying on trade at the disputed place did not cause any obstruction to the public. They have contended that they are licence holders and therefore have right to continue their business in the disputed places. ( 3 ) ). In Special Civil Application No. 1180/94 one more contention is raised that the Corporation ought to construct a shopping centre at the place where the members of the petitioner-Association were carrying on business. The said place is a triangular piece of land opposite Anupam Talkies. It is contended that 26 members of the petitioner-Association had paid a total sum of Rs. 75 0 to the Municipality but despite their representation dated 3-2-1979 no final decision was being taken. ( 4 ) ). The Corporation has contended that the rekdis/larri-gallas/cabins were causing nuisance and disturbances to the vehicular traffic and pedestrians and therefore they were required to be removed from the disputed places. It is contended that the petitioners have no legal right to occupy a particular place permanently even on the basis of periodic stand passes. It is also contended that some of these persons had put up pucca cabins which were required to be removed. The Traffic Adviser Committee which met on 31-1-1994 had decided to remove the rekdis from the disputed places which caused obstruction. The Collector of the District was the Chairman and the Municipal Commissioner and D. S. P. were the members of that Committee. The Traffic Adviser Committee which met on 31-1-1994 had decided to remove the rekdis from the disputed places which caused obstruction. The Collector of the District was the Chairman and the Municipal Commissioner and D. S. P. were the members of that Committee. As regards the contention of the petitioners of Special Civil Application No. 1880 regarding construction of a shopping centre it is contended by the Corporation that no decision to make a shopping centre or to provide permanent arrangement to the 26 members of the Association was taken by the Corporation. It is contended that there is heavy traffic and the roads in this area are very congested and therefore it was impossible to construct a shopping centre at the disputed place which is on a parking island in between the roads leading from Teen Batti to Bedi Gate and Three talkies to Bedi Gate. ( 5 ) ). It appears that after the filing of the petition effort was made to find out suitable alternative places in the city for these rekdi/larri-gallas/cabin owners. Ultimately fifteen alternate sites were proposed in the affidavit filed by the Corporation on 29th April 1994 All these places proposed are said to be situated in the heart of the city and in important commercial-cum-residential parts of the city. ( 6 ) ). It is clear from the record that the petitioner-Association and its members who were carrying on trade in the disputed places were removed from such places in view of heavy traffic and the obstruction and nuisance which was being caused to the pedestrians and the traffic. These cabins/larri-gallas/rekdis were occupying vital public roads where there was heavy vehicular traffic and this resulted in traffic hazards and accidents. The Corporation has found it expedient in the interest of public to remove these rekdis/larri-gallas/cabins from the disputed places. ( 7 ) ). The footpaths and roads are public properties which are intended to serve the convenience of the general public and they ought not to be converted to a private use. These traders cannot claim a permanent right to continue at a particular public place for their business. The Municipal Corporation is under an obligation by virtue of the provisions of Section 63 (19) of the said Act to remove obstructions and projections in or upon the streets and other public places. These traders cannot claim a permanent right to continue at a particular public place for their business. The Municipal Corporation is under an obligation by virtue of the provisions of Section 63 (19) of the said Act to remove obstructions and projections in or upon the streets and other public places. We are therefore satisfied that the Corporation has undertaken the drive of removing the petitioners from the disputed places for valid reasons and in exercise of its statutory obligation to remove obstructions from public places and streets. ( 8 ) ). Under Section 231 (a) of the said Act which is sought to be challenged it is provided that the Commissioner may without notice cause to be removed inter alia any booth or other structure whether fixed or movable which is set up in any street contrary to the provisions of the Act. By Clause (c) of Section 231 the Commissioner is authorised to remove any article hawked or exposed for sale in a public place or in any public street in contravention of the provisions of the Act and any vehicle or other thing in which such article is placed. The affidavits filed on behalf of Corporation clearly show that the continuance of the trade by the petitioners in the rekdis / cabins / larri-gallas at the public places in dispute constituted a grave traffic hazard and obstruction to pedestrians who deserve consideration in the matter of their physical safety which cannot be sacrificed in order to accommodate the petitioners and other persons who use public properties for a private purpose unauthorisedly. Empowering the Commissioner to remove the obstructions upon the public streets and other public places cannot be said to be an unreasonable provision. Section 231 of the Act enables the Commissioner in appropriate cases to dispense with previous notice to the persons who are likely to be affected by the proposed action. The said provision confers a discretion on the Commissioner to cause an encroachment to be removed with or without notice and such discretion has to be exercised in a reasonable manner so as to comply with the constitutional mandate that the procedure accompanying the performance of a public act must be fair and reasonable. The power under Section 231 has to be exercised by the Commissioner where the provisions of the Act are contravened. The power under Section 231 has to be exercised by the Commissioner where the provisions of the Act are contravened. It must be presumed that while vesting in the Commissioner the power to act without notice the Legislature intended that the powers should be exercised sparingly and in cases of urgency which brook no delay. As observed above the provisions of Section 231 of the Act confer a discretion on the Commissioner to act with or without notice and it does not intend a command not to issue notice before the removal of an encroachment. In our view therefore the procedure prescribed under Section 231 of the said Act for removal of encroachment on footpaths or public places over which the public has a right of passage or access cannot be regarded as unreasonable unfair or unjust. The challenge against constitutionality of the provisions of Section 231 of the said Act made by the petitioners cannot therefore be sustained and the said provision is held to be constitutionally valid. We have taken this view following the reasoning of the Supreme Court for upholding the constitutional validity of a similar provision contained in Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888 in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation reported in AR 1986 S. C. 180 ( 9 ) ). We had by an earlier order dated 14th July 1994 directed the respondents to prepare a scheme for allotment of alternative sites to the petitioners which should be in terms of the judgments of the Supreme Court in Saudan Singh v. NDMC and Ors J. T. 1992 (2) S. C. 190 and Gaindaram and Ors. v. MCD J. T. 1993 (3) S. C. 396 It was directed that the respondents may also take into consideration the scheme formulated by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi which was referred to with approval in Gaindarams case. The type of occupation which will be allowed the amount of licence fee payable etc. were required to be indicated in the scheme. Thereafter proposed scheme was prepared by the respondent-Corporation and filed in this Court. The type of occupation which will be allowed the amount of licence fee payable etc. were required to be indicated in the scheme. Thereafter proposed scheme was prepared by the respondent-Corporation and filed in this Court. The parties agreed that the said scheme be treated as a proposal and that a public notice would be inserted in the city Newspaper Nobet informing the public that a proposal was drafted for granting licence regarding larri-gallas and if any person or Association desire to make any suggestion it should be sent to the Collector Jamnagar within one week of the publication. The Collector Jamnagar was to consider the suggestions and give his report indicating as to whether the proposed scheme needed any amendment or not and if amendment was required then to indicate such amendments. The Corporation agreed to give effect to the recommendations of the Collector. This agreed order was made on 12th August 1994 by this Court and it was directed that the scheme so finalised after adoption of the Corporation should be presented in Court. Accordingly a public notice was issued on 19th August 1994 by the Municipal Commissioner referring to this group of writ petitions and the orders made by this Court on 12th August 1994 and to the scheme which was submitted by the Corporation before the High Court inviting suggestions from any institution or person in respect of the said scheme in writing to be sent to the Collector Jamnagar. The scheme proposed before the High Court was accessible to the public in the office of the Corporation as notified. The Collector classified the objections received in response to the scheme into four categories and dealt with the objections which were raised also suggesting some modifications. Out of the fifteen places which were suggested as alternative cites for accommodating the petitioners and other similarly situated person the Collector taking into account the objections which were received opined that the site at item No. 10 in the proposed scheme near D. K. V. College should be cancelled from the scheme. He considered the objections received from Navanagar Chamber of Commerce and Industries and other objections and found them to be acceptable. Twenty rekdis which were proposed to be accommodated at the said place near D. K. V. College were recommended to be accommodated in the other places of the scheme. He considered the objections received from Navanagar Chamber of Commerce and Industries and other objections and found them to be acceptable. Twenty rekdis which were proposed to be accommodated at the said place near D. K. V. College were recommended to be accommodated in the other places of the scheme. Accordingly the Municipal Commissioner agreed with that suggestion of the Collector and twenty rekdi-owners who were to be accommodated at Stand M. K. 10 near D. K. V. College were to be adjusted at the places shown at items 3 4 5 and 6 of the scheme by adding five more rekdis to each of these four alternative sites. ( 10 ) ). The Collector in paragraph 4 of his report had recommended that certain type of trade cannot be carried out in a moving rekdi and therefore in respect of such trades no passes should be issued. On this basis the Municipal Commissioner has made a further suggestion that no rekdi for eatables should be given pass because persons to whom such passes are given sell unhygienic food creating nuisance and dirt on the roads. We find that this suggestion of the Commissioner goes contrary to the scheme which by Clause 5 (6) prevents a licensee or a holder of a stand pass only from cooking or selling any food exposed to dust smoke etc. which in the opinion of the Commissioner is likely to cause health hazard. Therefore the suggestion of the Commissioner that no pass should be granted for eatables to the rekdi owners is too wid to be accepted and need not be incorporated in the scheme. ( 11 ) ). It was sought to be contended by the learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners that the petitioners will be shifted to alternative sites. It was also submitted that the scheme does not provide for cabins. It was also submitted that there were more than 3000 hawkers who did not have any licence or stand pass and it will not be possible to accommodate all of them under this scheme. It was further contended by Mr. Shastry that alternative places be given as far as possible near the sites which were previously used by the rekdi owners. ( 12 ) ). The hawkers cannot assert any legal right to occupy permanently any particular place on the streets or pavements or other public property. It was further contended by Mr. Shastry that alternative places be given as far as possible near the sites which were previously used by the rekdi owners. ( 12 ) ). The hawkers cannot assert any legal right to occupy permanently any particular place on the streets or pavements or other public property. As held by the Supreme Court in Bombay Hawkers Union v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 S. C. C. 528 the public streets are meant for the use of general public and are not laid to facilitate the carrying on of private business. If hawkers were to be conceded the right claimed by them they could hold the society to ransom by squatting on the busy thoroughfares thereby paralysing all civic life. On the other hand if properly regulated according to the exigencies of the circumstances the small traders on the side-walks could considerably add to the comfort and convenience of the general public. In Saudan Singh v. NDMC and Ors. J. T. 1992 (2) S. C. the Supreme Court reiterated that the right to street trading under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution does not extend to a citizen occupying or squatting on any specific place of his choice on the pavement regardless of the rights of others including pedestrians to make use of the pavements. It is thus clear that the petitioners cannot claim any right to continue at a particular public place for carrying on their business. In the instant case the Corporation and the Police have considering the traffic hazards and obstructions at various congested points undertaken to remove the obstructions in the interest of general public. An effort is also made to make alternative provision for those who are removed. The places at which business cannot be done in rekdis cabins or larris are enumerated in Clause 3 (i) (a) of the scheme. Clause 4 deals with allotment of alternative place for carrying on business in rekdi or larri. It provides that they shall be allotted to petitioners belonging to category 1 mentioned in column 3 of Schedule 2 in such manner as the Commissioner may order alternative place for carrying on the nature of business mentioned in column 6 of the said Schedule. It provides that they shall be allotted to petitioners belonging to category 1 mentioned in column 3 of Schedule 2 in such manner as the Commissioner may order alternative place for carrying on the nature of business mentioned in column 6 of the said Schedule. It is further provided that any person referred to in sub-para (ii) of Clause 1 (3) (a) of the scheme may within a period of thirty days from the commencement of the scheme apply to the Commissioner for allotment of an alternative place from amongst the 14 alternative places mentioned in column 2 of the schedule. On receipt of an application the Commissioner shall allot to the applicant such place as he having regard to the nature of business proposed to be carried on may determine. Clause 5 of the scheme provides for general conditions applicable to a licensee or holder of a stand pass. Clause 6 provides for a grant of licence for moving rekdis/larri and the licence is to be in the prescribed form A subject to the conditions mentioned therein. If the application for a stand pass is rejected by the Commissioner he is required to record reasons for such orders. An appeal lies against an order of the Commissioner to the Corporation within thirty days from the date of the order rejecting the application as provided by Clause 8 of the scheme. ( 13 ) ). Mr. Pawa pointed out a discrepancy in Clause 1 (3) (a) (ii) as regards the words for carrying on business in rekdis cabins or larris and who carry on such business which were agreed to be deleted by the Corporation and instead the words rekdis/larris are added in the same sub-clause after the words who hold the stand pass or licence for a cabin and so amended the sentence would read thus who hold the stand pass or licence for a cabin rekdi or larri issued by the Corporation since the year 1985. The learned Advocate for the Corporation Mr. Nanavati stated that Clause 1 (3) of the scheme is to be treated as accordingly amended. ( 14 ) ). On going through the provisions of the scheme and keeping in view the relevant facts and circumstances of the case we are of the opinion that the modified scheme prepared by the respondent-Corporation is fair just and valid. Nanavati stated that Clause 1 (3) of the scheme is to be treated as accordingly amended. ( 14 ) ). On going through the provisions of the scheme and keeping in view the relevant facts and circumstances of the case we are of the opinion that the modified scheme prepared by the respondent-Corporation is fair just and valid. The scheme has been prepared by the Corporation keeping in view the traffic hazards which were caused due to congestion at various places and the alternative sites have been chosen at appropriate places which are said to be in the heart of the city and in the important commercial-cum-residential parts of the city and are in well developed localities. ( 15 ) ). We may note that the learned Counsel for the petitioners Mr. Pawa has stated that the suits which were filed by the petitioners will be withdrawn and we trust that they will be duly withdrawn as stated by him. As regards his contention that in Special Civil Application No. 1880 the Corporation should be compelled to construct a shopping centre on going through the record we are of the view that the site which was long back considered for such purpose is a triangular piece of land at a junction of three roads and it is not possible to put up a shopping centre at that place. There is no decision or resolution of the Corporation to put up shopping centre at the disputed place. As stated in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the Corporation having regard to the present development of the roads it is impossible to construct shopping centre at the disputed place which is a parking island. This Court therefore cannot direct the Corporation to construct a shopping centre at that parking plot. The learned Advocate for the Corporation stales that the amounts which were deposited by the members of the petitioner-Association prior to 1979 will be refunded to them. ( 16 ) ). It has come to our notice that the Courts have been passing orders of injunction in the matters of encroachment on streets and other public places indiscriminately and even before issuance of notices or hearing the parties against whom such orders are to operate without recording the reasons for such orders. ( 16 ) ). It has come to our notice that the Courts have been passing orders of injunction in the matters of encroachment on streets and other public places indiscriminately and even before issuance of notices or hearing the parties against whom such orders are to operate without recording the reasons for such orders. Power to grant injunction is an extraordinary power vested in the Court to be exercised taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of a particular case and the Courts have to be more cautious when the said power is being exercised without notice or hearing the party who is to be affected by the order so passed. That is why Rule 3 of Order 39 of the C. P. C. requires that in all cases the Court shall before grant of an injunction direct notice of the application to be given to the opposite party except where it appears that object of granting injunction itself would be defeated by delay. The hawkers have no fundamental right or a legal right to occupy any particular place on the pavements streets or other public places and the Court should ordinarily refrain from protecting such encroachers by granting injunctions which may work to the detriment of the public at large. ( 17 ) ). The decisions of the Municipal authorities taken under the relevant statutory provisions ought not to be lightly interfered with and the Court would not sit in appeal on merits over such decisions. In absence of some gross procedural lapse or arbitrariness or breach of statutory mandate ordinarily there would be no warrant for the Court to interfere with the action taken by the Municipal authorities under the relevant provisions of the law. ( 18 ) ). There are cases where the order made by the Municipal authorities is challenged on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice and the contention is that appropriate hearing as required by law was not given. In such cases when interim orders are issued against operation of notices/orders made by the Municipal authorities a delay is likely to occur and the action which may ultimately prove to be justified under the law would stand deferred. In such cases when interim orders are issued against operation of notices/orders made by the Municipal authorities a delay is likely to occur and the action which may ultimately prove to be justified under the law would stand deferred. Therefore the Court in such cases can and ought to by way of an interim arrangement and without prejudice to the contentions raised in the Court proceedings direct the concerned authority to give a hearing and decide the matter within a specified time so that the plaintiff does not get any undue advantage of the Courts delay in deciding the matter. Such practical approach would be within the powers of the Court while making interim orders The outcome of such an arrangement can be placed on record of the case which may even assist in disposing of the entire proceedings expeditiously. ( 19 ) ). There have been some cases where the ratio laid down by the superior Court is not followed by the subordinate Courts in some Municipal matters. Judicial discipline demands that the subordinate Courts should invariably follow the ratio of the decisions rendered by the High Court and the Supreme Court. Any deliberate attempt to flout the ratio laid down in the binding decisions ought to be viewed seriously and may even merit disciplinary action against the erring official. ( 20 ) ). UNDER the above circumstances we direct that the Corporation will implement the modified scheme mark A which is placed on record by the Corporation for giving licences and/or stand passes to the petitioners as per the scheme We also direct that if the proceedings instituted by those against whom action for removal of cabins/larri-gallas/rekdis was taken or contemplated by the Corporation are not withdrawn as was envisaged during these proceedings the respondent-Corporation will take necessary steps for removal of the encroachments. The Corporation will be at liberty to move the Court in which suits are filed by the petitioners for vacating any injunction that may have been granted against removal of encroachments and if proper relief is not obtained to move the High Court in the matter. The Corporation will be at liberty to move the Court in which suits are filed by the petitioners for vacating any injunction that may have been granted against removal of encroachments and if proper relief is not obtained to move the High Court in the matter. The Corporation should ensure that no encroachment takes place at the places from where the petitioners are removed and for which there is prohibition against carrying on business in rekdis cabins or larris under Clause 3 of the scheme and that action is taken against the Municipal staff responsible if any encroachment takes place at any of such places. All the above petitions are disposed of in the above terms with no order as to costs . ( 21 ) ). I have read the erudite and lucid judgment of my Brother R. K. Abichandani J. and I entirely agree with the same. I would however like to re-emphasise certain aspects with regard to grant of injunction by Courts. ( 22 ) ). It is often said in certain quarters perhaps at times unfairly that in order to grab public property or avoid paying just dues to the Government or the Local Bodies the best course to adopt is to file a suit and obtain an interim injunction. Unlike cases where injunctions are sought by a plaintiff against a private party where an ex parte order is seldom passed or if passed the application is soon a decided an ad interim injunction against the State or Local Public Bodies however tend to continue for long period of time without such application being finally disposed of. Lack of personal interest on the part of the State or such Public Bodies in seeing to the early disposal of such applications may be the reason for the delay in their disposal. That there may even be passive or active connivance on the part of the employees of the State or such Public Bodies with the plaintiff may also at times be not ruled out. There is therefore all the more reason that the Court should not unwillingly become a part of a design of taking unfair advantage by securing ad interim orders notwithstanding that there may have been clear violation or non-compliance with the substantive provisions of the law by the plaintiff. There is therefore all the more reason that the Court should not unwillingly become a part of a design of taking unfair advantage by securing ad interim orders notwithstanding that there may have been clear violation or non-compliance with the substantive provisions of the law by the plaintiff. Passing interim orders indiscriminately and without apparent due application which has the effect of allowing the plaintiff to continue to enjoy the fruits of his actions which may be contrary to law tends to lower the courts prestige and clearly undermines the Rule of Law. ( 23 ) ). It is unfortunate that in recent time notwithstanding clear pronouncements by the Supreme Court with regard to the principles to be followed while giving ad interim injunctions the Subordinate Courts permitted what has been referred to in the case of Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das. (1994) 4 SCC 225 disgruntled litigants to indulge in adventurism. ( 24 ) ). It cannot be denied that the procedure established by law has to be followed. Public Authorities whether it be the State or a Local Body are required to follow the law but procedural lapses of a person ought not to result in such ad interim orders being passed which in effect protect illegalities having already been committed by the plaintiff or to protect or give licence to his desire not to comply with the substantive legal provisions in the future. Rule of Law requires that the law should be respected and followed voluntarily by one and all. Violators of the law should not be allowed to take protection of the courts of law by obtaining ad interim injunctions which have the effect of allowing the violation to continue. ( 25 ) ). The need to see that a prima facie case is made out before a court grants an ad interim injunction cannot but be over-emphasised. Violators of the law should not be allowed to take protection of the courts of law by obtaining ad interim injunctions which have the effect of allowing the violation to continue. ( 25 ) ). The need to see that a prima facie case is made out before a court grants an ad interim injunction cannot but be over-emphasised. In this regard reference may usefully be made to the following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India (1981) 2 SCC 766 which was quoted with approval in Morgan Stanleys case (supra) : no injunction could be granted under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code unless the plaintiffs establish that they have a prima facie case meaning thereby that there was a bona fide contention between the parties or a serious question to be tried. The question that must necessarily arise is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case there is a prima facie case and if so as between whom ? In view of the legal principles applicable it is difficult for us to say on the material on record that the plaintiffs have a prima facie case. It cannot be disputed that if the suit were to be brought by the Bank of India the High Court would not have granted any injunction as it was bound by the terms of the contract. What could not be done directly cannot be achieved indirectly in a suit brought by the plaintiffs. Even if there was a serious question to be tried the High Court had to consider the balance of convenience. We have no doubt that there is no reason to prevent the appellant from recalling the amount of Rs. 85 84 456 The fact remains that the payment of Rs. 36 52 960 against the first lot of 20 documents made by the appellant to the Bank of India v. as a payment under reserve while that of Rs. 49 31 496 was also made under reserve as well as against the letter of guarantee Or indemnity executed by it. A payment under reserve is understood in banking transactions to mean that the recipient of money may not deem it as his own but must be prepared to return it on demand. 49 31 496 was also made under reserve as well as against the letter of guarantee Or indemnity executed by it. A payment under reserve is understood in banking transactions to mean that the recipient of money may not deem it as his own but must be prepared to return it on demand. The balance of convience clearly lies in allowing the normal banking transactions to go forward. Furthermore the plaintiffs have failed to establish that they would be put to an irreparable losss unless an interim injunction was granted. ( 26 ) ). It has also been seen that the provisions of the proviso to Order 39 Rule 3 have scarcely been complied with by the subordinate courts. Ad interim ex parte injunctions causing serious prejudice and at times irreparable injury and harm to the defendants have been issued without caring to see whether the provisions of Order 39 Rule 3 are satisfied or not. The need to give reasons before passing ex parte orders of injunction have been emphasised by the Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1993) 3 SCC 161 when at page 176 it was observed as follows :. . . . the Court shall record the reasons why an ex parte order of injunction was being passed in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In this background the requirement for recording the reasons for grant of ex parte injunction cannot be held to be a mere formality. This requirement is consistent with the principle that a party to a suit who is being restrained from exercising a right which such party claims to exercise either under a statute or under the common law must be informed why instead of following the requirement of Rule 3 the procedure prescribed under the proviso has been followed. The party which invokes the jurisdiction of the court for grant of an order of restraint against a party without affording an opportunity to him of being heard must satisfy the court about the gravity of the situation and court has to consider briefly these factors in the ex parte order. We are quite conscious of the fact that there are other statutes which contain similar provisions requiring the court or the authority concerned to record reasons as before exercising power vested in them. We are quite conscious of the fact that there are other statutes which contain similar provisions requiring the court or the authority concerned to record reasons as before exercising power vested in them. In respect of some of such provisions it has been held that they are required to be complied with but non-compliance therewith will not vitiate the order so passed. But same cannot be said in respect of the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39. The Parliament has prescribed a particular procedure for passing of an order of injunction without notice to the other side under exceptional circumstances. Such ex parte orders have far-reaching effect as such a condition has been imposed that court must record reasons before passing such older. If it is held that the compliance with the proviso aforesaid is optional and not obligatory then the introduction of the proviso by the Parliament shall be a futile exercise and that part of Rule 3 will be a surplusage for all practical purposes. Proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code attracts the principle that if a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner it should be done in that manner or not all. The principle was approved and accepted in well-known cases of Taylor v. Taylor and Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor. This Court has also expressed the same view in respect of procedural requirement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act in the case of Ramchandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare. As such whenever a Court considers it necessary in the facts and circumstances of a particular case to pass an order of injunction without notice to other side it must record the reasons for doing so and should take into consideration while passing an order of injunction all relevant factors including as to how the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated if an ex parte order is not passed. ( 27 ) ). The aforesaid observations were quoted with approval in Morgan Stanleys case and S. Mohan J. speaking for the Court in Morgan Stanleys case summarised the principles for the grant of an ex parte injunction as follows : 36 a principle ex parte injunction could be granted only under exceptional circumstances. ( 27 ) ). The aforesaid observations were quoted with approval in Morgan Stanleys case and S. Mohan J. speaking for the Court in Morgan Stanleys case summarised the principles for the grant of an ex parte injunction as follows : 36 a principle ex parte injunction could be granted only under exceptional circumstances. The factors which should weigh with the court in the grant of ex parte injunction are (a) whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensue to the plaintiff; (b) whether the refusal of ex parte injunction would involve greater injustice than the grant of it would involve; (c) the court will also consider the time at which the plaintiff first had notice of the act complained so that the making of improper order against a party in his absence is prevented; (d) the court will consider whether the plaintiff had acquiesced for sometime and in such circumstances it will not grant ex parte injunction; (e) the court would expect a party applying for ex parte injunction to show utmost good faith in making the application; (f) even if granted the ex parte injunction would be for a limited period of time; (g) general principles like prima facie case balance of convenience and irreparable loss would also be considered by the court. (Emphasis added.) ( 28 ) ). Recently the Supreme Court once again in Bloom Dekor Limited v. Subhash Himatlal Desai and Ors. (1994) 6 SCC 322 re-emphasised the need of the courts to properly apply the provisionss of Order 39 Rule 1. While adversely commenting on ex parte interim injunction being granted it was observed in Bloom Dekors case at page 327 :. . . . Unfortunately the courts below wittingly or otherwise have aided this judicial adventurism without even determining whether they had jurisdiction. . . . (Emphasis added.) ( 29 ) ). While adversely commenting on ex parte interim injunction being granted it was observed in Bloom Dekors case at page 327 :. . . . Unfortunately the courts below wittingly or otherwise have aided this judicial adventurism without even determining whether they had jurisdiction. . . . (Emphasis added.) ( 29 ) ). In the present case we are concerned with persons who are occupying government land without their having any right title or interest in the same Our attention has also been drawn to the fact that a number of suits for injunctions have been filed whereby the subordinate courts have granted interim injunctions which have the effect of allowing the trespassers to remain in unlawful possession Perhaps attention of the courts was not drawn to the provisions of Sections 38 and 39 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 read with Section 41 of the said Act. The Supreme Court in Premji Ratansey Shah and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1994) 5 SCC 547 was dealing with a case where an injunction had been granted in favour of a trespasser on government land. Even though in that case the land had been acquired by the Government the same had been sold by the original owners to two persons who were defendants 3 and 4 in the civil suit which had been filed. The appellants before the Supreme Court were the successors to the said defendants 3 and 4. As the land had been acquired before its sale to defendants 3 and 4 the Supreme Court observed as follows :. . . . Thus Defendants 3 and 4 had no ghost of right title or interest in the lands acquired from the original owner Maibhai. The said sale is a void sale and the petitioners therefore cannot derive any interest under the agreement of sale to resist the possession of the lawful owner nor could the declaration sought for be given. The question therefore is whether an injunction can be issued against the true owner. Issuance of an order of injunction is absolutely a discretionary and equitable relief. In a given set of facts injunction may be given to protect the possession of the owner or person in lawful possession. It is not mandatory that for mere asking such relief should be given. Issuance of an order of injunction is absolutely a discretionary and equitable relief. In a given set of facts injunction may be given to protect the possession of the owner or person in lawful possession. It is not mandatory that for mere asking such relief should be given. Injunction is a personal right under Section 41 (j) of the Specific Relief Act 1963 the plaintiff must have personal interest in the matter. The interest of right not shown to be in existence cannot be protected by injunction. 5 It is equally settled law that injunction would not be issued against the true owner. Therefore the courts below have rightly rejected the relief of declaration and injunction in favour of the petitioners who have no interest in the property. Even assuming that they had any possession their possession is wholly unlawful possession of a trespasser and an injunction cannot be issued in favour of a trespasser or a person who gained unlawful possession as against the owner Pretext of dispute of identity of the land should not be an excuse to claim injunction against true owner. . . . . ( 30 ) ). The aforesaid Special Leave Petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court with exemplary costs of Rs. 30 0 ( 31 ) ). After the aforesaid decision in Premji Ratansey Shahs case there should not be an iota of doubt in the minds of the Presiding Officers when dealing with applications for injunctions filed by the plaintiffs who are trespassers and want protection against true owners Judicial discipline requires that the law laid down by the superior courts has to be followed. ( 32 ) ). The judicial adventurism by the plaintiffs has to be discouraged and if known principles of law are not applied by the subordinate courts and ad interim injunctions are granted for the asking the superior courts would be failing in their duty if they do not correct such orders by taking appropriate actions. Judicial adventurism by the litigant or by the courts cannot be permitted. By deliberately ignoring or disregarding the decision or directions by the superior courts administration of justice suffers and the rule of law is undermined. Blatant disregard of the principles of law cannot be countenanced. ( 33 ) ). A prayer has been made for stay of operation of our judgment. We see no reason to grant the same. By deliberately ignoring or disregarding the decision or directions by the superior courts administration of justice suffers and the rule of law is undermined. Blatant disregard of the principles of law cannot be countenanced. ( 33 ) ). A prayer has been made for stay of operation of our judgment. We see no reason to grant the same. All that the Court has done is to implement and follow the judgments of the Supreme Court. .