A. N. DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) ). The order passed by and on behalf of the respondent. On 13th August 1987 under Section 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 (the Act for brief) is under challenge in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Thereby the application of the petitioner for exemption under Section 20 (1) of the Act came to be rejected. ( 2 ) ). The facts giving rise to this petition move in a narrow compass. The dispute centres round one parcel of land bearing Survey No. 165 admeasuring 4 acres 23 gunthas situated in village Majura taluka Choryasi district Surat (the disputed land for convenience ). It was originally owned by Nathubhai Ranchhodbhai and his two sons named Babubhai Nathubhai and Ishwarbhai Nathubhai. It appears that the owners executed one agreement on 8 January 1975 to sell the disputed land in favour of the petitioner. The agreement in that regard is at Annexure-B to this petition. It may be mentioned that the petitioner is a society registered under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act 1961. A copy of its Registration Certificate is at Annexure-A to this petition Pursuant to the agreement at Annexure-B to this petition the possession of the disputed land was handed over to the society through its Chairman. It may be mentioned that the agreement at Annexure-B to this petition was executed in favour of the society inter alia through its Chairman Pursuant thereto the owners also executed one irrevocable power of attorney in favour of the Chairman of the petitioner-society by name on 7th March 1975 its copy is at Annexure to this petition. Thereafter an application was made for the non-agricultural use of the disputed land By the order passed by the District Development Officer at Surat on 20th January 1976 the necessary permission in that regard was granted its copy is at Annexure-D to this petition. It appears that the petitioner-society thereafter made one application to the respondents on 14th August 1976 claiming exception with respect to the disputed land under Section 20 (1) of the Act. Its copy is at Annexure B to this petition. It appears that in the meantime the petitioner-society had filed the declaration in the prescribed form under Section 6 (1) of the Act as the holder of the disputed land. Its copy is at Annexure B to this petition. It appears that in the meantime the petitioner-society had filed the declaration in the prescribed form under Section 6 (1) of the Act as the holder of the disputed land. The Competent Authority at Surat by his older passed on 15th February 1986 came to the conclusion that the holding of the petitioner was not in excess of the ceiling limit for the purposes of the Act. It appears to have come to the notice of the concerned officer of the respondent He appears to have found it not according to law. Its revision under Section 34 thereof was contemplated. Thereupon one show-cause notice came to be issued to the petitioner on 27th July 1986 calling upon the petitioner to show cause why the aforesaid order passed by the Competent Authority at Surat on 15th February 1986 should not be revised. Its copy is at Annexure-F to this petition. It appears that thereafter by the order passed by and on behalf of the respondent on 13th August 1987 the application made by the petitioner for exemption under Section 20 (1) of the Act came to be rejected. Its copy is at Annexure-G to this petition. The aggrieved petitioner has thereupon approached this Court by means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for questioning the correctness of the order at Annexure-G to his petition. ( 3 ) ). It transpires from the tenor of the impugned order at Annexure-G to this petition that the application for exemption made by the petitioner was rejected only on the ground that the petitioner could not be said to be the holder of the disputed land. The fate of its application for exemption has not been decided on merits. Kum. Shah for the petitioner has therefore urged that in view of the definition of the expression to hold contained in Section 2 (1) of the Act there is no escape front the conclusion that the petitioner would be the holder of the disputed land on the date of coming into force of the Act. In that view of the matter runs her submission its application under Section 20 (1) of the Act could not have been rejected on the ground that it was not its holder. ( 4 ) ). In that view of the matter runs her submission its application under Section 20 (1) of the Act could not have been rejected on the ground that it was not its holder. ( 4 ) ). As against this Shri Chhaya for the respondent has urged that it transpires from the impugned order at Annexure-G to this petition that an application for exemption under Section 20 (1) of the Act with permission to sell the land to the petitioner was made by the original owners and it came to be rejected by the order passed by and on behalf of the respondent on 2nd November 1982 and as such no fresh application for exemption can he entertained. According to Shri Chhaya for the respondent the impugned order at Annexure-G to this petition therefore deserves not to he interfered with in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 5 ) ). It would be quite proper to look at the definition of the term to hold contained in Section 2 (1) of the Act. So far relevant it reads : 2 (1) to hold with its grammatical variations in relation to nay vacant land means (i) to own such land; or (ii) to possess such land as owner or as tenant or as mortgagee or under an irrevocable power of attorney or under a hire-purchase agreement or partly in one of the said capacities and partly in any other of the said capacity or capacities. EXPLANATION Where the same vacant land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in another capacity than for the purposes of this Act such land shall be deemed to be held by both such persons. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision would go to show that to possess a land under an irrevocable power of attorney would also mean to hold such land. In the present case as pointed out hereinabove the owners executed an irrevocable power of attorney in favour of the Chairman of the society on 7th March 1975 at Annexure C to this petition. It is not in dispute that possession of the disputed land was handed over to the society through its Chairman at the time or execution of the Agreement to Sell at Annexure-B to this petition. It is not in dispute that possession of the disputed land was handed over to the society through its Chairman at the time or execution of the Agreement to Sell at Annexure-B to this petition. It thus becomes clear that the Chairman of the society was in possession of the disputed land on execution the Agreement to Sell at Annexure-B to this petition and he to continued to remain in its possession at the time of execution of the irrevocable power of attorney in his favour at Annexure-C to this petition. In view of this factual position there is no escape from the conclusion that the petitioner society-through its Chairman was holding the disputed land on and from 7th March 1975 under an irrevocable power of attorney executed on 7th March 1975 at Annexure-C to this petition within the meaning of Section 2 (1) of the Act. When the petitioner-society was holding the disputed land under the irrevocable power of attorney at Annexure-C to this petition it can certainly be said to be its holder for he purposes of the Act. Its application for exemption under Section 20 (1) of the Act could not have been rejected on the ground that the petitioner society was not a holder or the disputed land ( 6 ) ). It is true that the application for exemption under Section 20 (1) of the Act made by the original owners came to be rejected As pointed out hereinabove that was for exemption for the purpose of effecting sale of the disputed land in favour of the petitioner. The exemption was not claimed by the original owners on the ground as claimed by the present petitioner. In that view of the matter rejection of the application for exemption under Section 20 (1) of the Act by the original owners should not come in the way of the petitioner in claiming the desired exemption. ( 7 ) ). In view of my aforesaid discussion the impugned order at Annexure-G to this petition cannot he sustained in law. It has to he quashed and set aside. The matter will have to be remanded to the respondent for restoration of the proceeding to the and for its fresh decision according to law on merits of the application for exemption. ( 8 ) ). In the result this petition is accepted. It has to he quashed and set aside. The matter will have to be remanded to the respondent for restoration of the proceeding to the and for its fresh decision according to law on merits of the application for exemption. ( 8 ) ). In the result this petition is accepted. The impugned order passed by and on behalf of the respondent on 23rd August 1987 at Annexure-G to this petition is quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to the respondent for restoration of the proceeding to file and for its fresh decision on merits of the petitioners application for exemption under Section 20 (1) of the Act according to law. Rule is accordingly made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs. .