( 1 ) THE order of the Court was delivered by U. L. Bhat, C. J.- The petitioner has been detained by order of the respondent No. 2 under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter called 'the Act' for short) (Annexure P/2) passed on 22-7-1993. The grounds of detention were served on 25-7-1992. The detenu did not make a written representation. The matter was referred to the Advisory Board. The detenu was made to appear before the Advisory Board on 18-8-1993. The Advisory Board gave him a personal hearing and reported that there is sufficient cause for detention. The State Government by order dated 3-9-1993 confirmed the detention and fixed the period of detention as twelve months. Petitioner filed this habeas corpus petition challenging the legality of the order of detention. ( 2 ) THE writ petition was heard at the Gwalior Bench of the High Court. On behalf of the petitioner two contentions were urged before the Bench. The first contention was that the order of confirmation was passed mechanically and without application of mind. Both the Judges who constituted the Division Bench have repelled this contention. The other contention urged was where a detenu has not submitted a written representation and appeared before the Board, the Board has an obligation to ask him whether he requires the assistance of a friend to submit a representation. It was further argued that in the present case the detenu was not asked to make a representation and therefore, he was deprived of opportunity in the matter of submitting representation before the Advisory Board. S. K. Dube, J. accepted this contention as tenable while S. K. Chawla, J. was not inclined to agree with contention. Therefore, the Bench referred the case to the Chief Justice hence the occasion for this Full Bench the matter. (sic) ( 3 ) WHEN the petition was pending before Gwalior Bench, the petitioner was represented by Sarvashri R. K. Verma and Y. K. Pathak, Advocates. S. P. C. was issued to senior counsel about the scheduled date of hearing by the Full Bench, but none of the counsel appeared before the Full Bench on 28-4-1994 and 10-5-1995. We requested Shri Deepak Verma, Advocate, to assist the petitioner. He has addressed his arguments on behalf of the petitioner. We have heard the learned Additional Advocate General also. We requested Shri Deepak Verma, Advocate, to assist the petitioner. He has addressed his arguments on behalf of the petitioner. We have heard the learned Additional Advocate General also. ( 4 ) THE short question for consideration is whether where a detenu under the Act fails to make a written representation and is brought before the Advisory Board, the Board has an obligation to question him about his failure to make a written representation and in the event of the Board's failure to do so, whether the order of detention has to fail. In view of the findings recorded by both the learned Judges in the Division Bench rejecting the other contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner, no other question arises for consideration. ( 5 ) IN order to appreciate the controversy before us, it is necessary to look at the constitutional and legislative back-drop. The back-ground for consideration of the controversy in provided by Art. 21 of the Constitution which is a bulwark against deprivation of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. Article 22 contains the constitutional scheme for protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. According to clause (1), no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult and to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. Clause (2) requires such person to be produced before the nearest Magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest. Clause (3) makes it clear that neither of the residual clauses shall apply to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention. ( 6 ) THE contours of such law of preventive detention are drawn in the remaining clauses of the Article. The law shall not authorise detention of a person over three months unless and Advisory Board has reported before the expiration of the said period that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for such detention. The persons who could be appointed members of the Board are also specified in the clause. The law shall not authorise detention of a person over three months unless and Advisory Board has reported before the expiration of the said period that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for such detention. The persons who could be appointed members of the Board are also specified in the clause. Clause (5) requires that the authority making the order of detention shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. Clause 7 (b) empowers the Parliament to prescribe the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in the enquiry. ( 7 ) THE National Security Act, 1980 has been enacted in pursuance of the provisions contained in Article 22 (3) and (4) of the Constitution. Section 3 of the Act enables the Central Government or the State to make an order of detention. Sub-section (3) of Section 3 enables the State Government to direct the District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police to use the power for passing an order of detention. Section 8 requires the grounds of detention to be communicated to the person detained within the time specified therein. Section 9 deals with constitution of Advisory Board for the purpose of the Act. Section 10 requires the appropriate Government to place before the Advisory Board the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order. The procedure of Advisory Board is governed by Section 11. The Board shall consider the material placed before it and call for such further information as it may deem necessary from the appropriate Government or from any person through the appropriate Government. If in any particular case it considers it essential to do so or the detenu desires to be heard, the Board shall hear him and thereupon submit its report to the appropriate Government within seven weeks from the date of detention of the person concerned. The report shall specify the opinion of the Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention. The report shall specify the opinion of the Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention. By virtue of sub-section (1) of Section 12, the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention for such period as it thinks fit where the Board has reported that there is sufficient cause for the detention. By virtue of subsection (2) of Sec. 12, the appropriate Government shall revoke the detention order where the Advisory Board has reported that there is no sufficient cause for the detention. Section 13 prescribes the maximum period of detention. ( 8 ) THE Supreme Court in A. K. Roy v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 710 : (1982 Cri LJ 340), upheld the constitutionality of the Act. In para 87 of the leading judgment of Chandrachud, C. J. , it is made clear that according to the express intendment of the Constitution, no detenu has a right to consult a legal practitioner of his choice or to be defended by him and, therefore, it cannot be held that such representation is warranted and that procedure of the Advisory Board in which the detenu is denied representation by a legal practitioner cannot be regard as unfair, unjust or unreasonable. In para 89, the view was reiterated. The right under Article 22 (5) does not carry with it the right to be represented by a legal practitioner before the Advisory Board. While expressing this view, the Court in paragraphs 94 and 95 laid down two propositions, namely - (1) if the detaining authority or the Government takes the aid of a legal practitioner or a legal adviser before the Advisory Board, the detenu must be allowed the facility of appearing before the Board through a legal practitioner and (20) "it is not fair, and, the statute does not exclude that right that the detenu should not even be allowed to take the aid of a friend. Whenever demanded, the Advisory Board must grant that facility. " ( 9 ) THE above principles were followed by the Supreme Court in Abdul Zabbar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1983 SC 505 : (1983 Cri LJ 853 ). In this case, the detenu applied to the Board for being represented on the date of hearing either through a counsel or by a non-lawyer educated friend. This application was rejected. In this case, the detenu applied to the Board for being represented on the date of hearing either through a counsel or by a non-lawyer educated friend. This application was rejected. The Court followed the principles laid down in A. K. Roy's case (1982 Cri LJ 340) (SC) to hold that in the absence of reasons for denial of right to be represented before the Advisory Board, the entire proceedings before the Advisory Board would be vitiated and the continued detention of the detenu would be illegal. ( 10 ) IN Johney D'couto v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1988 SC 109 : (1988 Cri LJ 178) a case under the provisions of the COFEPOSA Act, the detaining authority was assisted by the Deputy Collector and a Superintendent of Central Excise and the Board refused assistance of a Retired Assistant Collector of Central Excise to the detenu. Placing reliance on the principles laid down in A. K. Roy's case (1982 Cri LJ 340) the Supreme Court held that the Advisory Board was not justified in declining assistance of a friend and quashed the detention order. ( 11 ) IN Anil Vats v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 979 : (1991 Cri LJ 605), the friend of the detenu who was actually present in the premises was not allowed to assist the detenu. The Supreme Court held that refusal of friend's assistance would be violative of Article 22 (5) and would render the detention order invalid. ( 12 ) THE sum and substance of the propositions laid down in A. K. Roy's case (1982 Cri LJ 340) (SC) is that if demanded, the assistance of a friend should not be refused to the detenu. None of the cases referred to above has laid down a proposition that even where the detenu does not seek assistance of a friend, it is obligatory for the Advisory Board to question him and find out why he has not made a written representation and whether he needs the assistance of a friend. ( 13 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner, Shri Verma, invited our attention to four earlier decisions of this Court. ( 13 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner, Shri Verma, invited our attention to four earlier decisions of this Court. They are Bharat v. District Magistrate Gwalior, 1986 MPLJ 420 : (1986 Cri LJ 1976), Hiralal v. State of M. P. , (1987 Cri LJ 659), Dhunna v. District Magistrate, Morena, 1988 Jab LJ 446 and Siroman Singh v. State of M. P. , 1988 Jab LJ 657 : (1989 Cri LJ NOC 137 ). The earliest decision had taken the view in favour of the detenu. The next decision had taken the view against the detenu and the later two decisions took the view in favour of the detenu following the earliest decision. The earliest decision was not brought to the notice of the court decided the second case. The three decisions taking the view in favour of the detenue were by Benches which included Dr. T. N. Singh, J. In Bharat's case, the Court referred to the propositions laid down and the reasons given in A. K. Roy's case (1982 Cri LJ 340) (SC) and an earlier unreported decision of the Division Bench following A. K. Roy's case. The Court agreed that it is open to the Advisory Board to devise its own procedure, but held that it must not transgress the constraints of the Constitution and the State and, therefore, the Board is required to follow a fair and just procedure. The learned Judges, therefore, were of the opinion that in terms of Art. 39-A, the Court is duty bound to ensure that the Board so functions and that the detenu gets justice at Board's forum on a basis of equal opportunity. Any treatment to the detaining authority and the detenu unequally would offend Art. 14 and it would amount to hostile discrimination. This is particularly so, it was felt, in a case where the detenu has failed to make a written representation. It was indicated that A. K. Roy's case does not deny the detenu the right to consult a legal practitioner in preparing his written representation. This is particularly so, it was felt, in a case where the detenu has failed to make a written representation. It was indicated that A. K. Roy's case does not deny the detenu the right to consult a legal practitioner in preparing his written representation. From these circumstances, the learned Judges drew the inference that the Board has a duty to question the detenu why he has not filed a written representation and whether he would like to file a representation and further ask him where the detaining authority is represented by a legally qualified person, if he would like to have the same facility and ask him whether he would like to have assistance of a friend. ( 14 ) WITH respect, we are unable to agree with the approach made in the above decision or with the reasoning contained therein. The decision proceeds on the assumption that the Board is a forum for the litigating parties and the State is in an advantageous position and the Board is duty bound to ensure that the other litigating party is treated equally, if necessary, by subjecting that party to questions in order to find whether he requires the assistance either of a lawyer or of a friend. This approach may perhaps be commendable where the Court deals with a lis between parties and for proper adjudication of the lis. At page 210 of Basu's Shorter Constitution of India, Eleventh (1994) Edition, it is stated: "the proceedings before the Board are non-justiciable, because its functions are advisory. Thus, the Courts cannot compel the Board to call for further information from the Government. " xxxx xxxx xxxx "the functions of the Board being advisory there is no lis to adjudicate upon and the proceedings cannot be said to be similar to those before a quasi judicial tribunal. " the constitutional provisions as well as the statutory provisions contained in the scheme are intended to provide safeguards to the detenu. One of the safeguards is that the detenu shall have a right to submit a representation and thereupon the State Government and the AdvisoryBoard shall have a duty to consider the written representation. He has a right to insist on personal appearance before the Board for hearing. The Board has also the discretion in other cases to procure his presence for personal presentation. He has a right to insist on personal appearance before the Board for hearing. The Board has also the discretion in other cases to procure his presence for personal presentation. These are additional safeguards provided for the detenu, not to fight a lis, but to apprise the Board of facts and circumstances which may tend to satisfy the Board that his continuous detention would be unnecessary. The Board is not a Tribunal empowered to go into the correctness of the facts stated by the detaining authority. The Board is required to go into examination of the sufficiency of the material. Such being the nature of functions of the Board, which is, as we have indicated, a body consists of legally trained individuals with a judicial background, the proceedings before the Board cannot be regarded as a quasi judicial proceedings giving rise to application of principles of natural justice which are not contemplated either in the Constitution or in the statute. The Supreme Court had read into the scheme of the Act the principle of enabling the detenu to be assisted by a friend where such assistance is demaned, on account of various considerations including concern for safeguarding personal liberty of individuals. We do not think such considerations could persuade the Court to so modify the principles laid down in A. K. Roy's case (1982 Cri LJ 340) (SC) as to alter its content and complexion. The Supreme Court has defined the right of assistance of a friend as arising only on demand. We do not think it appropriate for the High Court to lay down that a right inheres with a detenu if he has not made demand. Absence of assistance of a friend where the detenu does not make a demand for such assistance cannot import unreasonableness or arbitrariness in the proceedings of the Board. As we have indicated, the Board itself is constituted to safeguard the interests of the detenu as well as the interests of the State. It is not a quasi judicial Tribunal adjudicating any lis. It is entrusted with the task of arriving at a conclusion on the sufficiency of materials for detention by taking into consideration the materials placed before it. It is not a quasi judicial Tribunal adjudicating any lis. It is entrusted with the task of arriving at a conclusion on the sufficiency of materials for detention by taking into consideration the materials placed before it. We find nothings in Art. 22 or Art. 14 of the Constitution or in the statutory scheme which could be the foundation for laying down the principle that the Board should question the detenu when brought before it as to why he has not submitted a written representation and whether he needs assistance of a friend for making a representation or to present his case before the Board. Article 39-A cannot alter the position. We are in agreement with the view taken by this Court in Hirabai v. State of M. P. , 1987 Cri LJ 659. With respect, we disagree with the view taken in Dhunna v. District Magistrate, Morena, 1988 Jab LJ 446 and Siroman Singh v. State of M. P. , 1988 Jab LJ 657 : (1989 Cri LJ NOC 137) and hold that they do not lay down the correct law. Since we have indicated that the Board has not failed to perform its statutory duty or has caused any prejudice to the detenu by not putting certain questions to him in relation to the presentation of representation and requirement of a friend as an assistant and in the light of the fact that no other contention survives for consideration, we dismiss the petition, but without costs. Petition dismissed. .