Judgment A. K. Ganguly, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed by Dr. Sachita kumar Sinha with a prayer for payment of bis salary with all admissible allowances and retirement benefits for the post of Additional Director of secondary Education with effect from 6.8.1988 till 9.5.1990 and also for the post of Director (Secondary Education) Bihar, Patna with effect from 10.5.1990 till 31.12.1991, the date of retirement of the petitioner. 2. The case of the petitioner is that he is an Officer of Class I Bihar education Services since 1976 and while he was posted as Deputy Director of Education in the pay scale of Rs.3700-5000 he was appointed to the post of Additional Director of Secondary Education to which post the petitioner worked from 6 8 1988 to 9 5.1990 Thereafter by another notification dated 10.5.1990 the petitioner was asked to discharge the duties of the Director (Secondary Education) in addition to his own work of Additional Director of Secondary Education (Headquarters ). The order by which the petitioner was so appointed to the posts of Additional Director of Secondary Education and Director (Secondary Education) are contained in Annexures 4 and 5 of the writ petition. 3. The petitioners grievance is that he has an up-blemished service career and he worked in the said post of Additional Director of Secondary education (Headquarters) and Director, Secondary Education but he has been denied the pay attached to the aforesaid two posts. For the post of additional Director of Secondary Education (Headquarters) the sanctioned scale of pay is Rs.4500-5700 as revised by the 5th Pay Revision Committee with effect from 1.1.1986 and the post of Director, Secondary Education carries the scale of pay of Rs.5100-6300 as per the aforesaid revision. The petitioner has retired on 31.12.1991 but the Account General, Bihar, did not sanction his pension in the higher scale of pay but sanctioned his full pension in the lower scale of Rs.3000-4500 even though the petitioner worked as the Director, Secondary Education as would appear from the pension payment order The petitioners further case is that his services were not only un-blemished but the said services were appreciated from time to time by R. K. Shrivastava, Commissoner, Human Resources Development department, Bihar, Patna, as would appear from Annexure-1 to the writ petition. 4. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that when the petitioner has satisfactorily, without any complaint from any quarter, discharged the duties of the posts of Additional Director of Secondary Education (Headquarters) and Director of Secondary Education, there is no reason to deny him the pay attached to the said post. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on Rules 58 and 103 of the Bihar Service Code and on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt P. Grover V/s. State of Haryana and others reported in 1963 (2)SLR, page 735 which is equivalent to 1983 (2) SCC page 291 5. Mrs. Sheema Ali Khan, learned counsel appearing for the State respondents, strenuously resisted the said claim of the petitioner by raising various objections. Her objections are three-fold, namely, (i) that the petitioner Was, at no point of time, promoted to those poses, (ii) the relevant orders at annexures 4 and 5 of the writ-petition would show that the petitioner was posted against the post of Additional Director of Secondary Education (Headquarters) Patna in his own scale of pay until further orders and then again he was asked to take over charge of the post of director (Secondary, Education ). Bihar, Patna, in addition to his original work of Additional Director of Secondary Education (Headquarters), Patna and (iii) the petitioner agreed to work against those posts on those terms, namely, on his own scale of pay. Further contention of the learned counsel for the State is that the petitioner previously also came to this Court and filed a writ petition complaining of similar grievances and this Hon ble court by an order dated 19.12.1991 directed the petitioner to represent before the authority concerned in regard to his grievances and the respondents were directed to dispose of the said representation within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the said order. It was made clear in the said order dated 19.12.1991 that the writ-petition was dismissed as withdrawn and the merit of the case had not been considered. The learned state Counsel has, of course, fairly stated that it is not her contention that this writ petition in view of the order dated 19.12.1991, is not maintainable. It was made clear in the said order dated 19.12.1991 that the writ-petition was dismissed as withdrawn and the merit of the case had not been considered. The learned state Counsel has, of course, fairly stated that it is not her contention that this writ petition in view of the order dated 19.12.1991, is not maintainable. By drawing the attention of this Court to the order dated 19.12.1991, she only wanted to show that the grievances of the petitioner were considered and rejected by the respondents with reasons. 6. Now the questions which falls for consideration before this Court is whether the State Government is entitled, in the peculiar facts of this case to deny the salary is admissible to the posts of Additional Director of secondary Education (Headquarters) and the Director of Secondary education to the petitioner and whether the respondents can deny the benefits of the pay attached to the aforesaid posts in fixing the retirement benefits of the petitioner. 7. The decision cited by the petitioners counsel in the case of Smt. P. Grover (Supra), as has been rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents, is clearly distinguishable from the present case. In that case Smt. P. Grover was promoted to the post in question on an acting basis. In the present case, the petitioner has not been promoted. As such the principle decided in the said case does not, in terms, apply to the facts of the present case. The learned State Counsel further relied on paragraph 10 of the counter-affidavit which is as follows ; "the petitioner was in Class I Senior branch in Education Department and was working on the post of Dy. Director when he was allowed to addition to his own duties as Additional Director. The post of Additional Director is above the super time pay scale Besides the Government has not sanctioned the post and this way the petitioner will be entitled for the pay of that post when he will be promoted in the scale of pay of that super selection grade post. The post of Director Secondary is an ex-cadre post of Education Department. So the petitioners claim for the time scale of pay of Additional Director or Director, secondary does not arise in view of the facts that be was not promoted on either of the posts. " 8. The post of Director Secondary is an ex-cadre post of Education Department. So the petitioners claim for the time scale of pay of Additional Director or Director, secondary does not arise in view of the facts that be was not promoted on either of the posts. " 8. The petitioner in support of his case has further affirmed a supplementary affidavit disclosing therein a letter of the State Government dated 13th February, 1982 issued by the Special Secretary to the Government of bihar Education Department to the Accountant-General, Biscomaun bhawan, Patna. In the letter is has been stated that the post of Director, additional Director, etc. may be filled up by promotion for which necessary provisions shall be made in the Bihar Education Service Recruitment Rules when this Court asked the learned counsel for the respondents to produce the rules. If any, made for promotion to the aforesaid posts, the learned counsel for the respondents fairly stated before the Court that no such rule has yet been made. 9. The position, therefore, is clear that no rule for promotion to the posts in question has been made so far. In absence of the rules, the petitioner has been asked to officiate in the aforesaid two posts which the petitioner did without any complaint from any quarter. Therefore, the objection of the respondents that as the petitioner has not been promoted to the said posts, he is not entitled to the salaries attached to the said posts does not hold good. In this connection, the petitioner has relied upon an un-reported judgment of the Supreme Court dated 4th May, 1992 passed in s. L P. (C) No.6066 of 1991 (Shashi Bhushan Sinha V/s. State of Bihar and others) whereby the apex Court has been pleased to observe as follows : "in our opinion, there is no reason why the appellant should not be paid the salary as Senior Graphic-cum-Chief Visualiser in the state Institute of Technology for the period during which he discharged the duties to that post. " 10. This Court also feels that there does not exist any valid reason for denying the petitioner the salary attached to the posts of Additional director of Secondary Education and Director of Secondary Education when he has satisfactorily discharged his duties attached to those posts. 11. " 10. This Court also feels that there does not exist any valid reason for denying the petitioner the salary attached to the posts of Additional director of Secondary Education and Director of Secondary Education when he has satisfactorily discharged his duties attached to those posts. 11. In coming to the aforesaid conclusion this Court is reminded of the ratio flowing from the two decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited v Brojo Noth Ganguly reported in AIR 1986 SC page 1571, which was affirmed in the case of Delhi transport Corporation V/s. D T. C. Mazdoor Congress reported in AIR 1991 SC page 101. In both the cases the Hon ble Supreme Court has held that when an employee is asked by the employer to work against a post on certain terms, the employee concerned by reason of the un-equal bargaining position cannot object to the terms and concitions of service. In fact the employees are bound to accept whatever terms were offered to them. Keeping those principles in mind. I am unable to sustain the objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents that as the petitioner did not raise any objection to the terms of his appointment as additional Director and Director of Secondary Education, he is to agitate his present grievance before this Court. 12. There is also another aspect of matter inasmuch as the Supreme court has repeatedly asked the State to act as model employer. In a welfare State where the Government is one of laws and not of men, the role of a model employer of the State is not at all compatible with its action in the present case, namely, getting the work for higher posts discharged by the petitioner and at the time of making payment trying to defeat the claim of the petitioner by raising all sorts of, if I may say so, without any disrespect, specious pleas. 13. Therefore, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the fact that there is no relevant rule which prohibits the grant of pay attached to the posts of the petitioner, the claim of the petitioner ought to succeed. On the other hand, Rules 58 and 103 of the Bihar Service Code support the view which I am taking. 14. On the other hand, Rules 58 and 103 of the Bihar Service Code support the view which I am taking. 14. It is also necessary to remember that the petitioner has approached the Court for justice which should not be defeated on mere technicalities. A Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of india has to act not only in accordance with law but it must also act in consonance with the equitable principles as the apex Court has done it some many time. Here I may appropriately set out the observation of the supreme Court in the case of Gurbax Singh V/s. The Financial Commissioner and another reported in AIR 1991 SC page 435 at page 440 : "we feel that while this Court is to administer justice according to law there may be scope for doing justice and equity between the parties. In such a situation were member what the Institutes of Justinian, De Justltla Et Jure, in liber Primus Tit. I said "justice est constans et perpetue voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi. " Justice is the constant and perpetual wish to render every one on his due. " (emphasis added)I am of the view that justice of this case requires that the petitioner be paid the salary and emoluments that are due to the said posts in which he worked satisfactorily, 15. Therefore, I am unable to uphold the pleas raised by the learned counsel for the respondents and I allow this writ application by directing the respondents to pay to the petitioner the salary and other allowances for the work taken from him for the post of Addititonal Director of Secondary education from 6.8.1988 to 9 5.1990 and for the post of Director of secondary Education from 10.5.1990 till 31 12,1991 on the basis of the revised scale of pay as stated above after deducting the amount already paid. I further direct the respondents to pay the retirement benefits of the petitioner on the basis of his pay as Director Secondary Education. The respondents are further directed to make the aforesaid payment within a period of three months from today and fix the pension of the petitioner and other retirement benefits, as aforesaid, within a period of four months from date. 16. The respondents are further directed to make the aforesaid payment within a period of three months from today and fix the pension of the petitioner and other retirement benefits, as aforesaid, within a period of four months from date. 16. I make it clear that I have passed this order taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and this order is, as obviously confined to the facts of this case. 17. This writ petition Is allowed accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. Petition Allowed