S. K. SEN, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an application for review of the judgment and order dated 25/04/1994 passed by the Division Bench to which I was a party. By the said judgment and order Appeal No. 514 of 1992 was dismissed but it was held that the appellant M / s. Abhijit it Tea Company Pvt. Ltd. was entitled to be paid back the sum of Rs. 19,33,873. 74 p. lying with the Registrar, original side of this Court being part of the amount deposited by the Registrar pursuant to the order of the Division Bench dated 10/10/1991. By the said order dated 25/04/1994 we directed the Registrar, original side of this Court to pay the said sum of Rs. 19,33,873. 74 p. with accrued interest thereon to M/s. Abhijit Tea Co. (P.) Ltd. after deducting his commission within 4 weeks from the date of the said judgment and order. ( 2 ) THE New Red Bank Tea Co. Ltd. and Sri Rebin Pal who are the respondents Nos. 4 and 5 in the said Appeal No. 514 of 1992 being aggrieved by the said direction of refund of the sum of Rs, 19,33,873. 74, with accrued interest, have filed the instant review petition. ( 3 ) THE Learned Advocate for the respondent raised an objection as to maintainability of the review application. ( 4 ) THE main objection with regard to maintainability of the review application as urged by Mr. Dutt, Learned Advocate for the respondent is that since Abhijit Tea Company (P) Ltd. has preferred a special leave petition before the Supreme Court against the order dated 25/04/1994, the review application is not maintainable. It, however, appears to me that the said objection is not valid in view of the provision contained in O. XLVII R. 1 (2) of the C. P. C. which reads as follows: -" (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant or when being respondent he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review. " ( 5 ) IT appears from record that special leave petition has been filed against the order dated 6/05/1994 passed by me in the review application. No record has been produced to show that Special Leave Petition against the judgment and order of the Division Bench dated 25/04/1994 has been made although it has been submitted by the Learned Advocate for the respondent that Special Leave petition has been filed. ( 6 ) BE that as it may, even assuming such Special Leave petition has been filed the respondent Abhijit Tea Co. (P) Ltd. could not have preferred an appeal against the directions for refund of the said amount of Rs. 19,33,873. 74 which is in its favour and there cannot be any common ground for such application and the present application for review. ( 7 ) IT has been urged on behalf of the respondent that since the earlier review petition was rejected by me as the same was not according to form, the instant review application is also not maintainable. This contention of the Ld. Advocate for the respondent does not appear to me to be sound since the first review petition was not decided on merit. Accordingly the said objection cannot be sustained. ( 8 ) IN the case of Colam Kabir v. D. S. R. Ebenezer reported in (1986) 2 Cal HN 40, the facts involved were that on an application filed by the tenant petitioner under Ss. 17 (1), 12 (2) and (a) (3) and (b) of the Tenancy Act, the Court though found that the tenant was in arrears of rent for 68 months, held that the petitioner was a defaulter for 50 months and, accordingly, directed the petitioner to pay the arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 600. 00 per month in addition to the current rent but the Court did not direct him to deposit the statutory interest on the total amount of arrears of rent. The opposite party filed an application for review of the order. The petitioner thereafter filed a revisional application before the High Court against the said order. But ultimately when the review application came up for hearing as no one appeared on behalf of the petitioner, the High Court rejected the application. The opposite party filed an application for review of the order. The petitioner thereafter filed a revisional application before the High Court against the said order. But ultimately when the review application came up for hearing as no one appeared on behalf of the petitioner, the High Court rejected the application. The review application in the Trial Court was opposed on behalf of the petitioner contending that it was not maintainable after the rejection of the revisional application in the High Court. Overruling the contention, the court, allowed the (sic) finding that that the High Court (sic) of the revisional application on merits and that there were errors apparent on the face of the record inasmuch as the Court by mistake directed the tenant to deposit rent for 50 months after finding that he was a defaulter for 58 months and that the Court also did not direct the tenant to deposit the statutory interest. The petitioner challenged the order in revision. ( 9 ) IT was also held that the review application was filed before the Court when the petitioner had not moved this Court 'in revision against the order. The revisional application was disposed of before the disposal of the review application, but since the revisional application was not disposed of on merits the rejection of the revisional application could not stand in the way of disposing the review application by the Court below, subsequent to the rejection and of the said revisional application. ( 10 ) A review application which has not been disposed of on merits does not bar a second application for review. In this connection reference may be made to the decision in the case of Karragadda Venakatasubhayya v. Kartagadda Virayya reported in AIR 1957 Andh Pra 981. In the aforesaid decision it was decided that since prior application for amendment or review was not disposed of on merits, a fresh application could well be maintained. In the aforesaid decision the facts involved were that in a previous suit for partition of joint family property the Court held that a certain item was joint family property but through mistake or oversight no direction for division of that property was given in the preliminary decree or final decree for partition. In the aforesaid decision the facts involved were that in a previous suit for partition of joint family property the Court held that a certain item was joint family property but through mistake or oversight no direction for division of that property was given in the preliminary decree or final decree for partition. The plaintiff's application for review or amendment of decree was rejected on ground of non-payment of Court-fee and therefore he brought a second suit for partition at that time of property. It has been held that the second suit was barred by res judicata. ( 11 ) IT has been held, further that the matter could have been and could perhaps be rectified under S. 152, Civil P. C. as a clerical mistake due to accidental omission. Such a mistake could be set right without an application for review. As the prior application for amendment or review was not disposed of on merits, a fresh application could well be maintained. ( 12 ) IN the aforesaid decision, the principles decided in the case of Langat Singh v. Janki Koer reported in (1912) ILR 39 Cal 265 was followed. ( 13 ) IT has been submitted on behalf of the applicant that the sum of Rs. 19,33,873. 74 paise is lying deposited with the Registrar, Original Side under the said order dated 10l0-91 passed by another Division Bench consisting of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee and the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Altamas Kabir in an appeal arising out of suit No. 240 of 1990. The said suit No. 240 of 1990 is a suit for specific performance of an alleged agreement entered into between Abhijit Tea Co. and Terai Tea Co. for sale dated 15/01/1990. ( 14 ) IT has further been submitted by the Learned Advocate for the applicant that in view of the order of Division Bench dated 10/10/1991 and also the Supreme Court Order dated 6/09/1993 the Division Bench to which I was also a party, should not have passed the said direction for refund of Rs, 19,33,873. 74 p. ( 15 ) IT has also been submitted on behalf of the applicant that although the said order dated 10/10/1991 of Division Bench and 6/04/1993 of the Supreme Court were placed before us we failed to consider the effect of the two orders. 74 p. ( 15 ) IT has also been submitted on behalf of the applicant that although the said order dated 10/10/1991 of Division Bench and 6/04/1993 of the Supreme Court were placed before us we failed to consider the effect of the two orders. ( 16 ) IT has further been submitted that no reason has been assigned by us as to why the refund of the said amount should be granted in spite of the said two orders dated 10/10/1991 and 6/04/1993. ( 17 ) IT has further been contended that by the said order dated 6/04/1993 the Supreme Court did not direct this Court to consider the question of refund and pass orders, on the contrary the Supreme Court rejected the application for refund. ( 18 ) UNDER aforesaid circumstances it has been contended on behalf of the applicant that there is error apparent on the face of the record. ( 19 ) IN support of his contention Mr. Sen referred to Mulla's C. P. C. , 14th Ed. P.2339. He has also relied upon the decision in the case of Brindavan Chandra Ghosh v. Damodar Prosad Pandey reported in (1925) 29 CWN 148: (AIR 1925 Cal 304 ). ( 20 ) IT has further been submitted that the Supreme Court directed the Division Bench of this Court to decide the appeal in accordance with law and on merits. ( 21 ) IT has also been contended by Mr. Sen that the order for refund of the said sum of Rs. 19,33,873. 74 p. was beyond the scope of the suit and the appeal arising out of it, namely, Extra-ordinary Suit No. 2 of 1992 and Appeal No. 514 of 1992. ( 22 ) IT has also been submitted that scope of the said Suit No. 240 of 1990 out of which the appeal came up before Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee and Altamas Kabir JJ. and the scope of extra-ordinary Suit No. 2 of 1992 filed by Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. are different. ( 23 ) TERAI Tea Co. Limited filed a suit against Dhirendra Kumar Bhowmick and others, inter alia, praying for a decree for specific performance of the alleged agreement for sale dated 15/01/1990. In an appeal arising out of the said specific performance suit, the Division Bench comprising Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee and Altamas Kabir, JJ. Pvt. Ltd. are different. ( 23 ) TERAI Tea Co. Limited filed a suit against Dhirendra Kumar Bhowmick and others, inter alia, praying for a decree for specific performance of the alleged agreement for sale dated 15/01/1990. In an appeal arising out of the said specific performance suit, the Division Bench comprising Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee and Altamas Kabir, JJ. directed Sardar Amjad Ali, the Learned Receiver to deposit the said sum of Rs. 19, 33,873. 74p, with the Registrar, Original Side. ( 24 ) B The other Extra-ordinary Suit No. 2 of 1992 was filed by Abhijit Tea Co. Limited against Terai Tea Co. Limited inter alia, praying for a decree for declaration that the agreement entered into on 3/08/1991 by and between Abhijit Tea Co. Ltd. and "rerai Tea Co. Ltd. to supply of Green Leaf tea for five years at Rs. 5. 00 per kg. was valid and binding upon the defendants and for other reliefs. ( 25 ) IN the said suit No. 2 of 1992 an interlocutory application was made which was rejected by the Learned Single Judge against which appeal was preferred being Appeal No. 514 of 1992 wherein we rejected the appeal by our order dated 25/04/1994 but directed the refund of the said sum of Rs. 19,33,873. 74 p. ( 26 ) IT has also been submitted on behalf of the applicant that in the aforesaid appeal before us as well as in the interlocutory application as well as in the suit there is no prayer for refund of the money lying with the Registrar, Original Side. The refund of the money lying with the Registrar, is not the subject matter either of the Extra-ordinary Suit No. 2 of 1992 and (or the appeal being Appeal No. 514 of 1992. It was beyond our scope to pass any direction for refund as the question was not in issue either in suit or appeal. ( 27 ) ACCORDINGLY it was contended that there is an error on the face of the record. ( 28 ) IN support of this contention Mr. Sen relied upon the judgment and decision in the case of Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and another v. Most Rev. Mar Poupose Athanasius reported in AIR 1954 SC 526 at p. 538. ( 27 ) ACCORDINGLY it was contended that there is an error on the face of the record. ( 28 ) IN support of this contention Mr. Sen relied upon the judgment and decision in the case of Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and another v. Most Rev. Mar Poupose Athanasius reported in AIR 1954 SC 526 at p. 538. ( 29 ) IT has been submitted that by the said judgment and order passed by us dated 25/04/1994 we have provided, inter alia, as follows :-"that apart status-quo ante has to be restored and it is to be restored with whole hog. " ( 30 ) IT has been submitted by Mr. Sen that admittedly when the receiver was in possession from 3/08/1991 till 11/09/1991, green tea leaves have been removed from Dharanipur Tea Estate by Abhijit Tea Co. (P) Ltd. and the sale proceeds was lying with the Receiver. ( 31 ) IT has further been submitted that if status quo ante has to be restored with whole hog then the green tea leaves which have been removed from Dharanipur Tea Estate and/ or the sale proceeds thereof has to be restored and/or refunded to New Red Bank Tea Co. Ltd. Having regard to the Division Bench's own finding that status-quo ante has to be restored with whole hog, the order, (sic) is an error apparent on the face of the record. ( 32 ) MR. Sen further submitted that there is another error apparent on the face of the record as appears from the said order dated 25/04/1994. In this connection he has referred to the relevant portion of the said order which is set out hereinbelow: -"however, there is no dispute that the appellant deposited a sum of Rs. 20 lacs as an advance towards the purchase of green tea leaves. The receiver has submitted accounts before this Court and the money which was lying with the Receiver was deposited with the Registrar, Original Side. It appears from the certificate of the Registrar, Original Side that a sum of Rs. 19,33,873. 74p. is lying deposited with the Registrar, High Court, Original Side. The Receiver has also submitted a report wherein the accounts have also been furnished. In that view of the matter, the appellant is entitled to refund of the said sum of Rs. 19,33,873. 74p. lying with the Registrar, Original Side. 19,33,873. 74p. is lying deposited with the Registrar, High Court, Original Side. The Receiver has also submitted a report wherein the accounts have also been furnished. In that view of the matter, the appellant is entitled to refund of the said sum of Rs. 19,33,873. 74p. lying with the Registrar, Original Side. " ( 33 ) IT has been contended that the said sum of Rs. 19,33,873. 74p. is not advance towards the purchase of green tea leaves only but the same includes sale proceeds of green tea leaves which is evident from the judgment and order dated 25/04/1994, ( 34 ) IT has also been urged by Mr. Sen that the sum of Rs. 19,33,873. 74p. includes sale price of green tea leaves from Dharanipur Tea Estate and not the advance towards the purchase of green tea leaves and the same cannot be refunded. ( 35 ) IT has been contended that the advance alleged to have been made by the appellant has only to be adjusted against the sale proceeds of green tea leaves, which are lying in deposit. The advance alleged to have been made has already been used for running the garden though this was not necessary as New Red Bank Tea Co. was running the Garden profitably. ( 36 ) IT has accordingly been submitted that the finding made by us that the appellant, that is Abhijit Tea Co. Limited, was entitled to refund of the sum of Rs. 19,33,873. 74 p. lying with the Registrar, Original Side and the direction upon the Registrar, Original Side to refund the said sum of Rs. 19,33,873. 74p. with accrued interest thereon to Abhijit Tea Co. Limited after deducting his commission, suffers from an error on the face of the record and should be set aside. ( 37 ) IT has been submitted by the Learned Advocate for the respondent, on the other hand, that there is no such error apparent on the face of the record in the order and judgment dated 25/04/1994, so as to call for review of the said order and judgment. ( 37 ) IT has been submitted by the Learned Advocate for the respondent, on the other hand, that there is no such error apparent on the face of the record in the order and judgment dated 25/04/1994, so as to call for review of the said order and judgment. ( 38 ) IT has further been submitted on behalf of the respondent that the Division Bench while delivering the judgment and order dated 25/04/1994 took into consideration all the facts and all the orders passed from time to time and as also the advance given by the Abhijit Tea Company and the Appeal Court was of the opinion that the money advanced by the Abhijit Tea Company should be refunded and accordingly such direction was given. ( 39 ) IT has been contended by the Learned Advocate for the respondent that although there is no prayer for refund of the said amount of Rs. 19,33,873. 74p. It is open to the Appeal Court while disposing of the appeal to pass such direction with regard to the said amount as may be necessary for the ends of justice. ( 40 ) IT has also been contended by the Learned Advocate for the respondent that even if the Appeal Court had no jurisdiction to pass any' order the same cannot be reviewed and appeal could have been preferred against the said order. ( 41 ) FURTHER contention of the Learned Advocate for the respondent is that the allegation of the applicant that the direction for refund was passed in the absence of the applicant and the same has seriously affected it cannot be a ground for review. ( 42 ) IT has further been submitted by the Learned Advocate for the respondent that wrong appreciation of the case and wrong decision cannot be a subject matter of the review application. ( 43 ) IT has been submitted by the Learned Advocate for the respondent that no cogent ground has been made out which calls for an order for review and, as such, the application for review should be dismissed. ( 44 ) I have considered the respective submissions of the parties and the decisions is cited from the bar. It cannot be disputed that scope of Suit No. 240 of 1990 (M/s. Terai Tea Co. ( 44 ) I have considered the respective submissions of the parties and the decisions is cited from the bar. It cannot be disputed that scope of Suit No. 240 of 1990 (M/s. Terai Tea Co. (P.) Ltd. v. Dhirendra Nath, Bhowmick and another) out of which the appeal came up before Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee and Altamas Kabir, JJ. and that of extraordinary Suit No. 2 of 1992 (M/s. Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. Terai Tea Company Pvt. Ltd. and others) out of which the Appeal No. 514 of 1992, are different. ( 45 ) TO appreciate the true scope of the instant review petition, it is necessary to consider the following relevant facts:- on 27/10/1964 the Government of West Bengal granted lease of the land over which Dharanipur Tea Estate is situated, to one Dhirendra Nath Bhowmick, since deceased, for a period of 30 years, at yearly rent of Rs. 6,385,90 payable on or before 28th March every year. The said lease was registered on 23/09/1970. ( 46 ) IN 1970 Dhirendra Nath Bhowmick and his wife, Smt. Reba Bhomick promoted companies New Red Bank Tea Company Private Limited and Surendranagar Tea Estate Private Limited with the controlling shares thereof being held by them to the extent of nearly 97%, Dhirendra Nath Bhomick was at all material times the Managing Director of the New Red Bank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. ( 47 ) ON or about 15/03/1977 an agreement for sub-lease was executed between Dhirendra Nath Bhowmick and New Red Bank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. whereby Dhirendra Nath Bhowmick agreed to demise his leasehold interest in Dharanipur Tea Estate to New Red Bank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. by way of sub-lease. Since 15/03/1977 New Red Bank Tea Company Private Limited has been in possession of the Dharanipur Tea Estate, pursuant to the said sub-lease, and running the same as its own garden, Dhirendra Nath Bhowmick and his wife, Reba Bhowmick continued to be the controlling shareholders of New Red Bank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. and its Directors also treated the said garden as one of the units of New Red Bank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. and showed the same as one of its assets in the Balance Sheets of New Red Bank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. by signing the same as Director year after year. Pvt. Ltd. and its Directors also treated the said garden as one of the units of New Red Bank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. and showed the same as one of its assets in the Balance Sheets of New Red Bank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. by signing the same as Director year after year. Dhirendra Nath Bhowmick and his wife were the Managing Director and Director respectively of New Red Bank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. until 14/05/1981. ( 48 ) ON 4/02/1981, the Bhowmicks created mortgage over the Dharanipur Tea Estate as well as the Red Bank group of Tea Estates in favour of United Bank of India and confirmed that the Title Deeds in respect of all the three estates were already lying deposited with the said Bank. ( 49 ) ON 14/05/1981, Dhirendra Nath Bhowmick, since deceased and his wife, Smt. Reba Bhowmick, sold their controlling block of shares of New Red Bank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. and also of a Company called Surendranagar Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd. to Rabin Pal, the respondent No. 5 herein for valuable consideration and since 14/05/1981 the said Pal became the controlling shareholder of the said two companies and three tea estates including the said Dharanipur Tea Estate. Dhirendra Nath Bhowmick and his wife made over possession of the said tea gardens including Dharanipur Tea Estate and got Rabin Pal elected as the Managing Director of New Red Bank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. in his place and retired completely therefrom. ( 50 ) ON 27/07/1983, Dhirendra Nath Bhowmick floated a Company by the name of Dharnipur Tea Industries Pvt. Ltd. and purported to transfer his purported leasehold interest of said Dharnipur Tea Estate to Dharnipur Tea Industries Private Limited and caused the same to be mutated in favour of Dharanipur Tea Industries Pvt. Ltd. ( 51 ) ON 15/09/1983, the mutation made in favour of Dharanipur Tea Industries Pvt. Ltd. was cancelled by an order passed by the Land Registration Collector, Jalpaiguri, in a proceeding initiated by United Bank of India under the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953. ( 52 ) ON May, 1984, Dhirendra Nath Bhowmick (since deceased) and his wife Reba Bhowmick filed a suit in the Court of the Assistant District Judge at Jalpaiguri being Title Suit No. 8 of 1984 against New Redbank Tea Co. ( 52 ) ON May, 1984, Dhirendra Nath Bhowmick (since deceased) and his wife Reba Bhowmick filed a suit in the Court of the Assistant District Judge at Jalpaiguri being Title Suit No. 8 of 1984 against New Redbank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. , Surendranagar Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd. and United Bank of India praying inter alia, for a declaration that they had equitable right title and interest in respect of the said Dharanipur Tea Estate and also for possession and for other reliefs. ( 53 ) ON 27/11/1984, the said Title Suit No. 8 of 1984 was transferred from the Jalpaipuri Court to the High Court at Calcutta under clause 13 of the Letters Patent which was registered and numbered as Extraordinary Suit No. 1 of 1985. ( 54 ) ON 15/01/1990, Dhirendra Nath Bhowmick and Dharanipur Tea Industries Pvt. Ltd. entered into an agreement for sale of Dharanipur Tea Estate with one Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. ( 55 ) IN January, 1990, Terai Tea Company Pvt. Ltd. , respondent No. 1 herein, filed a suit on the original side of this Court for specific performance of the said agreement for sale dated 15/01/1990 against Dhirendra Nath Bhowmick (since deceased), his wife Reba Bhowmick and Dharanipur Tea Industries Pvt. Ltd. The said suit was registered and numbered as Suit No. 240 of 1990. It was alleged in the plaint filed in Suit No. 240 of 1990 that the said Dhirendra Nath Bhowmick and his wife Reba Bhowmick had by an alleged agreement for sale dated 15/01/1990 agreed to sell the said Dharanipur Tea Estate to Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. and was immediately thereafter trying to resile from it. In the said suit, an interlocutory application was filed by Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. for injunction and other consequential reliefs. ( 56 ) ON 1/04/1991, a learned Single Judge of this Court was pleased to dismiss the interlocutory application filed by Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. in Suit No. 240 of 1990. Against the order dated 1/04/1991, the said Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of this Court. ( 57 ) ON 23/04/1991 on the appeal filed by Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. , the Division Bench of this Court was pleased to pass an order directing the parties to maintain status quo over and in respect of the Dharanipur Tea Estate. Pvt. Ltd. preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of this Court. ( 57 ) ON 23/04/1991 on the appeal filed by Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. , the Division Bench of this Court was pleased to pass an order directing the parties to maintain status quo over and in respect of the Dharanipur Tea Estate. ( 58 ) ON 19/04/1991 another application was moved by Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. before the learned Single Bench for appointment of receiver over the said Dharanipur Tea Estate which was rejected. ( 59 ) IN May, 1991 Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. preferred an appeal from the said Order dated 19/04/1991 before the Division Bench. ( 60 ) ON 2/08/1991, the Division Bench of this Court in the Appeal arising out of interlocutory order dated 19/04/1991 was pleased to pass a decree by consent for specific performance of the said alleged agreement for sale dated 15-1-1990. There was no evidence adduced by any of the parties. Although New Redbank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. the respondent No. 4 herein, was the owner and as such in possession of the said Dharanipur Tea Estate and was running the said Tea Estate, the said New Redbank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. and its Managing Director, Rabin Pal, were neither made party to the suit for specific performance nor any opportunity of being heard was given to them. Everything was done behind the back of New Redbank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. , Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. and rabin Pal. The Division Bench was pleased to appoint Sardar Amjad Ali, a learned Advocate of this Court, as Receiver over the said Dharanipur Tea Estate to take possession of the same, if necessary with police help. Conveyance was directed to be registered by the Registering Authority without insisting on production of no objection certificate required under the Income-tax Act. ( 61 ) ON 3/08/1991, the Receiver so appointed went to the garden and disposed New Redbank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. and its officers with police help, took possession of the same and posted one Mr. Rungta as an authorised representative of Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. to run, manage and look after the affairs of Dharanipur Tea Estate. ( 62 ) ON 6/08/1991, the matter was mentioned on behalf of New Redbank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. and its officers with police help, took possession of the same and posted one Mr. Rungta as an authorised representative of Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. to run, manage and look after the affairs of Dharanipur Tea Estate. ( 62 ) ON 6/08/1991, the matter was mentioned on behalf of New Redbank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Rabin Pal before the Division Bench of this Court whereupon the order dated 2/08/1991 was varied to the extent that the Receiver will not handover possession of Dharanipur Tea Estate to M/s. Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. till further order. New Redbank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. was also given leave to file an application for intervention. On the same day, Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. set up its another sister concern, namely, Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. and filed a suit in the Court of the learned Assistant District Judge at Jalpaiguri being I. S. No. 84 of 1991 against Tarai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. , Manager, Dharanipur Tea Estate and the Receiver, inter alia, praying for a decree for permanent injunction restraining Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. and others from selling the green leaves to others and / or from interfering with the day to day management of the said Dharanipur Tea Estate by the said Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. Significantly, New Redbank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. was not made a party. In the said suit, an interlocutory application was moved but no order was passed by the Assistant District Judge. The appeal preferred by Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. to the High Court was dismissed on 10-9-91. The suit was later transferred to this Hon'ble Court and which has been registered and numbered as Extraordinary Suit No. 2 of 1992. ( 63 ) ON 31/08/1991, Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. filed an application in O. C. Suit No. 89 of 1991 before the Assistant District Judge at Jalpaiguri for an order directing Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. to supply green tea leaf of Dharanipur Tea Estate to the plaintiff only and not to any other party and for a further direction that such supply should continue for a period of five years as per alleged agreement purportedly entered in between Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. ( 64 ) ON 9/09/1991, New Redbank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. ( 64 ) ON 9/09/1991, New Redbank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Rabin Pal filed a Special Leave petition in the Supreme Court of India against the order dated 2/08/1991. The Supreme Court by its judgment and order dated 9/09/1991, was pleased to set aside the said decree for specific performance made in the Suit No. 240 of 1990, the order for appointment of Receiver and the Receiver was directed to restore possession of Dharanipur Tea Estate to New Redbank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. Conveyance executed by the Receiver in favour of Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. was also set aside. ( 65 ) ON 11/09/1991, the Receiver delivered possession of Dharanipur Tea Estate to New Redbank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. It has been alleged that between 3/09/1991 and 11/09/1991, the said Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. and/or the said Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. in collusion with each other removed 2,37,523 kgs. of green tea leaves from the said Dharanipur Tea Estate, the minimum value of which would be Rs. 23,75,230. 00 if it is sold @ Rs. 10. 00 per kg. (a conservative estimate ). ( 66 ) ON October, 1991, an application for clarification and/or further direction filed by Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. was disposed of by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. ( 67 ) ON 10/10/1991, Receiver mentioned the matter before the Division Bench of this Court in the said appeal arising out of Suit No. 240 of 1990 when the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee and the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Altamas Kabir by an order dated 10/10/1991 was pleased to direct Sardar Amjad Ali, the learned Advocate/ Receiver as follows :"we, therefore, direct Sardar Amjad Ali, the learned Advocate to pay off and adjust the costs and expenses incurred by him while acting as Receiver from the amount held by him and to deposit the balance and other securities held by him including two cheques referred to above with the Registrar. Original Side of this Hon'ble Court. Original Side of this Hon'ble Court. The above two cheques are to be made over by the former Receiver to the Registrar, Original Side after duly endorsing the same in favour of the Registrar, Original Side who shall then reopen an account in any nationalised bank and deposit the said two cheques and other amounts, if any, in such account and on encashment of cheques, the Registrar, Original Side will invest the entire amount in short term deposit subject to further direction of the Supreme Court. " ( 68 ) THEREAFTER on 13/12/1991 Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. filed a Review application before the Supreme Court for review of the order dated 9-9-91. The same was dismissed by Supreme Court. ( 69 ) ON 15/03/1992, Dhirendra Nath Bhowmick died. ( 70 ) ON 27/03/1992 Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. filed another review application before the Supreme Court for review of the order dated 9-9-91. The Supreme Court dismissed the same as being without any merit. ( 71 ) ON 3/04/1992 New Redbank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. filed a suit on the Original Side of this Hon'ble Court, inter alia, praying for a decree for damages and for compensation of Rs. 54,34,000. 00 against Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. and other reliefs, caused by the delivery of green tea leaves by the Receiver to Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. under the agreement with Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. at a rediculously low price of Rs. 5. 00 per kg. when there were offers of Rs. 10. 00 per kg. The said suit is pending. ( 72 ) ON 26/06/1992 the said Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. made an application in the said Extraordinary Suit No. 2 of 1992 for an order of injunction restraining the defendants from selling and/ or supplying any green tea leaves to any party other than Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. The Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Padma Khastgir, after hearing, by an order dated 2/07/1992, was pleased to dismiss the said applications. ( 73 ) BEING aggrieved by the said order dated 2/07/1992 the said Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of this Court. ( 74 ) ON 6/04/1993 Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. filed an application before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3569 of 1991 (The New Redbank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of this Court. ( 74 ) ON 6/04/1993 Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. filed an application before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3569 of 1991 (The New Redbank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd.) which was registered as I. A. No. 4 of 1992 for clarification of the order dated 9-9-91. In the said application a prayer was made for directing the New Redbank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. to supply Green Tea Leaves to Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. on the basis of the alleged agreement dated 3/08/1991 between Abhijit Tea Co. Ltd. and Terai Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. or in the alternative, for refund of the amount lying with the Registrar, Original Side, Calcutta, pursuant to the order dated 10-10-91 passed by the Division Bench of this Court. ( 75 ) ON the said application, the Supreme Court was pleased to pass order inter alia holding that the order dated 9-9-91 insofar as the position of the Receiver is concerned is very clear and does not require any clarification. The Supreme Court further ordered that the appeal which was pending before the Division Bench of this Court against the order of Khastgir, J. dated 2/07/1992 may be disposed of by that Court in accordance with law and on merits and no further directions in that behalf are necessary. The Supreme Court saw no reason to entertain the said I. A. on behalf of Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. and hence dismissed the same. ( 76 ) CONSIDERING the aforesaid facts and submissions made by the parties it appears to me that the order directing the refund of amount lying with the Registrar to the appellant could not have been passed in the said appeal arising out of the Extraordinary Suit No. 2 of 1992 and the direction to that extent suffers from inherent infirmity. ( 77 ) THE order for refund of the said sum of Rs. 19,33,873. 74 p. was beyond the scope of the suit and the appeal arising out of it, namely Extraordinary Suit No. 2 of 1992 and Appeal No. 514 of 1992. ( 78 ) THE scope of the suit No. 240 of 1990 out of which the appeal came up before Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee and Altamas Kabir, JJ. 19,33,873. 74 p. was beyond the scope of the suit and the appeal arising out of it, namely Extraordinary Suit No. 2 of 1992 and Appeal No. 514 of 1992. ( 78 ) THE scope of the suit No. 240 of 1990 out of which the appeal came up before Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee and Altamas Kabir, JJ. and the scope of Extraordinary Suit No. 2 of 1992 filed by Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. are different and there was in fact an omission on our part to consider the true scope and effect of the said order passed by the appellate Court directing the Receiver to deposit the said amount. ( 79 ) THE contention made on behalf of the applicant that the advance alleged to have been made by the appellant has only to be adjusted against the sale proceeds of green tea leaves, which are lying in deposit and the advance alleged to have been made has already been used for running the garden though this was not necessary as New Red Bank Tea Co. was running the Garden profitably, and cannot be brushed aside. ( 80 ) ON the face of the record the said sum of Rs. 19,33,873. 74 p. is not advance towards the purchase of Green Tea Leaves only but the same includes sale proceedes of green tea leaves. It is, therefore, an apparent contradiction or error to direct the refund of the said sum of Rs. 19,33,873. 74 p. ( 81 ) IN that view of the matter the order if any relating to the said sum of Rupees 19,33,873. 74 lying in deposit with the Registrar, Original side, pursuant to the order of the Division Bench dated 10/10/1991 could have only been passed, in the appeal arising out of Suit No. 240 of 1990 and there was no scope for us to pass the direction in the said appeal. ( 82 ) IN our order dated 25/04/1994 we have directed status quo ante to be restored and it was to be restored with whole hog, then there was no scope for directing return of the money to the appellant. ( 83 ) THE Receiver was admittedly in possession from 3/08/1991 till 11th Sept. 1991, Green Tea Leaves have been removed from Dharanipur Tea Estate by Abhijit Tea Co. ( 83 ) THE Receiver was admittedly in possession from 3/08/1991 till 11th Sept. 1991, Green Tea Leaves have been removed from Dharanipur Tea Estate by Abhijit Tea Co. (P) Ltd. and the sale proceeds was lying with the receiver, if status quo ante has to be restored with whole hog the position before removal of Green Tea Leaves from Dharanipur Tea Estate sale proceeds thereof should be restored back. ( 84 ) IN any event as we have already noted there was no scope for passing such order in the aforesaid proceeding, Direction for refund, if any can be obtained in the proceeding wherein the amount was directed to be deposited with the Registrar. ( 85 ) THE question of error apparent on the face of record was also considered in the judgment and decision in the case of Panchanan Bhowmick v. State of West Bengal and Makhanlal Koley v. State of West Bengal, reported in (1987) 1 Cal HN 343. In the aforesaid decision, the land in question requisitioned under the 1948 Act were subsequently acquisitioned. The L. A. Collector made his awards on 21/12/1980. The petitioner made reference against the awards. The Additional Special Land Acquisition Judge by his judgment dated the 14th Nov. 1984 enhanced the market value of the lands and ordered payment of compensation with interest at 6% p. a. and statutory allowance at the rate of 15%. Review application was filed before the Special Land Acquisition Judge on the ground that the Court committed an error apparent on the face of the record in not awarding statutory allowance and interest at the rates provided respectively under S. 28 (2) and S. 28 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act of 1984, which had come into force on the 24th Sept. 1984 that is, before the date of the judgment. The said review application having been dismissed by the Judge, the petitioners came up in revision. The question was whether by not awarding the statutory allowance and the interest in accordance with the amended provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, the Court below had committed an error apparent on the face of the record. The said review application having been dismissed by the Judge, the petitioners came up in revision. The question was whether by not awarding the statutory allowance and the interest in accordance with the amended provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, the Court below had committed an error apparent on the face of the record. On behalf of the respondent it was argued that the Act of 1948 as amended in 1978 incorporated the provisions of Section 23 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act as it stood before the amendment, subsequent amendment in Section 23 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act can have no effect in determining compensation for land acquired under Section 4 of the Requisition and Acquisition Act. ( 86 ) WHEN a Court did not apply the provisions of an enactment which on the face of it would apply to a case, same would be a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. But a mere error of law is not a ground for review only a manifest error would be a ground for review. ( 87 ) AS observed by Supreme Court, an error apparent on the face of record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively there being an element of indefiniteness inherent from its very nature. It must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of the each case. In this connection, I may take note of the judgment and decision in the case of Hari Vishnu v. Ahmed Ishaque reported in AIR 1955 SC 233 . In the aforesaid decision the Supreme Court in paragraph 23 of the said judgment inter alia held and observed as follows "when does an error cease to be mere error, and become an error apparent on the face of the record? Learned Counsel on either side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated. Mr. Pathak for the first respondent contended on the strength of certain observations of Chagla, C. J. in Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat Borough Municipality', AIR 1953 Bom 133 , that no error could be said to be apparent on the face of the record if it was not self-evident, and if it required an examination or argument to establish it. This test might afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of cases. This test might afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of cases. But there must be cases in which even this test might break down, because judicial opinions also differ, and an error that might be considered by one judge as self-evident might not be so considered by another. The fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case. " ( 88 ) BE that as it may, it is well settled that in order that an error might be a ground for review, it must be one apparent on the face of the record. ( 89 ) THE judgment and decision in the case of Sir Hari Sankar Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter reported in AIR 1949 FC 106 may be taken note of. ( 90 ) IN the aforesaid decision it was held by the Federal Court inter alia "that a decision is erroneous in law is certainly no ground for ordering review. If the Court has decided a point and decided it erroneously, the error could not be one apparent on the face of the record or even analogous to it. ( 90 ) IN the aforesaid decision it was held by the Federal Court inter alia "that a decision is erroneous in law is certainly no ground for ordering review. If the Court has decided a point and decided it erroneously, the error could not be one apparent on the face of the record or even analogous to it. When, however, the Court disposes of a case without adverting to or applying its mind to a provision of law which gives it jurisdiction to act in a particular way, that may amount to an error analogous to one apparent on the face of the record sufficient to bring the case within the purivew of O. 47, R. 1, Civil P. C. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 91 ) IN the aforesaid decision the Federal Court further inter alia held in paragraph 20 of the said judgment at page 111 of the said report to the following effect -" From such materials as we have got, we are bound to say that in fact there was an omission on the part of the Court to consider the clear provision of O. 41, R. 33, Civil P. C. when the original judgment was passed; and such omission, which appears on the face of the judgment, would constitute a sufficient ground analogous to those mentioned in O. 47, R. 1, Civil P. C. and the Court was not incompetent to reconsider the matter if it so desired. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 92 ) IN the instant case there was an omisison on the part of the Court to consider the scope and effect of the order of the appellate Court dated 10/10/1991 which directed the receiver to deposit the amount with the Registrar, O. S. In fact that said order was passed in an appeal arising out of Suit No. 240 of 1990 the scope of which is entirely different was not considered by us. Such an omission on our part constitutes, sufficient cause analogous to those mentioned in O. 47, R. 1. ( 93 ) THE judgment and decision in the case of Brindaban Chandra Ghosh v. Damodar Prosad Pandey reported in (1925) 29 Cal WN 148 : (AIR 1925 Cal 304) may also be taken note of. In the aforesaid decision the expression "error apparent on the face of the record" was considered. ( 93 ) THE judgment and decision in the case of Brindaban Chandra Ghosh v. Damodar Prosad Pandey reported in (1925) 29 Cal WN 148 : (AIR 1925 Cal 304) may also be taken note of. In the aforesaid decision the expression "error apparent on the face of the record" was considered. In a second appeal the High Court passed an order in favour of the defendant-appellant relying on a decision of the judicial committee. After an application for a review of this judgment was presented but before its hearing the judicial committee delivered another judgment in which the case relied on in the judgment of the High Court was construed in a manner which rendered the judgment of the High Court wrong. A rule was issued on the basis of the later decision of the judicial committee. It was held that the expression "error apparent on the fact of the record" was wide enough to embrace a case like which came up before High Court and the Court was justified in granting the review. ( 94 ) THE scope of an application for review has been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Moran Mar Baselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius reported in AIR 1954 SC 526 . In the aforesaid decision, it was held by the Supreme Court that the Court may allow review application on three specified grounds. The Supreme Court then considered the judgment and decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and in the case of Chhajju Ram v. Neki reported in AIR 1922 PC 112. In the aforesaid decision the Judicial Committee held and observed that "any other sufficient reasons" must mean a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule. ( 95 ) THE Supreme Court further held in paragraph 39 of the said judgment at page 545 of the said report inter alia as follows "to decide against a party on matters which do not come within the issues on which the parties went to trial clearly amounts to an error apparent on the face of the record. It is futile to speculate as to the effect these matters had on the minds of the Judges in comparison with the effect of the other points. It is futile to speculate as to the effect these matters had on the minds of the Judges in comparison with the effect of the other points. " ( 96 ) IN the instant case in my view there was an apparent error in passing an order directing refund of Rs. 19,33,873. 74 p. Accordingly, the application for review is allowed and in so far as the order dated 25/04/1994 directs refund of the said sum of Rs. 19,33,873. 74p. stands recalled and set aside and will stand deleted from the said judgment. The Registrar, original side is directed to hold the amount. ( 97 ) IT will, however, be open to the parties to apply for suitable directions regarding the said amount in appropriate proceeding in accordance with law if they are so advised. ( 98 ) ALL parties are to act on the signed copy of the operative part of the judgment on the usual undertaking. Petition allowed.