N. J. PANDYA, J. ( 1 ) ). The petitioner is the tenant of HRP as Suit No. 5310 of 1973. The said suit was filed by the respondent on various grounds for getting vacant possession of the room rented out to the tenant situated in Jamalpur Ward of Ahmedabad city. The trial Court disbelieved the case of the landlord and dismissed the suit by the judgment and order dated 17-10-1977. The landlord therefore carried the matter in appeal before the Appellate Bench of Small Causes Court Ahmedabad as Civil Appeal No. 64 of 1978. ( 2 ) ). Needless to say that the appeal was pressed for on all the counts for decree of eviction as was done by the plaintiff before the trial Court in the said suit. However the learned Appellate Judges allowed the appeal and granted decree of possession on the ground of arrears of rent only. ( 3 ) ). In the revision application therefore the attention is focused only on Section 12 (3) (b) of the Bombay Rent Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) and the compliance thereof by the tenant during the pendency of the suit as well as during the pendency of the appeal. ( 4 ) ). It is an admitted position and is born out by record also that after the tenant filed written statement at Exh. 10 the landlord moved any application under Section 11 (4) of the Act requesting the Court to direct the tenant to pay up arrears of rent. As there was dispute of standard rent the court fixed interim rent as Rs. 7 p. m. and ordered the tenant to deposit the arrears within the time prescribed. ( 5 ) ). This was not complied with and therefore the learned trial Judge passed second oder preventing the tenant from appearing and defending the suit. Later on the tenant did deposit sum of Rs. 280. 00 and requested by application Exh. 14 that he be permitted to defend the suit. That permission came to be granted on condition that tenant shall continue to pay regularly the said interim rent of Rs. 7. 00 p. m. ( 6 ) ). The contractual rent was Rs. 7. 00 and interim rent also came to be fixed at that rate only. 14 that he be permitted to defend the suit. That permission came to be granted on condition that tenant shall continue to pay regularly the said interim rent of Rs. 7. 00 p. m. ( 6 ) ). The contractual rent was Rs. 7. 00 and interim rent also came to be fixed at that rate only. At the end of trial the issue of standard rent came to be decided along with other issues and the amount fixed as standard rent turned out to be the same amount as the contractual rent was namely Rs. 7 p. m. ( 7 ) ). So far as the demand notice is concerned and the response of the tenant to the notice is concerned it has come on record that reply to the notice Exh. 26 dated 12-10-1972 was sent well within the time. However the money order of the amount demanded was despatched on 2-12-1972 and hence arguably there was a case that amount has not been remitted withiin one month of the receipt of the notice. Per se said date of money order i. e. 2-12-1972 is beyond the period of one month. ( 8 ) ). However if notice paras 5 and 7 are read together it does appear that tenant was called upon to clear up all the arrears up to 30-11-1972 and hence if the amount is sent on 2-12-1972 it would be within the period of one month. ( 9 ) ). No doubt in para 5 arrears has been demanded from 1-4-1972 till the date of notice i. e. 12 which would mean that rent upto the month of September 1972 was asked for and that way demand was made for rent for six months only. When para 7 is read along with para 5 of the notice as stated earlier the amount ultimately should have been for the month of October and November both and hence late remittence by money order cannot be held against the tenant. ( 10 ) ). Whether it amounts to default whether entire amount was sent or not can be the matter of dispute and what will be its effect on the aspect of regular payment and readiness and willingness will be discussed hereafter. ( 11 ) ). It has been held by the trial Court that money order coupon Exh. ( 10 ) ). Whether it amounts to default whether entire amount was sent or not can be the matter of dispute and what will be its effect on the aspect of regular payment and readiness and willingness will be discussed hereafter. ( 11 ) ). It has been held by the trial Court that money order coupon Exh. 28 does not disclose any amount of money which has been remitted either in words or in figure. On close scrutiny one can find that amount is mentioned but it is not easy to decipher the same. The conclusion arrived at by the learned Appellate Judge is therefore that the defendant has failed to make out as to what amount he had actually sent that finding has to be accepted. ( 12 ) ). However there being a dispute of standard rent raised in reply to the notice as well as in the written statement and when issue was framed and the decision thereon was given at the end of trial the provisions of Section 12 (3) (b) of the Act will certainly be attracted. Moreover in the notice the claim is also made as to permitted increases which would mean that the amount of tax property or otherwise eduation cess if applicable etc. was also required to be considered while fixing the standard rent. ( 13 ) ). The net result therefore is that the case was falling within the provisions of Section 12 of the act. No doubt there is an order under Section 11 (4) of the Act fixing the interim rent to be Rs. 7. 00 p. m. and therefore there was an amount for the purposes of the tenant to be treated as standard rent and more so for the purpose of complying with the requirements of Section 12 (3) (b) of the Act as there was a condition imposed on the tenant which was required to be complied with. ( 14 ) ). The learned Advocate Shri Memon therefore argued on behalf of the landlord that non-compliance of the first order under Section 11 of the Act would amount for all times to come to be noncompliance of Section 12 (3) (b) of the Act and hence the subsequent payment rent was paid in advance or not cannot save the tenant from decree of eviction. He has also maintained that the tenant has never paid regularly and several defaults have been committed and for that reasons also he has forfeitted the protection of Section 12 (3) (b) of the Act. ( 15 ) ). The petition available in the trial Court has been dealt with by the learned Judges of the Appellate Bench at pages 6 and 7 of the judgment. Therein it is to be found that some defaults have been committed. However when closely scrutinised it will be found from the very table that the deposit has been made soon after the amount of rent had become payable for a month preceding the month in which the deposit has been made. For example the very first item set out in the said table indicates that Rs. 14. 00 were deposited on 1 which would represent two months rent and that should cover according to the said calculation period up to September 1975. The next deposit is in the month of December 1975 for Rs. 35 which would cover five months rent. To that extent learned Appllate Judges are right that there is a default so far as month of October is concerned. However looking to each of the entries as described by the learned Appellate Judges revealed month in which rent of preceding month falling due deposit has been made after adjusting the amount already paid in advance and therefore if at all there is any default it will be strictly in relation to the date on which rent is required to be paid as per the contract. So far as the trial Court is concerned while fixing the interim rent it has not fixed any definite date by which the rent is required to be paid. ( 16 ) ). Once the amount of rent is to be paid in a given month for the month that has preceded it unless there is date fixed the payment during the subsequent month will be for the preceding month and hence it has to be accepted as comliance. That exactly is the situation all throughout. ( 17 ) ). Coupled with this it is the position that the standard rent came to be fixed at the end of the trial. That exactly is the situation all throughout. ( 17 ) ). Coupled with this it is the position that the standard rent came to be fixed at the end of the trial. Had there been any shortfall the tenant would have got time to pay up the balance and that is why even if those so called defaults are taken into consideration the situation would certainly mean that the tenant will get protection of Section 12 (3) (b) of the Act. ( 18 ) ). Either way therefore the tenant has not forfeitted the protection of Section 12 (3) (b) of the Act. By this I mean that fixation of interim rent which is to be taken as standard rent till the rent is fixed by the Court at the end of the trial Court than there is sufficient compliance. ( 19 ) ). So far as the compliance of Section 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act during the pendency of the appeal is concerned the details have been given by the learned Advocate Shri Shelat appearing for the tenant which clearly show that by the time appeal came to be decided on 11-12-1981 rent up to 31 was paid. The statement given by the learned Advocate Mr. Shelat is taken on record. ( 20 ) ). The compliance during the pendency of appeal is therefore quite clearly made out. The learned Advocate Shri Shelat has relied on the decision reported in AIR 1988 SC 1111 where the position available under the Act prior to its amendment in the year 1985 has been considered. At that time word regularly was occurring in Section 12 (3) (b) of the Act and while reiterating that the tenant seeking protection under Section 12 (3) (b) of the Act must regularly complied with the direction given. In para 7 examining the chart of deposit set out at page 1113 below para 3 Their Lordships were pleased to hold that the trial Court had directed the tenant to deposit on 5th day of each month the amount of rent as fixed by it. The defaults that were noticed were not found to be such as would take away the protection under Section 12 (3) (b) of the Act because amongst other things most of time rent was paid in advance for several months by the tenant. The defaults that were noticed were not found to be such as would take away the protection under Section 12 (3) (b) of the Act because amongst other things most of time rent was paid in advance for several months by the tenant. It was considered to be a reasonable punctuality and therefore compliance of Section 12 (3) (b) of the Act with reference to word regularly also. . ( 21 ) ). Learned Advocate Shri Memon relying upon other decisions of the Supreme Court has strongly urged the word regularly has to be given its true meaning and therefore punctuality is to be insisted upon. This aspect I would have considered certainly provided that the trial Court while passing the said interim order has fixed up the date by which the amount was required to be paid and moreover said decision reported in AIR 1988 SC 1111 decisions referred to by the learned Advocate Shri Memon have also been referred to. ( 22 ) ). Shri Memon learned Advocate has drawn my attention to the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 1994 (2) GLH 27 wherein the effect of removal of word regularly in Section 12 of the Act has been considered from the point of view of controversy whether it is retrospective or prospective it is held to be prospective. However this being not the controversy here no discussion therefore is required to be made. ( 23 ) ). A passing reference was made to the fact that during the pendency of revision the tenant has not complied with the requirement of paying rent regularly. The ready answer to this submission of learned Advocate Shri Memon is the reported decision of this Court which is reported in 21 GLR 560 wherein the learned single Judge Justice G. T. Nanavati as he then was after referring to other decisions of the learned single Judges of this very court has categorically held that the requirement of Section 12 (3) (b) of the Act is to operate till the pendency of the appeal and not during the pendency of the revision. ( 24 ) ). ( 24 ) ). Learned Appellate Judges seem to have gone by the aforesaid idea of mathematical punctuality of paying the amount and not appreciating the aforesaid factual position of rent having been paid in advance and more particularly when no date has been fixed by the trial Court for paying rent. AIR 1981 (sic.- 1988) SC 1111 authority is therefore apt authority for the purpose. ( 25 ) ). The net result therefore is that the petitioner succeeds in the petition. The order of the learned Appellate Bench of Small Causes Court Ahmedabad is set aside. The suit of respondent-plaintiff stands dismissed. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs. .