JUDGMENT TIRATH S. THAKUR, J. - The petitioner is engaged in the manufacture and sale of liquor. For the assessment year 1985-86, the petitioner filed a return in which it claimed exemption on packing and forwarding charges amounting to Rs. 2,67,506. The assessing authority however by an order passed on January 30, 1989, refused exemption on the said amount and brought it to tax at the rate applicable to liquor. The petitioner feeling aggrieved of the order of refusal challenged the same by way of an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeal), Bangalore City Division No. II. The Deputy Commissioner by an order dated February 2, 1990, allowed the exemption claimed by the petitioner and observed thus : "The claim of exemption by the appellant also supported by the decision of the Karnataka High Court in their decision reported in [1981] 48 STC 169 (State of Karnataka v. Shaw Wallace and Co. Ltd.) which was upheld by the honourable Supreme Court in their decision reported in [1989] 74 STC 379 (Raj Sheel v. State of Andhra Pradesh). Therefore, the action of the assessing authority in disallowing exemption on packing and forwarding charges amounting to Rs. 2,67,506, is illegal and incorrect and the same is not allowed as exemption in the light of the above observations." 2. The Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, City Zone-II, Bangalore, thereafter appears to have started suo motu revision proceedings in terms of section 22-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), which proceedings were finally disposed of by an order dated August 17, 1993, modifying the appellate order of the Deputy Commissioner only in so far as the same related to the levy of turnover tax. Against the said order the petitioner has filed an appeal before this Court which is said to be pending disposal. 3. In the meantime, the assessing authority, namely, the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Assessment-IV) issued a notice dated September 12, 1994, purporting to be one under section 12-A of the Act suggesting that there was a short levy of tax on packing charges and proposing to tax the same at the rate of 30 per cent up to July 31, 1985 and 25 per cent between August 1, 1985 to March 31, 1986. 4. 4. Aggrieved of the aforesaid notice, the petitioner has filed this writ petition, inter alia, on the ground that the appellate authority having passed a speaking order granting exemption to the petitioner on the packing charges, the assessing authority was not competent to sit in judgment over the said order and bring to tax the said charges which had already been held to be exempt by the appellate authority. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Nazeer, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, both of whom agreed to the disposal of the writ petition at this stage itself. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the notice proposes to bring to tax packing charges as also turnover tax on the basis that the same had been short levied. He however submitted that since the issue as to the turnover tax was pending disposal in appeal before this Court, the petitioner would give up his challenge so far as the said part of the notice was concerned and would confine his grievance in the proceedings only to that part of the notice which proposes to bring to tax the packing charges held exempt by the appellate authority. He argued that the appellate authority having considered the matter and having held the petitioner entitled to exemption from payment of sales tax on packing charges, it was not open to the assessing authority to issue a notice in terms of section 12-A of the Act, as the said provision was not available to the assessing authority after the appellate authority had expressed its opinion on the subject, in specific terms. 7. Mr. Nazeer, on the other hand urged that the impugned notice was only a proposal and that it was open to the petitioner to appear before the assessing authority and point out that the appellate order having held packing charges entitled to exemption from tax, the same could not be brought to tax. He submitted that the petition was premature and deserved to be dismissed on that ground. 8. He submitted that the petition was premature and deserved to be dismissed on that ground. 8. Section 12-A of the Act, provides that if the assessing authority has reasons to believe that whole or any part of the turnover of a dealer in respect of any period has escaped assessment to tax or has been under-assessed or has been assessed at a rate lower than the rate at which it is assessable under this Act or any deductions or exemptions have been wrongly allowed in respect thereof, the assessing authority may, notwithstanding the fact that the whole or part of such escaped turnover was already before the said authority at the time of the original assessment or reassessment, proceed to assess or reassess to the best of its judgment the tax payable by the dealer in respect of such turnover after issuing a notice to the dealer and after making such enquiry as it may consider necessary. 9. A plan reading of the provisions makes it manifest that the assessing authority before it can proceed under section 12-A must have reasons to believe that any part of the turnover has escaped assessment or that any exemption or deduction has been improperly granted. This implies that the assessing authority has not only to have some material or information to assume that there has been escaped assessment but also that any such escaped turnover was legally taxable. 10. In the instant case, it is not denied that the packing charges incurred by the petitioner-assessee were disclosed in the return filed by it and exemption was also claimed in respect thereto even though the same was turned down by the assessing authority on the ground that no such exemption was admissible in respect of the said charges. In appeal, however, the appellate authority had reversed this finding and come to the conclusion based on two judgments, namely, State of Karnataka v. Shaw Wallace and Co. Ltd. [1981] 48 STC 169 (Kar) and Raj Steel v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1989] 74 STC 379 (SC) that packing charges were admissible to exemption under the Act. The remedy available to the Revenue after the appellate authority's order was only by way of a challenge to the said order, before the appropriate forum in appropriate proceedings. The appellate order had not however been questioned and holds the field as on date. The remedy available to the Revenue after the appellate authority's order was only by way of a challenge to the said order, before the appropriate forum in appropriate proceedings. The appellate order had not however been questioned and holds the field as on date. In that view therefore any attempt on the part of the assessing authority to bring to tax the amount incurred by way of packing charges amounted to the assessing authority sitting in judgment over what had been finally determined by the appellate authority. This was not permissible for, there is no gainsaid that powers available to the assessing authority under section 12-A of the Act, do not extend to giving the assessing authority a licence to sit in judgment over the orders passed by the appellate authority. Any such interpretation of section 12-A of the Act would in my opinion render the said provision otiose and create an anomalous situation depriving the appellate orders of the finality attached to them. Law lears in favour of finality of decisions and would not permit an interpretation which may militate against the said principles. It therefore follows that once the appellate authority had finally determined whether rightly or wrongly that packing charges were admissible to exemption it was not open to the assessing authority to sit in judgment and to suggest that what had been done by the appellate authority was impermissible or otherwise, improper. Inasmuch as the notice sent by the assessing authority amounts to setting at naught the order passed by the appellate authority, the same is without jurisdiction and ex facie improper and arbitrary. In that view of the matter, therefore, Mr. Nazeer's argument that the petitioner-assessee must necessarily subject itself to the jurisdiction of the assessing authority does not appeal to me. Once it is shown that the notice issued by the assessing authority was incompetent or a result of total non-application of mind, the availability of an alternate remedy even if the same be equally efficacious as the remedy chosen by the petitioner would not by itself be a bar to the issue of a writ. The present is in my opinion one such case where the statutory authority has issued the notice impugned in disregard of the principles governing the proceedings under the Act. The present is in my opinion one such case where the statutory authority has issued the notice impugned in disregard of the principles governing the proceedings under the Act. I therefore see no reason to refuse relief to the petitioner only because it is a notice of proposal and not a final order. 11. In the result, this petition is allowed. The impugned notice dated September 12, 1994 issued by the respondent in so far as the same proposes to tax packing charges is hereby quashed. The respondent is however at liberty to take such other recourse as may be legally permissible to it in case it is of the opinion that the allowance of the exemption by the appellate authority on the packing charges was either impermissible or improper. In the circumstances, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. Writ petition allowed.