Judgment :- This writ petition is for the issue of a writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the record relating to the charge sheets memo No. EEC/EMD/Asst./FP/R/R.2137/90 dated June 21, 1990 and memo No. EE/C/Asst/F.DP/R.1525/91 dated May 8, 1991 and show cause notice memo No. CE/Hg/PA/F2/79/92 dated May 5, 1992 and endt. No. EEC/EMD/IAI/...... FPF/R690/91 dated March 7, 1991 rejecting his notice of retirement on the file of the 1st respondent and quash the same and direct the 3rd respondent to declare the petitioner's retirement as final and effective from the afternoon of February 28, 1991 and pay the pension from March 1, 1991 and also retirement benefits payable to the petitioner under rules. 2. The petitioner was a licentiate in Civil Engineering. He joined as Special Officer (Civil) in Tamil Nadu Electricity Board on September 23, 1961 at Tirunelveli. He was promoted as Assistant Executive Engineer, Salem, in 1979. Ultimately he was posted to Porthimand Dam site in Kundah Hydro Electric Circle. He claims to have served a notice of voluntary retirement to the Chief Engineer (R&D) through proper channel on April 1, 1990 to take effect from May 31, 1990. The respondents have disputed such a notice and according to them, there is no such notice. 3- 4. The petitioner sent another letter on November 30, 1990 that he would voluntarily retire with effect from January 28, 1991. The petitioner received the charge memo referred to in the prayer in the writ petition and disciplinary action has been initiated against him. 5. It is the contention of the petitioner that once a notice of voluntary retirement has been issued by him, it is the duty of the respondents to accept the same and they cannot initiate disciplinary proceedings against him. Secondly it is argued that the charges against him are framed by the Executive Engineer, who is inferior in rank to the Chief Engineer, who was his appointing authority. It is contended that the Chief Engineer alone can frame charges and non-else. 6. Both the contentions have no merit in view of the relevant provisions in the service Regulations as well as Conduct Regulations. It is contended that the Chief Engineer alone can frame charges and non-else. 6. Both the contentions have no merit in view of the relevant provisions in the service Regulations as well as Conduct Regulations. Regulation Number 7(g) of the Service Regulations and Leave Regulations reads thus : "Notwithstanding anything contained in this regulation, the appropriate authority shall, if it is of the opinion that it is the Board's interest so to do, have the absolute right to retire any employee excluding those covered by the I.D. Act, 1947 by giving him notice of not less than three months in writing or three months' pay and allowances in lieu of such notice at any time after he has attained the age of fifty years or after he has completed thirty years of qualifying service. Any employee aforesaid who has attained the age of fifty years who has completed twenty five years of qualifying service may likewise retire from service by giving notice of not less than three months in writing to the appropriate authority"* . Explanation IV thereto provides that when a Board's employee under suspension or against whom disciplinary action is pending seeks to retire voluntarily under the above regulation, the specific permission of the appropriate authority, for such voluntary retirement shall be necessary, and that the appropriate authority may withhold the permission sought by the Board's employee. In the present case the disciplinary proceedings have been initiated in May, 1990. The petitioner's retirement notice was issued only on November 30, 1990. No doubt, the petitioner claims to have sent an earlier notice on April 1, 1990, which, according to him, was also acknowledged by the concerned officials. That is however disputed by the respondents. Even assuming that there was a notice on April 1, 1990, which would take effect from May 31, 1990 the notice dated November 30, 1990 clearly says that the petitioner would retire with effect from January 28, 1991. Hence, the earlier notice, even if there was one, had become ineffective because of the subsequent notice dated November 30, 1990. 7. By that time the disciplinary proceedings had admittedly commenced and they were pending against the petitioner. Hence, under Explanation IV the petitioner ought to have obtained the specific permission of the appropriate authority for voluntary retirement. As he has not obtained such permission the retirement notice will be of no use to the petitioner. 7. By that time the disciplinary proceedings had admittedly commenced and they were pending against the petitioner. Hence, under Explanation IV the petitioner ought to have obtained the specific permission of the appropriate authority for voluntary retirement. As he has not obtained such permission the retirement notice will be of no use to the petitioner. He cannot "place any reliance on that notice and contend that the Authorities ought to have accepted the same and there is no other option to make to the Authorities. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Dr. Mrs. Santhosh Gupta v. The State of Punjab 1991-II-SLR 145, the court held that a mere issuance of a charge-sheet or pendency of enquiry cannot stop an employee from seeking retirement under the statutory rules and the statutory provisions contained in the Punjab Civil Service Rules permitted such voluntary retirement by the concerned employee. The decision turned on the rules prevailing in the State. That can have no bearing in the present case in view of the express provisions in Explanation IV to Regulation 17(g). Reliance was placed on a decision of the Administrative Tribunal of Orissa reported in 1993 (3) SLR 232 Dulal Chandra Adhikary v. Union of India. In that case it was held that as per the Rules prevailing there that the notice of voluntary retirement shall be presumed to have been accepted if there is no order to the contrary. There is no such provision in the Regulations, which govern the petitioner herein. As pointed out already, Explanation IV to Regulation 17(g) is acceptable and the petitioner cannot get over the same. 9. The next contention urged by learned counsel for the petitioner is also without any merit. It is submitted that the charges are framed by the Executive Engineer while the appointing authority is Chief Engineer. According to learned counsel, it is only the Chief Engineer who can frame charges and none-else. 9. The next contention urged by learned counsel for the petitioner is also without any merit. It is submitted that the charges are framed by the Executive Engineer while the appointing authority is Chief Engineer. According to learned counsel, it is only the Chief Engineer who can frame charges and none-else. Regulation 8(f)(i) of the Conduct Regulations reads thus :"* where the competent authority considers that the allegations against an employee, if proved, will necessitate any of the penalties specified in items (i), (ii), (iv) or (viii) of Regulations 5, he may authorise any officer in Class I or Class II Service superior in rank to the employee to initiate disciplinary proceedings and remit the case to the competent authority for passing order." Under Regulation 6, the Authority competent to impose penalty against the petitioner is the Superintending Engineer or the Financial Controller or the Personnel Officer. In the present case, the Additional Chief Engineer, Generation Circle, Kundah has by his proceedings in memo No. ADM.I/A.3/F.DP/R.526/90 dated May 28, 1990 and memo No. Adm. I/A/.3/F.DP/R.5/91 dated April 15, 1992 authorised the Executive Engineer, Civil, Emerald to initiate departmental proceedings and frame charges against the petitioner herein. Such authorisation is expressly under Regulation 8(f) and (g). The Additional Chief Engineer is an authority superior to the Superintending Engineer, who is the competent authority to impose punishment on the petitioner. There cannot be any objection to the Superior authority taking disciplinary proceedings or authorising another authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings. It is not in dispute that the Executive Engineer is an authority superior to the petitioner herein and, therefore, the delegation cannot be invalid on that ground. 10. However, it is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the charge memo issued by the Executive Engineer does not make any reference whatever to the authorisation given by the Additional Chief Engineer and the relevant authorisation could have been fabricated much later at any time. There is no substance in this contention. I have gone through the entire file and I find no reason whatever to accept the wild allegation made by learned counsel as above. The relevant records appear to be quite genuine. They contain the appropriate sheets and also the initials and signatures of the authority concerned. I am convinced with the genuineness of the authorisation and, therefore, the contention urged by learned counsel is rejected. 11. The relevant records appear to be quite genuine. They contain the appropriate sheets and also the initials and signatures of the authority concerned. I am convinced with the genuineness of the authorisation and, therefore, the contention urged by learned counsel is rejected. 11. In the circumstances, there is no merit whatever in the writ petition and it is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.