JUDGMENT - SIRPURKAR V.S., J.:—This is an application for grant of bail. The accused/applicant is facing a prosecution for an offence under section 20(b)(i) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). 2. The allegations against the applicant are that he was found in possession of ganja weighing about 2.250 kgs. when he was allegedly travelling by a bus. The Head Constable on duty on a prior information attended this bus which was going from Akola to Pandharkawda and when the accused alighted from that bus, he was caught and on his search being taken by the Head Constable in presence of the panchas, the said ganja was found. On that basis the investigation was carried on and a charge-sheet came to be filed alleging an offence under section 20(b)(i) of the Act. A bail application was filed before the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Yavatmal. However, the said application having been rejected by an order dated 8-7-1994, the present bail application is being pressed into service. 3. Shri P.C. Madkholkar, the learned Counsel for the accused/applicant, strongly submits that in fact this accused was entitled to the grant of bail and that in fact there is no prima facie case against the accused. Shri R. H. Akhani, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State raised a preliminary objection and contended that as a matter of fact the offence under section 20(b)(i) of the Act is covered by section 37(1)(b) and, therefore, unless the two conditions as envisaged under section 37(1)(b) of the Act are fulfilled, the bail application of the accused cannot be granted. It will be better to quote the section. It will be better to quote the section. Section 37 of the Act is as under :— “Section 37(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)— (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable; (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless— (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail, (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in Clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.” It will, therefore, be seen that where the provisions of section 37 apply, the Court is prohibited from releasing the accused on bail unless firstly that the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application and secondly, where the Public Prosecutor opposes such application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Sub-section (2) specifically provides that these fetters under section 37(1)(b ) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, or any other law for the time being in force. It will be seen that in order that the provisions of section 37(1)(b) are attracted, the offence should be such which is punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more under the Act. Shri R.H. Akhani contends that since the offence under section 20(b)(i) which the accused is presently facing is such an offence which is punishable for a term of imprisonment for five years, the provisions of section 37(1)(b) of the Act are attracted. He strongly contends, therefore, that unless the Court comes to a positive finding as envisaged under section 37(1)(b)(ii), the bail cannot be granted. 14. He strongly contends, therefore, that unless the Court comes to a positive finding as envisaged under section 37(1)(b)(ii), the bail cannot be granted. 14. Shri P.C. Madkholkar; the learned Counsel for the accused/applicant, contends that in fact there is no scope for attracting section 37(1)(b) as the offence under section 20(b)(i) is not an offence which is punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years. According to Shri Madkholkar, the wording of section 20(b)(i) is not such as would be covered under the language of section 37(1)(b). Section 20 runs as under :— “Section 20 : Whoever, in contravention of any provision of this Act or any Rule or order made or condition of licence granted thereunder — (A) not relevant, (b) produce, manufactures, possesses, sells, purchases, transports, imports inter-State, exports inter-State or uses cannabis, shall be punishable— (i) where such contravention relates to ganja or the cultivation of cannabis plant, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees; (ii) ……… not relevant.” Shri Madkholkar invites the attention of the Court to the terminology in this section prescribing punishment which is “for a term which may extend to five years”. According to Shri Madkholkar, this terminology is distinct and different from the terminology used in section 37(1)(b) and cannot be covered as such by that section. In short, Shri Madkholkar contends that since section 37(1)(b) is attracted only in cases of offences punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more, the offence which is punishable with a term which may be extended to five years is not intended to be covered. His argument is that in section 20(b)(i) the Court concerned will have a power to award a sentence less than five years also. According to him, the Court has thus a discretion while trying an offence under section 20(b)(i) to award a punishment less than five years. However, the intendment of section 37(1)(b) is not to cover such offences where there may be a discretion in the Court to award lesser punishment than five years. According to him, the Court has thus a discretion while trying an offence under section 20(b)(i) to award a punishment less than five years. However, the intendment of section 37(1)(b) is not to cover such offences where there may be a discretion in the Court to award lesser punishment than five years. He, therefore, contends that there is no question of attracting of the provisions of section 37(1)(b) as that section applies only to the offences punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more and, therefore, clearly envisages that it covers only the offences where there is no such discretion in the Court to grant punishment less than five years. Shri Madkholkar has relied upon the decisions of various Courts which I shall consider later on in the part of this judgment. 5. In order to consider the real import of the terminology under section 37(1)(b) and in order to know the real meaning behind that terminology, we will necessarily be guided by the language of section 37(1)(b). It will have to be considered in this behalf that this Act is a special enactment. The Preamble of this Act is as under: “An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to narcotic drugs, to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to provide for the forfeiture of property derived from, or used in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic, substances, to implement the provisions of the International Conventions on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and for matters connected therewith.” In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of Act 61 of 1985, it has been stated that there was no sufficiently deterrent scheme of penalty in the Acts prevalent before the advent of the present Act, they being the Opium Act, 1857, Opium Act, 1878 and the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930. It has also been observed that no minimum punishment was prescribed in the present laws as a result of which drug traffickers have sometimes been let off by the Courts with nominal punishment. It has been further observed that the country was for a few years increasingly facing the problem of transit traffic of drugs coming mainly from some of the neighbouring countries and destined mainly to the Western countries. It has been further observed that the country was for a few years increasingly facing the problem of transit traffic of drugs coming mainly from some of the neighbouring countries and destined mainly to the Western countries. Therefore, it is clear that the Legislature when it enacted the present Act intended to bring on statute an Act with stringent provisions to deal with and to control the drug menace which was being felt over the years. 6. Provisions of bail always go long way generally in favour of the accused. It has been observed number of times that the accused do misuse the bail by either tampering with the evidence or by interfering with the investigations. There are innumerable examples when the complaints have been made that the investigation has been thwarted by the accused who have been released on bail, that the witnesses have been intimidated by such accused, that the readiness of the witnesses is minimised or affected to a great extent by the very fact that such witnesses find that the accused is released on bail and is free at least temporarily. It is complained that the bail provisions thus have proved to be a stumbling block in the path of the smooth investigation and/or the smooth finalisation of the trial. This is not to in any way minimise the importance of the right of liberty of the accused. This is again not to minimise the principle that the pre-conviction incarceration of the accused should not be by way of punishment. However, considering the importance of this subject, also considering the provisions in the International Conventions and also considering that number of times advantages of bail are invariably misused by the unscrupulous accused persons, the present provision seems to have been brought on the anvil. The stern spirit of this provision becomes all the more apparent from the language of sub-section (2) that the limitations brought in by sub-section (1) of section 37 are to be treated as additions to the limitations under the ordinary criminal law of land. It is with this idea in mind that the present provision has been enacted. The stern spirit of this provision becomes all the more apparent from the language of sub-section (2) that the limitations brought in by sub-section (1) of section 37 are to be treated as additions to the limitations under the ordinary criminal law of land. It is with this idea in mind that the present provision has been enacted. It would have been really hazardous had all the offences serious or insignificant been included in this scheme and, therefore, it is only in the case of serious offences that the Legislature seems to have favoured their being treated separately and harshly in the matter of bail. 7. Once the Legislature intended to bring curbs on the bail provisions by making them more stringent, it was imperative that a clear-cut distinction was made in case of the offences. The act envisages number of offences which also include some minor offences. Therefore, the Legislature had to create a distinguishing line clearly demarcating the offences which would be brought into the cover of section 37 and the other ones which would not be so covered. It is only in respect of the serious offences that section 37 is being sought to be applied. The seriousness of the offences has been made apparent from the punishment prescribed for those offences. It is, therefore, that the Legislature has brought into existence the distinguishing line; the distinguishing line being the offences which are punishable with five years and more and the other offences, meaning thereby the other offences in which the punishment of 5 years cannot be given. If we look at the language of section 37(1)(b) of the Act, it is clear that it intends to classify and bring into existence two categories, the first category being the offences in which the punishment for five years of imprisonment and more can be given and the other category being all the other offences in which the sentence of five years' imprisonment cannot be given. The limitation of five years, therefore, appears to be deliberate. The limitation of five years, therefore, appears to be deliberate. The plain meaning of the language would, therefore, be that all such offences in which a punishment of five years or more can be granted are covered under the language of section 37(1)(b) and such other offences in which such punishment cannot be granted would not be so covered and such offences would be covered by the ordinary and general provisions of Criminal Procedure Code regarding the bail. 8. Shri P.C. Madkholkar, the learned Counsel for the, accused/applicant, however, took me through all the penal sections and contended that a resume of those sections clearly indicated that there are in all four categories of offences. According to him, the first category was the offences in which the punishment for a term which could be extended upto five years was given. He pointed out that section 20(b)(i) and section 68-Y of the Act would be in this category. In section 68-Y also the punishment is for the imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years. According to Shri Madkholkar, the second category of offences would be of the offences which are punishable with less than five years of imprisonment. He pointed out that sections 27, 58 as also section 30 read with section 20(b)(i) would be such category. In the third category, Shri Madkholkar brings in the offences in which the punishment as the imprisonment which could be extended to the term of ten years, while the fourth category was the punishment where minimum ten years is extended. The argument of Shri Madkholkar is that from the very language of section 37, it would be clear that the offences in the first two categories would not be coverable and it is only the offences which are covered by the third and fourth categories which are contemplated by that section. Shri Madkholkar reiterates his argument on the basis of the term five years or more. He urges the Court to read this term as a full term and not disjunctively. He contends further that the words “or more” suggest that the term five years has to be a minimum term of five years. Shri Madkholkar reiterates his argument on the basis of the term five years or more. He urges the Court to read this term as a full term and not disjunctively. He contends further that the words “or more” suggest that the term five years has to be a minimum term of five years. In short, according to Shri Madkholkar, because of the peculiar wording used in section 37(1)(b), for example, 'five years or more' it will have to be held that the term five years should be a minimum five years. According to him, since there is no limitation' under section 20(b)(i) to award a minimum punishment of five years, that section and such other sections where there is no such limitation prescribing minimum sentence of five years would be out of the purview of section 37(1)(b). I am afraid, the argument cannot be accepted. Firstly, the acceptance of this argument would mean that we will have to read a word 'minimum' after the words 'for a term of imprisonment of' but before the words 'five years or more'. Any interpretation which requires the addition of certain words would not be a feasible interpretation particularly if the term, which is being sought to be interpreted is clear enough and admits of no ambiguity. There are undoubtedly the instances where the Apex Court has read certain words but that has been done only to bring in the harmonious construction where there appeared to be an apparent conflict in between the two enactments. However, the Apex Court has more than once cautioned against user of any such surplusage where the intention of the Legislature was clear and where the language was wholly unambiguous. Reading the provision of section 37(1)(b), the language appears to be absolutely clear that the section intended to create only two categories of the offences on the basis of their seriousness and the seriousness of such offences depended upon the punishment that the said offences provided. Even at the cost of repetition, it could be said that section 37 uses the words 'five years or more' as a dissecting line between the two categories. All the offences in which a punishment of five years or more could be given are the offences which would be so covered under section 37(1)(b ) and all the others would be left out from the operation of that section. All the offences in which a punishment of five years or more could be given are the offences which would be so covered under section 37(1)(b ) and all the others would be left out from the operation of that section. The two categories are clear, distinct, intelligible and admit of no doubt or confusion. The argument that there were intended to be four categories, therefore, will have to be rejected. 9. Shri Madkholkar further submitted that the words 'term of imprisonment extended upto five years' would not cover five years. This submission is also incorrect for the same reason. Under section 20(b)(i), if the accused can be legally convicted for a term which may extend to five years, it would naturally include the maximum punishment also. After all the words 'five years' used in section 20(b)(i) show the last limit of imprisonment which could be awarded by the Court. If under that section the punishment of five years could be awarded, then it has to undoubtedly come within the umbrella of section 37(1)(b) to form one of the distinct categories as has been shown earlier. 10. Shri Madkholkar thereafter submitted taking recourse to the terminology that the words used in section 37(1)(b) should have been instead of the present terminology in the following manner:— “no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment extended upto five years or more………..” He says that it is only in that event the offence under section 20 or section 68-Y as the case may be could have been covered as that would have given the clearest possible intention. According to him, since the Legislature has not used that terminology and has used the terminology of 'for a term of imprisonment of five years or more', the offences under section 20(b)(i) and section 68-Y would not be covered. I am afraid, even that is not possible. If the Legislature had used that terminology, then the words 'extended upto a term' would have been the surplusage as they would not convey anything extra than the words presently used. As has already been clarified, only serious kinds of offences were tried to be covered they being the offences punishable with five years of imprisonment or more. If the Legislature had used that terminology, then the words 'extended upto a term' would have been the surplusage as they would not convey anything extra than the words presently used. As has already been clarified, only serious kinds of offences were tried to be covered they being the offences punishable with five years of imprisonment or more. In fact, the words 'or more' were absolutely necessary as in the absence of those words, an extreme argument could have been made that the offences which are I punishable with the imprisonment of anything other than five years are not covered. Such absurdities could not be allowed to creep in through the language of law. 11. It is further pointed out that the words 'five years' have significance. Practically in all the offences the punishment is ten years or more, e.g. section 20(b)(ii) provides minimum ten years of imprisonment as it uses the terminology 'for a term which shall not be less than ten years'. Similar terminology is used in section 21, section 22, section 23, section 24 and section 25 of the Act. The only exception is section 25-A where the minimum sentence of ten years is not provided but different terminology is used which is 'rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years'. Section 26 is obviously not covered because the maximum punishment that could be given for that offence is only three years. Similar is the case of section 27. Again section 27-A uses the terminology of not less than ten years. In short, there are various kinds of offences wherein the various other punishments are provided including section 26 where three years' imprisonment is provided, section 27 where the punishment provided is only six months. When under such circumstances the Legislature makes a distinction between the offences which are punishable with five years or more and the other offences, the intention of the Legislature becomes all the more clear that it intended to cover such offences where the punishment of five years could be given. Section 20(b)(i) being that offence would, therefore, obviously be covered under section 37(1)(b). 12. Shri Madkholkar relied upon the reported decision in the case of (A.V. Dhannasingh v. State of Karnataka)1, 1993 Cri.L.J. 94. Section 20(b)(i) being that offence would, therefore, obviously be covered under section 37(1)(b). 12. Shri Madkholkar relied upon the reported decision in the case of (A.V. Dhannasingh v. State of Karnataka)1, 1993 Cri.L.J. 94. The learned Single Judge of Karnataka High Court relying upon the terminology 'five years or more' and reading it as a whole has held that these five years would mean 'minimum five years' and, therefore, the offence under section 20(b)(i) is not covered under the provisions of section 37(1)(b). I am unable to agree with the view expressed in this decision for the reasons which I have given. The learned Judge has read the word 'minimum' prior to the words 'five years' which could not be so supplied. For this reason, I do not wish to accept the verdict. 13. The learned Counsel arguing on behalf of the Government Shri R.H. Akhani, Shri V.M. Deshpande and Shri K.G. Pande, Additional Public Prosecutors, drew my attention to the Division Bench decision of Madras High Court reported in (Sundaresan @ Meganathan @ Mega v. State)2, 1993 Cri.L.J. 3342, and pointed out that the Division Bench has held that section 20(b)(i) is covered under the provisions of section 37(1)(b). The Division Bench has also proceeded on the basis of the clearest possible language of section 37(1)(b) and accordingly held that section 20(b)(i) is covered. I am in respectful agreement with the law laid down and the reasoning by the Division Bench. Similar is the situation in respect of the law laid down by Rajasthan High Court in (Gena Ram v. State of Rajasthan)3,1994 Cri.L.J. 671. There the learned Single Judge has proceeded on the same basis of the clear and unambiguous language of section 37(1)(b). I respectfully agree with the ratio laid down in that judgment. In view of what has been shown above, it will have to be held that section 37(1)(b) applies to an offence under section 20(b)(i) of the Act and hence it applies to the present case also. 14. The question, however, is whether on the facts of this case the accused can be released on bail. Shri Madkholkar insisted that the first condition under section 37(1)(b) of the Act was complied with as the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for bail. 14. The question, however, is whether on the facts of this case the accused can be released on bail. Shri Madkholkar insisted that the first condition under section 37(1)(b) of the Act was complied with as the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for bail. Here in this application the Public Prosecutor has opposed the grant of bail and, therefore, it will have to be seen as to whether there are any reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Shri Akhani very positively and strenuously brought to my notice that this accused was tried once for possession of ganja. However, he very fairly stated that the accused was acquitted in that prosecution. Obviously that judgment will not, therefore, be liable to be considered. He says that there was sufficient material on the record and that it could not be conceived that there are any reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence. We will have to consider the facts in the present case in the light of the submissions made by the learned Counsel. 15. The story put forth by the prosecution in this case is that Krupashankar Mishra, a constable got a definite information that one person was coming from Karanja by S.T. bus and that the said person was carrying ganja. On the basis of this information, he deputed one other police constable, namely, Police Constable Pralhad and both of them watched the bus going from Akola to Pandarkawda. As soon as the accused alighted from that bus, he was caught by the twosome and it was found that the accused was carrying 2.250 kgs. of ganja. On the basis of this first information, further investigation took place which was nothing but a seizure-panchanama. This seizure-panchanama, however, seems to have been executed on the spot itself. Shri Madkholkar on the basis of this pointed out that since the Constable had a definite information regarding he ganja itself, it could, not be said that this was a chance detection of ganja. He pointed out from the provisions of sections 41 and 42 that the Constable had ample time to comply with the mandatory provisions of sections 41 and 42 of the Act. He pointed out from the provisions of sections 41 and 42 that the Constable had ample time to comply with the mandatory provisions of sections 41 and 42 of the Act. He pointed out that the Constable was not a proper person in law who could have conducted a search particularly in view of the provisions of section 41(4) of the Act. He pointed out that all the provisions of sections 41, 42 and 50 have been followed only in their breach in the present case. There does not appear to be any recording of the information in writing. There does not appear to be any valid authorisation in favour of the present Constable to effect the search by a Magistrate or by any Authorised Officer; There also does not appear to be sending of this information to the immediate superior officers. Further there does not appear to be any compliance of section 50. No idea seems to have been given to the accused that he was being searched and that if he so desired he could be searched in presence of a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer. No efforts seem to have been made by the said Police Officer to take him to the nearest Gazetted Officer though this raid is supposed to have taken place in the day time at 10 O' clock in the morning and in the city of Darwha, where there was no dearth of Magistrates or Gazetted Officers for that matter. Shri Madkholkar, therefore, rightly submits that considering all these irregularities in the investigation, there was no likelihood of the accused being convicted as the Apex Court has declared in reported decision of (State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh)4, 1994(3) S.C.C. 299 , that the provisions of section 41(2) and section 42(1) are mandatory. The Apex Court has in the clearest possible terms held that the provisions in sections 41 and 42 as regards the authorisation and also as regards the recording of information, and the provisions of section 50 regarding the notice to be given to the accused are mandatory in nature. The Apex Court has in the clearest possible terms declared the law that under section 41(1} only an empowered Magistrate can issue a warrant for the arrest or for search in respect of offences punishable under Chapter IV of the Act. The Apex Court has in the clearest possible terms declared the law that under section 41(1} only an empowered Magistrate can issue a warrant for the arrest or for search in respect of offences punishable under Chapter IV of the Act. Likewise only empowered officers or duly authorised officers as enumerated in section 41(2) and section 42(1) can act under the provisions of the Act. Under section 41(2) only the empowered officer can give the authorisation to his subordinate officer to carry out the arrest of a person or search as mentioned therein. The Apex Court further holds that if an arrest or search contemplated under sections 41 and 42 is made under a warrant issued by any other Magistrate or is made by any other officer not empowered or authorised, it would per se be illegal and would affect the prosecution case and consequently, vitiate the trial. Needless to say that a Police Constable is not an officer authorised and in fact the section specifically bars a Police Constable. Even under the aforementioned sections, the Supreme Court has further stated that under section 42 where an empowered officer who takes down any information in writing or records the grounds under proviso to section 42, he shall forthwith send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior. If there is a total non-compliance of this provision, the same affects the prosecution case. To that extent, it is mandatory. As I have pointed out, practically all the safeguards as provided in sections 41, 42 and 50 have been thrown to winds in this case. 16. It will not be proper for me to express on the merits of the prosecution case now at this stage but the non-observance of these mandatory provisions would certainly entitle the accused to be released on bail. This is the consistent view expressed even by this Court as also by the other High Courts. The law is too clear to be stated. In that view of the matter, the application will have to be granted. Hence, the following order:— The Criminal Application is granted. The accused/applicant be released on bail on his executing a P.R. bond in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- and on furnishing two solvent sureties in the same amount. He shall attend the Police Station Darwha every Sunday till the trial commences. Application granted. -----