Judgment B. L. Yadav, J. 1. Miss Krishna Bala Sinha (defendant No.6) is. the appellant in this second appeal. 2. The suit was filed by the plaintiff-respondent Smt. Manju Verma for declaration that plaintiff is the legally appointed Lecturer in the Department of Political Science against one of the sanctioned post and she has become a permanent Lecturer by lapse of time and that she be declared to have been permanently absorbed against 2nd post of Lecturer in the Political secience department and that her name be declared to be recommended for absorption against the permanent post and that there was no vacancy against which defendent No.6, the present appellant could have been appointed. The suit was contested by the defendant-appellant and other defendents on the ground that the same was not maintainable and defendant No.6, the present appellant was legally appointed as Lecturer in the Political Science department in M. J. M. Mahila College, Katihar. 3. The trial court decreed the suit holding that the plaintiff was legally appointed against the 2nd vacant post of Lecturer in the Political Science department. The representation of defendent No.6, the present appellant was rejected and thereafter she filed an appeal before the Vice-Chancellor, mithila University, Darbhanga and the same was also rejected. But somehow defendent No.6 joined as Lecturer on 17th July, 1978 whereas, the plaintiff was appointed and worked since 15th November, 1976. Against the judgment and decree, the Ist Appeal was filed by the defendent No.6 the present appellant and the same was dismissed as it was not maintainable in view of bar created by Sec.80-A of the Bihar State Universities Act. Sec.80-A was added by Bihar Act 68 of 1982. Against that Secition of the lower appellate court this second appeal has been filed. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that Sec.80-A was added by Bihar State Universities Amendment Act 68 of 1982 and it was not retrospective in operation, whereas the suit was filed in 1978 and the appeal is in continuation of the suit and on the date when the suit was filed, section 80-A was not on the statute book. Consequently that provision would not create a bar against the maintainability of the second appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that Sec.80-A of the Act was retrospective. Consequently that provision would not create a bar against the maintainability of the second appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that Sec.80-A of the Act was retrospective. But at psesent only the maintainability of the second appeal is to be considered and as on the date of filing of the appeal Sec.80-A of the Act was on the Statute Book and has reprospective operation, hence the second appeal was certainly not maintainable. 6. Having scrutinised the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties the question for consideration is whether Sec.80-A was retrospective and whether the second appeal was maintainable? As to whether section 80-A was retrospective in operation, there is a Latin Maxim "nova constitution FUTURIS FORMAN IMPONERE DEBET NON PRATERITIS" which connotes that a new law ought to regulate which is to follow and not the past In the words of Lord Bloneshburgh" the provisions which touch a right in existence at the time of passing of Statute is not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. (See Colonial Refining Co. V/s. Irving (1905) A. C.369, relied upon in Delhi Cloth Mills V/s. Income tax Commissioner. A. I. R.1927 P. C.242 ). The union Parliament and State Legislature have plenary powers to enact restrospectively. 7. In Palaki Motors and others V/s. State of Orissa and others (1993) 2 suppl SCC 674, it was observed by thsir lordships of the Apex Court that the legislature has power to legislate retrospectively and to validate an invalid laws or executive actions. 8. In my opinion the Doctrine of Retrospectively creates a legal fiction that the law enacted would also affect past transactions or it shall be operative from a date in recent past. But substantially the retrospective laws are of questionable policy and contrary to the general principles that legislature must deal with conduct of human being in future and ought not change the past transactions. But no Statute must be construed so as to have a retrospective operation unless the language employed is such as to warrant that conclusion. Similarly the degree of retropectivity must be spelt out from the language of the provision. In the instant case, however the language employed under Sec.80-A is not such as to warrant a resrospective operation 9. But no Statute must be construed so as to have a retrospective operation unless the language employed is such as to warrant that conclusion. Similarly the degree of retropectivity must be spelt out from the language of the provision. In the instant case, however the language employed under Sec.80-A is not such as to warrant a resrospective operation 9. Section 80-A admits no exception and it is clear that no law, suits and proceedings shall lie in Cevil Courts with respect to the implementotion of the provisions of this Act, Statutes, Ordinance or Regulations. The appeal is covered by the civil proceeding as the suit has already been decreeed. Consequently the maintainability of the suit is not before the court but the discussion is confined about the maintainability of the second appeal. The second appeal can not be said to be maintainable in view of the bar created by Sec.80-A of the Bihar State Universities Act. 10. This second appeal is held to be not maintainable and the same isjdismissed without any order as to costs. 11. It is, however made clear that it is open to the defendent-appellant to seek any remedy if so advised, before a proper forum. Appeal Dismissed.