G. C. BHARUKA, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition involves an important question of law pertaining to Section 4 of the Karnataka Land Revenue (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980 (Ordinance No. 8 of 1980) (hereinafter "the first Ordinance" ). Section 4 of the Karnataka land Revenue (Amendment) Ordinance, 1981 (Ordinance No. 8 of 1981) (hereinafter "the second Ordinance") and Section 6 of the Karnataka Land Revenue (Amendment) Act, 1981 (Act No. 42 of 1981) (hereinafter "the Amendment Act") read with various other provisions of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 (hereinafter, 'the Principal Act' ). ( 2 ) THE petitioner is the owner of certain extent of land in Survey Nos. 3/2-A and 3-B/2-A of Rannebennur Town in the district of Dharwad. Pursuant to the applications filed by the petitioner, respondent-Tahsildar under his communications dated 26-3-1981 (Annexures-A and A-1) informed the petitioner that in view of the fact that the petitioner has deposited conversion charges, he has no objection if the lands in question are used for non-agricultural purpose. Thereupon, pursuant to this communication of the Tahsildar, Mutation Entry Nos. 11600 and 11597 dated 1-12-1981 were recorded wherein the nature of the lands were shown as having been converted from agriculture to non-agriculture. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, subsequent to completion of the said formalities, he formed building sites out of the lands in question and sold some of those to independent purchasers, who have all come into possession of those sites. It is also said that the purchasers have got their names entered in property registers maintained by the Municipality. ( 4 ) SUBSEQUENTLY, the petitioner was served with a notice dated 31-12-1985 (Annexure-C) issued by the respondent-Assistant commissioner whereunder the petitioner was required to show cause as to why the aforesaid mutation entries be not cancelled since the petitioner got those entries made on the basis of his self-declaration of conversion without in fact there being any conversion order passed by the appropriate Authority. The petitioner filed a detailed reply thereto which is placed at annexure-D. Thereupon, the impugned order has been passed by which the mutation entries in question have been cancelled and a direction has been given to the Tahsildar to take appropriate action in accordance with Section 96 of the Principal Act. The said order is at Annexure-E being dated 30-11-1986. The petitioner filed a detailed reply thereto which is placed at annexure-D. Thereupon, the impugned order has been passed by which the mutation entries in question have been cancelled and a direction has been given to the Tahsildar to take appropriate action in accordance with Section 96 of the Principal Act. The said order is at Annexure-E being dated 30-11-1986. According to the Assistant Commissioner, the petitioner could not have used the land for the purpose other than agriculture or for his own use in view of the provisions of the two Ordinances referred to above. ( 5 ) SRI S. K. Joshi, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has assailed the impugned order by raising the following contentions: (1) that the Assistant Commissioner has no jurisdiction or authority under the provisions of the Principal Act either to annul or set aside the impugned mutation entries or to issue any direction to the Tahsildar for initiating proceedings under Section 96 thereof; (2) the impugned order has been passed without granting any personal hearing to the petitioner. Therefore the same is not sustainable in law; (3) the petitioner having used the lands for non-agricultural purpose pursuant to the orders of the tahsildar, namely, Annexures-A and A-1, who had passed the same after having accepted the conversion charges, the impugned order cannot be sustained in law in view of the settled principle of promissory estoppel and (4) no proceedings like the impugned one could have been taken except by impleading the present owners of the sites culled out from the survey numbers in question. ( 6 ) ON the other hand, Sri H. H. Kaladagi, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the respondents-authorities has submitted that in view of Ordinance No. 8 of 1981 i. e. , the second Ordinance and the provisions contained in the amendment Act No. 42 of 1981, the petitioner had no authority to convert the lands in question for non-agricultural purposes of his own and got the entries recorded to that extent, and therefore according to him, the Assistant Commissioner has rightly annulled the said entries and has suggested for taking appropriate action against the petitioner under Section 96 of the principal Act. ( 7 ) BEFORE adverting to the rival contentions raised at the Bar, it will be necessary to notice the relevant provisions of the 'principal Act', two Ordinances and the 'amendment Act'. ( 7 ) BEFORE adverting to the rival contentions raised at the Bar, it will be necessary to notice the relevant provisions of the 'principal Act', two Ordinances and the 'amendment Act'. Section 95 of the Principal Act deals with the use of Agricultural land and the procedure for use of agricultural land for other ' purposes. Sub-section (1) of this Section is in the following terms:"subject to any law for the time being in force regarding erection of buildings or construction of wells or tanks, an occupant of land assessed or held for the purpose of agriculture is entitled by himself, his servants, tenants, agents or other legal representatives, to erect farm buildings, construct wells or tanks, or to make any other improvements thereon for better cultivation of the land or its more convenient use for the purpose aforesaid". Sub-sections (2) to (6) of Section 95 of the Principal Act lay down the provisions whereunder the occupant of the agricultural land can make application for converting the said land for non-agricultural purposes. Section 96 of the act provides for penalty for using the agricultural land for other purposes without permission. By Section 4 of the first ordinance No. 8 of 1980, sub-sections (2) to (6) of Section 95 were omitted. By Sections 5 and 6 of the said ordinance, the consequential amendments were also effected. The effect of omission of sub-sections (2) to (6) of section 95 was that the right previously conferred 011 the occupants of the land to get their lands converted for other purposes in accordance with those provisions was taken away, and, therefore, neither the occupant could have made any application for that purpose nor any authority could have granted such permission. In the circumstances, the agricultural lands under no situation could have been used for the purposes other than agriculture and those mentioned in Section 95 (1) of the Principal Act. ( 8 ) BY the second Ordinance being No. 8 of 1981 which came into force on 28-4-1981 by Section 4 thereof sub-sections (2) to (6) were revived with retrospective effect. The said Section reads as hereunder:"4. ( 8 ) BY the second Ordinance being No. 8 of 1981 which came into force on 28-4-1981 by Section 4 thereof sub-sections (2) to (6) were revived with retrospective effect. The said Section reads as hereunder:"4. Certain Provisions of the Karnataka Ordinance No. 8 of 1980, not to have effect amendments to sub-section (1) of Section 56, amendment to Section 69, amendment to section 95, omission of Section 96, amendment to Section 97, omission of Section 98 and amendment to Section 104 of the Principal Act by the Karnataka Land Revenue (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980 (Karnataka Ordinance No. 8 of 1980) shall be deemed never to have been made and the provisions of sub-section (l) of Section 56, Section 69, section 95, Section 96, Section 97, Section 98 and Section 104 of the Principal Act as they stood prior to the commencement of the said Ordinance shall be and shall be deemed to continue to be in force". ( 9 ) THEREFORE, in view of the aforesaid provisions, the Revenue Authorities were empowered to permit the conversion of agricultural lands for other purposes subject to the conditions contained therein. ( 10 ) THEN came the Amendment Act No. 42 of 1981 which was enforced on 25th August, 1981. Sections 5 and 6 of the said Act read as under:" 5. Certain provisions of Karnataka Ordinance no. 8 of 1980 not to have effect. Amendment to sub-section (1) of Section 56, amendment to Section 69, amendment to Section 95, omission of section 96, amendment to Section 97, omission of Section 98 and amendment to Section 104 of the Principal Act by the Karnataka Land Revenue (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980 shall be deemed never to have been made and the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 56, Section 69, section 95, Section 96, Section 97, Section 98 and Section 104 of the Principal Act as they stood prior to the commencement of the said Ordinance shall be and shall be deemed to continue to be in force. "6. Validation etc. "6. Validation etc. Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 95 of the Principal Act any application for permission made under sub-section (2) of the said section to the Deputy Commissioner and which has abated on account of the Karnataka Land Revenue (Amendment) ordinance, 1980 (Karnataka Ordinance No. 8 of 1980) shall be revived and be disposed of in accordance with the said Section and in computing the period of four months for the purpose of sub-section (5), the period commencing from the date on which the said Ordinance came into force and ending on the date on which the Karnataka Land revenue (Amendment) Ordinance, 1981, (Karnataka ordinance No. 8 of 1981) was promulgated shall be excluded". ( 11 ) THE effect of Section 4 of the second Ordinance and Sections 5 and 6 of the Amendment Act was that the provisions regarding conversion of lands which were there in the Principal act before enforcement of the first Ordinance again become operative retrospectively, as if those had never been deleted or amended and further that any application made for conversion prior to the enforcement of the said first Ordinance was required to be revived and disposed of in accordance with those provisions. ( 12 ) NOW, coming back to the facts of the present case, admittedly, the petitioner herein of his own under an obvious misconception had deposited conversion charges and obtained orders at Annexures-A and A-1 from the Tahsildar during the period of the first Ordinance as discussed above. During that period neither the occupant of the land was authorised to use the land for a purpose other than the agriculture nor any Revenue officer was vested with a power to grant any such permission. Therefore, on the face of it, the act of the petitioner was contrary to law and the communications at Annexures-A and A-1 were ultra vires the powers of the Tahsildar. The Mutation Entry Nos. 11600 and 11597 made pursuant to Annexures-A and A-l were also illegal. Therefore the impugned order passed by the respondent-Assistant Commissioner annulling the said entries cannot be said to be illegal. The Mutation Entry Nos. 11600 and 11597 made pursuant to Annexures-A and A-l were also illegal. Therefore the impugned order passed by the respondent-Assistant Commissioner annulling the said entries cannot be said to be illegal. ( 13 ) NOW coming to the first contention raised by Sri Joshi, regarding the jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner to interfere with the mutation entries in question, in my opinion, it is suffice to refer to Section 56 of the Principal Act, which specifically authorises the Assistant Commissioner to call for and examine the record of any proceedings of any subordinate officer under the Act for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the proceedings of such Officer. In view of this provision the Assistant Commissioner was within his powers while passing the impugned order, since according to him the subordinate Authority had acted illegally in altering the mutation entries in question. ( 14 ) SO far as the second contention of Sri Joshi is concerned, according to him, though the impugned orders were passed after giving a show cause notice to the petitioner, that by itself was not sufficient, since according to him, a personal hearing was a must. According to him apart from the principles of natural justice even the proviso to Section 56 (2) of the Act requires "an opportunity of being heard". According to him, the use of the word "heard" by the legislature clearly makes it mandatory on the part of the Revising Authority to grant a personal hearing. According to him, since in the present case no opportunity for such personal hearing was granted, therefore, this ground by itself is sufficient to quash the impugned order. ( 15 ) NOW, in the above context, it is sufficient to indicate that it is well-settled that the right of oral or personal hearing is not an essential element of natural justice. No doubt, a person sought to be proceeded against is entitled to a right" of defence, but that does not necessarily imply a personal hearing. Even an opportunity to file a written representation complies with the principles based on the requirement of natural justice. ( 16 ) IT is well-settled that whether oral hearing should be given or written representation will meet the ends of justice depends on the facts of each case. Even an opportunity to file a written representation complies with the principles based on the requirement of natural justice. ( 16 ) IT is well-settled that whether oral hearing should be given or written representation will meet the ends of justice depends on the facts of each case. It is only in such cases which requires determination of disputed question of fact, where personal hearing becomes incumbent. If not otherwise provided in the statute itself, 'hearing' does not mean grant of a personal hearing as mandatory. In the present case, the facts were not at all in dispute. The decision of the Assistant Commissioner is based on clear and unambiguous provisions of law. Therefore, in my opinion, non-grant of personal hearing cannot be said to be fatal. ( 17 ) IN so far as the last plea based on promissory estoppel is concerned, as I have held above, the act of the Tahsildar converting the nature of the land from agriculture to non-agriculture was clearly ultra vires his powers under the Act. It is also well-settled that there cannot be any estoppel against the statute. The doctrine of promissory estoppel can be invoked only in such cases where there had been a representation by the competent authority leading to alteration of position by the complaining person and not in such cases where the representation had been by a person who had absolutely no authority under the statute. ( 18 ) IN the case of Vasantkumar Radhakisan Vora v Theboard of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, it has been held that"the promissory estoppel cannot be used compelling the government or a Public Authority to carry out a representation or promise which is prohibited by law or which was devoid of the authority or power of the officer of the Government or the public Authority to make". ( 19 ) THEREFORE, in my opinion, none of the grounds raised by Sri Joshi can come to the rescue of the petitioner to avoid the impugned order Annexure-E passed by the respondent-Assistant commissioner. Accordingly, no relief can be granted to the petitioner. Writ petition is therefore dismissed. --- *** --- .