S. N. BHARGAVA, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision has been directed against the Judgment of the learned Judicial Magistrate, North and East Sikkim allowing the application for maintenance filed by the respondent and awarding Rs. 600/- per month for respondents No. 1, 3 and 4 as maintenance allowance. ( 2 ) CASE of the respondent No. 1 is that she was legally married to the petitioner in the year 1981 and out of their wedlock petitioner Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were born. Till 1987, the petitioner and the opposite parties lived together peacefully but when the petitioners remarried and brought a second wife, he started ill treating respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 made a complaint before the local Panchayat, Aritar Block, East Sikkim as a conseouence of which the petitioner agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 350/- per month as maintenance to the respondents and also agreed to give the right and title of half share of his house, dry fields and paddy fields situated at Aritar. But the petitioner did not comply with the agreement. He instead sent Rs. 200/- per month only for about six months and thereafter stopped sending that also and hence a petition under Section 488 of Code of Criminal Procedure was filed in Court on 26. 10. 1990. ( 3 ) THE petitioner in his reply admitted that he had legally married respondent No. 1 in 1981 and respondent Nos. 2 and 3 only were born out of their wedlock. He has asserted that respondent No. 4, minor daughter was not born out of their wedlock and the respondent No. 1 is leading an adulterous life. He further asserted that he had been undergoing police training at Paljor Stadium, Gangtok from 1st June, 1936 to 19th June, 1987 and therefore, he had no access/opportunity or occasion for cohabitation with respondent No. 1. While he was under training respondent No. 1 deserted the matrimonial home and went to her Fatherts house. After the training the petitioner went to the house of respondent No. ls father to bring her back but she declined and therefore he brought respondent No. 2 with him for his education and he is staying with him. As such maintenance for respondent No. 2 cannot he claimed. After the training the petitioner went to the house of respondent No. ls father to bring her back but she declined and therefore he brought respondent No. 2 with him for his education and he is staying with him. As such maintenance for respondent No. 2 cannot he claimed. He has further asserted that after the training, on the advise of his parents and before the respondent No. 1 approached the Pancha in 1988, the petitioner had started sending Rs. 200/-per month suo motu for the maintenance of the petitioners. In 1988 respondent No. 1 approached the Panchayat stating that the amount of Rs. 200/- was not sufficient and therefore. the petitioner agreed (vide Exhibit P) to pay Rs. 150/- per month and, also agreed to provide a portion of the house where she could live. However, respondent No. 1 did not start living in the house provided by the petitioner, so he did not pay Rs: 350/- per month as agreed before the Panchayat, further the petitioner came to know that respondent No. 1 was selling liquor and leading an adulterous life and was also having illicit relation with one Dilip Gurung. Learned trial Court lifter recording evidence allowed the petition and awarded a sum of Rs. 600/- as maintenance for respondent Nos. 1, 3, and 4. It is against this order that the present petition has been filed. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to Venkateswarlu v. Venkatanarayana and A. I. R. 1969 Madras. p. 235 Vira Reddy v. Kistamma and has submitted that the presumption under Section 112. Evidence Act is not conclusive but it rebuttable either by director circumstantial evidence and the standard of proof required for rebutting the presumption is not that of beyond reasonable doubt. He has further submitted that the approach of the learned trial Court is not in accordance with law and has failed to appreciate the evidence in a proper manner. Since respondent No. 1 has admitted in her statement on oath, recorded on 19. 3. He has further submitted that the approach of the learned trial Court is not in accordance with law and has failed to appreciate the evidence in a proper manner. Since respondent No. 1 has admitted in her statement on oath, recorded on 19. 3. 199 1 that she had been deserted 5 years before she was giving evidence and in face of the statement of the petitioner on oath that he had no chance of cohabitation with respondent No. 1 the trial Court ought to have come to the conclusion that respondent No. 4 had not been born out of the wedlock of the petitioner and respondent No. 1. It was not necessary for the petitioner to prove as to whose child the respondent No. 4 was. If respondent No. 4 was not the child of the petitioner then it will be obvious that respondent No. I, by indulging in adultery, had conceived respondent No. 4 and therefore was not entitled to any maintenance whatsoever. ( 4 ) ON the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the jurisdiction of revisional Court is very limited and it cannot go into the questions of fact. For this he has placed reliance on Pathumma v. Muhammad, Varadappa Naidu v. Thayaramma. He has also submitted that there is a presumption under Section 112 of the Evidence Act that if any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man it shall be conclusive proof that he is a legitimate son of that man unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage has no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten. In this connection he has placed reliance on A. I. R. 1954 Supreme Court p. 176 (supra) and Kasthuri v. Ramasamy and Padmanabhan Kesavan v. Krishnamma. He has further submitted that adverse inference should be drawn against the petitioner as he has failed to produce material evidence which was available relying on State of U. P. v. Jaggo. The petitioner has not produced any evidence whatsoever to corporate his statement that he had no access to cohabitate with respondent No. 1 during the time he was under police training. The petitioner has not produced any evidence whatsoever to corporate his statement that he had no access to cohabitate with respondent No. 1 during the time he was under police training. ( 5 ) I have given my thoughtful consideration to the whole matter and have also gone through the record of the case and the authorities relied the learned counsel for the parties. It is an admitted fact that petitioner and respondent No. 1 were legally married in 1981. The petitioner has also admitted that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were born out of the wedlock of the petitioner and respondent No. 1. He has of course denied that the respondent No. 4 was born out of their wedlock. His case is that when he was undergoing police training at Gangtok from 1st June, 1986 to 19th June, 1987, respondent No. 1 had deserted the matrimonial home and had gone to her fathers house. The exact date of birth of respondent No. 4 has not come on record but according to respondent No. 1, she was 3 years old when the petition was filed on 26. 10. 1990. Therefore, she must have been born somewhere in October, 1987 and she must have been conceived sometime in the end of 1986 or beginning of 1987. According to the petitioner, he was undergoing police training from June, 1986 to June, 1987 and during this period he had not gone to his house. Therefore, he had no access to have an intercourse with his wife, respondent No. 1 either in the end of 1986 or beginning of 1987. The petitioner in support of his case gave only his own statement but did not produce the attendance Register of the Police Training Institute or any officer who was conducting the training to state that no leave was granted to the petitioner during the police training and that he was in Gangtok throughout the training. This was the best evidence which the petitioner could have produced but he has failed to produce the same which implies that either no such evidence was available or if produced would not have supported the case of the petitioner. Under Section 112 of the Evidence Act, there is a presumption of legitimacy of a child born in lawful wedlock and it can be rebutted only in the manner contemplated by Section 112. Under Section 112 of the Evidence Act, there is a presumption of legitimacy of a child born in lawful wedlock and it can be rebutted only in the manner contemplated by Section 112. If non-access is not proved, the presumption becomes irrebuttable. A heavy burden lies on the one who wants to rebut that presumption and the standard of proof reouired to rebut the presumption is similar to the standard of proof reouired to establish the built of an access in a criminal case. Access or non-access connotes only existence or non-existence of opportunity for marital intercourse, the burden of proving the same rests entirely upon the person disclaiming it. The evidence of non-access can be either direct or circumstantial but the proof of non-access must be clear satisfactory and convincing. Petitioner has not been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he had no access or opportunity to meet respondent No. 1 for marital intercourse during the period when respondent No. 4 was conceived. His solitary statement is not sufficient to rebut the presumption under Section 112 of Evidence Act. Reference may also be made to the latest decision of the Supreme Court reported in A. I. R. 1993 Supreme Court, p. 2295, Goutam Kundu v. State of West Bengal. Moreover, the conduct of the petitioner in sending Rs. 200/- as maintenance suo-motu and again agreeing to pay a sum of Rs. 350/- as maintenance and further agreeing to give share of the property, shows that the case of the petitioner is only an after thought. If it was a fact that the respondent No. 1 was living an adulterous life the petitioner would not have sent the maintenance of Rs. 200/- and subsequently agreed to pay Rs. 350/- per month and also a share in the property before the Panchayat. ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on Exhibit-D, a letter alleged to have been written by respondent No. 1 to one Dilip Gurung and submitted that this shows that she was having some illegal connections with Dilip Gurung. A bare perusal of the letter does not support his contention. It is addressed as Aadarniya Daju that is respected brothert. Moreover, the letter does not contain any date nor does it bear the name of the sender or to whom it is addressed. A bare perusal of the letter does not support his contention. It is addressed as Aadarniya Daju that is respected brothert. Moreover, the letter does not contain any date nor does it bear the name of the sender or to whom it is addressed. The language also does not show it to be a love letter or a letter addressed to onets fiancee. Moreover, the writer of the letter has not been examined and therefore,t I do not find any force in this contention either. ( 7 ) THE power of revision under Section 435 of Code of Criminal Procedure are also limited and this jurisdiction cannot be exercised in every case of impropriety or illegality unless-it causes failure of justice. The revisional Court is not justified in substituting its own view for that of a Magistrate of a question of fact. It is not open for the revisional Court to either re-assess or to review the materials available on record and come to a conclusion different from the one arrived at by the Court below, unless there are compelling circumstances chocking the conscience of the Court. In the result, I do not find any force in this revision petition and the same is hereby dismissed. Revision dismissed. --- *** --- .