In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has challenged Annexure 8 show cause notice dated 19th February, 1993 issued by the second respondent. The opposite party initiated a disciplinary proceeding on the ground that the petitioner entered into a second marriage during the life time of first wife of the petitioner. A show cause notice was issued and the petitioner duly replied to it controverting the allegation. The respondent-authority not being satisfied with the show cause notice decided to hold departmental proceeding and an enquiry was held. On completion of the departmental proceeding the petitioner was found guilty of the charges framed and a second show cause notice dated 19.2.93 (Annexure 8) was accordingly issued proposing to impose penalty of removal from service without disqualification for future employment. Against this notice the petitioner has approached this Court. 2. It may be mentioned that the petitioner approached the District Judge, Jorhat for dissolution of the marriage between him and Jogmaya Bhuyan. The District Judge, however, held that as there was no valid raarriage the question of granting divorce did not arise .The admitted fids are that the petitioner was living with Smti Jogmaya Bhuyan and an itmression was created as they are husband and wife, however, no marriage was solemnised either according to Hindu rites or under the Special Marriage Act. 3. Heard Mr. PG Baruah, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. BJ Talukdar, learned Standing Counsel for ONGC. Mr. Baruah submits that as there was no valid marriage the question of imposing penalty as proposed does not arise, therefore, the entire departmental proceeding is vitiated by error of law and jurisdiction. Mr. Baruah further submits that in order to make a marriage complete it has to be solemnized within the meaning of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, it may be by 'Saptapadi' or by any other custom recognised by the Hindu customs. la this case, neither there was any 'Sapta­padi' nor any solemnization of marriage as required under the Hindu customs. Therefore, there was no marriage in the eye of law. Hence, the petitioner cannot be held guilty for having entered into an alleged second marriage. 4. Mr. la this case, neither there was any 'Sapta­padi' nor any solemnization of marriage as required under the Hindu customs. Therefore, there was no marriage in the eye of law. Hence, the petitioner cannot be held guilty for having entered into an alleged second marriage. 4. Mr. Talukdar, learned standing counsel, on the other hand, strenuou­sly argues that departmental proceeding was conducted fairly without bias of predilection and in accordance with relevant disciplinary rules and constitu­tional provisions, therefore, the order passed by the authority concerned cannot be interfered with. Mr. Talukdar further submits that the case is premature in view of the fact that the finality of the disciplinary proceeding has not reached. 5. The main question falls for determination is whether the charge of having a second wife is made out. Contention of Mr. Talukdar that a fair enquiry conducted by the authority without any bias may be material arid relevant only if the charge framed against the petitioner is made out. In the present case, there being no material to show that the marriage between the petitioner and Smti Jogmaya Bhuyan was solemnized in accordance with law. Therefore, the charge framed has not been proved. In order to attract section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 the marriage shall have to be solemnized with proper ceremonies ie either 'Saptapadi' or by any other , ceremony sanctioned by the custom. In the present case, the respondent has not been able to show that there was some sort of marriage as sanctioned by the Hindu Marriage Act or by any other Act. Mere living a man even for a considerable period with a woman does not make or confer the status of husband and wife. The marriage must be solemnized. 6. Mr. Baruah has drawn my attention to a decision Surjit Kaur vs. Garja Singh, (1994) 1 SCC 407 . In the said decision the Apex Court' had the occasion to deal with a similar case. It has been held in the said case that man and woman living as husband and wife does not, at any rate, normally give them the status of husband and wife even though they may hold themsel­ves out before the society as husband and wife and the society treats them as such. The Supreme Court further held that".-the expression 'whoever marries' must mean 'whoever...marries validly' or 'whoever... The Supreme Court further held that".-the expression 'whoever marries' must mean 'whoever...marries validly' or 'whoever... marries and whose marriage is a valid one'. If the marriage is not a valid one, according to the law applicable to the parties, no question of its being void by reason of its taking place during the life of the husband or wife of the person marrying arises. If the marriage is not a valid marriage, it is not marriage in the eye of law. The bare fact of a man and a woman living as husband and wife does not, at any rate, normally give them the status of husband and wife even though they may hold themselves out before society as husband and wife and the society treats them as husband and wife." 7. This has exactly happened here. In view of the above, I find sufficient force in the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was no valid marriage. Therefore, in my opinion, the departmental proceeding on the basis of the charge framed against the petitioner is without jurisdi­ction and unfounded. Accordingly, I quash the departmental proceeding as well as the Annexure 8 second show cause notice issued by the respondents. 8. Mr. Baruah further submits that because of the pendency of the departmental proceeding the promotion of the petitioner has been withheld. If that is so, the respondents may consider the case of the petitioner in accordance with law. With the above direction and observation, the petition is disposed of. No costs.