A. N. DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) THE decision-rendered by Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad (the Tribunal for convenience) on 28th June 1985 in Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 661 of 1983 is under challenge in this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Thereby the Tribunal accepted the revisional application preferred by respondent No. 1 herein against the order passed by the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal at Vijapur (the First Authority for convenience) on 23rd June 1980 in Tenancy Case No. Jantral/revi/141 of 1980 as affirmed in appeal by the order passed by the Deputy Collector at Mehsana (the Appellate Authority for convenience ) on 27th June 1982 in Tenancy Appeal No. 147 of 1981 By his impugned order the First Authority had come to the conclusion that respondent No. 1 herein was not the tenant of one piece of land bearing survey No. 768 admeasuring 2 acres 22 gunthas situated in village Jantral taluka Vijapur district Mehsana (the disputed land for convenience ). ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this petition move in a narrow compass. The original owner of the disputed land was the father of the present petitioner. He appears to have mortgaged it with possession to one Jivrajbhai Hathibhai. It appears that the mortgagee in possession inducted respondent No. 1 herein as a tenant of the disputed land sometime prior to 1955. It appears that the landlord moved the court for redemption of the mortgagee and for recovery of its possession. It appears that it was found at that stage that respondent No. 1 was in possession of the disputed land as its tenant. It appears that the proceeding for redemption of the mortgagee ended in a compromise between the mortgagor and the mortgagee and the Court passed the necessary decree on 2nd August 1956 directing handing over of possession of the disputed land to the mortgagor. It appears that respondent No. 1 was made a party to the proceeding but his signature was not obtained in the compromise pursis. It appears that respondent No. 1 was made a party to the proceeding but his signature was not obtained in the compromise pursis. It may be mentioned at this stage that though the Court passing the decree had noted the presence of respondent No. 1 on the disputed land prior to 1959 as indcated by the mortgagee in-possession for reasons best known to it it did not choose to make a reference in terms of the relevant provisions contained in Section 85 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 (the Act for brief) for deciding the question whether or not respondent No. 1 was a tenant of the disputed land. The fact however remains that the court passed the necessary decree on the basis of the compromise pursis directing handing over of possession of the disputed land to the landlord. It appears that pursuant to the aforesaid decree passed on 2nd August 1956 possession of the disputed land was taken from respondent No. 1 sometime in 1958 or thereafter. Respondent No. 1 thereafter moved the First Authority for fixation of the purchase price of the disputed land under Section 324 of the Act. That proceeding was decided aganist respondent No. 1 He appears to have made another application sometime in 1978 to the First Authority for fixation of the purchase price of the disputed land under Section 32-G of the Act. The proceeding came to be registered as Tenancy case No. Jantral/78. By his order passed on 23rd March 1978 in the aforesaid proceeding the First Authority ordered to drop the proceeding on the ground that the landlord was in possession of the disputed land. It may be noted at this stage that the original landlord had by that time breathed his last leaving behind him the present petitioner as his heir and legal representative. The present petitioner was a party to the proceeding culminating into the aforesaid order passed by the First Authority on 23rd March 1978. Its copy is at Annexures-A and B to this petition. That aggrieved respondent No. 1 herein. He carried the matter in appeal before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority set aside the order passed on 16th March 1964 as well as the order at Annexure-A and B to this petition and remanded the matter to the First Authority for his fresh decision according to law. That aggrieved respondent No. 1 herein. He carried the matter in appeal before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority set aside the order passed on 16th March 1964 as well as the order at Annexure-A and B to this petition and remanded the matter to the First Authority for his fresh decision according to law. Thereupon the proceeding came to be registered as Tenancy case No. (Jantral) Revi/141 of 1980. By his order passed on 23rd June 1980 in the aforesaid proceeding the First Authority came to the conclusion that the right of respondent No. 1 herein did not survive as the landlord had obtained possession pursuant to the aforesaid decree passed by the competent Court. Its copy is at Annexure-C to this petition. That aggrieved respondent No. 1 herein. He carried the matter in appeal before the Appellate Authority by means of his Appeal No. 147 of 1981. By his order passed on 27 June 1982 in the aforesaid appeal the Appellate Authority dismissed it. That again aggrieved respondent No. 1 herein. He thereupon invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal by means of his Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 661 of 1983. A copy of the memo of revision is at Annexure-D to this petition. By its decision rendered on 28th June 1985 in the aforeaid revisional application the Tribunal accepted it and set aside the order at Annexure-C to this petition as affirmed in appeal by the appellate order passed on 27th June 1982 in Appeal No. 147 of 1981. A copy of the aforesaid decision of the Tribunal is at Annexure-E to this petition. It may be noted that the Tribunal declared respondent No. 1 herein to be the tenant of the disputed land in possession as on 1st April 1957 and had therefore become its deemed purchaser by virtue of Section 32 of the Act and directed the First Authority to fix its purchase price under Section 32-G thereof. That aggrieved the present petitioner. He has therefore moved this Court by means of this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for questioning the correctness of the impugned decision of the Tribunal at Annexure-E to this petition. That aggrieved the present petitioner. He has therefore moved this Court by means of this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for questioning the correctness of the impugned decision of the Tribunal at Annexure-E to this petition. ( 3 ) THOUGH this petition is purported to have been filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India it has to be treated as under Article 227 only in view of the Division Bench ruling of this Court in the case of J. H. Gandhi vs. Deputy Collector Ahmedabad reported 1990 (2) Gujarat Law Herald at page 609. ( 4 ) IT is difficult to agree with the submission urged before me by Shri Vyas for the petitioner to the effect that the finding recorded by the Tribunal to the effect that respondent No. 1 was in possession of the disputed land as on 1st April 1957 was perverse as there was no evidence on record in that regard. The reason therefor is quite simple. Before the Tribunal the necessary revenue records pertaining to the disputed land for the years 1957-58 and 1958-59 were on record. On perusal thereof the Tribunal found that respondent No. 1 was deprived of is possession of the disputed land sometime after 1958. In that view of the matter it is difficult to accept the submission that there was no material on record before the Tribunal for recording the finding that respondent No. 1 herein was in possession of the disputed land as on 1st April 1957 I am unable to accept the submission of Shri Vyas for the petitioner that the revenue records will have only presumptive value in view of Section 135-J of the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 Code for brief) and in absence of any other evidence on record the Tribunal was not justified in coming to the conclusion that respondent No. 1 was the tenant of the disputed land. Again reasons for non-acceptance of such submission ar. not far to seek. The present petitioner has made no attempt whatsoever to rebut the presumption arising from the revenue records as perused by the Tribunal. In absence of any other cogent and convincing evidence on record the Tribunal was justified in drawing the conclusion drawn by it on perusal of the revenue records. not far to seek. The present petitioner has made no attempt whatsoever to rebut the presumption arising from the revenue records as perused by the Tribunal. In absence of any other cogent and convincing evidence on record the Tribunal was justified in drawing the conclusion drawn by it on perusal of the revenue records. The presumption arising with respect to the entries in the revenue records under Section 135 of the Code will remain operative unless it is rebutted by cogent and convincing evidence on record. Even at the cost of repetition it may be reiterated that no material whatsoever was brought on record by or on behalf of the present petitioner to rebut such presumption arising on the basis of the entries in the revenue records. In that view of the matter the conclusion reached by the Tribunal to the effect that respondent No. 1 herein was the tenant of the disputed land cannot be said to be perverse in any manner. ( 5 ) IT is a sealed principle of law that the tenant inducted by a mortgagee in possession on a piece of agricultural land would be a tenant for the purposes of the Act in view of the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Dahya Lala vs Rasul Mahomed reported in AIR 1964 SC at page 1320. Once the tenant was found in possession of the disputed land as its tenant on 1st April 1957 he would become its doomed purchaser by virtue of Section 32 of the Act. That conclusion reached by the Tribunal is therefore unassailable. ( 6 ) THE submission urged before me by Shri Vyas for the petitioner to the effect that the mortgagee in possession was no longer alive at the time the order at Annexure-C to this petition came to be passed and his heirs and legal representatives would be the necessary parties to the proceeding in question cannot be accepted in view of the aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Dahya Lala (Supra ). Once the tenant of the mortgagee in possession becomes the tenant of the disputed land on redemption of the mortgagee the relationship of the landlord and the tenant between the owner of the land and the person in possession of the disputed land as a tenant would come into existence and the mortgagee in possession would pale into insignificance. The proceeding culminating into the order at Annexure-C to this petition was essentially between the landlord and the tenant. The mortgagee in possession at the most could be said to be a formal party and not a necessary party. Absence of a formal party in the proceeding would not vitiate it more particularly when no such point appears to have been canvassed by or on behalf of the petitioner before the Tribunal. It is too late in the day for the petitioner to urge that point before this Court. Even otherwise in view of my aforesaid discussion I am unable to persuade myself to accept the submission to the effect that the successors-in-interest of the mortgagee in possession were necessary parties to the proceeding in question. ( 7 ) SHRI Vyas for the petitioner has then urged that respondent No. 1 is no longer in possession of the disputed land and he has not made any application under Section 29 of the Act for restoration of possession and as such he would not be entitled to gel possession of the disputed land and fixation of the purchase price under section 32-G of the Act would be an empty formality of an exercise in futility. I am unable to accept this submission for the simple reason that the legislative policy has undergone a sea change after Gujarat Act No. 5 of 1973. In order to protect persons like respondent No. 1 herein Gujarat Act No. 5 of 1973 has seen the light of the day. Thereby the provisions like Sections 32 (1-B) and 32-FF read with Section 2 (18) (d) of the Act have been brought on statute book. These benevolent provisions have been introduced with a view to retrieving the tenants from the position on account of their having missed the bus by invoking Section 29 of the Act within the prescribed time-limit. Thereby the provisions like Sections 32 (1-B) and 32-FF read with Section 2 (18) (d) of the Act have been brought on statute book. These benevolent provisions have been introduced with a view to retrieving the tenants from the position on account of their having missed the bus by invoking Section 29 of the Act within the prescribed time-limit. Prior to coming into force of Gujarat Act No. 5 of 1973 the dispossessed tenant was required to resort to Section 29 of the Act for restoration of possession of the disputed land. After 3rd March 1973 the specified date for the purposes of the Act resort can be made to Section 84 of the Act for removal of unauthorised person in occupation and possession of any tenanted land in respect of which the tenant became its deemed purchaser by virtue of Section 32 of the Act or any other provision of law like Section 32-FF thereof. ( 8 ) IN its ruling in Special Civil Application No. 6976 of 1988 decided on 2nd February 1994 this Court has taken the view that the revisional proceeding under Section 76 of the Act is continuation of the proceeding before the First Authority. In that view of the matter the Tribunal could exercise the powers exercisable by the First Authority in the original proceeding. It appears that the Tribunal has exercised the powers under Section 32 (1-B) of the Act for the purpose and has thereupon directed the First Authority to fix the purchase price. In the alternative the Tribunal could be said to have proceeded to declare respondent No. 1 herein to be the tenant by virtue of Section 32- FF of the Act and has directed the First Authority to fix its purchase price in accordance with Section 32-G thereof. It is obvious that the First Authority would take appropriate measures for putting respondent No. 1 herein in possession of the disputed land. ( 9 ) IN view of my aforesaid discussion I find no substance or merit in any on the aforesaid submissions urged before me on behalf of the petitioner in support of this petition. No interference whatsoever is called for with the impugned decision of the Tribunal at Annexure-E to this petition. ( 10 ) IN the result this petition fails. It is hereby rejected. Rule is accordingly discharged with no order as to costs. No interference whatsoever is called for with the impugned decision of the Tribunal at Annexure-E to this petition. ( 10 ) IN the result this petition fails. It is hereby rejected. Rule is accordingly discharged with no order as to costs. The interim relief stands vacated. Petition Rejected. .