K. J. VAIDYA, J. ( 1 ) ). (i) Whether once the accused having already approached the High Court by filing a Misc. Criminal Application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 praying for quashing the process issued against him and the same having been disposed off as withdrawn is he still entitled to have a second inning to invoke the very same inherent power under the Code to quash the proceedings arising out of the very same complaint ? If yes when ? (ii) Whether an unconditional withdrawal of earlier Misc. Criminal Application amounts to dismissal of the same disentitling the petitioner to approach High Court second time under Section 482 of the Code ? (iii) Whether despite the fact that as far as the allegations in the complaint are concerned they though prima facie technically speeking do satisfy all the ingredients to constitute the alleged offence under the Indian Penal Code bind yet whether this Court in view of certain glaring facts and circumstances of the case emerging from the complaint itself of which even a judicial notice can be taken (going to show that having regard to the ordinary natural course of human conduct and transaction the allegation made in the said complaint were inherently improbable stemming from nothing else than mala fides and therefore palpably false made only with a view to brow-beat demoralize black-mail and deter thereby the public servants discharging their lawful duties) can quash the complaint and the proceedings taken up pursuant thereto exercising its inherent extraordinary power under Section 482 of the Code ? these three are the basic questions arising in this petition for consideration in the context and background of the following facts and circumstances. ( 2 ) ). To state few relevant facts briefly the petitioner No. 1 is a Competent Authority of the Slums Clearance Board. Ahmedabad while rest of the petitioners are as such his associate officers helping him in discharge of his official duties. To he exact it appears that Mr. R. S. Shah petitioner No. 1 at the relevant time was holding the post of Deputy Secretary of the Board to exercise powers as a Competent Authority under the provisions of the Gujarat Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act 1972 (for short the Act ). Similarly Mr. J. D. Jani and Mr. Kalpesh Shall the petitioners Nos. R. S. Shah petitioner No. 1 at the relevant time was holding the post of Deputy Secretary of the Board to exercise powers as a Competent Authority under the provisions of the Gujarat Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act 1972 (for short the Act ). Similarly Mr. J. D. Jani and Mr. Kalpesh Shall the petitioners Nos. 2 and 5 respectively were working as rent-clerks Mr. B. D. Shukla the petitioner No. 3 was working as an in charge Estate Officer Mr. B. S. Joshi Mamlatdar petitioner No. 4 was working as a Recovery Officer and Mr. Maharashtrian the petitioner No. 6 was working as a Clerk in the Gujarat Slum Clearance Board Ahmedabad. As against this the respondent-Mr. Vinod H. Brahmbhatt is a practising Advocate of Ahmedabad. It appears that Mr. Brahmbhatt filed a criminal complaint against all the petitioners herein for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 448 341 504 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code before P. S. O. Kunjad Police Station inter alia alleging that on 15-7-1988 he was in possession of the premises in question viz. 1 situated at Vivekanand Nagar Hathijan Ahmedabad and that in his absence at about 6. 00 p. m. the petitioners committing trespass into his house insulted his old mother Madhukantaben and after ransacking the house throwing away the utensils went away. However since according to Mr. Brahmbhatt the police machinery was slow in investigation most probably because accused were the public servants he filed a complaint on the basis of very same allegations before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate Court No. 19 Ahmedabad. Therefore the learned Magistrate issued the process against the petitioners and who in turn aggrieved by the same moved this Court under Section 482 of the Code inter alia praying for quashing and setting aside the same by filing Misc. Criminal Application No. 1466 of 1989. When this Misc. Application came up for admission On 28 this Court [coram: Honble Mr. B. S. Kapadia J. as he then was] passed the following order: after lengthy arguments in the matter Mr. D. A. Bambhania learned Advocate for the petitions seeks permission to withdraw the petition. Permission granted. Petition stands disposed of as withdrawn. Thereafter after about four years the petitioner has once again approached this Court by presenting the present Misc. Cri. B. S. Kapadia J. as he then was] passed the following order: after lengthy arguments in the matter Mr. D. A. Bambhania learned Advocate for the petitions seeks permission to withdraw the petition. Permission granted. Petition stands disposed of as withdrawn. Thereafter after about four years the petitioner has once again approached this Court by presenting the present Misc. Cri. Application No. 5319/1993 under Section 482 of the Code to quash the process on the ground of some material change in the facts and circumstances of the case after the aforesaid Misc. Criminal Application No 1466 of 1989 came to be disposed of as withdrawn Those changes of material circumstances according to Mr. Bambhania are: (1) That after the commission of alleged offences in the year 1988 as many as six long years have passed and yet the trial having not made any progress an inch hangs fire over the heads of the petitioners with all its uncertainties as to when it will begin and when it will end and in the meantime for that purpose how long the accused should go on waiting and summoned on every date to attend the Court leaving aside the routine office duty (2) That the breach of injunction/ contempt application under Civil Appeal No 19 of 1988 arising out of the eviction order passed by the competent authority filed by evictee Rasiklal Rana through his learned Advocate Mr. Vinod Brahmbhatt which was pending before the City Civil Court was dismissed by an order dated 20 holding that the opponent or any of its officers cannot be said to have committed any contempt of Court. They have not committed any wilful breach of injunction as there was no stay order on 15-7-1989 and in pursuance of their official duty they have executed the warrant of possession. There is therefore no substance in this application and the application being devoid of any merit deserves to be dismissed (3) That thereafter Appeal No. 19 of 1988 also came to be dismissed vide judgment and order dated 30 passed by the City Civil Court with costs (4) That the evictee Mr. Rana aggrieved by the above order passed by the City Civil Court challenged the same by filing Special Civil Application No. 6929 of 1990 which in turn was rejected by this Court (Coram: Mr. C. K. Thakkar J.) by an order dated 28-12- 1993. Rana aggrieved by the above order passed by the City Civil Court challenged the same by filing Special Civil Application No. 6929 of 1990 which in turn was rejected by this Court (Coram: Mr. C. K. Thakkar J.) by an order dated 28-12- 1993. (5) That the memo of petition presented by the appellants original allotees does not state anything as to having handed over the possession of the premises in question to the complainant. (Special Civil Application No. 6929 of 1990 ). (6) That the petitioner Nos. 1 and 4 have already retired on account of reaching age of superannuation. (7) That it is the persistent practice of Mr. Brahmbhatt to lodge private complaints against the said officers on one pretext and or the other such as C. C. No. 1792 of 1989 C. C. No. 26 of 1992 and 1466 of 1992 and others just to deter them from discharging their lawful duties 2. 1 Both the petitioner as well as the respondent have placed on record documents in subject of their respective contentions however those only have been taken into consideration which admittedly cannot be disputed regarding its genuineness. ( 3 ) ). When this matter was called out Mr. K. J. Shethna the learned senior Counsel appearing for the respondent raised preliminary objection challenging the very maintainability of the present Misc. Criminal Application on two grounds firstly because the earlier Misc. Criminal Application was withdrawn as order shows after the lengthy arguments which simply means that since the petitioners had failed to make out even a prima facie case there was indeed no alternative left with them at that stage of proceedings but to withdraw. When such can be an inescapable conclusion the so-called withdrawal for all practical purposes should be treated as dismissal once and for all. Secondly even treating the previous Misc. Criminal Application as withdrawn then even taking into consideration the fact that the said order was already signed in view of the express-embargo placed on the powers of the Court in Section 362 of the Code it is not open to this Court to review or alter the same. Making good this submission Mr. Secondly even treating the previous Misc. Criminal Application as withdrawn then even taking into consideration the fact that the said order was already signed in view of the express-embargo placed on the powers of the Court in Section 362 of the Code it is not open to this Court to review or alter the same. Making good this submission Mr. Shethna has invited attention of this Court to Section 362 of the Code which reads as under: save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force no Court when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. While attempting to consolidate this submission further Mr. Shethna has also invited the attention of this Court to the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Smt. Sooraj Devi v. Pyarelal reported in AIR 1981 S. C. 736. Mr. Shethna on the basis of these submissions finally urged that since this Court is not empowered to review or alter its earlier order the present application having been based on the very same facts and circumstances was ex facie not maintainable and therefore deserves to be dismissed. ( 4 ) ). Countering the above preliminary objection Mr. Bambhania the learned Advocate for the petitioners submitted that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case though admittedly the present Misc. Cri. Application is a second one arising out of the very same complaint praying for the very same relief of quashing and setting aside the proceedings; yet at the same time the same cannot be said to be in nature of review of altering the earlier order as firstly because the first Misc. Criminal Application was not dismised but was ordered to he simply disposed off as withdrawn and secondly because assuming for the sake of argument even that earlier withdrawal of application was as good as dismissal then even since it is based on altogether different and distinct material change of the facts and circumstances as narrated above in para two there cannot be any bar to approach High Court on the basis of the same. In support of his second submission viz. In support of his second submission viz. that on the ground of the change of the facts and circumstances the second application under Section 482 of the Code is maintainable Mr. Bambhania has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs W B. v. Mohan Singh and Others. reported in AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1002 On the basis of these submissions Mr. Bambhania finally urged that the preliminary objection raised about the maintainability of the second (present) application having no substance deserves to be rejected outrightly. ( 5 ) ). Now taking the first contention first of Mr. Shethna viz. that unconditional withdrawal of application amounts to dismissal there is indeed no difficulty in summarily rejecting the same in view of the Supreme Court decision rendered in case of Ahmedabad Mfg. and Calico Printing Company Limited v. The Workman and Anr. reported in AIR 1981 S. C. p. 960. In that case in an industrial dispute between the workers and the Mill/ Company the tribunal gave an award in favour of the workmen Challenging this the Company filed a petition for the special leave to appeal under Act 136 of the Constitution of India before the Supreme Court wherein pursuant to notice the respondent unit put in appearance and filed a counter-affidavit. After some arguments the appellant company withdrew the leave petition whereon the Supreme Court passed the following order: upon hearing the Counsel the Court allowed the Special Leave Petition to be withdrawn. Four days after the said withdrawal the Company filed another petition under Article 226 of the Constitution this time before the High Court challenging the award. The petition was virtually based on the same facts and grounds as were taken in Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. The respondent-union appeared and filed a counter-affidavit urging that the petition be dismissed in limine. A rejoinder affidavit was filed on behalf of the company. It was contended before the High Court that it should not exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitutions after the withdrawal of leave petition unconditionally. On this contention having being accepted by the High Court the Company took the matter to the Supreme Court wherein one of the question raised before it was; Whether unconditional withdrawal of the leave petition would amount 10 dismissal ? On this contention having being accepted by the High Court the Company took the matter to the Supreme Court wherein one of the question raised before it was; Whether unconditional withdrawal of the leave petition would amount 10 dismissal ? Answering this question Supreme Court in para-20 at page 964 held as under: after having analyzed the various case cited we are of the view that permission to withdraw a leave petition cannot be equated with an order of its dismissal. We also come to the conclusion that in the circumstances of the case the High Court has not exercised a proper and sound discretion in dismissing the writ petition in limine on the sole ground that the application for special leave on the same facts and grounds has been withdrawn unconditionally. Now bearing in mind the overall discussion centering around the phrase unconditional withdrawal in aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court it is very clear that the same applies with all force to the facts and circumstances of the present case and in that view of the matter there is no difficulty in this ease also in holding that unconditional withdrawal cannot amount to dismissal. Now merely because the decision renderd in case of the Ahmedabad Mgf. and Calico Printing Company Limited is in a matter under Article 136 of the Constitution of India that by itself cannot be pleaded as a distinguishing feature and bar in applying the same to the application under Section 482 or the Code. The meaning and the principle underlying the phrase unconditional withdrawal for all purpose remains the same 5. 1 This now takes us to the second contention of Mr. Shethna regarding non maintainability of the second (present) Misc. Criminal Application in view of express bar in Section 362 of the Code. Bearing in mind the facts and circumstances of the present ease as available today and two Supreme Court decisions one against the another cited at the bar by the learned Advocate appearing for the respective parties it appears that the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs W. B. (supra) holds the field and is applicable with all its force to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In that case the High Court of West Bengal had rejected the prior application for quashing and when the petitioner approached the High Court by filing a second application under Section 482 of the Code it was held that the quashing of the criminal proceedings on the ground of absence of prima facie case was no bar and that the question does not amount to review or revision. It further appears that the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision allowed the second application under Section 482 of the Code on two grounds namely (i) the time factor that is to say after filing of the first application which came to be rejected the trial had not made any progress as such and (ii) on merits also on the ground of no prima facie case was made out. In this regard the following observations made by the Supreme Court in case of the Superintendent Remembrancer and Legal Affairs W. B. V. Mohan Singh and Ors (supra) are worth noting which are reproduced as under :- section 561-A preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as it deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of the justice and the High Court must therefore exercise it inherent powers having regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent jurisdiction is sought to be invoked. The High Court was in the circumstances entitled to entertain the subsequent application of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and consider whether on the facts and circumstances then obtaining the continuance of the proceedings against the respondents constituted an abuse of the process of the Court or its quashing was necessary to secure the ends of justice. The facts and circumstances obtaining at the time of the subsequent application of the respondents No. 1 and 2 were at the time of the earlier application of the first respondent because despite the rejection of the earlier application of the first respondent the prosecution had failed to make any progress in the criminal case eve though it was filed as far back as 1965 and the criminal case rested where it was for a period of over and a half years. It was for this reason that despite the earlier order dated 12th December 1968 the High Court proceeded to consider the subsequent application of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 for the purpose of deciding whether it should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A This High Court was perfectly entitled to do and we do not see any jurisdictional infirmity in the order of the High Court Even on the merits we find that the order of the High Court was jursified as no prima facie case appears to have been made out against respondent Nos. 1 and 2. In view of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court there is indeed nothing in Section 482 of the Code which can put any fetters or limit on the a inherent powers of the High Court which are essentially made for preventing the abuse of the process of law and on the other hand to secure the ends of justice. Once the petitioner places the material before the High Court at any interim stage pending trial indicating the change of circumstances and the plight in which he is caught as a result of the abuse of the process of law the same more than a right of the accuse it is the bounden duty of the Court to immediately intervene and see that on the anvil of the Court forum in the alleged name of law and justice the accused is not indiscreetly hammered out and made to suffer by some scheming unscrupulous and malicious complainant. 5. 2 That takes this Court now to the Supreme Court decision in case of Smt. Sooraj Devi v. Pyarelal (supra) relied upon by Mr. K. J. Shethna. Now indisputable the facts in the case and those in the case of Superintendent Remmbrancer of Legal Affairs W. B. (supra) stands entirely on different footing First of all in the opinion of this Court Section 362 of the Code cannot be allowed to have any say in view of its opening words namely Save as otherwise provided by this Code. . . . . further still in the opinion of this Court Section 362 of the Code would be attracted only and only in those cases wherein the cases are finally tried and disposed of on merits at the end of full dressed trial and thereafter in appeal or revision after final hearing on merits as the case may be. The termination of any interim application either by way of dismissal more particularly of withdrawal stand on entirely different footing Under the circumstance if the submission of Mr. Shethna viz. that since the earlier first Misc. Criminal Application was either withdrawn or dismissed the same cannot be subsequently entertained because of bar in view of Section 362 of the Code 1 was to be accepted then it would crate such an anomalous situation wherein once an application for bail under Section 437 and 439 is decided against the accused the subsequent hail application cannot be entertained because the final order passed therein has been duly signed which cannot be either reviewed or altered by any court in view of Section 362 of the Code Similarly also whenever in case of the absence of learned Advocate any appeals or applications are dismissed for default then also on the alleged ground of bar to review or alter earlier order subsequent application for restoration cannot be entertained that would create an unjust situation. This would indeed be too far fetched proposition running contrary to the concept of substantial justice. In fact after dismissal of the bail application if there is some manifest change in the facts and circumstances of the case then despite the fact that the earlier bail application has been dismissed or withdrawn or even dismissed it would still be open to the accused once again to approach the very Court which refused him the bail and if at this juncture the provisions contained in Section 362 of the Code viz. not to reserve or alter the judgment is pressed into service for consideration then instead of serving the cause of justice it would surely defeat the same Likewise. if any appeal or applications under dismissed (not on merit) for default of the learned Advocate absent when the case was called out then on some sufficient ground shown for the said default the same can he restored. if any appeal or applications under dismissed (not on merit) for default of the learned Advocate absent when the case was called out then on some sufficient ground shown for the said default the same can he restored. Similarly when any such second application under Section 482 of the Code is made and if subsequently there are change of circumstances and yet the petitioners is prevented from invoking the inherent powers because the earlier application was disposed of as withdrawn then that would be putting unwarranted and unnecessary fetters on the powers of the High Court where though it is duty bound to interfere to prevent the abuse of process of law and still it conveniently resign itself to believe and find itself helpless unable to exercise inherent power in view of Section 362 of the Code to do anything This simply cannot be permitted to happen In fact the judgment and order at the end of full dressed trial on merit or at the end of final hearing in appeal or revision stand entirely on a different footing then the application for bail and or quashing the process under Section 482 of the Code as both these proceedings are distinct mutually exclusive and independent in very nature of things. Further the inherent powers are ultimately the inherent powers of the High Court being in the very nature of things independent proceedings vesting discretion in it to find out at any stage whether there was any abuse of the process of law an to secure ends of justice it was required to circumstances of the case at the relevant point of time whether the extraordinary powers invoking inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 should be exercised or not that is always left to the discretion of the High Court which knows its extraordinary power under Section 482 and also the limitation thereunder and accordingly any application under Section 482 of the Code merely because it was dismissed earlier cannot come in the way to prevent the abuse of process or law and to secure the ends of justice if the High Court at that stage feels satisfied to intervene to secure the ends of justice Now the contention raised by Mr. Shethna for which he has relied upon the ease of Smt. Sooraj Devi (supra) is amply taken care of by the Supreme Court in its decision rendered in the case of Superintendent Remembrancer of Legal Affairs W B. (supra) In view or the clear distinction Section 362 of the Code having not even remotest application the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Shethna deserves to be rejected and stands rejected accordingly 5. 3 Incidentally it needs to be clarified that it is not merely on account or time factor that this Court has thought it expedient to quash the proceedings Rather on perusal of the complaint but for the fact that the Court is prima facie satisfied regarding the mala fide of the questionable complaint on inherently improbable fact which appears to be nothing less than false frivolous and vexatious mere time factor perhaps might not have weighed while deciding this application. The reason is that taking into consideration the huge backing of the cases an adding to it ever increasing spate of litigation vis-a-vis corresponding insufficient number of Courts and judges these days any proceedings before the trial Court were hound to gather some dust before the trial actually commences and accordingly this Court having reached the conclusion (could be seen from the subsequent paragraphs) that the complaint filed by Mr. Vinod Brambhatt was on the face or it is false malicious and vexatious to allow such proceedings to continue indefinitely which is already hanging fire for last six years would be something which the Court whose duty is to see to prevent abuse the process of law cannot afford to hoodwink/ignore. The powers under Section 482 of the Code are indeed extraordinary powers and accordingly the same should certainly he exercised at any stage even if the earlier application under Section 482 of the Code of quashing was made and stood disposed off either as withdrawn or dismissed even. In fact more than the right of the accused it is indeed the foremost duly of the High Court to entertain any such subsequent application in the light of changed circumstances as not to do so would be unnecessarily imposing self-imposed fetters on the extraordinary inherent powers of preventing the abuse of the process of law to secure the ends of justice specially invested by the Legislature in the High Courts i. tself. ( 6 ) ). ( 6 ) ). That takes us now to main plank of attack of Mrs. Shethna that since the facts alleged in the complain prima facie satisfy all the ingredients of the alleged offences this Court is not legally empowered to take exception to the same to quash the process issued by the learned Magistrate by short circuiting the trial and thereby a justice which is the right of the complainant. Mr. Shethna further submitted that on identical points raised before this Court an application is pending therefore the learned Magistrate which appears to have not been decided because the stay of the proceedings ordered by this Court in the present Misc. Criminal Application is still operating. Mr. Shethna further submitted that not only the complaint discloses more than prima facie offences but the same to say the least at the stage also does raise grave suspicion which in view of the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh reported in AIR 1977 SC 2018 is sufficient to frame the charge. When such is the legal position according to Mr. Shethna this Court should restrain itself at this stage from quashing and setting aside the process and instead would indeed to better to direct petitioners to apply for discharge before the learned Magistrate at the appropriate stage. On the basis of these submissions Mr. Shethan finally urged that apart from the preliminary objections on merit also this Misc. Criminal Application deserves to be dismissed and be dismissed accordingly. ( 7 ) ). Mr. Bambhania while countering the above submissions has invited the attention of this Court to the following indisputable glaring facts and circumstances or the ease which this Court can certainly take a judicial notice of the same and more particularly when the same when put to the complainant Mr. Vinod Brahmbatt who was present before the Court are not disputed by him The catalogue of the said undisputable facts are as under:- (1) That the Gujarat State Clearance Board had proposed a project scheme for providing a residential premises on hire purchase basis to the hutment dwellers economical backward class and Industrial workers known as VIVEKANAND NAGAR at Hathijan Ahmedabad. Note: Mr. Brahmbhatt indisputably do not fall within any of the category of the said class of person. (2) The cost of premises was fixed at Rs. Note: Mr. Brahmbhatt indisputably do not fall within any of the category of the said class of person. (2) The cost of premises was fixed at Rs. 17 265 payable in hire-purchase instalments of Rs. 160. 00 in 147 instalments and as per terms and conditions of allotment of the premises. One of the terms being that without the prior permission of the Board neither possession of the premises shall be transferred nor parted with in part and/or rented and/or transferred in any mode or method and if found to have committed any breach the Board may get the premises vacated as per the regulations and rules framed by the Board. Note: No such permission from the Board has been relied upon by Mr. Brahmbhatt. (3) That the promises No 1/k/45 was allotted to Shri Rasiklal K. . Rana vide allotment letter dated 12 on certain terms and conditions in particular the condition No. 4 that (i) the premises was allotted to him only for his personal se and (ii) that it shall not be transferred and/or alienated in any mode and/or method. Thsese terms and conditions wore duly accepted by Mr. Rana who had executed the receipt undertaking in said regard to the Board (4) That as Mr. Rana after taking possession and occupying the premises in question allotted to him failed to pay up the agreed instalments regularly and penal interest thereupon the Board was constrained to move the competent authority under the Gujarat Public Premises (Eviction Of Unauthorised) Occupants Act. 1972 by filing an application in the said regard which came to be registered as Eviction Case No 19 of 1988. This was decided on 24-3-1988 whereby Mr. Rana was directed to make the payment in question within 30 days else to be evicted immediately etc. (5) That above order was challenged by Mr. Rana by filing Appeal No. 19 of 1988 before the City Civil Court Ahmedabad inter alia stating that the orders of eviction has been served on him on 25-5-1988. (6) That on failure to make the payments within the stipulated period or 30 days as ordered the eviction orders were implemented by the officers and servants on 15-8-1988. (7) That in the Appeal filed by Mr. Rana before the City Civil Court Ahmedabad at the time of hearing on 29-7-1988 learned Advocate Mr. (6) That on failure to make the payments within the stipulated period or 30 days as ordered the eviction orders were implemented by the officers and servants on 15-8-1988. (7) That in the Appeal filed by Mr. Rana before the City Civil Court Ahmedabad at the time of hearing on 29-7-1988 learned Advocate Mr. V. H. Brahmbhatt and S. B. Brahmbhatt appeared as Advocates for the appellant. (8) That the Memo of appeal injunction application and affidavit did not disclose anything as to parting of possession in favour of any one/body i. e. to Mr. V. H.-Brahmbhatt (9) That neither appellant nor his Advocate Shri V. H. Brahmbhatt and Ors. disclosed that the eviction orders have been executed on the date of hearing on 29-7-1988. However an application Exh. 16 has been presented before the City Civil Court in Appeal No. 19 of 1988 inter alia alleging that the eviction has been made in violation of Section 4 of the Act and injunction granted by the City Civil Court (vide application dated 19-08-1988 ). (10) Mr. V. H. Brahmbhatt lodged another complaint on 8-8-1989 against the four persons i. e. R. S. Shah (who exercised the powers conferred under the Gujarat Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act 1972 B. S. Joshi (original complainant on behalf of the Board) and two others inter alia alleging that on illegal orders of the accused Nos. 3 and 4 i. e. R. S. Shah and B. S. Joshi the accused Nos. 1 and 2 has illegally locked the premises and said complaint came to be registered as C. C. No. 1792 of 1989. (11) Before the filing of the above complaint Mamlatdar had already filed a criminal complaint on 2-9-1988 against Shri Vinod Brahmbhatt for the alleged 4 trespass etc. before the learned Magistrate. (12) That thereafter on 26-9-1988 Mr. Vinod Brahmbhatt the learned Advocate himself filed a Criminal complaint against the petitioners and Others before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate Ahmedabad who in turn was pleased to issue process which is the subject-matter under challenge before this Court by the present Misc. Criminal Application. (13) That since at the time or earlier Misc. Criminal Application No. 1466 of 1989 the Appeal No. 19 of 1988 and the Contempt Application Exh. 16 made thereunder by Mr. Criminal Application. (13) That since at the time or earlier Misc. Criminal Application No. 1466 of 1989 the Appeal No. 19 of 1988 and the Contempt Application Exh. 16 made thereunder by Mr. Rana were pending the petitioners in order to have final verdict from the Civil Court sought permission to withdraw the same which was granted as stated above. To this list of circumstances may be added here several other circumstances already narrated in para two of this judgment. Mr. Bambhania on the basis of the aforesaid circumstances finally urged that once the same are taken into consideration they clearly expose the utter falsity of the complaint and thereby the abuse of process of law when such is the inevitable conclusion the process issued against the petitioner deserves to be quashed at once ( 8 ) ). Now no doubt the submissions of Mr. Shethna taking at its face value at first sight are indeed quite attractive alluring but when the same is closely scrutinized in the light of certain facts and circumstances highlighted by Mr. Bambhania it is indeed no more real than the cosmetic appearance an illusion of beauty and glamour To start with the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (supra) cannot be disputed rather if the facts and circumstances stated therein were identical with the facts and circumstances alleged in the present case this Court was indeed duty bound to follow the same quite humbly and respectfully. But that is not the case here. In fact when any Court is called upon to apply the ratio of any particular decision of the Supreme Court/high Courts (as the case may be) to any case at hand the same has to be appreciated in the context and background of the facts and circumstances of that particular case. The decision of the Supreme Court or for that purpose even of High Court like a readymade garment cannot be thrown to any person to put on by him irrespective of his/her gender age height and size of the body unless and until the person whom it is thrown to put on is either of the same age height and size. In fact every criminal cases have variety of facts circumstances colours and shades distinctly differing from case to case and therefore unless and until the facts of tow cases are so to say the identical one or so to say near identical one if would indeed be to mechanical and an indiscreet approach on the part of concerned court to apply the same The Court when called upon the apply any decision of the High Court or for that purpose the Supreme Court it is required to carefully apply its mind and find out whether facts circumstances and law governing the same are matching that is to say of the same origin and/or group In this view of the matter the decision of Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (supra) factually and legally having no bearing on the facts and circumstances of the present case has to be respectfully kept aside out of consideration. ( 9 ) ). Further still the general and overall test namely that because the facts alleged in the complaint prima facie constituted the offences under the Indian Penal Code the High Court exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code was not empowered to quash the process issued pursuant to the said complaint standing by itself ignoring intrinsic weakness/inherent improbability of the prosecution case would not be the just and proper test more particular when on persual of the complaint itself the averments made therein contain self contradictory and self-exposive res ipse loquitor material showing the complaint to be mala fide. Accordingly now turning to the facts alleged in the complaint it is no doubt true that hey do constitute the offences punishable under Sections 448 341 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. But at the same time the complaint also does contain the further averments by than Mr. Vinod Brahmbhatt Advocate himself that he was in possession of the premises in question by virtue of some arrangement arrived at with Rasiklal Rana evictee whom he defended while appearing as his Advocate in appellate proceedings It was this Rana who came to be evicted by the Competent Authority. It was this Rana whose eviction was further confirmed by the City Civil Court and ultimately by the High Court. It was this Rana whose eviction was further confirmed by the City Civil Court and ultimately by the High Court. The complainant more particularly rather specially being an Advocate of Rasiklal Rana was knowing full well that the said Rasiklal already stood evicted and therefore he had indeed no right title or interest whatsoever worth the name in the premises in question and therefore by no stretch of imagination he could ever confer any better title right or interest in the said premises upon the complainant to arrive at nay arrangement Not only that but the complainant-Brahmbhatt he being an Advocate of Rana in eviction case also full well knew that without prior permission of the Board no possession cold be transferred to him still further Mr. Brahmbhatt knew and knew it fully well that he was neither a hutmentdweller nor an industrial worker entitling him any claim of house in question which him any claim of house in question which were specially meant for the poor. On calling upon the complainant to show the document of alleged arrangement arrived at with Mr. Rana as stated in the complaint he was unable to do so. Not only this but eve V. P. filed on behalf of Mr. Rana in City Civil Court on 1-6-1988 shows his address at the relevant time as Dakshini Society Gajanand Colony Bungalow No. ( 10 ) ). Maninagar Ahmedabad-380 008. Ordinarily this is not taken into consideration but having regard to the peculiar facts this Court has not been able to resist its temptation to look at it for moral certainty. When asked about the same Mr. Brahmbhatt had indeed no reply Of course Mr. Brahmbhatt in order to show that at relevant point of time he was in possession of the premises in question has produced a ration card. But in background of facts and circumstances of the case there is no doubt in the mind of this Court that the same is fabricated one. Brahmbhatt had indeed no reply Of course Mr. Brahmbhatt in order to show that at relevant point of time he was in possession of the premises in question has produced a ration card. But in background of facts and circumstances of the case there is no doubt in the mind of this Court that the same is fabricated one. Now despite this eloquent circumstances if the complainant could still assert that he was in possession of premises in question whether the alleged incident took place and this Court was to accept such a cock and bull story it would be simply nothing but the violation on the common sense When such is the day light clear unquestionable position where the complainant by no stretch of imagination could ever have been in a lawful possession of the premises in question no offence as alleged under Section 482 of the Indian Penal Code pertaining to the House-trespass and under Section 341 pertaining to the wrongful restraint can ever be said to have been committed (!) more particularly when the condition precedent viz. of being in possession of the property in question was patently absent. Under the circumstances ultimately the reason for making wild and baseless allegation against the public servants of Slum Clearance Board by filing a false concocted complaint appears to be pure and simple counterblast to demoralize and deter the public servants from discharging their lawful duty. In this view of the matter complainant Brahmbhatt can easily be inferred to be an interested in counter blasting and forestalling the legal proceedings initiated by the petitioners against Rasiklal Rana by filing a false complaint against them When such is the unavoidable conclusion eminently coming out from the complaint itself and attending circumstances discussed above the question is can the complainant raising a toy-gun of technicality that the complaint discloses the offence be permitted to deter the Court from discharging its duty to quash and set aside the process to prevent the abuse of process of law ? The answer is obviously No. In fact having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstance of this case not to quash the proceedings on the alleged limited ground that the complainant discloses the offence without carefully scanning the inherent weakness would be nothing less that shutting ones eyes to the real fact viz. The answer is obviously No. In fact having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstance of this case not to quash the proceedings on the alleged limited ground that the complainant discloses the offence without carefully scanning the inherent weakness would be nothing less that shutting ones eyes to the real fact viz. that the complainant was not and could not have been in a lawful possession of the premises in question. The ramification of this is indeed very wide as obviously once such complaints are lightly entertained no law enforcing agency would be able to discharge his public duty freely fearlessly Not that all the public servants for all the times to come under all sort of circumstances are that chicken hearted timed but none the less while discharging their public duty against all sort of possible ordeals if some baseless malicious wild allegations are made against them and they are subjected to suffer unwarranted criminal proceedings if not all at least some getting afraid of the same would be in jittery losing required self-confidence to discharge their duty without fear or favour To save such public servants from unfortunate circumstances like the hazards and hardship that has fallen on the petitioner the Court entertaining complaint must be extremely careful and should not mechanically issue the process without carefully screening the same Thus keeping in mind the facts of the case like the present one if complaints more particularly against the public servants are carelessly entertained no administration can ever work and it is here that this Court feel absolutely duty bound in the interest of overall public administration and ultimately public servant to see that such false frivolous and vaxatious complaints are not encouraged by allowing them to continue ( 11 ) ). This Court while allowing this application for quashing the proceedings is indeed quite conscious on the one hand extent of its wider inherent powers to prevent nay abuse of process of law to secure the ends of justice and also at the same time on the other hand the selfnamely that the same is to be exercised very sparingly in exceptional and rarest of the reminded by the Supreme Court in its various decisions. Thus fully conscious of its extent of powers under Section 482 of the Code and accordingly taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the present case as discussed above there cannot be any better grosser and exceptional case than the present one which immediately calls and enjoins upon us to interfere to prevent the patent abuse of process of law taken out at the instance of the complainant Mr. Brahmbhatt against the petitioners. This Court is also further conscious of the fact that ordinarily when the allegations made in the complaint prima facie constitute the offences the sanctity of such a complaint cannot be questioned and violated by quashing the proceedings and the process issued pursuant thereto. Even in ease where the accused have some reasonable defence then even ordinarily the same cannot be straighway taken into consideration at the stage of deciding the application under Section 482 of the Code as that could be done only at the time of the trial unless of course the facts highlighted by accused are of such an indisputable nature where judicial notice can be safely taken in consideration or where the prosecution story is inherently improbable Thus this Court once again though ordinarily would not be justified in short-circuiting the trial by looking into the defence which the complainant had no opportunity to challenge and contradict the truth or otherwise or the case between the complainant and the accused for which the proper forum is in the trial Court still however to this ordinary general principle there are certain exceptions and accordingly when the judicial conscience feels and feels beyond any manner of doubt that in the name of law and justice a dubious attempt is made to devour the very spirit of law and justice itself by abusing the process of law/court the High Court exercising its extraordinary inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code should not at all feel hesitant helpless and passive in preventing the same. In fact as observed by the Supreme Court in one of its decision rendered in case of State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy reported in AIR 1977 S. C. p. 1489 the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the code are designed to achieve a salutary public purpose namely that the criminal Court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and persecution. In the present case it prima facie clearly appears that the complaint who is an Advocate that on account of his failing in eviction proceedings where he appeared for Mr. Rasiklal Rana identifying himself with the case and client surprisingly and shockingly too illegally claiming himself to be in the continued possession of the premises in question on the one hand and on the other hand to frustrate the object and the outcome of the eviction proceedings confirmed at the High Court level has falsely and maliciously by making wild allegations against the petitioners has filed the complaint. As already stated somewhere above in the present case unwittingly the complainant himself has kept a crevice open from where the Court by peeping into it could see appreciate and find out that by no stretch of imagination the complainant could have been in lawful possession of the premises in question and accordingly when the bottom of the case itself is knocked down or so to say the foundation is lost and gives way the artificial superstructure of the false allegations cannot be allowed to continue for a minute more rather it falls flat like the pack of cards the moment the gaze of the Court falls upon it. This Court is indeed quite conscious of the observations and remarks made against the complainant but taking into consideration the overall facts and circumstances of the case it appears to be the plain duty to do so to keep legal profession unsullied. ( 12 ) ). It is indeed unfortunate that the officer of the rank of the Deputy Collector and his associates discharging lawful duty have been maliciously dragged into the Court and suffer the pain of uncertainty of trial since last six years. Their only fault being to discharge the duty enjoined upon them by law honestly and sincerely. In view of the aforesaid discussion since it appears to this Court that the claim/case of possession of promises in question by the complainant is on the lace of it inherently improbable and further in view of the fact that apparantly the complaint is filed with a view to counter-blast that is to say brow beat demoralize and black mail and thereby deter the law enforcing agency and in particular petitioners from performing their part of duty this complaint shall have to be quashed and set-aside and is quashed accordingly. It is indeed unfortunate that the complainant who is a young Advocate prima facie appears to have conducted himself in such an unbecoming manner which does not befit a members of the noble profession of lawyers to which he belongs. It is entirely for the Gujarat Bar Council to consider its duty and accordingly should be taken against Mr. Vinod Brahmbhatt learned Advocate. ( 13 ) ). In view of the aforesaid discussion to briefly sum up the answers to the questions raised at the top of this judgment it may be stated (i) that there is indeed no bar to entertain a second application under Section 482 of the Code as it cannot be said to be reviewing the earlier judgment or order. In fact whenever any person approaching the High Court second or third or for that purpose any further time and at whatever stage of such application satisfies it that there is indeed a patent abuse of process of law in view of the changed set of facts and circumstances and that but for the intervention of the High Court there was indeed no hope and rather none to save him from malicious unwarranted unnecessary suffering except the High Court then in that case more than the right of the accused it is indeed the foremost duty of the High Court to immediately step in and do the needful to rescue him out. An application under Section 482 of the Code be it first second or third or any when the Court entertains it it would be entertaining it with full sense of responsibility and awareness of extent of its powers and limitations under Section 482 of the Code and that too after hearing both the sides and therefore whether it should entertain such a subsequent application or not is always a matter of judicial discretion of the High Court at that particular stage depending upon the quality of the changed facts and circumstances made out regarding the impending abuse of process of law and to secure the ends of justice; (ii) the unconditional withdrawal of any application by itself does not amount to dismissal and (iii) similarly merely because the facts alleged in the complaint apparently contain all the ingredients constituting the offence that by itself does not take away power of the Court to closely screen scrutinize and appreciate the inherent improbabilities of case interwoven in the story by none else then the complainant himself. In fact once the Court reaches the conclusion that the prosecution case is intrinsically inherently imporbable or so to say in substance it is the cock and bull story like the present one where the complaint is filed only with a view to counter-blast and wreck the personal vengeance on the accused public-servants so as to demoralize and deter them from discharging their lawful duties it is indeed the paramount duty of the Court to step-in and bring to an end the malicious proceedings by quashing and setting aside the process issued pursuant thereto ( 14 ) ). In the result this Misc. Criminal Application is allowed. The process issued pursuant to the complaint filed by Vinod Brahmbhatt and the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 548 of 1992 pending before the learned Metropolitan magistrate Court No. 19 Ahmedabad is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute. 13. 1 The Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the Chairman Bar Council of Gujarat Ahmedabad immediately for necessary action. .