Judgment :- Viswanatha Iyer, J. This is an application filed under S.64(3) of the Estate Duty Act, 1958 to compel reference of certain questions of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal. H. H. Sethu Parvathi Bai died on 4-8-1983. In the order of assessment, the Assistant Controller included as part of her estate, the amount arising by way of refund consequent on certain appellate orders relating to Income tax and Wealth tax and Gift tax passed after the death. According to the assessee, this did not form part of the estate of the deceased, passing on her death. But the Assistant Controller held otherwise and treated it as property passing on death. He brought the amount of refund to assessment. In appeal, the Appellate Controller noted that it was not clear from the materials whether the refund had accrued before the death of the deceased or after, and accordingly remitted the matter back to the Assistant Controller to decide whether the refund had accrued before or after the death. The accountable person and the revenue filed separate appeal s before the Appellate Tribunal. By the time the appeals were heard, the fresh order of the Assistant Controller pursuant to the remand had been passed, in which he had held that the refund had become due only after the death, the appellate orders being passed subsequent to that date. The Tribunal therefore held that the amount of refund had not accrued to the deceased at or before the death, and it was not property passing on death. The amount was consequently deleted from the assessment. It is in this background that the revenue has come up with this application for compelling reference of certain questions of law. 2. We do not however find any reason to entertain this petition or to direct reference of any question of law as in our opinion the answer to the question raised is self-evident. What is assessable to duty is only the principal value of the property which passes on the death of the deceased person. If the refund was ordered only consequent to the death of the deceased, the right accrued only thereby, and it could not be postulated that the amount of refund was property passing on death. What is assessable to duty is only the principal value of the property which passes on the death of the deceased person. If the refund was ordered only consequent to the death of the deceased, the right accrued only thereby, and it could not be postulated that the amount of refund was property passing on death. This was the view taken by the High Court of Allahabad in Controller of Estate Duty v. Maharani Raj Laxmi Devi (1987) 168 ITR 389 where it was held that the refund which became payable after the death of a person could not be considered as property available at the time of the deceased's death. It could not therefore be considered as property passing on his death and it should not be assessed as part of his estate. For reaching this conclusion, the Allahabad High Court drew support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Muthiah (M. Ct.) v. C. E. D. (1986) 161 ITR 768. A similar view was taken by the High Court of Bombay in Estate of Sir Shankar S.S.J.B. Rana v. Controller of Estate Duty (1990) 186 ITR 578, where the court held that the mere right to claim refund which might or might not materialise was not property wjthin the meaning of S.2(15) of the Estate Duty Act. Unless it was possible to say that there was some amount due by way of refund as of right at the time of the death, it would not be property under the Act. 3. We are in agreement with the statement of the law in the aforesaid decisions. At the time of assessee's death the appeals were only pending. The fate of the appeals was not certain. The question of refund of any amount depended on the result of those appeals. Since the fate of the appeals was an uncertain future event, and the availability or otherwise of the refund was dependent on such an uncertain contingency, it could not for a moment be said that there was any tangible property available to the deceased on the date of her death, which could pass on death. The right accrued only when the appellate orders were passed and not earlier. The right accrued only when the appellate orders were passed and not earlier. The amount of refund was not therefore property passing on the death of H.H. Sethu Parvathi Bai and therefore not liable to be included in her estate, for the purpose of Estate Duty. The Tribunal was justified in the view that it took. We do not therefore find any referable question of law. This petition is dismissed.