JUDGMENT - Dr. E.S. DA SILVA, J. :—The challenge in this petition is the judgment of the Administrative Tribunal dated 21st June, 1990 in Eviction Appeal No. 53 of 1987 whereby, during the pendency of the said appeal, the Tribunal has allowed an application filed by the respondents, who were the appellants in the said appeal, under section 32(4) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968 (hereinafter called the Act) and stopped all further proceedings in the appeal, directing the petitioner who was the respondent in the appeal to put the landlord in vacant possession of the suit premises. As the petitioner put it the limited question in the petition is whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of the respondents which sought to impugn the order of the Rent Controller whereby he had dismissed a review application filed by the respondents against an earlier order passed by him rejecting the respondents application for eviction of the petitioner on the ground of non-payment of rents. 2. The case of the petitioner is that he was the lessee of the respondents in respect of a portion of the ground floor of their building at Fontainhas, Panaji. Initially the premises bad been let out at a monthly rent of Rs. 10/- but some years thereafter on an application moved by the respondents for fixation of fair rent, the monthly rent was enhanced to Rs. 64/-. It is also the case of the petitioner that with a view of forcing him to vacate the premises and surrender the tenancy rights the respondents continued to refuse to accept the monthly rents tendered by the petitioner at the rate of Rs. 64/- and also refused the tender of rents remitted by the petitioner regularly every month by Money Order. Thereupon sometime in the year 1985 the respondents Filed an application for the petitioners eviction on 19-3-1985 alleging non-payment of rents in the sum of Rs. 8302/- in respect of the months from August, 1973 to February, 1985, being at the rate of Rs. 10/- from August, 1973 to June, 1974 (i.e. for 11 months) and at the rate of Rs. 64/- from July. 1974 to February, 1985 (128 months). The case was registered by the Rent Controller as Eviction Case No. Rent/ARC/14/85. 8302/- in respect of the months from August, 1973 to February, 1985, being at the rate of Rs. 10/- from August, 1973 to June, 1974 (i.e. for 11 months) and at the rate of Rs. 64/- from July. 1974 to February, 1985 (128 months). The case was registered by the Rent Controller as Eviction Case No. Rent/ARC/14/85. On 21-1-1987, sometime after the receipt of the notice in this .application, the petitioner moved an application before the Rent Controller slating that he wanted to deposit a sum of Rs. 900/- with regard to rents from 1-11-1985 to 31-3-1987 at the rate of Rs. 64/-. According to the petitioner this amount was corresponding to the outstanding balance of the rents due from November, 1985 to January, 1987 as earlier rents had been already paid to the respondents .regarding this period by depositing the sum in the Rent Controllers Office and District Court at the same rate. The petitioner stated that this very amount had been sought to be paid by the petitioner to the respondents prior to that by remitting the rent due every month by Money Order which the respondents refused to accept. However, it appears that even before this application was made by the petitioner proceedings in respect of the respondents application for eviction had been also dropped and the case closed by the Rent Controller by his impugned order dated 31-10-1985 and no appeal was filed by the respondents against this order of virtual rejection of their application for eviction under section 22(2)(a) of the Act. Therefore, in view of the fact that the said application had been already dismissed the Rent Controller rejected the petitioners application to deposit the rents in his Court by Order dated 21-1-1987 and the Rent Controller directed the petitioner to pay the rents personally to the .respondents. It is further the case of the petitioner that thereupon he started remitting the rents to the respondents by Money Order and the same were regularly refused to be accepted by them. In the meantime the respondents filed a review application before the Rent Controller on 28-7-1986 which was rejected by the Controller on 15-7-1987 on the ground that the Rent Court had no powers to review its earlier order. In the meantime the respondents filed a review application before the Rent Controller on 28-7-1986 which was rejected by the Controller on 15-7-1987 on the ground that the Rent Court had no powers to review its earlier order. The respondents then filed an appeal to the Tribunal, being Eviction Appeal No. 53 of 1987, although in the memo of appeal the respondents have admitted that there was no right of review available for the Rent Controller to review his orders earlier passed. It was during the pendency of this appeal the respondents have admitted that there was no right of review available for the Rent Controller to review his orders earlier passed. It was during the pendency of this appeal that the respondents moved an application before the Tribunal under section 32(4) of the Act, dated 25-4-1988, praying that the proceedings before the Tribunal be stored and the respondents be given vacant possession of the premises. The allegation was that the petitioner had failed to either pay or deposit the arrears of rent for 31 months i.e. right from November, 1985 to March, 1988. The petitioner filed his reply to this application on 2-4-1990. Thereafter on 21-6-1990 the Tribunal passed the impugned judgment allowing the respondents motion without considering the question of jurisdiction raised by the petitioner which was not even dealt with in the impugned order. 3. Mr. Kolwalkar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has submitted mat before the Tribunal he had contended that the very appeal of the respondents was not maintainable on account of inherent lack of jurisdiction of the Tribunal because since the Rent Controller had no right to review his own orders no appeal could have been filed against the Order of the Controller declining to exercise review powers. It was also submitted that the Tribunal should have first decided this preliminary objection of the petitioner regarding the very maintainability of the appeal before it. Admittedly the respondents had filed an application against the petitioner for his eviction under section 22(2)(a) on the ground of arrears of rents and in his written statement the petitioner has taken the plea that BO application for eviction would tie for want of a valid notice under the same subjection of section 22. Admittedly the respondents had filed an application against the petitioner for his eviction under section 22(2)(a) on the ground of arrears of rents and in his written statement the petitioner has taken the plea that BO application for eviction would tie for want of a valid notice under the same subjection of section 22. According to the learned Counsel, in the absence of such a notice there could be no cause of action for the respondents and therefore there was lack of jurisdiction of the Rent Court to entertain the application. This point was specifically raised by the petitioner before the Controller in his written reply to the application. Besides the petitioner had also moved before the Rent Controller an- application seeking the issue of challan to enable him to deposit the arrears of rents because it was allied that the respondents were refusing to accept the rents regularly attempted to be paid by him to them personally. Although such application is not in the file, the learned Counsel said that there is a reference to this motion in the judgment of the Rent Controller, namely, in its paras 3, 4, 6 and 7. However, inspite of the Controller coming to the conclusion that notice under section 22(2)(a) was mandatory the respondents application for eviction was not dismissed on this ground, but instead disposed of on the ground that the petitioner had deposited all the arrears of rents within thirty days from the date of service of the notice in the application. It was further contended by the learned Counsel that when the petitioner filed his motion before the Controller, dated 9-5-1985, to deposit the arrears with deduction of Rs. 640/- which had been purportedly deposited in the District Court, the respondents disputed that such deposit was made by him but the Controller negativated the said allegation. It was further submitted that against the Order dated, 31-10-1985 whereby the proceedings were dropped in the Eviction Application no appeal was filed by the respondents. But on 28-7-1986 the respondents chose to file a review application against the said order on the ground that there was a mistake in the calculation by the Controller about the actual amount of rents deposited by the petitioner in the District Court. But on 28-7-1986 the respondents chose to file a review application against the said order on the ground that there was a mistake in the calculation by the Controller about the actual amount of rents deposited by the petitioner in the District Court. It was also contended that after this application for review was filed the petitioner moved another application before the Controller dated 21-1-1987 i.e. during the pendency of review praying that he should be allowed to deposit the rents in the Rent Court from November, 1985 on the ground that the respondents were continuing to illegally refuse the rents which were sought to be regularly paid by him to them. This application was also rejected on the same day by the Controller who has stated that the original proceedings having been dropped by order dated 31-10-1985 there was no question of the petitioner continuing to deposit rents in the Rent Court. Thereafter the Controller rejected also the respondents review application by his Order dated 15-7-1987 and in this Order he has gone through all the challans of payment made by the petitioner because the respondents had vehemently submitted that the Rent Controller while dropping the proceedings in the application for eviction had not applied his mind and miscalculated the amount of rents purported to have been deposited by the petitioner in the District Court. 4. Against this order of dismissal of the review the respondents filed an appeal before the Tribunal wherein the respondents moved an application under section 32(4) and reply was also presented by the petitioner on 2-4-1990 in which the petitioner again reiterated the fact that the respondents had consistently refused to accept the rents tendered by him while at the same time the question of jurisdiction of the Tribunal was raised to entertain the respondents appeal. It was further submitted that on this reply having been filed by the petitioner the matter was argued only on the maintainability of the appeal but inspite of that the Tribunal chose to decide the entire application of the respondents on its merits by allowing it without even touching the point of preliminary issue of maintainability raised by him. In this respect it was urged by learned Counsel that no arguments on the merits of the application were advanced by him at all. In this respect it was urged by learned Counsel that no arguments on the merits of the application were advanced by him at all. In this respect learned Counsel invited my .attention to the judgment of the Tribunal which shows that the same was not passed on merits of the appeal but only on the application under section 32(4). My attention was also drawn to section 43 of the Act which speaks of the power of the Controller and wherein no reference is made to any power of review. Summing up his submissions the learned Counsel has thus urged that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain an application for review and consequently there could not be any appeal against his order rejecting the review application. Hence the appeal before the Tribunal was without jurisdiction. Further the order of the Tribunal insofar as it entertains the respondents application under section 32(4) without considering and adjudicating the merits of the petitioners preliminary objection that no appeal against the Order of the Rent Controller would lie was also without jurisdiction. Further when the merits of the application under section 32(4) had not been argued at all by the petitioner and only the question of maintainability of the appeal was argued the Tribunal could not pass the order on the merits of the application and by so doing gross violation of the principles of natural justice have been done by the Tribunal. 5. The next submission was that the finding of the Tribunal to the effect that there was no sufficient cause shown by the petitioner in committing default in the payment of arrears of rent was perverse and against the evidence on record thus revealing total non-application of mind. According to the learned Counsel the Tribunal ought to have held that the evidence shows that the petitioner was regularly trying to pay the rents and sending them through Money Order which the respondents were consistently refusing to accept. Further the Tribunal should have considered that the petitioner had even moved applications dated 21-1-1987 and 18-3-1987 seeking to deposit the rents which were being refused by the respondents, which applications were rejected by the Rent Controller on the ground that the proceedings were closed and therefore the payment should be tendered directly to the respondents. Further the Tribunal should have considered that the petitioner had even moved applications dated 21-1-1987 and 18-3-1987 seeking to deposit the rents which were being refused by the respondents, which applications were rejected by the Rent Controller on the ground that the proceedings were closed and therefore the payment should be tendered directly to the respondents. It was also urged that there was lack of a valid notice under section 22(2)(a) which was going to the root of the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller to entertain the application. Hence no proceedings could have been allowed to be maintained in the Rent Controllers Court and therefore no appeal would lie against any order passed in such proceedings. In support of these submissions, the learned Counsel has relied on the case of (Patel Narshi Thakershi and others v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji)1, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1273. This was to show that the power to review is not an inherent power and must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. My attention was also drawn to the case of (Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar)2, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1185. This was also to show that the effect of allowing an application for review of a decree is to vacate the decree passed and that the decree that is subsequently passed on review, whether it modifies, reverses or confirms the decree originally passed, is a new decree superseding the original one. The facts of that case were that in an award in Land Acquisition Reference the respondent was the State of Bihar who did not file any appeal from the decree of the reference Court enhancing compensation for the land acquired from Rs. 14/- to Rs. 200/- per katha but sought for a review of that decree and succeeded in getting the decree vacated. The Court observed that when it filed an appeal before the High Court it could not have filed an appeal against the first decree passed by the reference Court as at that time that decree had already been superseded by the decree passed after review. The Court observed that when it filed an appeal before the High Court it could not have filed an appeal against the first decree passed by the reference Court as at that time that decree had already been superseded by the decree passed after review. So appeal filed by the respondent before the High Court could only be an appeal filed after the High Court came to the conclusion that the reference Court went wrong in allowing the appeal which should have allowed the cross appeal and since no appeal was preferred against the original decree awarding compensation for the land at the rate of Rs. 200/- that decree became final. The respondent made no attempt to file an appeal against that decree when the High Court found that the review was wrongly allowed on the basis that the decree revived and came into life again. One more case was cited by the learned Counsel in the case of (Suka Ishram Chaudhari v. Jamnabai Ranchoddas Gujarathi and others)3, A.I.R. 1972 Bombay 273. This was a case under section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 wherein the Court has held that in case of refusal by landlord to accept rents sent by M.O. tenant cannot be said to be in arrears of rents nor can he be said to be not ready and willing to pay rents thus eviction under section 12(3)(a) was erroneous. The learned Counsel urged that in the instant case the petitioner had sent rents by M.O. which were refused by the respondents and also sought permission of the Rent Controller to get the rents deposited which attempt was foiled by this Controller himself who declined to grant his application. This by itself would show the conduct of the petitioner and his willingness to pay and in such situation the respondents application under section 32(4) could not have been allowed for want of sufficient cause. 6. Mr. Talaulikar, learned Counsel for the respondents, has joined issue with the submissions canvassed across the bar by the learned petitioners Counsel. According to the learned Counsel the relevant question for consideration of the Court was whether the application moved by the respondents under section 32(4) in the appeal proceedings has been validly made and available to them because the aftermath of this petition was necessarily linked with that application. According to the learned Counsel the relevant question for consideration of the Court was whether the application moved by the respondents under section 32(4) in the appeal proceedings has been validly made and available to them because the aftermath of this petition was necessarily linked with that application. Learned Counsel has drawn my attention to section 32, namely, its sub-sections (1) and (4) of the Act. This was for the purpose of showing that no tenant against whom proceedings for eviction has been instituted by a landlord would be entitled to contest the proceedings before the Controller or any appellate or revisional authority or to prefer any appeal or revision unless he had paid to the landlord or deposited with the Controller or the appellate or revisional authority all arrears of rents and in case the tenant had failed to pay or deposit the rents the Controller or the appellate or revisional authority was bound to, unless the tenant showed sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. Learned Counsel urged that this provision was clearly indicating that in the infant case the petitioner could not be allowed to contest the appeal proceedings without paying or depositing with the appellate Court all the rents due during the pendency of the appeal. Learned Counsel thus submitted that he was keen in analysing the conduct of the petitioner in respect of the period of time after the filing of his appeal of which the petitioner had got the notice. Therefore the real controversy was that the appeal having been filed and the notice of the appeal having, also been received by the tenant it was in this appeal that the respondents had filed their application under section 32(4). The grievance of the respondents was precisely that after the filing of the appeal the petitioner has failed to pay or deposit the rents due without sufficient cause either with the Rent Controller or in the Tribunal. Thus the question was whether after the receiving of the notice of the appeal the petitioner has deposited the rents due in the appellate Court or had shown sufficient cause not to do so. Thus the question was whether after the receiving of the notice of the appeal the petitioner has deposited the rents due in the appellate Court or had shown sufficient cause not to do so. In this regard learned Counsel has formulated two propositions, the first one being that the submissions of the petitioners learned Counsel that the respondents appeal was not competent or maintainable could not be a material or relevant issue before the Tribunal while entertaining the respondents application under section 32(4). The other one is that the impugned order of the Tribunal was perfectly justified and according to the principles of natural justice. With regard to these propositions learned Counsel relied on the pleadings of the parties, namely, on the respondents application under section 32(4) and the petitioners reply to this application as well as under the provisions of section 32 of the Act to which I have already made a mention. He has also submitted that the Tribunal has correctly considered the scope of section 32(4) and hence duly assessed the merits of the application and there could be no error apparent on the face of the record or perversity so as to justify interference on the part of this Court in its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Learned Counsel emphasised that under Article 227 even if this Court .could take a different view from the one taken by the Tribunal this view could not be substituted only because in its judgment the same was preferable to the one taken by the courts below. While dealing with the various submissions advanced by the learned petitioners Counsel it was urged by Mr. Talaulikar that the contention that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain an application for review and consequently there could be no appeal against the order rejecting the review the reason why the appeal before the Tribunal was without jurisdiction the said submission was not relevant to decide the application under section 32(4). It was stated that the Tribunal was already seized of the appeal and even notice had been issued to the petitioner in this regard. The petitioner did not even raise the question of jurisdiction of the Tribunal is entertaining the appeal in his reply and his only contention was that he had failed to deposit the rents earlier on account of the advice given by his advocate. The petitioner did not even raise the question of jurisdiction of the Tribunal is entertaining the appeal in his reply and his only contention was that he had failed to deposit the rents earlier on account of the advice given by his advocate. Being so, under section 32(4) of the Act, the Tribunal was bound to consider the respondents application during the pendency of the appeal, so much so the petitioner has admitted the factual position of his having not deposited the rent during the period referred to by the respondents. With regard to the second submission that the Order of the Tribunal in so far it entertains the respondents application under section 32(4) without considering the merits of his preliminary objection that no appeal against the order of the Controller would lie was without jurisdiction. It was urged that the same was not warranted under section 32(4) bearing in mind the scheme of section 34 itself which shows that during the proceedings an application under section 32(4) could be filed and was always available to the landlord even before an appellate or revisional authority. In respect of the petitioners grievance that the Tribunal had disposed the application under section 32(4) on merits in clear violation of the principles of natural justice inspite of the fact that only the point of preliminary issue raised by the petitioner has been argued by him with regard to the maintainability of the appeal it was submitted that the same was not attracted because admittedly a copy of the motion of the respondents application for dropping the proceeding had been served on the petitioner besides the copy of the very application for eviction filed by the respondents. The petitioner put up his reply to both these applications and the matter was posted for arguments. Whether the petitioner has taken before the Tribunal only the preliminary point of non-maintainability of the appeal was immaterial because opportunity had been given to him to deal with the matter. Hence there was no question of the principles of natural justice being invoked before the Court when the petitioner could not deny that the Court had permitted him to meet the case sought to be established by the respondents in both their applications for evictions and dropping of the .proceedings under section 32(4). Hence there was no question of the principles of natural justice being invoked before the Court when the petitioner could not deny that the Court had permitted him to meet the case sought to be established by the respondents in both their applications for evictions and dropping of the .proceedings under section 32(4). Similarly with regard to the petitioners contention that the finding arrived at by the Tribunal that no sufficient cause has been shown by the petitioner is perverse and against the evidentiary value thus revealing non-application of mind. It was contended by the learned Counsel that if at all the petitioner had allegedly sent all the rents due during the relevant period by M.O. he could have very well attached in his reply the relevant receipts or documentary evidence to support this evidence with regard to the offer of rents and the respondents refusal to accept the same. Further on the conduct of the petitioner and his claim bona fide in this affair it was urged that proceedings were going on against him since 1974 precisely because the petitioner has been irregular in paying the rents. The learned Counsel disputed the petitioners grievance that the respondents were keen on throwing out the petitioner by hook or by crook and therefore they bad indulged in all type of litigation against him so as to harass the petitioner and forcibly drive him out of the premises. It was submitted in this regard that the contractual rent agreed initially had been enhanced by the competent authority at his request from Rs. 10/- to Rs. 64 and thereafter in 1984 the respondents had filed the application for petitioners eviction under section 22(2)(a) on the ground that the petitioner was in arrears with regard to the rents due. This application was disposed by the Controller by giving to the petitioner the benefit under section 22(3) i.e. by allowing him to avail of the possibility of avoid eviction by depositing the rents in arrears within the period of one month from the time of the service of this application. This application was disposed by the Controller by giving to the petitioner the benefit under section 22(3) i.e. by allowing him to avail of the possibility of avoid eviction by depositing the rents in arrears within the period of one month from the time of the service of this application. Hence it could not be said that in the circumstances the respondents bad unduly dragged the petitioner to Court because by effecting the payment of arrears within the time period of one month provided in the Act the petitioner has clearly admitted that he was in arrears and made a deposit of the rents accrued only after accepting the notice of the application for eviction. The learned Counsel made it clear that this conduct of the petitioner clearly indicates that only after the respondents went to Court that the petitioner chose to deposit whatever was due to them towards rents. Besides, during the pendency of the appeal and while filing the application under section 32(4), the respondents have claimed that the rents were again in arrears for a period of 31 months. While meeting with the authorities cited by learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Talaulikar urged that the same rulings had been given on facts. Even assuming that the Controller had no inherent powers to review this question was only an academic proposition in the light of the fact that what was decisive on the matter was not whether any appeal would lie or whether a review was available to the respondents but only whether an application under section 32(4) was valid and permissible in law during the pendency of the appeal before the Tribunal. Learned Counsel also tried to distinguish the decision in the case of Suka Ishram Chaudhari, A.I.R. 1972 Bombay 273, which according to him was irrelevant and again given on facts and under a different set of law. It was urged that in the Bombay Act there was no provision similar to the Goa Act as far as the need to deposit the rents in case of an application filed under section 32(4). The decision was dealing with section 12(3) of the Bombay Act and under the scheme of the Act itself the tenant had only to pay the rents due and in this context mere readiness or willingness to pay was sufficient to avoid the consequence of eviction. The decision was dealing with section 12(3) of the Bombay Act and under the scheme of the Act itself the tenant had only to pay the rents due and in this context mere readiness or willingness to pay was sufficient to avoid the consequence of eviction. Contrary to that the Goa Act was clear in providing that the tenant had to pay the rents either by hand deliver or M.O. failing which the deposit of the rents in arrears was to be done and that also within one month from the notice of the application under section 32(4) which admittedly was not done in the instant case. In other words mere readiness and willingness to pay which according to Mr. Kolwalka_or tendering the same by way of M.O. was not sufficient to avoid the consequences prescribed by section 32(4). The learned Counsel has thus urged that even assuming that the petitioner had sent the rents by M.O. and the same were refused to be accepted by the respondents the fact did not prevent the petitioner from discharging his obligations directly under section 32(4) and to effect the deposits of these rents in case of the respondents refusal to accept the M.O. In so far to the question of lack of jurisdiction of the Controller to entertain the application for eviction for want of valid notice, learned Counsel submitted that notices dated 27th October, 1983 and 3rd February, 1984 have been addressed to the petitioner in this regard. 7. Mr. Kolwalkar has submitted in this regard that the notices cannot be said to be under section 22(a), so much so the respondents learned Counsel has himself stated that the same were under section 17(3) of the Act. Therefore since the notices were meant to direct the petitioner to make the payment of arrears of rents within 10 and 15 days respectively it could not be held that they were satisfying the legal requirement of the notice contemplated under section 22(2)(a). 8. Mr. Talaulikar in reply has contended that by these notices the petitioner has been made very well aware that on account of non-payment of rents the respondents contemplated legal eviction proceedings against him. 8. Mr. Talaulikar in reply has contended that by these notices the petitioner has been made very well aware that on account of non-payment of rents the respondents contemplated legal eviction proceedings against him. Therefore, although a time period of 8 or 15 days had been allowed to the petitioner to effect the payment of arrears instead of 30 days as provided in section 22(a), the fact by itself would become irrelevant and therefore it could not be said that the notices were not valid. Reliance was placed by learned Counsel in this regard on the case of (Chandbi Mard Abdul Razak Sache v. Gulabhai Chandmal Gughale)4, 1991(2) All India Rent Control Journal 551. This was for the purpose of showing that a notice should always be liberally construed and that a mere mistake here or there in the demand notice should not be fatal so as to entail the dismissal of the suit. My attention was also drawn to the case of (Shambhu Narain Modak v. Rambabu Gupta)5, A.I.R 1983 Patna 135, which has laid down that, in the case of Bihar Buildings (Lease. Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1977 dealing with a suit for recovery of possession under section 13 and an order for deposit of arrears of rent, a tenant should deposit arrears of rents in the Court passing the order. The deposit made in another Court or another forum was of no consequence. 9. In order to appreciate the submissions of the learned Counsel Mr. Talaulikars that he is not concerned with the past story of this case but only with a situation arising after the filing of a decree, it is useful to examine the very scheme of section 32 of the Act, namely, its sub-section (4) which contemplates a situation conferring substantive rights to the landlord to approach the Court to get eviction proceedings stopped and to enable him to take the possession of the rented premises when during the pendency of such proceedings rents are not paid by the tenant without sufficient cause. A bare reading of this provision seems to suggest clearly that section 32 does not at all contemplate anything about either propriety or legality of the proceedings before the Controller or Appellate Authority. A bare reading of this provision seems to suggest clearly that section 32 does not at all contemplate anything about either propriety or legality of the proceedings before the Controller or Appellate Authority. It is quite an independent remedy provided in the statute to protect the interests of the landlord in securing the immediate and actual payment of the rents accrued during the pendency of the eviction proceedings and due to him without compelling him to indulge in further or separate litigation for the purpose. Section 32 which deals with the payment or deposit of rents during the pendency of the proceedings for eviction provides in sub-section (1) that no tenant against whom proceedings for eviction has been instituted by a landlord under the Act shall be entitled to contest the proceedings before the Controller or any Appellate Tribunal or revisional authority or to prefer an appeal unless he has paid to the landlord or (emphasis supplied) deposited with the Controller or revisional authority all arrears of rents due in respect of the building upto the date of payment or deposit and continues to pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building until the termination of the proceedings before the Controller or the appellate or revisional authority. Under sub-section (2) the deposit of rent under sub-section (1) shall be made within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed. This sub-clause shall be considered along with section 17 read with Rule 7 of the Rules which prescribes a period of 15 days for effecting payment of the rent. Sub-section (3) contemplates a case when there is a dispute as to the amount of rent to be paid or deposited under sub-section (1) and then the Controller or the appellate or revisional authority shall on application made either by the tenant or by the landlord and after making such inquiry as it deems necessary, determine summarily the rent to be so paid or deposited. Sub-section (4) reads that if any tenant fails to pay or (emphasis supplied) to deposit the rent the Controller or the appellate or revisional authority as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. Sub-section (4) reads that if any tenant fails to pay or (emphasis supplied) to deposit the rent the Controller or the appellate or revisional authority as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. Section 45(2) of the Act provides that every order other than an interim order passed by the authorised officer under section 31 or by the Controller an appeal shall lie to the Administrative Tribunal. It is in this background that we have to see that there is no dispute that in the review application filed by the respondents before the Controller an order has been passed by him, may be rejecting the same for want of jurisdiction and an appeal was filed by the respondents against this order. This appeal after its filing was admitted and numbered by the Tribunal. In this context one has to view whether an application under section 32(4) was tenable in the said appeal and it is in the light of this question that one must go through the impugned order of the Tribunal. The Tribunal in the said order has observed that after the show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on the respondents application under section 32(4) he has filed his reply stating, inter alia, that the landlord has been refusing to accept the rents and after service of the notice since the appeal was incompetent it was not necessary to deposit arrears in the Court. Therefore he did not deposit the same till 24-6-1988 when by way of abundant caution he applied for permission to deposit the arrears in this Tribunal. According to the learned Tribunal this stand taken by the petitioner would amount to a clear admission that actually and factually no rents were deposited by the petitioner either in the Rent Court or in Tribunal after the filing of the appeal. Admittedly the appeal was filed on 31-8-1987 and the application under section 32(4) was moved by the respondents on 25-4-1988. The petitioner has expressly acknowledged that rents were not deposited from 31-8-1987 to 25-4-1988 or until 24-6-1988 and the only explanation sought to be given for this non-deposit of rents is the advice of his advocate and that also on the ground that the appeal filed was incompetent. The petitioner has expressly acknowledged that rents were not deposited from 31-8-1987 to 25-4-1988 or until 24-6-1988 and the only explanation sought to be given for this non-deposit of rents is the advice of his advocate and that also on the ground that the appeal filed was incompetent. It was only on 24-6-1988 that the petitioner by way of abundant caution, although according to him this was not necessary, had sought permission of the Tribunal to deposit the rents in arrears. This means that the petitioner, apart from invoking advice, has not been able to show sufficient cause to deposit the rents and account for them in respect of the relevant period after the filing of the appeal. The Tribunal in its judgment has also held that admittedly the rents for 31 months at the rate of Rs. 64/- per month from 1-11-1985 to 31-5-1988, amounting to Rs. 1984/-, were not paid or deposited till the end of June, 1988 although the notice of appeal was served on the tenant as early as 28-10-1987. Therefore, the tenant did not pay the arrears accumulated by the date of service of the notice of appeal and the reason given by the tenant for non-deposit of arrears of rents within 30 days of the service of the notice of the appeal was again that he was advised that since the appeal was incompetent it was not necessary for him to deposit the arrears in the Court. The Tribunal thus held that this reason was hardly convincing because it was not for the tenant and his adviser to decide the competency of the appeal and the attitude shown by the petitioner in this regard was of indifference and wilful default on his part to deposit the arrears of rents accumulated for over two years even after the receipt of the notice of the appeal. The Tribunal also commented that nothing would prevent the petitioner from filing the application to deposit the arrears of rents within the prescribed period so much so he was assisted by a senior Counsel. On this ground the Tribunal concluded that the failure of the petitioner in paying the arrears of rents within time was without sufficient cause and the Tribunal was satisfied on this finding arrived at on the strength of the very admissions made by the petitioner with regard to non deposit of rents within time. 10. On this ground the Tribunal concluded that the failure of the petitioner in paying the arrears of rents within time was without sufficient cause and the Tribunal was satisfied on this finding arrived at on the strength of the very admissions made by the petitioner with regard to non deposit of rents within time. 10. In my view there is nothing wrong or perverse in these findings, bearing in mind the factual and legal position referred to above since in the instant case the real issue which had been placed for the consideration of the Tribunal was not the question of the appeal itself being incompetent and not maintainable but instead the very maintainability of the respondents application under section 32(4) of the Act. Thus, the lone relevant consideration for the Tribunal could be the time period spent by the petitioner after the filing of the appeal in effecting the deposit of the arrears of rent as the Tribunal was concerned only with the delay in this deposit after the notice of the application was served on the petitioner. In other words, the Tribunal was required to see whether the deposit of the rents in arrears, even assuming that the respondents had unduly refused to accept the payment of the rents sought to be tendered by the petitioner either personally or by Money Order, had been made within the period of one month after the service of the notice of the respondents application under section 32(4) of the Act which was undoubtedly very much available to them even during the pendency of the appeal. 11. Mr. Talaulikar has tried to explain the respondents refusal to accept the M.O. repeatedly sent by the petitioner towards the payment of rents and has submitted that there was some reason for the respondents to decline to accept the said M.O. because in the counterfoils of the M.O. there was always a remark made by the petitioner saying that the amount of money was being sent in full settlement of the house rent. According to the learned Counsel the unqualified acceptance of this remark would probably mean that the respondents were acknowledging that there would be no further dispute between them and the petitioner and in this manner it would practically amount that the respondents should give up their other rights sought to be enforced in their application for eviction. 12. Mr. According to the learned Counsel the unqualified acceptance of this remark would probably mean that the respondents were acknowledging that there would be no further dispute between them and the petitioner and in this manner it would practically amount that the respondents should give up their other rights sought to be enforced in their application for eviction. 12. Mr. Kolwalkar in his turn has disputed this reason given by the respondents. It was his case that in the absence of any pleadings made by the respondents in this regard in their affidavit-in-reply it was impermissible for the learned Counsel to advance this type of submission. That apart the counterfoils of the M.O. were clear in expressly mentioning that the rents sought to be tendered were in full settlement of each and every month in respect of which rents were admittedly due in the amount which was being remitted by the petitioner with regard to the lease of the suit premise. Be that as it may, the fact however remains that, as it was already stated above, although assuming that the reasons given are insufficient to justify the refusal of the M.Os. the petitioner could not be said that consequent upon this refusal he was dispensed from strictly complying with the legal requirements of depositing the rents in case the petitioner had declined to accept the same while sought to be personally tendered by the petitioner or sent by M.O. 13. Mr. Talaulikar has also drawn my attention to the ruling in the case of (Roque Antonio Judas Tadue Caetano Ribeiro v. Angelo Cassiano Neves e Souza and others)6, 1989(2) Goa Law Times 313, wherein it has been observed, in a matter under section 32(4) while dealing with such type of applications, that some of the factors which the Rent Controller should bear in mind while exercising his discretionary power would be amongst others whether the default is wilful or unintentional, whether it is for a short period or long period, whether it is stray or persistent, whether payment was made at the first opportunity or after contest, whether the default is bona fide or to harass the landlord and thus the circumstances of the case should be considered. According to learned Counsel even applying this test to the instant case the petitioner could not be said as qualifying for the condonation of delay or default in depositing the rents either with the Controller or the Tribunal after the filing of the application and in this view of the matter it was clear that the default of the petitioner had to be held as wilful and persistent because only when the matter was being taken to Court then the deposit was made in settlement of the arrears due in respect of the rents of the suit premises. The learned Counsel has thus sought to impress upon me that in the context of all the facts and circumstances, including the antecedents which had to be taken into account, the conduct of the petitioner was to be viewed. It was urged that in his affidavit-in-reply the respondents bad given the entire picture of the happenings from 1973 onwards and which would reveal that each and every time the respondents had been driven by the petitioner to the Court to recover the rents which have never been voluntarily deposited by the petitioner as per the law. It was also contended by the learned Counsel that the petitioner had sought permission from the Rent Controller to carry out repairs in the suit premises on the ground that the respondents were neglecting to maintain the premises in a proper shape. Despite of this permission having been given to him the petitioner never cared to take steps to initiate the repairs and adjust the amount of rents due thus allowing the premises to collapse. He therefore contended that all these facts including the last conduct of the petitioner would reflect his wilful and persistent behaviour to indicate his intention to simply harass the respondents and drive them to litigation. 14. Mr. Kolwalkar in reply has reiterated that the respondents had not been able to deny that, at least since July 1985 to May 1988 i.e., before the filing of the appeal, which the record shows was instituted on 31-8-1987, the petitioner was trying to tender the rents accrued every month by M.O. The learned Counsel has produced the counterfoils of the receipts of those M.Os. which had been refused to be accepted by the respondents. which had been refused to be accepted by the respondents. He has submitted that after May 1988 the petitioner started depositing the rents due in the Tribunal after securing permission to this effect. The rents prior to May 1988 could not be deposited because the petitioner had been served with the notice of the appeal on 28-10-1987 after which he had moved the Tribunal to deposit on 24-6-1988, that also prior to his having been served with the notice of the respondents application under section 32(4) which, although dated 25-4-1988, was served on him only on 27-7-1988. The learned Counsel therefore urged that in these circumstances he could not be said to be a persistent defaulter in the payment of rents due since he was offering rents by M.O. which the respondents were refusing to accept. Again, in his application dated 21-1-1987 before the Rent Controller during the pendency of the review, the petitioner had also stated that for the last 2 years rents were being sent by M.O. to the respondents which they were refusing to accept. Again, in his reply to the notice served on him by the Tribunal in respect of the respondents application under section 32(4), the petitioner had stated in his affidavit that at all material times he had sent rents to the respondents by M.O. which the respondents persistently refused to accept. None of these submissions were denied by the respondents and as such it have to be deemed as admitted by them. This shows, according to the learned Counsel, that the petitioner has always been ready and willing to effect the rents due and made all efforts to do so by repeatedly tendering the rents by M.O. without even deducting the commission to which they were entitled. He therefore submitted that even considering that after the filing of the appeal the petitioner had not deposited the rents and instead went on sending them by M.O., the very fact of his remitting the rents due by M.O. would indicate that he could never be held as wilful defaulter. He therefore submitted that even considering that after the filing of the appeal the petitioner had not deposited the rents and instead went on sending them by M.O., the very fact of his remitting the rents due by M.O. would indicate that he could never be held as wilful defaulter. The learned Counsel urged that it is in the light of this situation that the advice of the petitioners advocate not to deposit the rents had to be viewed and as such this advice was to be accepted by the Court as a sufficient cause for the petitioner not to effect the deposit of the rents due. 15. With due regard I find it difficult to accept or even appreciate this submission of the learned Counsel. As I have noted above the legal requirements with regard to the necessity of the tenant to deposit the rents which are fallen due during the pendency of the eviction proceedings even in case the same had been unduly refused to be accepted could not be lightly overlooked by the petitioner. Being so I am inclined to refuse to accept that in the facts of this case the purported advice may be considered as sufficient cause as claimed by the petitioner to spare him from the consequences of his failure to comply with the law. Besides the petitioner has not been able to even substantiate his allegation that he has failed to deposit the rents due to any wrong advice and apart from his bare plea no efforts were made by him to show that it was this advice alone which has prompted not to effect the rents within 30 days from the date of service of the notice of the respondents application under section 32(4) which the petitioner was bound to do in terms of the provision. In the circumstances it is difficult to believe that such type of advice could have been given to the petitioner by his learned Counsel. As rightly observed by the Tribunal it was not for the petitioner nor for his advisor to judge or decide about the competency, legality or non-maintainability of the petitioners application. In the circumstances it is difficult to believe that such type of advice could have been given to the petitioner by his learned Counsel. As rightly observed by the Tribunal it was not for the petitioner nor for his advisor to judge or decide about the competency, legality or non-maintainability of the petitioners application. Thus the wilful refusal of the petitioner in strictly complying with the legal requirements of section 32(4), which in my opinion is quite clear in its formulation and does raise any doubt about its interpretation, is to be held as amounting to a situation of a persistent default on the part of the petitioner in regularly making the payment of rents in arrears in terms of the relevant law and this alone is enough to rule out for the petitioner a case of good and sufficient cause to justify such default. 16. Reliance placed by Mr. Kolwalkar on the proposition laid down in the aforesaid case in 1989(2) G.L.T. 313, to the effect that a broad interpretation should be given to the provisions of the Act in view of the fact that it deals with a beneficial legislation and as such the words sufficient cause should be broadly construed seems to take the petitioners case nowhere. Similar is the position with regard to another case cited by the learned Counsel in the case of (Shri Joao Xavier Pinto v. Shri Oswald J.C. Velho and 2 others)7, 1990(1) Goa Law Times 116 : 1987(1) Bom.C.R. 113 . Both these decisions are again distinguishable on facts and given in the peculiar circumstances arising in each case. I must say in this regard that the learned Counsel has been specially permitted by me to cite the decisions in reply to the submissions of the respondents. Another ruling relied by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in this connection in the case of (Satyavijay Anna Tandel v. Administrative Tribunal of Goa, Daman Diu)8, 1990(XCII) Bombay Law Reporter 580, is also not going to help the petitioner. This was a decision again given on the special facts which were occurring and wherein the delay committed by the tenant was only of 9 days and sufficient explanation had been given as to why the amount was deposited only after such delay. This was a decision again given on the special facts which were occurring and wherein the delay committed by the tenant was only of 9 days and sufficient explanation had been given as to why the amount was deposited only after such delay. The original eviction application had been filed by three persons as plaintiffs and amongst them there was one who was the respondent No. 3 in the petition and had filed an affidavit stating that eviction proceedings had been instituted without her consent. The said petitioner/respondent also gave evidence in those proceedings wherein she admitted the receipt of rents from the tenant upto March, 1981. It appears that even thereafter the tenant also continued to pay the rent to the said respondent No. 3 during the pendency of the eviction proceedings and she received the rents upto December 1982 and only then she refused to accept further rents. Thereupon the petitioner started sending rents by M.O. from January 1983 onwards which were again refused by the respondent No. 3. It was at that stage, in November 1983 that the third and fourth respondents filed eviction application against the petitioner on certain grounds one of them being the arrears of rents from April 1976 to October 1983. When the notice of this application was received by the petitioner he made an application under section 32(3) raising the dispute as to the claim of the third and fourth respondents and seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rents. The Court allowed the application and the petitioner made the deposit and continued to deposit monthly rents every month in the Court of the Rent Controller. However, in May 1984, an application purported to be under section 32(4) was moved by respondents No. 3 and 4 on the allegation that the petitioners application in March 1984 was made nine days after the prescribed period of limitation. A notice was issued on this application to the petitioner and the Rent Controller, after hearing the parties, came to the conclusion that the arrears deposited were nine days beyond the prescribed period of thirty days and that the petitioner had not shown sufficient cause as to why the deposit was not made in time. A notice was issued on this application to the petitioner and the Rent Controller, after hearing the parties, came to the conclusion that the arrears deposited were nine days beyond the prescribed period of thirty days and that the petitioner had not shown sufficient cause as to why the deposit was not made in time. The Court observed that in such circumstances when the tenant on receipt of the show cause notice under section 32(4) had admittedly paid the entire arrears then due and had assured further payment regularly there can be no order for eviction just because he had delayed in depositing in the past. A clear finding was also given by the Court that when the application under section 32(4) was made excepting the fact that there was a delay of 9 days in the deposit of the amount there was no other material before the Rent Controller. The Court was thus of the view that if on the date of the application the tenant had deposited all the rents due there was no question of the Rent Controller passing any further order virtually evicting the tenant without a trial. In such circumstances the conclusion was that the non-explanation of the delay was of no consequence if very much before the application was made the tenant had been prompted to deposit the full rents due and therefore there was no question of showing any sufficient cause for the delay. The Court held that the respondents No. 3 and 4 had come with a case which was apparently false and as such the delay ought to have been condoned. It is thus clear that the facts of this case are totally different from the instant case. Here is a case in which admittedly there was no payment done by the petitioner according to the law. There is no denial on the part of the petitioner that deposit of rents were even sought to be made by him within the prescribed period of thirty days from the date of service of the notice of the respondents application under section 32(4). There is therefore a clearviolation of the aforesaid provisions and hence the ratio of the judgment relied by the petitioners learned Counsel is not at all attracted. 17. Nothing survives in this petition which is therefore bound to be rejected. There is therefore a clearviolation of the aforesaid provisions and hence the ratio of the judgment relied by the petitioners learned Counsel is not at all attracted. 17. Nothing survives in this petition which is therefore bound to be rejected. Hence the petition is hereby dismissed and rule made is accordingly discharged with however no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. *****