Judgment :- Arunachalam, J. Petitioner Malayalam has been detained as a bootlegger under Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 in pursuance of an order of detention dated 10. 1993, passed by the second respondent district Magistrate and Collector, Tiruchirapalli, with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and public health. 2. It will be totally unnecessary to state the facts in detail, which led to the passing of the impugned order, for this habeas corpus petition, will have to be allowed on the short ground of long and unexplained delay in the disposal of representation forwarded by the detenu to the State Government. 3. We find that two representations were forwarded to the State Government, one by the son of the detenu dated 110. 1993 and the other by the detenu himself on 110. 1993. The first representation was received by the State Government on 110. 1993. After a delay of six days, on 20.10.1993, parawar remarks were called for from the second respondent. They were received on 11. 1993 and the representation was rejected on 111. 1993. Though there is some delay evident, at certain points, we find that a few holidays had intervened and further comments had to be obtained from the second respondent who was stationed at Tiruchirapalli. Within a month of its receipt, representation sent by detenu’s son had been disposed of, and if, in the view of the Supreme Court expressed recently, freeway will have to be given for administrative delays, we cannot hold, on the peculiar, facts available, that the first representation, forwarded by the son of the detenu, had not been considered continuously and expeditiously. 4. However, we find that the second representation dated 110. 1993 forwarded by the detenu himself to the State Government was disposed of after an extraordinary delay of two months, only on 112. 1993. It is settled law that there is no right in favour of the detenu to get his successive representations based on the same grounds, rejected earlier, to be formally disposed of again. In any event, no period of limitation is fixed for such an application preferred for revocation of the impugned order. At the same time, it cannot mean that the second representation can be put to slumber, without being attended to, within a reasonable time. 5. In any event, no period of limitation is fixed for such an application preferred for revocation of the impugned order. At the same time, it cannot mean that the second representation can be put to slumber, without being attended to, within a reasonable time. 5. We have perused the representation sent by the son of the detenu as well as the contents of the representation forwarded by the detenu himself. The 1st representation is general, vague and bald, without making any reference to the grounds of detention. However, the second representation dated 110. 1993, forwarded by the detenu, contains, fresh circumstances and new factual constituents, challenging the validity of the impugned order. If the second representation did not contain new and relevant facts and circumstances then the position might have been different. It will be useful, to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in K. Aruna Kumari v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 227:1988 Crl.L.J. 411:(1988) 1 S.C.C.296: 1988 A.P.L.J. (Crl.) 1:1988 S.C.C.(Crl.) 116: (1988) 1 S.C.J. 679, wherein it has been stated as follows: "It is true that Sec. 14 of the Act (Prevention of Black-marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act (7 of 1980) clothes the authority with the power of revoking the detention order, and such a power carries with it the duty to exercise it whenever and as soon as change, or new factors call for the exercise of that power. However, the duty to exercise it arises only where new and relevant facts and circumstances come to light. There is no right in favour of the detenu to get his successive representations based on the same grounds rejected earlier to be formally disposed of again. In any event, no period of limitation is fixed for disposal of such an application under Sec. 14". The aforequoted observations clearly postulate, that as and when changed circumstances or new factors called for exercise of the power of revocation, then a correlated duty will be cast on the authority concerned, to dispose of the said representation, as he would have done, if this representation was the first and the earliest. 6. Recently, the Supreme Court has reiterated the same view in Rumana Begum v. State of A.P., 1993 S.C.C. (Crl.) 551, wherein the following observations were made. 6. Recently, the Supreme Court has reiterated the same view in Rumana Begum v. State of A.P., 1993 S.C.C. (Crl.) 551, wherein the following observations were made. "We may here advert to the other defence that the representation dated October 6, 1991 was not the first representation and as the earlier representations had been disposed of with promptitude the delay in dealing with this repetitive and non-statutory representation does not vitiate the detention. We are afraid that none of the so-called earlier representations did really raise the question of the validity of the order of the detention nor contain a prayer for its revocation. In one of them, the detenu aired a grievance that the records of medical treatment of his son who had undergone a serious cranial surgery had not been restored. Another representation pertained to matters other than the validity of the detention. We have been taken through the contents of the earlier representations relied upon by the detaining authority as having in effect and substance raised the validity of the detention. We are satisfied that the purpose and content of the representations cannot be understood the way the detaining authority wants us to understand. They dealt with matters other than the validity of the detention. The first and the only representation made by the detenu which raised the question of the validity of the detention was the one made on October 6, 1991 to the Governor for consideration which was greatly delayed. The position that a representation made to the Governor must be treated as one made to the Government was rightly accepted by the High Court on the analogy of the pronouncement of this Court in Raghavendra Singh v. Superintendent, District Jail, Kanpur, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 356:1986 Crl.L.J. 493:1986 S.C.C. (Crl.) 60: (1986)1 S.C.C. 650 . The decisions in Kubic Darusz v. Union of India, 1990 S.C.C. (Crl.) 227 and Phillippa Anne Duke v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1178: (1982) 2 S.C.C. 389 : 1982 Crl.L.J. 1389: 1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 444 relied on by Shri G. Prabhakar, learned counsel for the State of Andhra Pradesh, do not advance its case any further. The first case is an illustration as to how a representation would require to be construed in favour and for the benefit of the detenu. The first case is an illustration as to how a representation would require to be construed in favour and for the benefit of the detenu. The second case deals with a non-statutory representation, presented to the Prime Minister in a foreign country. In the facts of the case it requires to be held that the first representation made by the detenu for revocation was the one made to the Government on October, 6, 1991. That, as observed earlier, was not disposed of expeditiously. There was unexplained and unreasonable delay. That itself, in our opinion, vitiates the detention. It is not, therefore, necessary to consider the other contentions urged." We are satisfied, on the contents of the representation sent by the detenu though it is the second one, as primordial in effect and substance, having raised the question of validity of the impugned detention. 7. It will be pertinent to notice the observations of a single Judge of the Delhi High Court, in Dhiraj Singh Madan v. Union of India, 1993 Crl.L.J. 514, which clearly pinpoints our intended view. Those observations read as hereunder: "It is a settled principle of law that repeated representations cannot be considered expeditiously and with due promptitude provided they are based on the same facts and same cause of action. But if new facts are brought on record and new grounds are alleged then it would amount to fresh representation. It would not amount to repeated representation. A fresh representation is required to be considered as expeditiously and with due promptitude as the first representation is required to be considered under Art.22(5) of the Constitution." 8. Let us now look into the manner in which the representation of the detenu was disposed of. This representation dated 110. 1993, was received by the Home Department, in the Secretariat, on 20.10.1993. This representation was despatched from prison only 110. 1993. We were told by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, that the Prohibition and Excise Department, received this representation only on 210. 1993. It is conceded, that the Home Department and the Prohibition and excise Department are situated in the same building and that the Home Secretary is also the Secretary for Prohibition and Excise Department. If that be so, it is not known, as to why mere passing on of this representation to another wing under the same Secretary, must have taken nine days. If that be so, it is not known, as to why mere passing on of this representation to another wing under the same Secretary, must have taken nine days. Again, we find that a letter calling for parawar remarks the second respondent was made ready on 11. 1993, but despatched only three days later on 11. 1993. There is no reason why mere posting of a letter must have taken three days. We will leave it at that. However, parawar remarks were received only on 12. 1993 leading to rejection of representation on 1193. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor stated, that no plausible explanation can be offered for the long day between 11. 1993 and 12. 1993. If that be so, it is clear that the representation of the detenu had been put in cold storage, for an unduly long period. The entitlement of detenu to have his representation considered expeditiously and continuously, has thus been thwarted in the instant case. 9. Whether the second representation requires disposal with the same sense of urgency and promptitude as the first, will always be a question of fact and is bound to vary from case to case, No universal or rigid formula can be laid down, on that aspect. On the peculiar facts available in the instant case we satisfied, that the only effective representation, containing fresh factual constituents, had not been considered expeditiously and with due promptitude, as mandated by the Constitution. On that sole ground, the detenu is bound to succeed. 10. Impugned order of detention is set aside. The detenu shall be set at liberty forthwith unless his detention is otherwise required. This habeas corpus petition is allowed.