M. J. Rao ( 1 ) THIS C. M. raises a question which, of late, has been arising day in and day out, in this Court. The matter is in regard to the condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 filed by the State Public Sector Pubiic Corporations and whether certain factors common to these bodies in their structure and administrative procedures have to be taken into accounts by the Courts while considering applications for condonation of delay. The matter has required review particularly in the light of the recent Judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. N. Das R. Israni (Civil Appeal No. 2480 of 1993) arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 417 of 1993 dated 12-4-93) (2) reversing the decision of this Court in Narain Das R. Israni vs. Union of India (1992 (1) Arb. L. R. 405 ). (1) In that decision this Court had taken the view that "if the Courts were to accept the mere procedure of working in Government offices as sufficient cause, then delay will have to be condoned almost in every case. There can be no discrimination between a common man and the Union of India for furnishing sufficient cause for condonation of delay. " The same view was held by this Court in Kanishka Builders vs. Union of India (1990 [2] Arb. L. R. 197 ). (3) Learned cousel for respondent, in fact relied upon several rulings of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and in particular. Govrnment of Andhra Pradesh vs. Batchala Balaiah ( AIR 1985 AP 52 ): (4) Spl. Deputy Collector vs. Nawab T. Yar June ( AIR 1973 AP 43 ), (5) R. D. O. vs. T. Laxminarayana ( AIR 1975 AP 109 ) (6) S. M. Hadi Jaffrey vs. Spl. Deputy Collector (1975) [2] Andhra W. R. 7) (7 ). But now. we are. considering the matter afresh in the light of various recent rulings of the Supreme Court and in particular, in the light of the Supreme Court in Narain Das R. Israni s case wherein the Judgment of this Court "was reversed. ( 2 ) BEFORE coming to the last mentioned case. we shall refer to some of the other recent rulings of the Supreme Court taking a similar view in favour of the State Public Sector. These cases fall in two cases. ( 2 ) BEFORE coming to the last mentioned case. we shall refer to some of the other recent rulings of the Supreme Court taking a similar view in favour of the State Public Sector. These cases fall in two cases. One category is where there is collusion between the officers of the Stateipublic Sector (including the Standing Counsel or Government Pleaders) on the one hand and the litigants who are fighting the case on the opposite side: or where these officers play fraud on the Stateipublic Sector. G. Ramesowda vs. Spl. L. A. O. Bangalore (AIR 1988 S. C. 897) (S) falls into this category. The other cases decided by the Supreme Court in favour of condonation of delay accept that the deay occurriag on account of govermental departmental procedures is sufficient cause. To this category belong State of U. P. vs. Bahadur Singh (AIR 1983 S. C. 845) (9) and Collector. Land Accuition. Anantnag vs. Katiji (AIR 1987 S. C. 1353) (10 ). In these cases. apart from holding that departmental delays and bureaucratic proce dures could be taken into account, it is also stated that the Court should keep public interest also in mind. public interest is also treated as a relevant ground in Union of India vs. Cyanamid (AIR 1987 S. C. 1802) (11 ). Then conies Union of India vs. Narain Das R. Israni (S. C.) decided on 12-4-1993. These are cases not involving fraud or collusion but even so departmental delays are treated as relevant factors to be taken into consideration. In other words, these factors are not irrelevant . In the State of U. P. vs. Bahadur Singh, the Supreme Court held that in matters such as a Land Ceiling law "there are no two parties as is the. case in a litigation between two parties wherein each would be prosecuting and watching the proceedings regularly. Further the departmental authority has to be apprised of adverse decision and further decision has to be taken whether the case is one required to be taken to higher court. case in a litigation between two parties wherein each would be prosecuting and watching the proceedings regularly. Further the departmental authority has to be apprised of adverse decision and further decision has to be taken whether the case is one required to be taken to higher court. Not that the departmental authorities charged with a duty to implement the law should not be vigilant; but one aspect cannot be overlooked that a departmental authority may delay the moving of higher court for oblique motives and public interest may suffer if such cause is thrown out merely on the ground of some delay which is also explainable. These are relevant considerations which must enter judicial verdict before rejecting such cause on the ground of delay. " In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs. Katiji the Supreme Court posed the following question : "whether or not to apply the same standard in applying the sufficient cause test to all the litigants regardless of their personality in the said context is another. ( 3 ) THE Supreme Court observed that the words sufficient cause in Section 5 are adequately elastic to enable the Court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice, that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. The Supreme Court said that though it had advocated a liberal approach in this context. "the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the others in the hierarchy". It then said that ordinary, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is, that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties; "every day s delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is, that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties; "every day s delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner; when substantial justice and technical cosiderations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred inasmuch as the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay; there is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence or on account ot mala fides; a litigant does not stand, to benefit by resorting to delay. The Supreme Court said that no doubt, the tact that it was the state that was seeking condonation of delay and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. But, there is no warrant tor according a step-motherly treatment when the state is praying for condonation of delay. They pithily observed mat "experience shows that on account ot impersonal machinery (no one is in-charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the interested bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to prove. In any event, the State which represents collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non grata status". Again in G. Ramegowda vs. Spl. L. A. O. Bangalore the argument was that if Government Pleaders did not discharge their duty properly, that was besides the point as it would be a matter of "internal administration". If Government was, it was argued not able to set its own "house" in order, nobody could give it any indulgence. On the other hand, it was contended for the State that bad faith, divided loyalties of officers and advisers of Government and the technicalities of procedure should yield to considerations promoting public interest and substantial justice. Government, in that case, narrated the chronological sequence of events and the somewhat protracted corrcspcndence between the Government Pleader and the Government and the difficulties faced by the administration in even ascertaining the correct state of affairs, owing to the negative and evasive attitude of Government Pleaders. Government, in that case, narrated the chronological sequence of events and the somewhat protracted corrcspcndence between the Government Pleader and the Government and the difficulties faced by the administration in even ascertaining the correct state of affairs, owing to the negative and evasive attitude of Government Pleaders. There was also allegation of fraud on the part of the goverment pleaders, The Supreme Court pointed out : "in litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected, but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. "the Court then observed that where fraud or bad faith was proved, public interest clearly suffered. The above factors an" "peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government". There is procedural red-tape and "a certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible". Due recognition of these limitations on governmentfunctioning of course, within a reasonable limit is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. The Supreme Court observed : "it would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistie to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. "implicit in the very nature of Government functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. A bureaucratic organ hesitates and debates, consults and considers, speaks through paper, moves horizontally and vertically till at last it gravitates towards a conclusion unmindful of time and impersonally. A Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court took a similar view in Tahsildar, L. A. O. vs. Suresh Babu (1986 (2) ( 4 ) IN Union of India vs. Cyanamid (P) Ltd (AIR 1987 S. C. 1802) (13) towards the end, Chinnappa Reddy, J referred to public interest as a relevant cosideration. ( 5 ) FINALLY, we come to the recent Judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. N. Das R. Israni dated 12-4-1993. The case was decided by a Bench consisting of their Lordships K. Ramaswamy and Justice R. M. Sahai. Their Lordships wrote separate Judgments. The main reasoning which is binding on us under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, is contained in the Judgment of Justice Ramaswamy. The case was decided by a Bench consisting of their Lordships K. Ramaswamy and Justice R. M. Sahai. Their Lordships wrote separate Judgments. The main reasoning which is binding on us under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, is contained in the Judgment of Justice Ramaswamy. Referring to the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramlal Motilal and Chotelal vs. Rewa Coalfield, the learned Judge pointed out that the Supreme Court had approved of the decision of the Madras High Court in Krishnan vs. Chattappan ([ilr] 13 Mad 269 ) ( 14) to the effect that the words sufficient cause must receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when neither negligence nor any inaction or want of bonafides is imputable. The learned Judge also referred to Lala Mata Din vs. A. Narayanan (1970 (2) S. C. R. 91) (15) wherein the Supreme Court pointed out that the appellant there, by filing an appeal bevond limitation, would not stand to gain. It was there held that the High Court had started its reasoning from a wrong angle. His Lordships Ramaswamy, J then referred to Ms. Katiji s case to which we. have also adverted to earlier. Then reference was made to 0. P. Kathpalia vs. Lakshmi Singh (1984 (41 S. C. C. 66)r16) wherein it was held that if failure to exercise discretion leads to miscarriage of justice. it would be sufficient cause for the condonation of delay in filing the appeal. Reference was also made to Bhag Singh vs. Major Daljit Singh (1987 Suppl. S. C. C. 685) (17) wherein it was held that the Court must not take a strict and pendantic view would cause injustice but take a view which would advance the cause of justice. Then His Lordship referred to G. Ramegowda s case. ( 6 ) JUSTICE Ramaswamy, after referring to the abovesaid decisions, summarised the legal position that the approach of the Court must be to advance substantial justice but should not be a pedantic or a legalistic approach. While "law makes no distinction between a private party and Government", it must be remembered that a private party "would take instant decision and would pursue the appellate or revisional remedies promptly but Government acts through its officers who delay in their deliberations resulting in procrastination", "unmindful and insensitive to bar of limitation" and this was their "routine" behaviour. While "law makes no distinction between a private party and Government", it must be remembered that a private party "would take instant decision and would pursue the appellate or revisional remedies promptly but Government acts through its officers who delay in their deliberations resulting in procrastination", "unmindful and insensitive to bar of limitation" and this was their "routine" behaviour. Sometimes files arc even kept back for obvious reasons or by manouvres of the parties. Experience shows that the "public exchequer is the easy prey" on account of the delay in taking decisions to file appeals. Courts must take into consideration the "hard realities and prevailing condition" and cannot ignore them for that may breed corruption, nepotism or inefficiency. The Courts must note that delays occur in Government because no body wants to take the responsibility for the final decision. A pragmatic approach is necessary particularly when public exchequer is involved, pointed out his Lordship. On these principles. the appeal was allowed and delay condoned. The other learned Judge in the Bench, justcie Sahai pointed out that Government cannot claim a different treatment. His Lordship pointed out that there cannot be a rigid principle in these cases and that if there was loss to Governmental revenue, action should be taken against the officials responsible, for the delay. His Lordship referred to Ramegovda s case and observed that for a common man, it may be that his ignorance, illitrace, delayed communication and poor legal advice may be goods cause and likewise, for the State, the consultative process, Justice Sahai condoned the delay in that case and concurred in the appeal being allowed. ( 7 ) TN our view. the Judgment of Just ce K. Ramaswamv is based upon a large number of earlier decisions of the Supremf" Court and certain broad guidelines are drawn rather than a legal principle differentiating the State from the ordinary litigant. In f fact. the learned Judge clearly observed. "law makes no distinction between a private person and Government". Justice Sahai emphasised that as amatter of law it cannot be said that the the consultative process followed by the State before filing the appeal, if bonafide, could be sufficisnt cause. In f fact. the learned Judge clearly observed. "law makes no distinction between a private person and Government". Justice Sahai emphasised that as amatter of law it cannot be said that the the consultative process followed by the State before filing the appeal, if bonafide, could be sufficisnt cause. Thereforf, treating the views expressed by Ramaswamy, J as guidelines or factor which are relevant in dealing with delays by the State public Sector and not as a differentiating legal principle, we do not find any conflict between the two views. In fact, the appeal was allowed on facts by both the learned Judges. and the sufficient cause pleaded was merely based upon the delay in the movement of the file and obtaining the legal opinion or sanction for filing the objections to the award and in filing the appeal. ( 8 ) THE above decisions of the Supreme Court clearly lay down that while the State cannot be treated differently from any other litigant, the Court is "bound" to take into consideration the following factors d) red-tapism in gvernment, (ii) delays in correspondence, (iii) habitual indifference of government officials or government pleaders as distinct from the usual diligence of ordinary litigants or lawyers for private parties; (iv) collusion or negligence by government officials or govrnment pleaders or fraud, (v) damage to public interest or to public funds or interests of the State, (vi) institutional or bureaucratic procedures as well as delays arising thereon, and (vii) need to render substiantial justice on merits. It is not as if, fraud on. the part of the government officials or pleaders has necessarily to be proved by the Goverment in every case. ( 9 ) COMING to the facts of-the case, we find from the affidavit filed for the appellant that the Judgment was given by the learned Single Judge on 10-2-1992. certified copy was applied for on 14-2-1992, delivered on 30-4-1992 and though the date for delivery was 3-3-1992, it is said it was not delivered on that date, further dates were given and ultimately copy was delivered on 30-4-1992. Then the case files were sent to the department on 15-5-92 and it was sent for the opinion of the departmental counsel. who gavs his opinion on 3-6-1992. The Government Advocate nave opinion on 3-6-1992. Then the case files were sent to the department on 15-5-92 and it was sent for the opinion of the departmental counsel. who gavs his opinion on 3-6-1992. The Government Advocate nave opinion on 3-6-1992. After considering the opinions, the file was finally cleared on 16-7-1992 and marked to the learned Advocate in the High Court on 14-8-1992 and the case brief were received by the Government Advocate of the High Court along with certified copy on 20-8-1992. It is said that the delay was bonafide. unintentional and as a result of procedural complexities. we accept that, on these facts. sufficient cause is made out in the light of the guidelines referred to above. ( 10 ) IT must here be noted that it is not as if the file is taken up either bv the departmental officer or the Government Advocate or counsel the moment it reaches him. In today s flood of casern the Courts, the officers have to attend to the files one after the other and so do the counsel. If at a particular table there is a delay of a few days. we cannot rush to the conclusion that it amounted to inaction or negligence. As stated in the above ruliags, we must have a practical approach as, today, we know how the departments are functioning and what difficulties are faced. ( 11 ) THIS does not, as viewed by the Delhi High Court, in its earlier rulings, amount to opening of flood-gates . In Junior Books case ([1983] (1) A. C. 520) (18), Lord Fraser and Lord Roskil rejected the flood gates argument as unattractive because it involved drawing an arbitrary and iliogical line just because it had to be drawn somewhere I In Mayor of Southpore vs. Morris (1893) I Q. B. 359 (at 361) (19), Lord Coleridge said "the Attorney-General has asked whereby we are to draw the line. The answer is that! it is not necessary to draw it at any precise point. It is enough for us to say that the present case is on the rightside of any line that could reasonably be drawn". These quotations in pragmatism and Theory of English Law (The Hamlyn Lecture by Prof. P. S. Atiyah, 1987) were referred to by His Lordship Justice Venkatachaliah (as he then was) in Collector of Central Excise, N. D. vs. M/s. Ballarpur Inudstries Ltd. (20 ). These quotations in pragmatism and Theory of English Law (The Hamlyn Lecture by Prof. P. S. Atiyah, 1987) were referred to by His Lordship Justice Venkatachaliah (as he then was) in Collector of Central Excise, N. D. vs. M/s. Ballarpur Inudstries Ltd. (20 ). ( 12 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, the C. M. is allowed and the F. A. O. is taken on file subject to deposit of costs of Rs. 5,000 which will be paid to the Delhi Legal Aid Board. The Government will pay the sum initially and fix the responsibility for the delay on the concerned officers employees and recover the above sum of Rs. 5,000 from them. Notice to show cause be issued in the appeal, returnable on 12-9-1994.