A. R. TIWARI, J. ( 1 ) THE order of detention (Annexure P-I) dated 24. 1. 1994 passed by Joint Secretary to the Government of India under Section 3 (1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1988 (for short Act) with a view to preventing the detenu (husband of the petitioner) from engaging in the procurement, possession, transportation and sale of Psychotropic substances, is under challenge in this petition presented under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking WRIT of habeas corpust for restoration of liberty. ( 2 ) THE order is based on the linchpin of grounds (Annexure-P2) furnished to the detenu on the same date. List of documents in Annexure - P3. The copy of the representation dated 2. 2. 1994 is Annexure - P4. Copies of statements of witnesses Omprakash, Subhash and S. Kalyan, Inspector are marked as Annexure-P5. Copy of test memo about seized tablets addressed to Government opium and Alkaloid works, Neemuch, is Annexure-P6. The copy of test report, confirming the article to be methaqualone as regards two samples (267 and 271) only out of five samples, submitted for test, is marked as Annexure-7. ( 3 ) FACTS are jejune. Pursuant to intelligence the Superintendent (Preventive) of Central Excise Headquarters, Indore searched the premises of M/s. Ninosprings 46, Sector A Sanwer Road, Indore, owned by the detenu, on 30. 10. 1993 at 20. 00 hrs in the presence of detenu and four other persons namely Mohd. Fakru, Abdul Gani, Ramnarain Mishra and Ramchand Uregwar. Search was witnessed by two Panchas. A bag, containing 20968 Mandre (Methaqualone) tablets, weighing 11 kgms. was recovered and seized vide seizure memo prepared under N. D. P. S. Act. A scooter, alleged to be used for transportation was also seized. In follow-up action, residential premises of the detenu was also searched and 60 gms. of Mandrex (Methaqualone) powder was seized. The statement of detenu confirmed that he was the proprietor of the aforesaid concern engaged in trading of scrap. The detenu and aforesaid Mohd. Fakru, Abdul Gani and Ramnarain Mishra were arrested, on 31. 10. 1993 for offences punishable under N. D. P. S. Act and produced before the Addi. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Indore on 1. 11. 1993. Complaint has been filed in court for trial on 24. 12. 1993. Bail application was rejected by Sessions Court. The detenu and aforesaid Mohd. Fakru, Abdul Gani and Ramnarain Mishra were arrested, on 31. 10. 1993 for offences punishable under N. D. P. S. Act and produced before the Addi. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Indore on 1. 11. 1993. Complaint has been filed in court for trial on 24. 12. 1993. Bail application was rejected by Sessions Court. Despite prosecution the authorities felt that preventive detention was necessary to prevent the detenue from continuing to indulge in illicit traffic in Psychotropic Substances. Hence Order (Annexure P-I) was passed and served in jail. This order as well as continued detention in pursuance thereof are impugned herein. ( 4 ) I have heard both sides. ( 5 ) THE detention is assailed on the under noted points. (a) : Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution confers valuable rights. It obliges the authority making the order to communicate grounds and afford earliest opportunity of making representation against the order. The representation (Annexure-P4) was submitted on 2. 2. 1994, despite handicap implanted by language, unintelligibility and illegibility but the same was not disposed of the considered till 25. 2. 1994 (date of presentation of petition) and is disposed of on 18. 3. 1994 (as communicated ). Thus inordinate delay (44 days) is violative of the mandate as noted above and it vitiates the order and detention. (b) The detenu is not conversant with and is unable to read and write English. The order (Annexure P-i), grounds (Annexure-P2) and list of documents (Annexure-P3), relied upon were supplied to the detenu in English and not in the language (Hindi) which detenu knew and understood. This then rendered the safeguard, as envisaged by Art. 22 (5), illusory. (c) The order was made and served while fu detention due to case under N. D. P. S. Act. The bail application was dismissed on 13. 12. 1993. Yet the order was passed on 24. 1. 1994. There was no basis to form opinion that there was likelihood of your being released on bail under normal law when Section 37 N. D. P. S. Act inhibited the normal course of bail. (d) There was no material to conclude that if not prevented you will continue to indulge in illicit traffic in Psychotropic Substances. ( 6 ) THE counsel for the respondents has dubbed these points as non-meritorious and has supported the order and detention. (d) There was no material to conclude that if not prevented you will continue to indulge in illicit traffic in Psychotropic Substances. ( 6 ) THE counsel for the respondents has dubbed these points as non-meritorious and has supported the order and detention. Shri Khan has filed counter affidavit and argued that order is with due application of mind. It is asserted that detenu is proficient in English also. The explanation about delay is furnished. Disposal took place on 3. 3. 1994. However affidavit seems to be a routine affair and is found to be unsatisfactory. ( 7 ) LIBERTY is too precious a value recognised under constitution. R. G. Ingersoll voiced that what light is to eyes-what air is to the lungs, what love is to the heart, liberty is to the soul of man. ( 8 ) THE existence of right to represent is conceded even in Annexure-P2 (para 17 ). In Annexure-P4, grievance was made about language, yet translation in Hindi was not provided. The complaint about non-legibility also proved to be vainful. The statement was retracted. Yet answers to those questions were not given. The oppugnation, contained in representation, was not considered promptly and its rejection is communicated only on 18. 3. 1994. The detenu is denied bail and is still in custody. ( 9 ) IN Rama Dhondu Borade v. V. K. Saraf, Commissioner of Police and others gap of 28 days between receipt and disposal of representation was considered fatal. It is held that In the instant case, the gap between the receipt and the disposal of the representation in 28 days but up to the date of service of the order of rejection on the detenu the delay amounts to 32 days. The only explanation offered by the third respondent is that further information required from the State Government was received by the third respondent on 17. 10. 1988 after a delay of nearly 14 days and then the representation of the detenu was disposed of on 27. 10. 1988 within which period there were certain holidays. Barring that, there is no other explanation. This delay when scrutinized in the light of the proposition of law adumbrated above, we are of the view, that there is an inordinate and unreasonable delay and the present explanation given by the third respondent is not satisfactory. 10. 1988 within which period there were certain holidays. Barring that, there is no other explanation. This delay when scrutinized in the light of the proposition of law adumbrated above, we are of the view, that there is an inordinate and unreasonable delay and the present explanation given by the third respondent is not satisfactory. T ( 10 ) THE offence is said to be of 30. 10. 1993 where as the order of detention is of 14. 1. 1994. There is thus gap of 86 days between these events. The events immediately proceeding the impugned order do not seem to have been considered property and this indicates non-application of mind, Of the point of non-application and language Mahmmod Medhar Khan Maherdin Khan Mohammad Mohedin etc. v. Government of Maharashtra, 1988 (3) Crimes, 333, may usefully be referred. ( 11 ) MOREOVER, Annexure P-2, shows obscurity of thought through obscurity in language. It does not tear up the tenebrosity about alleged continuance and need of prevention of detention of person who was already under detention under N. D. P. S. Act with bleak prospects of immediate release on bail. About 612 months have rolled by and detenu is still under incarceration. ( 12 ) APART from this, it is noticed that order (Annexure P1) is too vague to be sustained. It speaks about procurement, possession, transportation and sale in one breath and refuses to be specific. What precise is then the allegation, ground or compulsion? Let law, punitive in effect, should take charge as it is already resorted to. ( 13 ) IN the analysis, I find that right guaranteed under Art. 22 (5) sands violated and that there is non-application of mind to the essential ingredients leading to infirmity, illegality and perversity. ( 14 ) THE Apex Court in Rameshwar v. District Magistrate, took the view as under: It is obvious that before an authority can legitimately come to the conclusion that the detention of the person is necessary to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner, the authority has to be satisfied that if the person is not detained he would act in a prejudicial manner and that inevitably postulates freedom of action to the said person at the relevant time. If a person is already in jail custody, how can it rationally be postulated that if he is not detained he would act in a prejudicial manner? At the point of time when an order of detention is going to be served on a person, it must be patent that the said person would act prejudicially if he is not detained and that is a consideration which would be absent when the authority is dealing with a person already is detention. The satisfaction that it is necessary to detain a person for the purpose of preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner is thus the basis of the order under section 3 (1) (a), and this basis is clearly absent in the case of the petitioner. Therefore, we see no escape from the conclusion that the detention of the petitioner in the circumstances of this case, is not justified by Section 3 (1o) (a) and is outside its purview. The District Magistrate, Burdwan who ordered the detention of the detenu acted outside his power conferred on him under section 3 (1) (a) when he held that it was necessary to detain the petitioner in order to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner TI ( 15 ) IN the instant case too, the basis is clearly and conspicuously absent. There is thus no escape from the conclusion that detention under section, 3 (1) of the Act is not justified and deserves to be demolished. The material justified prosecution and not preventive detention. The bail court may be requested to apply rigour of Section 37. N. D. P. S. Act more seriously. The points chronicled above, are thus found solid and valid and are permitted to prevail. ( 16 ) IN the result, I hold that detention under the law providing preventive detention as noted above is inutile and futile and is illegal and illogical. As such, I quash the order of detention (Annexure P-I), as impugned, as also the continued detention in pursuance thereof. Accordingly, the detenu shall be set at liberty if and when he is not required to be kept in custody in connection with any other case or matter. Let a writ of habeas corpus be issued in these terms. ( 17 ) THIS petition is thus allowed with no orders as to costs. Petition allowed. .