M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition once again raises the vexed question as to whether an employee should be permitted virtually on the eve of his retirement, to present a challenge with regard to his correct date of birth. The consensus of judicial opinion is heavily in favour of the position that the date of birth once recorded in the service records is sacrosanct and that no alteration would normally be permissible particularly at a belated stage. The overriding considerations in favour of this view are that the records are presumed to represent the correct state of affairs because those entries are based on the information furnished by the employee and the principle of estoppel will bar the employee from going back on those representations. The attendant difficulty of doing a virtual post-mortem after the lapse of several decades creates its own hazards and problems insofar as it would be extremely difficult for the employer to investigate the circumstances under which the entries were made at the stage of recruitment. The principle of finality is therefore pressed into service and an employee is normally bound by those entries. ( 2 ) THERE is another more compelling ground on which a prohibition is imposed with regard to alteration of the date of birth which stems from the all important consideration that the employment was secured on the basis of that representation. Almost every job prescribes age limitations and often times minimum and maximum, and if an employee has misrepresented the age and secured employment, it can never be argued at a later point of time that because there appears evidence to the contrary, that the date of birth will be altered. Courts would be extremely reluctant to permit any such alterations which would virtually confer a premium on misrepresentation. Cognisance must also be taken of the fact that several administrative functions proceed on the basis of a person's age and if a superannuation is suddenly held up or altered, it creates an unhappy chain-reaction particularly vis-a-vis others who are just behind the concerned employee in matters of promotion etc. It is true that these principles are not rigid and inflexible and that therefore, an exception may some times be made but the grounds on which this is done will have to be compelling and overwhelming. It is true that these principles are not rigid and inflexible and that therefore, an exception may some times be made but the grounds on which this is done will have to be compelling and overwhelming. ( 3 ) THE petitioner in this case was an employee of Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited and was initially appointed as an operator. He joined the services of the erstwhile Radio and electricals Manufacturing Company Limited (REMCO) as a casual Labourer on daily wage basis and after the period of 4 months, he was appointed as an Operator. According to him, some time in the year 1985 he came to know that BHEL which had taken over the erstwhile Company, had mentioned in its records that his date of birth was 28th January, 1935 where as his correct date of birth was 12th May, 1937. According to him, he submitted a representation on 25th March, 1985 along with his SSLC marks card showing his date of birth as 12-5-1937. He thereafter sent a second representation on 19th March, 1986 and one more on 20th March, 1991. This was followed by legal notice on 16-4-1991 to which the Company sent a reply stating that the records indicated his date of birth as 28th January, 1935 and that he was not entitled to have it altered. According to the petitioner, under the new standing orders of BHEL there is specific provision for rectification of the date of birth under clause 18 which reads as follows:"date of Birth: every workman must declare on his first appointment or on being required to do so by the Management, his date of birth according to the Christian Era and produce confirmatory documentary evidence, eg. , School Certificate or Municipal/birth Certificate and in the absence thereof such evidence as may be acceptable to the Management. The date of birth once recorded in the Service Book/sheet of the workman as stated above will not be altered except in the case of clerical error, or on production of proof acceptable to the Management, provided that the proof is produced within one year from the date of original appointment. The date of birth once recorded in the Service Book/sheet of the workman as stated above will not be altered except in the case of clerical error, or on production of proof acceptable to the Management, provided that the proof is produced within one year from the date of original appointment. In the absence of the aforesaid two categories of certificates, the employer or the Officer authorised by him in his behalf may require the workman to supply a certificate from a Government Medical Officer not below the rank of an Assistant Surgeon, indicating the probable age of the workman provided the cost of obtaining such certificate is borne by the employer. In case of the workman whose date of birth has been recorded by the erstwhile Company the workman concerned will produce one of the proofs referred to above on or before 31-12-1984. In case the workman do not produce proper proof as stated above, the date of birth recorded in the service record will be final". ( 4 ) THE petitioner has challenged the action of the respondents in refusing to rectify his date of birth, through the present petition and he contends that the respondents must be directed in the light of the documents produced by him to correct his date of birth which should read as 12th May, 1937' and give him the consequential benefits. ( 5 ) IT is necessary for me to briefly record the defence of the respondents. They have denied that any bias exist against the petitioner who has elaborately stated in the petition that because of the litigation between him and his employer over several years, one of which case is still pending and because of his Union activities, that the Company has refused to act fairly. The original documents at the time of the petitioner's recruitment have been produced by the Company and it is contended that in 1958, the petitioner very clearly represented that he was 23 years old. The respondents have denied that he produced any documents at that point of time as alleged by him and they have further contended that even when he submitted representations, that no supportive documents were produced by him. Undoubtedly, the petitioner has contended that he did produce his SSLC Certificate along with bis representations, but this has been specifically denied by the respondents. Undoubtedly, the petitioner has contended that he did produce his SSLC Certificate along with bis representations, but this has been specifically denied by the respondents. They have further contended that in the aforesaid background, it cannot be said that the petitioner has produced any satisfactory material even within the frame work of standing order 18 and that consequently, the refusal on the part of the respondents to alter the records is justified. ( 6 ) IN support of the petitioner, Mr. Subba Rao, learned counsel appearing on his behalf stated that the petitioner was hardly literate and that he is not responsible for the entries made at the time of recruitment. He submitted that in 1985 as soon as it came to the knowledge of the petitioner that the wrong entry has been made in the records that he submitted a representation along with his SSLC Certificate showing his correct date of birth and applied for rectification. Mr. Subba Rao has alleged mala fides on the part of the respondents stating that because of a personal animus against him due to the litigation and his Union activities that the respondents have deliberately refused to correct his date of birth. According to the learned counsel, the documents produced by him conclusively indicate that his date of birth is 12-5-1937. He relies heavily on the latter part of standing order 18 and he contends that the time limit prescribes therein which reads as 31-12-1984 will have to be read as 29-3-1988 because it was only on that date that the new standing orders came into force. Mr. Subba Rao submits that his application for rectification is therefore within the prescribed time. ( 7 ) MR. Subba Rao has relied on a decision reported in the case of Ahmad Husain v The Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh State road Transport Corporation, Lucknow and Others in support of his contention that the service record is the responsibility of the employer and that in cases of dispute, the benefit of doubt must go to the weaker side namely, the employee. Next, Mr. Next, Mr. Subba rao relies on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in the case of Deen Dayal Ojha v Uttar Pradesh Public Service tribunal and Others wherein, the authorities had altered the date of birth of a Police Constable on the basis of his Discharge certificate from the military service ignoring his examination certificate and the Court held that the latter should prevail. On the basis of the latter case, Mr. Subba Rao contended that it is perfectly permissible for an alteration which is fact must be done if the acceptable certificates clearly establish that the entry in the service record is a wrong one. ( 8 ) AS regards the contention of the respondents that disputed questions of fact cannot be agitated in a writ petition, Mr. Subba rao relies on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in the case of Jagdish Prasad Shastri v State of Uttar Pradesh and others , wherein, the Supreme Court did permit a resolution in respect of certain disputed issues in a writ petition. As regards this aspect of the matter, I need to record that undoubtedly disputed questions do arise even in the course of hearing of writ petitions but the real test is with regard to a situation wherein it becomes impossible to resolve the matter without resort to traditional processes of evidence such as examination-in-chief and cross-examination. This case is illustrative of precisely such a situation because the petitioner contends that he submitted the certificates in 1985 whereas the respondents deny this and it is therefore impossible to assess the correct position without having resort to oral evidence. To that extent therefore, the submission canvassed by Mr. Subba Rao will have to be rejected. This was precisely the issue that was considered in another decision of the Supreme Court relied on by Mr. Subba Rao in the case of Smt. Gunwant Kaur and Others v Municipal Committee, bhatinda and Others , wherein the Supreme Court observed that the High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to determine the questions of fact in a writ petition but where the complex questions of fact which may require oral evidence to be taken arise, that the Court would be justified in refusing to entertain such a petition. Similarly, in another decision of the supreme Court in the well known case of State of Orissa v Dr. Similarly, in another decision of the supreme Court in the well known case of State of Orissa v Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and Others , the Supreme Court left the discretion open to the High Court. In such a situation, though it did qualify that complicated issues of fact requiring specific evidence cannot be gone into in a writ petition. Mr. Rao also drew my attention to a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in the case of Secretary and Commissioner, Home department and Others v R. Kirubakaran , wherein, the supreme Court held that in matters of correction of the date of birth, should be very sparingly allowed because of the effect that it would have on those below him in service. However, the Court did. observe that such a correction may be permissible if an unimpeachable evidence is produced. ( 9 ) IN sum and substance, Mr. Subba Rao has submitted that he certificates produced by him unmistakably indicate that the petitioner's date of birth as recorded by the Company is erroneous and that consequently, he is entitled to the relief. He also submitted that the petitioner is not holding any important position whereby other persons moving up in their careers is depends on his retirement and that consequently, this case is distinguishable. He also emphasised the fact that the original date of birth recorded by the Company was obviously done by deducting 23 years from the date on which the petitioner applied for the job and that this is prima facie unacceptable since the certificates clearly demonstrates that it is erroneous. ( 10 ) AS against this position, the respondents learned counsel has contended that the petitioner is bound by the representations made by him at the earliest point of time which were recorded by REMCO. Further, he contends that standing order 18 would have no application because the petitioner did not submit any evidence to the Company along with his representations. Further, he contends that standing order 18 would have no application because the petitioner did not submit any evidence to the Company along with his representations. He has further relied on a decision of this Court reported in the case of R. Kuppuraj v Bharath Gold Mines limited , wherein, the Court refused to permit the alteration of the service records which were 30 years old principally on the ground that the entry was not challenged well in time and also because it could not be demonstrated that the plaintiff has not derived any undue benefit as a result of his original representation. More importantly, the Court held that since the employee had virtually accepted the correctness of the records for a long period of time, that no change was permissible thereafter. A more or less similar view has been taken in a recent decision of this Court in the case of A. Devadass v managing Director, KSRTC, Bangalore and Another , wherein again this Court observed that such a change would normally not be sanctioned particularly since the original entry has been made at the instance of the petitioner himself. One needs to take special note of the fact that in these decisions, the Court has emphasised that the employee has consciously represented his age for purposes of the employment and has obviously benefited therefrom. If this subsequently turns out to be false, he cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. Learned counsel has also drawn my attention to a decision of the supreme Court in the case of R. Kirubakaran, supra, wherein again, the Supreme Court disapproved of any alteration being permitted in the date of birth virtually on the eve of his retirement. Reliance was also placed on another decision of the supreme Court reported in the case of Executive Engineer, bhadrak (R and B) Division, Orissa and Others v Rangadhar malik wherein, the Supreme Court once again confirmed a decision whereby at a belated stage, an application was made for correcting the date of birth. ( 11 ) I do concede that under standing Order 18, some provision has been made for rectification of the date of birth. This provision cannot be viewed in isolation nor can it conflict with the well-settled law on the point. ( 11 ) I do concede that under standing Order 18, some provision has been made for rectification of the date of birth. This provision cannot be viewed in isolation nor can it conflict with the well-settled law on the point. To my mind, the well defined principles laid down by the Courts namely that a belated correction will generally not to be permitted, is the overriding consideration which would apply in all these cases. One cannot put the clock back to find out under what circumstances the wrong representation as far as date of birth was made, but having regard to the consequences of belated alterations, it should normally not to be permitted. In this case, the original documents produced by the respondents clearly establish that the petitioner had indicated his age as 23 years in 1958 and even if he had not given the date and month, it still indicates that his date of birth was 1935. He would therefore be bound by this statement. In the absence of cogent evidence with regard to how some other date is mentioned in some of his certificates, there is a ready answer available insofar as since even at this point of time if the petitioner is unable to produce his birth certificate, it is obvious that the school entries were made on the basis of similar representations and merely because on the basis of such entries, a date is reflected in the Leaving Certificates, a Court cannot straightaway rely upon them as unimpeachable evidence. Again, on the facts of the present case the question as to whether the petitioner in fact produced the certificates along with his representations or not is in dispute and cannot be conclusively decided one way or the other merely on the basis of pleadings. On an overall view of the matter therefore, no interference is called for as regards the decision of the respondents in this case. ( 12 ) THE petition accordingly fails and stand dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .