Judgment :- ABDUL HADI, J. 1. These two writ petitions were heard together since common questions are involved in both W.P. No. 10420 of 1985 seeks for a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to quash the land acquisition proceedings relating to the land of an extent of 2 ground and 1602 sq. ft. in T.S. No. 3/1/part. Block No. 31, Mambalam, Village, Madras, owned by the petitioner N.D. Ramanujam. W.P. No. 4836 of 1987 also seeks Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to quash the land acquisition proceedings relating to the land adjacent to the abovesaid land bearing T.S. No. 3/4 of the same Mambalam Village, Madras, owned by the petitioner, Oxford English School a registered society. 2. In both, the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) is the same, viz., G.O.Ms. No. 1297, Rural Development and Local Administration, dated 24.8.1982, published in the Gazette on 8.9.1982. Likewise S. 6 declaration under the Act is also same, viz., G.O.Ms. No. 1888 dated 19.12.1983 published in the Gazette on 15.2.1984. 3. In the light of the submissions made before us, the allegations in the affidavit in support of W.P. No. 10420 of 1985 may be summarised as follows: The Madras Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board informed by letter dated 27.1.1982 of it proposal to lays water main through the aforesaid petitioners property to provide water supply to the residents of the locality. By the said letter, the Board said that it would excavate a trench, execute all necessary works, the trench would be refilled and the land would be restored to its original condition. The petitioner requested for a joint inspection by his letter dated 8.2.1992, so that as inconvenience was caused to his schemes of project therein. The Board agreed for a joint inspection and fixed it 21st April, 1982. However, subsequently the petitioner requested for an adjournment of the said date. However, the Board without any further notification or joint inspection, trespassed into the petitioners property and unauthorisedly proceeded with its work. The petitioner protested by his letter dated 9.5.1982 and requested the Board to stop the work and drop the proceedings. Thereafter the petitioner did not hear anything from the Board. However, the Board without any further notification or joint inspection, trespassed into the petitioners property and unauthorisedly proceeded with its work. The petitioner protested by his letter dated 9.5.1982 and requested the Board to stop the work and drop the proceedings. Thereafter the petitioner did not hear anything from the Board. But, on 14.10.1982, a notice issued by the 2nd respondent, Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition work, Madras City was served on the petitioner, which informed differently that an extent of land Gr. 1.2095 sq. ft. of the petitioner is needed for improvement and provision of water and drainage arrangement in South Kothandaraswamy Koil Street. By the said notice, the petitioner was required to lodge his objection, if any. It also stated that the objections would be inquired on 30.10.1982. The said notice is an act of reprisal against the petitioner for questioning the authority of the Board to enter into the petitioners property and dig trenches therein without permission. It is not a bona fide act of acquiring land for public purpose, but a mala fide one. The petitioner replied by his letter dated 28.10.1992, stating that the abovesaid notice was defective and had no effect for want of particulars like furnishing a plan etc. The said reply also stated that Section 4(1) Notification in this regard was illegal and that there was no compliance with the Tamil Nadu Land Acquisition Rules. The said reply also mentioned that the arrangements had been made by the petitioner to out up a building in the said property, for which, the plans had been already submitted to the Corporation of Madras. In the hearing on 30.10.1982, the petitioner reiterated the abovesaid contentions. The matter was adjourned to 10.12.1982. Two years thereafter, the petitioner was surprised to receive on 12.9.1984 a notice under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Act from the 2nd respondent, informing the proposal of acquisition, varying the extent of the land to be acquired from Gr. 1.2093 sq. ft. to Gr. 1.1602 sq. ft. and also varying the purpose of acquisition for formation of road to connect South Kothandaramaswamy Koil Street, and Reddikuppam road. The said notice requested the petitioner to appear before the 2nd respondent on 29.9.1984. However, the said date of enquiry was subsequently adjourned to 15.10.1984. 1.2093 sq. ft. to Gr. 1.1602 sq. ft. and also varying the purpose of acquisition for formation of road to connect South Kothandaramaswamy Koil Street, and Reddikuppam road. The said notice requested the petitioner to appear before the 2nd respondent on 29.9.1984. However, the said date of enquiry was subsequently adjourned to 15.10.1984. In the mean time on 8.10.1984, the petitioner appealed to the Minister for Local Administration and obtained stay of further proceedings. However, to the petitioners utter dismay, he received on 8.8.1985 a letter dated 2.8.1985 from the 3rd respondent, the Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department, Government of Tamil Nadu, stating that the petitioners request for dropping the land acquisition proceeding could not be complied with. Inter alias , the petitioner also contended that the abovesaid land acquisition proceeding has been intittated at the instigation of the residents of the locality. According to the petitioner, the alleged purpose of equation was not a public purpose and the said purpose also had been changed every now and then. The petitioner also inter alis contended that the mandatory requirements as provided under Section 54 of the Act and Rule 3(b) and (c) have not been complied with. 4. The counter affidavit of the 1st respondent-Collector of Madras and the other respondents may be summarised as follows:— A request was received from the Corporation of Madras by letter dated 13.3.1982 (based on the resolution of the Special Officer-Council dated 23.2.1982) is acquire an extent of land measuring 2 grounds and 1596 sq. ft. in the abovesaid T.S. No. 3/1 and 3/4 to form a link road to connect South Kothandramaswamy Koil Street and Reddikuppam road and to provide water and sewerage connecti on in the above area. Accordingly the lands were inspected and necessary proposals were sent to Government. On the approval of the said proposals, the above referred to Ss. 4(1) Notification was published. Thereafter, a notice under Section 4(1), 5A and 55(1) of the Act was issued to the owners of the land. The said notice was served on the petitioner for his appearance for enquiry on 30.10.1982. Accordingly the petitioner appeared on 30.10.1982 and also filed certain objections by his letter dated 8.11.1982. 4(1) Notification was published. Thereafter, a notice under Section 4(1), 5A and 55(1) of the Act was issued to the owners of the land. The said notice was served on the petitioner for his appearance for enquiry on 30.10.1982. Accordingly the petitioner appeared on 30.10.1982 and also filed certain objections by his letter dated 8.11.1982. The contention of the petitioner that the present proceeding is a measure of reprisal is baseless, in view of the fact that the provision of a link read to the local residents and to provide water and drainage facilities are one of the essential and basic amentities to be provided by the local body. The entire land acquisition proceedings were initiated on the requisition of the Corporation of Madras. The Water Supply and Sewerage Board has not one in the picture at all. In the present case, the Commissioner of Corporation of Madras has viewed that the objections raised by the petitioner are not justificable on the ground that the alternative suggestion made by him is not suitable to from a link road. The acquisition is legal. Section 5A enquiry posted on 30.10.1982 was adjourned to 10.11.1982, but the writ petitioner did not appear for enquiry on 10.11.1982. He sent his objections by the above referred to letter dated 8.11.1982, which was sent to the Commissioner of Corporation of Madras for remarks and the reply obtained. The advocate for the petitioner, who appeared for enquiry on 30.10.1982 had already perused all the documents, including the sketch, notification, etc. and gave a written statement to that effect. Hence, the contention of the petitioner that the information sought for by him was not furnished to him, is incorrect. After observing all formalities, a declaration under Section 6 was approved by the Government and published. Though the Government granted stray originally, after perusing all the relevant records, the Government have vacated the stay on 2.8.1985. The acquisition is only for a public purpose and not at the instigation of the local residents. The Corporation has decided to provide basic amenities of providing a link road, and water and drainage facilities. The petitioner will not in any way be affected if a piece of land is acquired for providing road and other facilities to the residents. The remaining pertion of his land would also get road access. All the mandatory requirements of Section 4(1) have been followed. The petitioner will not in any way be affected if a piece of land is acquired for providing road and other facilities to the residents. The remaining pertion of his land would also get road access. All the mandatory requirements of Section 4(1) have been followed. Section 5A enquiry was properly intimated. Objections of the petitioner before 5A enquiry, were examined and the opinion of the Commisioner, Corporation of Madras was also obtained. The objections were overruled as per the proceedings of the 1st respondent in K1.1114/82, dated 8.2.1983 and then only further action was taken to send draft declaration to the Government. The land acquisition proceeding is at the stage of passing of award and taking possession of the properties. At this stage, stay was granted by the High Court in W.M.P. No. 15788 of 1985 by order dated 7.10.1985. 5. The allegations made in the affidavit in support of W.P. No. 4836 of 1987 may be summarised as follows:— During 1981-1982, the Corporation of Madras and the Madras Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board approached the petitioner for consent to lay a water main through the petitioners abovesaid land by excavating a trench, executing the necessary work refilling the trench and restoring the land to the original condition. To the said proposal, the petitioner expressed its consent as there was no d eprivation of the land. On 24.8.1982, the 1st respondent, the Government of Tamil Nadu is sued a notice under Section 4(1) of the Act to the effect that an extent of 2364 sq. ft., forming part of the abovesaid T.S. No. 3/4, is needed or road purpose and for provision of water drainage arrangement in South Kothandaramasamy Koil Street. The 2nd respondent-Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition Works, also served a notice on 12.10.1982 to that effect. The petitioner sent a reply dated 27.10.1982 to the 2nd respondent stating that the said land is required for locating the school, but that however, the petitioner has no objection for connecting the water mains at K.R. Koil Street with Reddikuppam road. By letter dated 23.10.1982 also the petitioner raised objections. The 2nd respondent did not held enquiry under Section 5A of the Act, nor had sent the remarks of M.M.E.S.S. Board and the Corporation of Madras to the objections raised by the petitioner. The 1st respondent issued a declaration under Section 6 of the Act on 19.12.1983. By letter dated 23.10.1982 also the petitioner raised objections. The 2nd respondent did not held enquiry under Section 5A of the Act, nor had sent the remarks of M.M.E.S.S. Board and the Corporation of Madras to the objections raised by the petitioner. The 1st respondent issued a declaration under Section 6 of the Act on 19.12.1983. The petitioner was served with a notice under Ss. 9(3) and 10 of the Act, dated 13.8.1994, calling upon him to put forth his claim for compensation. The petitioner submitted a claim and followed it with a letter dated 9.10.1984. Though more than two years have passed nothing had been heard from the respondents, nor an award was passed or communicated by the 2nd respondent. As the entire extent of land is required for the purpose of the petitioners school, the petitioner is challenging the said acquisition as illegal. If the Collector fails to make the award within two years from the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984 (24.9.84), the entire land acquisition proceedings shall lapse as per Section 11A of the Act. The Explanation to Section 11A has no application to the petitioners case as the petitioner has neither applied for nor secured orders of stay pursuant to the declaration issued by the respondents. Stay, if any, secured by third parties, is of no consequence. Without prejudice to the abovesaid contention, inter alia , the petitioner states that the mandatory requirements of Rule 3(b) of the Act has not been followed in the present case since on the objections raised by the petitioner, the remarks offered either by the Corporation of Madras or by M.M.W.S.S. Board have not been communicated to the petitioner, nor an enquiry has been conducted, giving the opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner. 6. No counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents to the abovesaid affidavit of the petitioner, though some relevant files were shown to us. 7. 6. No counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents to the abovesaid affidavit of the petitioner, though some relevant files were shown to us. 7. The first submission of both learned Counsel appearing for the respective petitioners in the two writ petitions is based on S. 114 of the Act, which runs as follows:— “11-A. Period within which an award shall be made .— The Collector shall make on award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse: Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from Such commencement. Explanation :— In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.” The abovesaid Section 11A was introduced by an amendment which come into force on 24.9.1984. So, as per the abovesaid proviso, the award in the present case should have been passed on or before 24.9.1986. Admittedly in the present case, the award has not yet been passed. But, learned Counsel for the respondents relies on the above referred to Explanation appearing under Section 11A of the Act. In this connection, he particularly relies on a Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Balak Ram v. Union of India (AIR 1987 Delhi 239). While interpreting the said Explanation, the said Full Bench observed as follows:— “The use of the word “any” in the explanation considerably amplifies its scope and shows clearly that the explanation can be invoked in any case if some action or proceeding is stayed. It may be a complete stay of the operation of the entire notification or may even be a partial stay-partial in degree or in regard to persons or lands in respect of whom it will operate. It may be a complete stay of the operation of the entire notification or may even be a partial stay-partial in degree or in regard to persons or lands in respect of whom it will operate. The words used in the explanation are of the widest amplitude and there is no justification whatever to confine its terms and operation only to the cases in which the stay order is actually obtained.” 7 -A. We are in agreement with the abovesaid view taken by the Full Bench of Delhi High Court. We also find that the said view has been followed by a Division Bench of Patna High Court in Sachidahand Lal v. State (AIR 1989 Patna 181). Further, by order dated 2.8.1990, a Division Bench of this Court also in W.A. Nos. 178 and 179 of 1987 has held thus:— “We have no difficulty in accepting the submission of the learned Government Pleade that the period of stay covered by the interim orders obtained in the other writ petitions will enure to the help of the respondents to exclude such period of stay in computing the period of two years for passing an award in respect of the lands of the appellants also.” The abovesaid Division Bench also expressly approved the abovesaid view taken by the Full Bench of the Delhi High court. Further, in Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat ( AIR 1991 S.C. 2153 ) the Supreme Court also has held as follows in relation to the abovesaid Explanation:— “The said Explanation is in the widest possible terms, and in our opinion, there is no warrant for limiting the action or proceedings referred to in the Explanation to actions or proceedings proceeding the making of the award under Section 11 of the said Act. In the first place, as holds by the learned Single Judge himself where the case is converted by S. 17, the possession can be taken before an award is made and we see no reason why aforesaid expression in the Explanation should be given a different meaning depending upon whether the case is covered by Section 17 or otherwise. On the other hand, it appears to as that the Explanation in intended to confer a benefit on a land-holder whose land is acquired after the declaration under Section 6, is made in cases covered by the Explanation. On the other hand, it appears to as that the Explanation in intended to confer a benefit on a land-holder whose land is acquired after the declaration under Section 6, is made in cases covered by the Explanation. The benefit is that the award must be made within a period of two years of the declaration, failing which the acquisition proceedings would lapse and the land would revert to the landholder. In order to get the benefit of the said provision what is required, is that the land-holder who seeks the benefit must not have obtained any order from a Court restraining any action or proceeding in pursuance of the declaration under Section 6 of the said Act so that the Explanation covers only the cases of those land-holders who do not obtain any order from a Court which would delay or prevent the making of the award or taking possession of the land acquired. In our opinion, the Gujarat High Court was right in taking a similar view in the impugned judgment”. (Emphasis supplied). In this connection, we may also incidentally add that the decision in T.K. Singaram v. Urbah Land Ceiling Tribunal Chepauk (AIR 1992 Madras 180 = 1991-1-L.W. 56 (D.B.) relied on by learned Counsel for the petitioner in W.P. No. 4836 of 1987 has no application to the present case since that is a case where no order of stay at all was made by the Court staying any action pursuant to Section 6 declaration. 7. B. In the present case in W.P. No. 10420 of 1985, the petitioner obtained in W.M.P. No. 15788 of 1985 in W.P. No. 10420 of 1985, On 7.10.1985, stay of dispossession alone. Likewise, in W.M.P. No. 7050 of 1987 in W.P. No. 4836 of 1987, interim injunction restraining all further proceedings was originally granted on 12.5.1987 and on 18.8.1987 the said interim injunction was made absolute with reference to dispossession alone. In the light of the abovesaid legal position based on the aforesaid Explanation there is no doubt that the petitioners in these writ petitions cannot invoke Section 114 of the Act to contend that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed. The result is there is no merit in the abovesaid first submission. 8. In the light of the abovesaid legal position based on the aforesaid Explanation there is no doubt that the petitioners in these writ petitions cannot invoke Section 114 of the Act to contend that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed. The result is there is no merit in the abovesaid first submission. 8. Another submission, which was made by learned Counsel for the petitioner in W.P. No. 10420 of 1985 is that the abovesaid acquisition was a mala fide one since as stated in the affidavit in support of the said writ petition, originally M.M.W.S.S. Board only sought to lay water main without actually acquiring the land, but thereafter only changed the said purpose to provide water and drainage facilities and for making road and sought to acquire the land for the said purpose. But, we do not think that there is any substance in this contention, particularly in view of the averment in the counter affidavit that the provision of a link road to the local residents and water and drainage facilities are one of the essential basic amenities to be provided by the local body and also by the Government and that the entire land acquisition proceedings were initiated based on the requisition of the Corporation of Madras and not the Water Supply and Sewerage Board. 8-A. It was also contended by the said learned Counsel for petitioner in W.P. No. 10420 of 1985 that there was no requisition from M.M.W.S.S. Board. But, as already noted, it is only the Corporation of Madras that is the requisitioning body and not M.M.W.S.S. Board. Hence, there is no necessity to get the view of the abovesaid Board. It is also contended by the said Counsel that the same extent of property covered under W.P. No. 10420 of 1985 was also the subject matter of another Notification under Section 4(1) dated 30.7.1987. On this ground the said learned Counsel contends that the earlier Notification lapsed, and he relies on the decision in Raghunath v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1988 S.C. 1615 ) in this regard. But the said decision has no application to the present case since the petitioner has not proved that the property which is the subject matter in W.P. No. 10420 of 1985 is same as the property which is the subject matter of the abovesaid Notification dated 30.7.1987. But the said decision has no application to the present case since the petitioner has not proved that the property which is the subject matter in W.P. No. 10420 of 1985 is same as the property which is the subject matter of the abovesaid Notification dated 30.7.1987. We are also told that against the said Notification dated 30.7.1987, W.P. No. 5376 of 1990 is pending in this Court. 9. We may also add that learned Counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent-Association in W.P. No. 4836 of 1987, no doubt relies on Mohd. Habibullah v. Spl. Dy. Collector (AIR 1967 Madras 118 = 79 L.W. 469 to contend that these writ petitions have to be dismissed on the ground of delay in filing them. But, there, the writ petitions were filed after the Award was passed and after the petitioners even made a reference under Section 18 of the Act. So, the said decision has no application to the present case. 10. One contention by learned Counsel for respondents 1 and 2 in W.P. No. 4836 of 1987 is that the petitioner has given consent for the acquisition and hence, there is no necessity for enquiry under Section 5A. But, the said learned Counsel could not specifically point out that there was any such consent. No doubt, learned Counsel for the petitioner in this said W.P. could not also definitely assert that there was no such consent. At any rate, the decision in Mutakki Sesharathanam v. Sub-Collector, Land Acquisition, Vijayawada ( AIR 1992 S.C. 131 ), the Supreme Court has held thus:— “In our view, the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh were, respect, clearly in error in dismissing the respective writ petition and the appeal filed by the appellant on the ground that the appellant had stated that he was willing to accept the acquisition provided a lump-sum compensation was awarded to him. The statement of the appellant amounted in law to no more than an offer in terms of the Contract Act. The said offer was never accepted by the Land Acquis ition Officer is whom it was made. Leave, alone, making the award of lump-sum compensation, no award at all was made by the said officer awarding compensation to the appellant till Nov. The said offer was never accepted by the Land Acquis ition Officer is whom it was made. Leave, alone, making the award of lump-sum compensation, no award at all was made by the said officer awarding compensation to the appellant till Nov. 9, 1979, when the aforesaid offer was withdrawn by the appellant or even till the writ petition was filed. Till the offer was accepted there was no contract between the parties and the appellant was entitled to withdraw his offer. There was nothing inequitable or improper in withdrawing the offer, as the appellant was in no way bound to keep the offer open indefinitely. The writ petition, therefore, ought not to have been dismissed on the ground of the appellant having made a statement or consented as aforesaid before the Land Acquisition Officer.” Therefore, the above referred to contention of learned Counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 should necessarily fail. 11. One other submission made by learned Counsel for the petitioners in both the writ petitions is that the mandatory requirements of Rule 3(b) framed by the Government of Tamil Nadu under Section 55(1) of the Act, have not been complied with. In this regard, both the Counsel rely on Kadirvelu Mudaliar v. State of Tamil Nadu (1987 Writ L.R. 182). The said Rule 3(6) provides as follows:— “If any objections are received from a person interested in the land and within the time prescribed in sub-section (1) of Section 5-A the Collector shall fix a date of hearing the objections and give notice thereof to the objector as well as to the department or company requiring the land, where such department is not the Revenue Department. Copies of the objections shall also be forwarded to such department or company. Copies of the objections shall also be forwarded to such department or company. The department or company may file on or before the date fixed by the Collector a statement by way of answer to the objections and may also depute a representative to attend the enquiry.” The said decision of this court also held, following earlier decisions, as follows:— “Coming to the facts of the present case, an the date when the enquiry under S. 5A was held, namely, 12th December, 1975, the remarks of the requisitioning body were not obtained, much less furnished to the petitioner to afford him an opportunity to make his representation over the same and the remarks of the requisitioning body were obtained on 25th March, 1978 long after the enquiry under S. 5A and even though these remarks were communicated to the petitioner, there was no fresh enquiry held to find out the tenability or otherwise of the prosecution of the acquisition proceedings of the basis and consideration of the objections of the petitioner, the remarks of the requisitioning body and the further representations of the petitioner over the remarks. Hence, it has got to be held that the mandate of the rule stood violated. This obliges this Court to discountenance the prosecution of the acquisition proceedings after the stage of notifications under S. 4(1)” In the present case, in the counter that has been filed in W.P. No. 10420 of 1985 it has been averred as follows: “Regarding paras 6 and 7 of the affidavit it is submitted that the 5A enquiry which was posed to 30.10.82 was adjourned to 10.11.82 on the request of the advocate for the Writ Petitioner. No representative or the Writ Petitioner has appeared for enquiry on 10.11.82 as contended in the petition. But the writ petitioner has sent his adjections in writing by a letter dated 8.11.82 which was sent to the Commissioner, Corporation of Madras for remarks and the reply obtained.” It has also been averred subsequently in paragraph 22 thus:— “Regarding ground (1) it is submitted that the objections of the Writ Petitioner during 5A enquiry were examined and the opinion of the Commissioner Corporation of Madras was also obtained. The objections were overruled vide this office Proceedings KJ. The objections were overruled vide this office Proceedings KJ. 1114/82, dated 8.2.83 and then only further action taken to send Draft Declaration to Government.” From this, what can be gathered is only that the objections of the petitioner in W.P. No. 10420 of 1985 by his letter dated 8.11.1982 were sent to the Commissioner of Corporation of Madras for remarks and that reply was obtained from the Commissioner. But, it is not mentioned in the counter affidavit when actually the said objections were sent to the Commissioner of Corporation of Madras and when actually the abovesaid reply was obtained. That apart it is also not averred whether the said reply was communicated to the petitioner and whether there was continuation of Section 5A enquiry pursuant to the abovesaid reply received from the Commissioner. The only allegation is that after the enquiry on 30.10.1982 when the matter was adjourned to 10.11.1982, the petitioner did not appear for enquiry on 10.11.1982. There is no record to show that the reply of the requesting authority was communicated to the petitioners. That there was no Section 5A enquiry after the abovesaid reply was received from the Commissioner of Corporation of Madras. Therefore, it is clear that the requirements of Rule 3(b) have not been fully complied with. 11-A. This finding applies to W.P. No. 4836 of 1987 also. As already noted, there also, in the affidavit in support of the said writ petition, the petitioner raised specifically the contention thus:— “The mantory requirement of Rule 3(b) has not been followed in that on the objections raised by the petitioner, the remarks offered either by the Corporation or by M.M.W.S.S. Board has not been communicated to the petitioner nor an enquiry has been conducted giving an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner.” In this, and in fact to the other factual contention raised in the said supporting affidavit, there is no counter affidavit at all filed by the respondents, nor learned Counsel for the respondents could demonstrate to us through the relevant files that the abovesaid requirements have been strictly followed as stated above. As noted already, this court has repeatedly observed that after the remarks of the requisitioning body were obtained, they should be communicated, to the petitioner and there should, thereafter, be an enquiry under Section 5A to find out the tenability or otherwise of prosecution of acquisition proceedings on the basis of the consideration of the objections of the petitioner, the remarks of the requisitioning body and further representations of the petitioner over the remarks. Therefore, we have necessarily to hold that the mandate of the abovesaid rule stood violated in the present case also. 12. Therefore, in both the writ petition the entire acquisition proceedings after the stage of section 4 (1) Notification is quashed and accordingly these two writ petitions are allowed in part. There tall be a fresh enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act in accordance with law. In view of the fact that the matter is very old, the enquiry shall be completed, and, if the Government decides to proceed with the acquisition, the declaration shall be issued, within six months from this date and the award shall be passed within four months thereafter. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.