SUDHIR NARAYAN, J. The bunch of these writ petitions are being decided together as common questions of law and fact are involved therein. 2. Writ Petition No. 14653 of 1994 is being treated as leading case. Counter affidavit on behalf of the State of U. P. , has been Sled in this writ petition. 3. These writ petitions have been filed challenging the Government Order, dated 9th June, 1994, whereby the State Government cancelled the process of selection for the post of Sub-Inspector (Civil Police ). The events and the dates which followed in cancellation of the selection process may be stated briefly as follows. 4. On 4th October, 1991, an advertisement was issued by the respon dents inviting applications for the purpose of filling up of 475 posts of Male Sub-Inspectors and 50 posts of Female Sub-Inspectors in the State on direct recruitment basis. Subsequently, by means of corrigendum, the number of vacancies were increased and 570 posts in respect of Male and 60 posts in respect of Female were advertised to be filled up. The candidates were to appear for- (a) Preliminary examination ; (b) Physical test ; (c) Written Examination (Main); (d) Medical Test and (e) Interview. 5. A large number of candidates applied for the said posts. The pre liminary examination was conducted on 28th June, 1992, and the result of the same declared in the month of October, 1992. The successful candidates were required to undergo a physical test. The said test was held on three dates namely, 4th, 5th and 6th January, 1993, and the result of the physical test was declared on 7th January, 1993. The petitioners, who had appeared in the preliminary examination and physical test, were required to appear in the written examination (Main) which was held on 8th and 9th January, 1993. AH the petitioners appeared in the said examination. The result of the exami nation (Main) was declared on 19th July, 1993 and 2382 candidates were dec lared to have qualified in the said examination. 6. The successful candidates were to undergo Medical Examination which is the principal requisite for the interview. The Medical Examination normally was done at least one day earlier than the interview of the candi date concerned, as before the interview he must be declared to be fit for the said interview. The dates for interview were fixed between 4th September, 1993 and 19-10-1993. The Medical Examination normally was done at least one day earlier than the interview of the candi date concerned, as before the interview he must be declared to be fit for the said interview. The dates for interview were fixed between 4th September, 1993 and 19-10-1993. 961 candidates were interviewed between 24th September, 1993 to 1st October, 1993. On 2nd October, 1993, a press notice was issued by the respondent No. 4 to the effect that the remaining interviews which were scheduled to be held on 2nd October, 1993 onwards are being postponed and will commence since 1st December, 1993. Subse quently, another press notice was issued by respondent No. 4 indicating that the interviews which were scheduled to be held between 1st December, 1993 to 29-12-1993 for the direct recruits, are being postponed in pursuance of the direction issued by the State Government. 7. In the meantime, Assembly Elections took place between 18-11-1993 and 21-11-1993 and on 4th December, 1993, now Government was formed. The Joint Secretary, wrote a letter dated 19th December, 1993, informing respondent No. 4 that the Government has decided to postpone the process of selection for the post of Sub-Inspectors (Civil Police) till further orders and thereafter a press report was published by respondent No. 4 notifying that the interviews which were scheduled to be held between December, 1993 to 10th January, 1994 have been postponed. On llth February, 1994, the new Government issued Ordinance with retrospective effect from llth December, 1993 for making certain additional reservation for Scheduled Caste candidates. The Ordinance, however, introduced Clause 15 which provided that the Ordinance shall not apply to the cases in which selection process has been initiated. Within six weeks of the issuance of this Ordinance, it was replaced by Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Sche duled Tribes and other Backward Classes) Act, 1994, which was published in the U. P. Gazette on 23rd March, 1994. 8. On 9th June, 1994, an order was issued by the Government stating that the entire selection process is being cancelled and selection process will start afresh. In pursuance of the Government Order, dated 9th June. 1994, the respondent No. 4, Director General of Police, issued a consequential order dated 10th June, 1994 notifying that in view of the said Government Order, fresh orders will be issued shortly for starting the entire selection process afresh. In pursuance of the Government Order, dated 9th June. 1994, the respondent No. 4, Director General of Police, issued a consequential order dated 10th June, 1994 notifying that in view of the said Government Order, fresh orders will be issued shortly for starting the entire selection process afresh. On 24th June, 1994, respondent No. 4 issued fresh advertisement for the post of Sub-Inspectors. All the petitioners who were declared successful in the written (Main) Examination and most of them had also appeared in interview and some of them who were to be interviewed are aggrieved by the cancellation of the selection by Government order dated 9th June, 1994. 9. The question involved is whether the cancellation of the selection on process by the respondents was justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. An advertisement issued by an employer to apply for appointment to a post and asking the candidates to appear in the selection test is only an offer to apply to a post which is to be considered by such employer. The mere fact that a candidate has applied for appointment to a post and appears for selection does not create any right in him that the selection process should continue and he inevitably be considered for appointment to the post and even if a person is duly selected he cannot claim an indefeasible right to be appointed on the post for which he has been selected. In I. J. Divakar v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1982 SC 15ss, where the Government declared to withdraw certain posts from the Public Service Commission which had already conducted the selec tion, the Supreme Court observed as under : "there is no merit in this contention and we are broadly in agreement with the view of the Tribunal that inviting the applications for a post does not by itself create any right to the post in the candi date who in response to the advertisement makes an application. He only offers himself to be considered for the post. His appli cation only makes him eligible for being considered for the post. It does not create any right in the candidate to the post. " 10. He only offers himself to be considered for the post. His appli cation only makes him eligible for being considered for the post. It does not create any right in the candidate to the post. " 10. Even if this selection process is complete a candidate who is on select list has no indefeasible right to get appointment unless the action is arbitrary or mala fide as laid down by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Shankarasan Dash v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 1612 in the following words: "it is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied, Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candi dates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bonafide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted This correct position has been consistently followed by this Court, and we do not find any discordant note in the decisions in State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha, 1974 (1) SCR 165 : AIR 1973 SC 2216 , Miss Neelima Shangla v. State of Haryana, 1986 (4) SCC 268 : AIR 1987 SC 169 , Jitendra Kumar v. State of Punjab, 1985 1 SCR 899 : AIR 1984 SC 1850 . " 11 The action of the Government, however, in cancelling the process of selection or not making appointment after selection should not be arbitrary, mala fide or against the provisions of law. This has to be tested on the material which is placed before the Court. " 11 The action of the Government, however, in cancelling the process of selection or not making appointment after selection should not be arbitrary, mala fide or against the provisions of law. This has to be tested on the material which is placed before the Court. In every case where the selection process has been cancelled or the appointment to a selected candidate is denied the court has to scrutinise the material placed before it to find out as to whether the action of the authority concerned is arbitrary, mala fide or illegal. The word arbitrary has been defined in Blacks Law Dictionary as under: Arbitrary.-Means in an "arbitrary" manner as fixed or done capri ciously or at pleasure ; without adequate determining principle ; not founded in the nature of things ; non-rational; not done or acting according to reason or judgment ; depending on the will alone, absolutely in power ; capriciously tyrannical; despotic". 12 An action or an order which is passed on no reasons or discernible principle is arbitrary. What arbitrariness means was propounded in Shrilekha Vidyanhi v State of U. P. and others, AIR 1991 SC 537 , as under : "the meaning and true import of arbitrariness is more easily visualized than precisely stated or defined. The question, whether an impugned act is arbitrary or not, is ultimately to be answered on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case. An obvious test to apply is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned act and if so does it satisfy the test of reasonableness. Where a mode is prescribed for doing an act and there is no impedi ment in following that procedure, performance of the act otherwise and in a manner which does not disclose any discernible principle which is reasonable, may itself attract the vice of arbit rariness. Every state action must be informed by reason and it follows that an act uniformed by reason, is arbitrary. Rule of law contemplates governance by laws and not by humour, whims or caprices of the men to whom the governance is entrusted time being. It is trite that be you ever so high, the laws are above you. This is what men in power must remember, always. " 13. Rule of law contemplates governance by laws and not by humour, whims or caprices of the men to whom the governance is entrusted time being. It is trite that be you ever so high, the laws are above you. This is what men in power must remember, always. " 13. If a reason is given its rationale can be examined and if an order is passed on a certain principle it can be ascertained as to whether it is based on any accepted or legal norms which is a basic test of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution. The Honble Supreme Court observed in A. L. Kalra v. The Project and Equipment Corporation of India Limited, AIR 1984 SC 1361 that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in executive/administrative action because any action that is arbitrary must necessarily involve negation of equality. One need not confine the denial of equality to a comparative eva luation between two persons to arrive at a conclusion of discriminatory treat ment. Theaction per se arbitrary itself denies equality of protection bylaw. The Supreme Court while considering the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in Workmen v. Minakshi Mills Ltd. , 1992 (3) Supreme Court Cases, 336, observed that the recording of reasons by an Administrative Authority by itself serves a solutary purpose, viz. , "it excludes chance of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision making. " If any reason is given or any action is taken on a certain principle, the Court can examine its rationality, the norms and the principle on which the action is based. 14. In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, AIR 1981 SC 487 , where 33-1/3% of the total marks was allocated for oral interview for selection of candidates in an educational institution, was held plainly arbitrary after testing the reasonableness of the action. In the matter of selection of denying the right to a selected candidate to be appointed in the post on which he has been selected must be justified by the authority concerned while cancelling the selection process or refusing to appoint such selected candidate on the post for which he has been selected. In absence of any reason the action will be arbitrary. In absence of any reason the action will be arbitrary. A large number of cases have been cited by learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Yogeshwar Prasad, learned Senior Advocate for res pondents. The Court in each case tested the action of the authority con cerned while cancelling the selection process or denying the right to the select ed candidates for appointment to the posts on which they were selected. 15. In Km. Anamika Mishra and others v. U. P. Public Service Commis sion, Allahabad and others, AIR 1990 SC 461 , where the Public Service Com mission conducted the examination for recruitment to some posts in educa tional service but on finding that on account of improper feeding in Com puter some of the candidates who had better performance in the written exa mination held by Public Service Commission were not called, it cancelled the entire rectruitment examination and decided to rehold it. The Supreme Court justified the cancellation of the entire recruitment examination. Similarly, in Union Territory of Chandigarh v. Dilbagh Singh and others, AIR 1993 SC 796 , the Supreme Court found that the Chandigarh Administration which received complaints about unfair injudicious manner in which select- list of candidates for appointment as conductors were prepared by the Selection Board constituted for the purpose and such complaints were found to be well founded on an enquiry conducted in that regard, held that injudicious select list was invalid. The inquiry revealed favourtism and corruption at the behest of the members of the Selection Board. In another case, Preetpal Singh v. State of Haryana and others, J. T. 1994 (5) SC 245, it was found that when the selection was not fair, the Supreme Court quashed the entire selection. The answer books of the written examination were des troyed even before the results of the selection had been declared. There was no tabulation of the final marks awarded to the candidates at the interview and the State Government made appointments on a select list which smacked unfairness. The Supreme Court not only quashed the selection but cancelled the appointment made after such selection. 16. There was no tabulation of the final marks awarded to the candidates at the interview and the State Government made appointments on a select list which smacked unfairness. The Supreme Court not only quashed the selection but cancelled the appointment made after such selection. 16. The learned counsel for the respondents have placed reliance on the decision in writ petition No. 8733 of 1991-Mahesh Prasad Pandey v. Stale of U. P. wherein this Court relying upon Shankersan Das case (supra) held that a candidate by virtue of making application for appointment acquires not right. In this case the petitioner did not establish arbitrariness of the Government which was noticed by the Court in the following words- "it may also be mentioned that it is not the case of the petitioner that respondents are acting arbitrarily discriminating the petitioner or others have been Interviewed and appointed ignoring the case of the petitioner. " 17. In the present case it has to be examined as to what are the reasons for cancellation of the selection process which was initiated by issuing adver tisement on 4th October, 1991 and completed upto the stage of declaration of written examination (Main) on 19th July, 1993, and thereafter out of 2382 declared successfull candidates 961 candidates were interviewed between the period 24-9-1993 to 1-2- 1994. 18. A counter affidavit has been filed by Sri Radhey Shyam Mishra, Additional Superintendent of Police (Karmik) U. P. Headquarter, Allahabad, dated 4th August, 1994. In this counter-affidavit no reasons were assigned. In fact, it was termed as short counter affidavit, and parawise reply to the writ petition was not given. Daring the hearing of the writ petition a counter affidavit of the Horns Secretary, U. P. Government, Shri Virendra Nath Nigam, dated 23rd December, 1994, was filed. In the said counter affidavit the only reason to cancel the selection was given in paragraph 10 of the counter affidavit which is quoted below : "that the contents of paragraph No. 9 of the writ petition are absolutely misconceived and incorrect hence the same are denied emphatically. Due to uncertain warding of advertisement issued for selection in 1991 and due to consequential complications regarding reservation policy and due to complaints of irregularities and the selection process was suspended during Presidents Rule. Despite prolonged efforts the reservation complications could not be finalised. Due to uncertain warding of advertisement issued for selection in 1991 and due to consequential complications regarding reservation policy and due to complaints of irregularities and the selection process was suspended during Presidents Rule. Despite prolonged efforts the reservation complications could not be finalised. The selection process continued to be indefinitely suspended for 8 months when finally it was decided to cancel the selection process and start a fresh time bound selection. There was clearly no mala fide intention and the decision was taken in order to avoid further delay and future complications. " 19. The reasons given above may broadly be classified in two parts (1) Irregularities in the selection process, and (2) the difficulty in effecting the reservation policy. It is necessary to examine both these aspects as submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents. 20. It cannot be denied that if there was any irregularity in the selec tion process, it may be justifiable ground to cancel the selection process. In the counter affidavit no details of the alleged irregularities have been stated. In the counter affidavit of Mr. Nigam, it has been admitted that preliminary examination, physical test and written examination (main) had already been conducted and in para 12 of the counter affidavit, it has been stated that total 2382 candidates were called for interview and before cancellation of the selec tion process only 961 candidates were interviewed. In this selection process, in which test irregularity was committed and that as the material basis for it has not been disclosed. The written examination (Main) was conducted at various centres. If the written examination (main) was irregular at any particular centre on the basis of certain complaint received by an authority, the examination of that centre should have been cancelled. There is no specific averment or any material placed in the counter affidavit indicating that there was any irregularity committed in the selection process to the extent which had already taken place. 21. The sequence of the events will indicate that this allegation of irregularity has been made for the first time in the counter affidavit filed by Sri Nigam on 23rd December, 1994. In this Court Shamim Ahmad and others filed writ petition No. 21903 of 1993, against the present respondents on 17th August, 1993. . 21. The sequence of the events will indicate that this allegation of irregularity has been made for the first time in the counter affidavit filed by Sri Nigam on 23rd December, 1994. In this Court Shamim Ahmad and others filed writ petition No. 21903 of 1993, against the present respondents on 17th August, 1993. . They challenged the selection process mainly on two grounds firstly, that the application forms were invited and required to be submitted on different tables specifying different category which amounted to discrimination and secondly, certain irregularities were committed in conducting the examina tion. In the said writ petition Sri V. K. B, Nair, Deputy Inspector General of Police (Karmik) filed a counter affidavit and he denied all the allegations. He gave a detailed reply to the averments made in the writ petition and disclosed the manner in which the selection took place and he justified the selection and denied that there was any irregularity in the selection process. It is necessary to quote paragraph 14 of the said counter which reads as under : "it would be relevant to mention here that the entire evaluation of the answer books of the Main Written Examination was done by officers not below the rank of Superintendents of Police and or Commandants of the district/units. It is further submitted that before sending the answer books to the Head Examiners (who happen to be officers of the rank of Inspector General of police) for evaluation, portion of the answer books containing names of candidates, their Roll numbers and centres from where they appeared etc were removed from the answer books and code numbers were allotted on the answer books under the strict surveillance of a gazetted officer and only coded answer books were sent to the examiners for evaluation. The removed portions of the answer books were kept in sealed cover in the safe custody of the deponent. Thus, there was not the least possibility either for the Head Examiners or the examiners or the persons engaged in the coding job to locate the answer book or books of a particular candidate or candidates at any point of time. The marks were awarded by the examiners against Code numbers only. Thus, there was not the least possibility either for the Head Examiners or the examiners or the persons engaged in the coding job to locate the answer book or books of a particular candidate or candidates at any point of time. The marks were awarded by the examiners against Code numbers only. It was only on receipt of the answer books from the Head Examiners duly evaluated that they were decoded and the tabulation carried out and merit list prepared again under the close supervision of a gazetted officer. From the facts and submissions made above it is made abundantly clear that at every stage utmost care and precautions were taken in the evaluation of answer books and preparation of the result. There is, therefore, no reason to disbelieve the genuineness of the result declared which is wholly fair and foolproof. 22. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on 6th October, 1993 holding that the petitioners failed to prove any irregularity. 23. Subsequently, another Writ Petition No. 39217 of 1993, High Court Youth Bar Association Allahabad v. State of U. P. was filed for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to start the deferred interview for recruitment of the cadre of Sub Inspector of Police (Civil Police ). In the said writ petition following interim mandamus was issued by this Court on 14-10-1993. "standing counsel prays for and is granted two weeks time to file coun ter affidavit. List on 29-10-1993. The interim mandamus is issued to the respondents to start the inter view of Police Sub-Inspector or show cause within two weeks. Learned counsel for the petitioner will inform learned standing counsel in writing about this order by tomorrow. Sd/. M. K. 14-10-1993" 24. The interim mandamus issued by this Court was not complied with. The petitioner in that writ petition filed contempt case No. 2346 of 1993 against Sri Surendra Mohan, Principal Secretary, Home Department, U. P. Civil Secretariat, Lucknow. In that contempt petition Sri Surendra Mohan himself filed a counter affidavit. He gave the reasons as to why the interim mandamus issued by the Court could not be given effect to. In paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit, he stated that the State Assembly elections were scheduled to be held on 18 and 21st November, 1993. In that contempt petition Sri Surendra Mohan himself filed a counter affidavit. He gave the reasons as to why the interim mandamus issued by the Court could not be given effect to. In paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit, he stated that the State Assembly elections were scheduled to be held on 18 and 21st November, 1993. The Election Commis sion of India had prohibited the assigning of additional work to Government Officers during the election process which had started from 15-9-1993 and continued upto 2-12-1993 and in those situations the interim mandamus issued by the High Court could not be complied with. In that counter affidavit also it was no where stated that there was any irregularity committed in the written (Main) examination. 25. In the present writ petition the first counter affidavit which was filed by Sri Radhey Shyam on 4th August, 1994 there was no averment that there was any complaint regarding any irregularity. The hearing of the writ petition commenced on 9th December, 1994. On 13th December, 1994 learned counsel for the respondents prayed for time to file a supplementary counter affidavit which was granted and it is on 23rd December, 1994, that an affidavit was sworn by Sri Virendra Nath Nigam, Secretary, U. P. Government, Home Department, Lucknow. Even in this counter affidavit he has not given the nature of any irregularity. In paragraph 14 of the counter-affidavit it has been stated that C. I D. inquiry is being conducted and that will take time. It was not stated in the counter-affidavit as to what was the nature of the complaint and when it was entrusted to the C. I. D. In the absent of any material allegations in the counter-affidavit and any material placed before this Court, it is difficult to hold that the selection was cancelled on account of any irregu larity till the stage it had already completed. 26. The second reason given in the counter affidavit is that there was difficulty in implementation of new reservation policy as framed by the Government and, therefore, the Government decided to cancel the selection process. It is admitted that at the time of advertisement the provisions of U. P. Public Service (Reservation for Backward Clashes) Act, 1989 was appli cable regarding appointment to the posts in public services which provided reservation in favour of Backward Classes of citizens as specified in the schedule. It is admitted that at the time of advertisement the provisions of U. P. Public Service (Reservation for Backward Clashes) Act, 1989 was appli cable regarding appointment to the posts in public services which provided reservation in favour of Backward Classes of citizens as specified in the schedule. The percentage of reservation was indicated in Section 2 of the said Act. Subsequently, U. P. Public Service (Reservation for Backward Classes) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1993, was promulgated amending Section 2 of Act No/21 of 1989, which provided that in public service and posts in connection with the affairs of the State there shall be reservation of 27 per cent of posts at the stage of direct recruitment of Backward Classes of citizens as specified in the schedule. The U. P. Legislature passed U. P. Public Service (Reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Act, 1993 which came into force with effect from December 11, 1993, providing reservation for the Scheduled Castes to the extent of 18 per cent and for Scheduled Tribes two per cent. The position was that on December 11, 1993 there was 27 per cent reservation for Backward Classes, 18 per cent for Scheduled Castes and two per cent for Scheduled Tribes. The Government promulgated U. P. Public Services (Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Back ward Classes) Ordinance, 1994, published in the UP. Gazette on llth February 1994, which was given retrospective effect from December 11, 1993 Clause 3 of the Ordinance provides 21 per cent reservation for Scheduled Castes, 2 per cent for Scheduled Tribes and 27 per cent for Backward Classes. The net result was that instead of reservation to the extent of 18 percent to the Scheduled Caste, it was raised to 21 per cent. As regards the reservation for Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes of citizens, it continued to remain 7 per cent and 27 per cent respectively. Clause 16 of the Ordinance, repealed U. P. Public Service (Reservation for Backward Class) Act, 1989 (U. P. Act 21 of 1989) and Uttar Pradesh Public Service (Reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Act, 1993 (U. P. Act No. 3 of 1993 ). Clause 15 is a saving clause providing for continuation of the selection process which had started. Clause 15 of the Ordinance reads as under : "15. Clause 15 is a saving clause providing for continuation of the selection process which had started. Clause 15 of the Ordinance reads as under : "15. Savings.- (1) The provisions of this Act shall not apply to cases id which selection process has been initiated before the commencement of this Act and such cases shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of law and Government Orders as they stood before such commencement. Explanation.-Pot the purposes of this sub-section the selection process shall be deemed to have been initiated where, under the relevant service rules, recruitment is to be made on the basis of- (i) written test or interview only, the written test or the interview, as the case may be, has started, or (ii) both written test and interview, the written test has started. (2) The provisions of this Act shall not apply to the appointment, to be made under the Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Department of Government Servant Dying in Harness Rules, 1974. " 27. Within a period of six weeks this Ordinance was adopted by the U. P. Legislature by enacting U. P. Public service (Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes) Act, 1994, which was published in U. P. Gazette dated 23rd March 1994, giving it retrospective effect from December 11, 1993. Clause 15 of the Ordinance (referred to hereinafter as section 15 of the Act) contemplates that the provisions of this Act shall not apply to cases in which-selection process has been initiated before commencement of the Act and such cases shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of law and Government Orders as they stood before such commencement. The explanation added to Section 15 of the Act has amply clarified the meaning of selection process. 28. It is not denied that the written test had already taken place to the enforcement of the Act i. e. December 11,1993. The result of the test was itself declared on 19th July, 1993. So far as the interview was concerned, as disclosed in the counter affidavit, out of 2382 candidates who were qualified, 1961 candidates were already interviewed till 1st October, 1993. According to the explanation referred to in Section 15 of the Act, such selection was to be governed on the basis of the Act, Ordinance and Orders of the Government which were applicable before enforcement of the Act. According to the explanation referred to in Section 15 of the Act, such selection was to be governed on the basis of the Act, Ordinance and Orders of the Government which were applicable before enforcement of the Act. The result was that on the date of commencement of the Act instead of 21 per cent reservation for the Scheduled Castes, as provided under the U. P. Act No. 4 of 1994, 18 per cent reservation was to be made for them but as regards Scheduled Tribes, it was 2 per cent and Backward classes 27 per cent. 29. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon various decisions in support of his contention that the selection process, if once initiated, should be governed by the rule which then existed. The reliance has been placed upon P. Mahendran v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1990 SC 405 , wherein it was held that the selection process is to be completed in accordance with law as it stood at commencement and the amended Rule could not invalidate selection already made. 30. In Dr. Kailash Nath Mishra v. State of U. P. , (1993) 3 UPLBEC 1992 , a Division Bench of this Court took the view that the applicant has a right to be considered for selection on the basis of the qualifications at the time of advertisement of the post and subsequent re-advertisement of the post on the change of the qualification on the basis of the amended rule will not take ay the rights of the parties who had already appeared in selection. Similar view was taken by another Division Bench in Harish Chandra Saxena v, University of Lucknow, 1988 UPLBEC (2) 1066. 31. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that once the rule has been amended, it is the amended rule that applies for selection. He has placed reliance upon State of M. P. v. Raghubir Singh Yadav, (1994) 6 SCC 151 . In this case, for recruitment to the post of Inspectors, Depart ment of Weights and Measurements the State of M. P. advertised the vacancy on 27th July, 1987, called for applications from eligible candidates. The qualification prescribed for eligibility was degree in Arts or Commerce or Science of Engineering or Diploma in Engineering. Written examinations were held. The Board issued interview cards to the successful candidates. The qualification prescribed for eligibility was degree in Arts or Commerce or Science of Engineering or Diploma in Engineering. Written examinations were held. The Board issued interview cards to the successful candidates. In the meanwhile the Government amended the rules and altered the eligi bility qualification for appointment to these posts by providing that degree in Science and Physics as necessary subject or degree in Engineering or Technology or Diploma in Engineering. The candidates challenged the amended rules and claimed right to be considered for selection as per qualifications prescribed under the unamended Rules. The Supreme Court held that the Government had a right to prescribe a different qualification and a candidate had no vested right after he having appeared in the written test on the basis of the qualifications prescribed earlier. The case of P. Mahendran (supra) was distinguished on the ground that in that case by amendment certain additional qualifications were sought to be made by amended Rules which had no retrospective effect. This case has no application to the facts of the present case. There is no dispute that the Government has not changed the qualification under Act No. 4 of 1994. 32. It is, however, not necessary in the present case to dwell on the question as to whether the Amended Act or the Act which was applicable at the time of advertisement of the posts on 4th October, 1991 will be applicable. Section 15 of the Act itself prescribes the manner in which the selection which had already commenced prior to the enforcement of U. P. Act No. 4 of 1994 will be carried on. The saving clause in Statute preserves the existing rights or actions as provided under the Act. The saving clause provides for an exemption from a statute. It saves certain rights, proceed ings or actions as may be referred to in the Statute. The Supreme Court in Shah Bhojraj Kubrji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, AIR 1961 SC 1961 SC 1596 quoted with approval the observation by Wood V. C. in Fitzyerald v. Champoneys, (1961) 70 ER 958 that saying clauses are seldom used to construe Acts. These clauses are introduced into Acts which repeal others, to safeguard rights which, but for the savings, would be lost. 33. These clauses are introduced into Acts which repeal others, to safeguard rights which, but for the savings, would be lost. 33. When Section 15 of the Act itself provides that the selection which had already commenced, as explained under the said section, the same is to continue. There id no reason for the Government to cancel it on the ground of enforcement of the provisions of U. P. Act No. 4 of 1994. In N. D. Devinkathi v. Karnataka P. S. C. , 1990 (3) SCC 157 , where after the selection, the Government issued another order but paragraph 11 of the said order provided that the posts advertised before the issue of the revised Govern ment Order shall remain unchanged, it was held that the selection should continue on the basis of the old Government Orders as existed at the time the advertisement was issued. 34. There is another aspect of the matter. The selection process had already begun by inviting the applications for the posts in question on 4th October, 1991. The preliminary test, physical test and written examination had already been held and the result of successful candidates were already declared on 19th July, 1993, and the interviews were scheduled to be held between 24-7-1993 and 19th October, 1993 and between this period about half of the candidates were already interviewed. The dates of the interview were being postponed from time to time. The new Government came into force on 4th December, 1993, and it was fully aware of the situation regarding the selec tion of the posts which were advertised on 4th October, 1991. The Govern ment promulgated Ordinance No. 5 of 1994 on llth February, 1994 giving it retrospective effect from 19tb December, 1993, Clause 15 of the Ordinance itself saved the selection process which had already commenced. This Ordi nance was adopted by the State Legislature and it was enacted as U. P. Act No. 4 of 1994. The Government itself put fetter on it and kept the expecta tion of the candidates alive when it promulgated the Ordinance and subse quently, it was enacted by the legislature. At a subsequent stage the Govern ment by executive fiat cannot undo what the legislature itself provided under the Act. The Government itself put fetter on it and kept the expecta tion of the candidates alive when it promulgated the Ordinance and subse quently, it was enacted by the legislature. At a subsequent stage the Govern ment by executive fiat cannot undo what the legislature itself provided under the Act. It is settled principle of law that any executive instruction, order, direction or notification if issued contrary to statutory provisions, would be without jurisdiction and nullity vide State of Sikkim v. Borjee Tshering Bhutia and others, Judgments Today 1991, SC 456 and C. L, Verma v. State of M. P. and others, AIR 1990 SC 463 . In case the legislative intent is not to cancel the selection but to proceed, it would be contrary to all the legal norms to cancel it by an executive order. An authority has to act in the manner pro vided under law. This settled principle of law as referred to by Brooms Legal Maxim Xth Edition page 315 is quoted below : "on the other hand, quandp aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur et omne-per quod devenitur ad illud (s) : "whatever is prohibited by law to be done directly cannot legally be effected by an indirect and circuitous contrivance. " 35. Considering the various aspects, the action of the respondents in cancelling the selection process is contrary to the provisions of Section 15 of U. P. Act No. 4 of 1994 and is arbitrary. 36. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The order of cancellation of the selection dated 9th June, 1994, is hereby quashed. The respondents are directed- (i) to complete the process of selection which had already commen ced on the basis of the advertisement dated 4-10-1991, to the extent of the posts advertised on the said date along with corri gendum and to prepare the select list in accordance with the provisions of the Act and Government Orders as they stood immediately before llth December, 1993, within three months i. e. with reservation of 27 per cent for Backward Classes, 18 per cent for Scheduled Castes and 2 per cent for Scheduled Tribes. (ii) As regards the posts which fell due after the advertisement of the posts on 4th October, 1991, and were not covered under the advertisement dated 4th October, 1991. including corrigendum, shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of U. P. Act No. 4 of 1994. (ii) As regards the posts which fell due after the advertisement of the posts on 4th October, 1991, and were not covered under the advertisement dated 4th October, 1991. including corrigendum, shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of U. P. Act No. 4 of 1994. The parties shall bear their own costs. Petition allowed .