JUDGMENT : O.P. JAIN, J. 1. This appeal has been filed against the order dated 13.5.94 passed by 7th Addl. District Judge, Kanpur Nagar, dismissing an application under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure. 2. The brief facts, leading to the case, are that the non-applicant. Indra Kumar Lodha filed a suit against Capt. V. P. Sharma who appeared in the case and engaged a senior counsel--Sri Anand. The applicant also engaged three Junior lawyers who continued to appear for him for about five years. The suit was filed in 1984 and the counsel appeared for him upto December, 1989. Thereafter, the suit proceeded ex parte and was decreed on 28th Sept. 1991. 3. The Defendant-applicant filed an application under Order IX, Rule 13, CPC for setting aside the ex parte decree on the ground that he did not receive any communication after December, 1989 from his counsel and that he could know of the ex parte decree dated 28.9.91 only on 1st July, 1992 when another counsel engaged by him inspected the record. The contention of the Defendant-applicant, before the lower court, was that he should not be penalised for the negligence of his counsel. By the impugned order dated 13.5.94, the learned Addl. District Judge has dismissed the application. Hence this appeal. 4. I have heard Sri Pramod Jain appearing for the Appellant and have gone through the impugned order. 5. It is argued that the Defendant did everything which was within his power and he engaged senior counsel to look after the litigation and, therefore, should not be held responsible for the negligence of his counsel in support of this contention the learned Counsel has relied upon AIR 1978 (SC) 496; AIR 1987 SC 1352 and Rafiq and Another Vs. Munshilal and Another, AIR 1981 SC 1400 . 6. The basic ruling in Rafiq and Another Vs. Munshilal and Another, AIR 1981 SC 1400 . In fact the learned Counsel has quoted extensively from this ruling in paragraph 5 that "as per the present adversary legal system, the litigant who has selected his advocate, briefed him and paid him his fee can remain supremely confident that his lawyer will look after his interest and such an innocent litigant who has done everything in his power can be expected of him, should not suffer for the gross inaction, deliberate omission or misdemeanour of his party. 7. 7. Another authority relied upon by the learned Counsel is 1984 (1) ARC 603 in which it has been held that "the previous conduct of the Defendant is not relevant and on this basis it is argued that the trial court should not have taken into consideration the fact that the service on the Defendant was effected through publication in Newspaper." 8. I have given careful consideration to the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the applicant. However, I find that the latest case of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the point is reported in Salil Dutta Vs. T.M. and M.C. Private Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 185 , in which the following observations have been made: The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and statements, made within the limits of authority given to him, are the acts and statements of the principal Le., the party who engaged him. It is true that in certain situations, the court may, in the interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex parte decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or misdemeanour of the advocate where it finds that the client was an innocent litigant but there is no such absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at any time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognised. Such an absolute rule would make the working of the system extremely difficult. The observations made in Rafiq's must be understood in the fact and circumstances of that case and cannot be understood as an absolute proposition. 9. Therefore, the facts of the present case should be examined in the light of the authorities cited by the learned Counsel as well as in the light of Salil Dutta Vs. T.M. and M.C. Private Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 185 . 10. The record shows that the suit was filed as early as in 1984. Defendant Capt. V.P. Sharma is an educated man and should have known that. It is his duty to find out about the progress of the suit from time to time. It has come on record that the Defendant has a brother, named Yogendra Sharma who was residing at Kanpur where the case was pending. Yogendra Sharma was looking after the litigation on behalf of Capt. V. P. Sharma and was doing 'Pairvi". He had filed an affidavit also on behalf of his brother. It has come on record that the Defendant has a brother, named Yogendra Sharma who was residing at Kanpur where the case was pending. Yogendra Sharma was looking after the litigation on behalf of Capt. V. P. Sharma and was doing 'Pairvi". He had filed an affidavit also on behalf of his brother. in order to get over this difficulty, the Defendant took the plea that his brother has shifted from Kanpur to Meerut and that the relation between the two brothers are now strained. There is no material on record in support of this contention. Even assuming that the relationship between Capt. V. P. Sharma and his brother Yogendra Sharma are not cordial, Capt. V. P. Sharma should have appointed some other person to do "Pairvi" on his behalf. 11. There is also no material to support the contention that the senior counsel Sri S. N. Anand and his junior were negligent in conducting the case. The Defendant has not served any notice on his advocates imputing any negligence to them. Therefore, mere assertion on the part of the Defendant that his counsel was negligent is not sufficient to come to the conclusion that actually Sri S. N. Anand was at fault. Therefore, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the opinion that the observation made in Salil Dutta Vs. T.M. and M.C. Private Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 185 apply fully to the facts of the present case and the case of Rafiq and Another Vs. Munshilal and Another, AIR 1981 SC 1400 is not applicable because in Rafiq's case, the person was illiterate and rustic. 12. It may also be mentioned here that the ex parte decree was passed on 28.9.1991 and the application under Order IX, Rule 12, CPC was filed on 2.7.1992. i.e., about eight or nine months after passing of the decree. Limitation in such an application is only 30 days. The applicant has tried to bring the application within limitation from the date of knowledge which is said to be the 1st July, 1992 but the date of knowledge can be taken as the starting point of limitation only in those cases where summons have not been served properly and the party is not aware of the proceedings pending against him. in this case, the Defendant participated in the proceeding since a long time and he failed to instruct his counsel and that appears to be the reason why Sri S. N. Anand did not take any further part in the proceedings in such a case, starting point of limitation cannot be the date of knowledge of the decree. Limitation starts on the date on which ex parte decree is passed. 13. In view of the above discussion the appeal has no force and is hereby dismissed summarily.