Honble PALLI, J. — This special appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 10.12.1991, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed with the observation that the petitioner has an alternative remedy and shall approach the S.D.O. to put up his grievance and the S.D.O. will pass appropriate orders after hearing him. (2). Normally, such type of orders can hardly be interferred with in special appeal but having given our considerable thought to the matter and on the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case particularly the reading of the impugned order Annex. 16 has shaken our judicial conscience as to how the responsible officers of the State while discharging their functions as quasi judicial authorities through the executive fiat play havoc with the rights of a citizen vis-a-vis his property in flagrant abuse of the process of law, justice and procedure. So long as the authority does not go against the provisions of the Constitution or any rule or law the powers the authorities exercised are wide in amplitude and dimension. They, however, cannot be permitted to interfere with the rights of the citizens unless it can be pointed out that the authority has acted under some specific rule of law which authorises such an act. This is the essence of the rule of law as enshrined in our Constitution and on which the entire fabric of the democratic set up exists. (3). It was not absolutely necessary to give the facts in detail in order to dispose of this appeal but as said above it has become almost necessary to give the brief facts in order to project as to how the S.D.O.(Revenue), Raisinghnagar, respondent No.2 in this case came to hand down the impugned order in completely violating the principles of rule of law with carelessness and irresponsibility.The order further displays the callous disregard to the normal requirements of the rule of law in the society governed by the Constitution which guarantees to the citizens of this country against the arbitrary invasion of their rights by the executive. The action further exhibits and displays how the respondent No.2 acted in depriving the appellant from peaceful enjoyment and possession of the valuable rights in the property in the present case, but for the timely intervention of this Court. (4). The action further exhibits and displays how the respondent No.2 acted in depriving the appellant from peaceful enjoyment and possession of the valuable rights in the property in the present case, but for the timely intervention of this Court. (4). Respondent No.3 is a Pong Dam Oustee re-settled and rehabilitated with the allotment of 25 bighas of land in question in the District of Sri Ganganagar in the year 1973. The land is now in the command area of Indira Gandhi Canal. There is no dispute regarding the allotment as per Annex.l. Under the Rules, a tenant/ allottee cannot transfer the right, title and interest in the land so allotted except with the permission of the concerned Collector. The petitioner and his father in-law Karam Singh entered into an agreement with respondent No.3 for the purchase of the said land on 5.6.1980 Annex.2.The price settled was Rs.53,000/- and it is stated that Rs.43,000/- were received by the respondent No.3 leaving a balance of Rs.10,000/- to be paid at the time of registration of the sale-deed, which was to be executed within a month from the requisite permission of the Collector. It is further stated that in sequence of this agreement and in part performance thereof ,the possession was delivered to the petitioner, a power of attorney is stated to have been executed in favour of one Fateh Singh for getting the sale- deed and other formalities done by him but the sale-deed for one reason or the other was hot executed and the respondent No.3 Om Prakash went on delly dalling the matter in order to extract more money from the appellant. The appellant yielded and another agreement on 10.4.1987 was executed for a consideration of Rs.1,70,000/- which has been placed as Annex.4 on record. The appellant and his father in-law Karam Singh having been duped in the aforesaid manner as a precautionary resort got a will executed in their favour which is Annex.5 on record. Respondent No.3 still not satisfied went on realising mare and more money from the appellant by pressurising tactics and the endorsement of the amounts received by him were also made in black and white. Respondent No.3 still not satisfied went on realising mare and more money from the appellant by pressurising tactics and the endorsement of the amounts received by him were also made in black and white. Again a sum of Rs.10,000/- is stated to have been paid and this time the writing was got scribed from the Patwari signed by the respondent No.3 which is Annex.6 on record.Inspite of the repeated requests from the side of the appellant the requisite consent from the Collector was not obtained and no efforts appear to have been made in that direction and in the mean-time the land prices reached rocket high and when the appellant learnt that the respondent is trying to negotiate a deal of the land in question they again approached the respondent No.3 who now demanded Rs.6,00,000/- as the price of the land because of the enormous increase in the value and ultimately the appellant succumbed to the pressure and an amount of Rs.5.90,000/- inclusive of the amounts already paid is said to have been received, leaving Rs.10,000/- to be paid at the time of the registration of the sale-deed and this agreement third in the series is dated 13.2.1990 Annex.7 on record and the appellant by way of abundant caution got this document attested from the Tehsildar in order to safe-guard his right, title and interest. It is further stated by the appellant in the petition that the recovery dues to the Irrigation Department were also paid by him vide Annexs.8 to 11. Since the respondent No.3 still continued raising unjust demand, the appellant apprehending trouble approached the Tehsildar on 1.6.1991 to verify the factum of his possession on which a report was called from the Patwari who after verifying and making an enquiry at the spot made a report on 2.6.1991 Annex.12 on record. A further writing was obtained from the Irrigation Department which is Annex. 13 on record showing cultivation of the appellant. The notes made in Columns No.28 to 35 in this document further reveal that the possession of the appellant was in sequence of an agreement to sell. (5). A further writing was obtained from the Irrigation Department which is Annex. 13 on record showing cultivation of the appellant. The notes made in Columns No.28 to 35 in this document further reveal that the possession of the appellant was in sequence of an agreement to sell. (5). The real trouble started on 27.6.1991 when the respondent No.3 approached the respondent No.2 S.D.O. (Revenue) Raisinghnagar who on that date was camping at Gharsana and the respondent made a representation to him making all types of wild allegations stating that the appellant was in illegal and unauthorised possession of his land and the appellant was basing his claim on some agreement to sell which is forged and which he never executed. This application is Annex.14 on record. It would be quite interesting to reproduce here the relevant contents of the application: ^^3- ;g fd eSus viuh mä tehu esa ls 12&10 ch?kk jdck nyhi flag iq= Jh jkeflag tkfr jk;flag fuoklh ekk tksb;k rglhy tykykckn ftyk fQjkstiqj iatkc dk jgus okyk gS dks dkr ds fy;s fgLls ij nh FkhA vk/kh tehu eSa [kqn dkr djrk FkkA 4- ;g fd eSa okil vius xkao cPpksa dks laHkyus pyk tkrk Fkk ihNs ls nyhiflag iVokjh ls feydj dkr lkjh vius uke fn[kk nsrk Fkk tcfd ,slk djuk xyr gSA 5- ;g fd fnuk¡d 13-2-90 dks nyhi flag us ,d >wBk bZdjkjukek ftl ij esjh fgUnh esa QthZ nLr[kr fd;s gS eq>s 5 yk[k 90 gtkj :i;k nsuk crkdj esjh lkjh tehu ij dCtk djus ij vkeknk gSA 9- ;g fd nyhi flag ,d ekuk gqvk cnekk gS tks fd iatkc dk jgus okyk O;fä gS blds lkFk vU; dbZ vkneh gj le; jgrs gSaA esjs dks vUnskk gS fd nyhi flag Lo;a ;k fdlh vU; vius vkneh ls esjs dks tkuh ;k ekyh uqdlku igq¡pk ldrk gS vkSj esjs dks vxokdj mBok ldrk gSA vr% izkFkZuk i= izLrqr dj fuosnu gS fd tks esjh jdck dh ckcr~ ,Q-vkbZ-vkj- Fkkuk jkoyk esa ntZ gqbZ gS ftl ij tYn ls tYn dk;Zokgh djus ckcr~ o esjh tku o eky dh j{kk djus ckcr~ vknsk fn;k tkosa rkfd fdlh izdkj ls esjs dks nyhi flag vkfn uqdlku uk igq¡pk ldsA (6). A perusal of the application at best makes out a case for security proceedings. A perusal of the application at best makes out a case for security proceedings. The respondent No.2 entertained this application and proceeded to record the statement of respondent No.3 on 27.6.1991 and a certified copy of the statement is placed as Annex.15 on record and the relevant part of the statement is reproduced hereunder: ^^cgYQ c;ku fd;k fd esjs uke ls pd 13 Mh-vks-,y-ch- ds eq-ua- 13@60 dk 25-00 ch?kk Hkwfe crkSj ikSax cka/k foLFkkfirksa dks vkoaVu gqbZ gSA mä Hkwfe eq>s o"kZ 1973 esa vkoafVr gqbZ Fkh rFkk bldh reke drsa Hkh eSus tek djok nh gSA mä Hkwfe eSus nyhiflag ds llqj deZflag dks fgLls ij dkr gsrq nh FkhA rFkk og eq>s esjk fgLlk ns jgk FkkA xr rhu o"kksZa ls ;g Hkwfe nyhiflag iq= jkeflag dks fgLls ij ns j[kh Fkh rFkk og cjkcj eq>s esjk fgLlk nsrk jgk gSA esjs fiNys xk¡o ls okfil vkus ij bl o"kZ vizsy esa nyhiflag us dgk fd rqd bl tehu ds D;k yxrs gks] ;g tehu eSus eksy yh gSA nyhiflag us QthZ bdjkjukek dj j[kk gS rFkk eq>s dgk gS fd [ksr esa ?kql x;k rks ekj nwaxkA iVokjh rFkk nyhiflag us feyh Hkxr djds fiNyh fxjnkojh esjs uke ls cny nh gSA rFkk bl lky ikuh dh iphZ Hkh kk;n mlus vius uke ls djokbZ gSA nyhiflag us QthZ bdjkjukek cuk;k gSA mlus lu~ 87 ds [kjhns gq, LVkEi ij 13-2-90 dks bdjkjukek cuk;k gS tcfd eSa 13-2-90 dks fgekpy esa FkkA ogk¡ ds eSa lcwr isk dj ldrk gw¡A mä Hkwfe dCtk eq>s fookl fnyk;k tkos rFkk iqfyl benkn nh tkosA (7). After recording the aforesaid statement, the respondent No.2 immediately there and then without looking into any other document proceeded to pass the impunged order. Certified copy of which is Annex.16 and without caring to call the appellant to show cause why such an order be not passed. After recording the aforesaid statement, the respondent No.2 immediately there and then without looking into any other document proceeded to pass the impunged order. Certified copy of which is Annex.16 and without caring to call the appellant to show cause why such an order be not passed. The order is reproduced hereunder : — "27/6/91 vkt ceqdke /kM+lkuk izkFkhZ vkseizdkk ,l@vks lhxwjke vkj@vks 13 Mh vks ,y us izkFkZuk i= isk fd;k fd mls iksax ck¡/k foLFkkfir gksus ds dkj.k 13 Mhvks,y esa eqjCck 13@60 25½ ch?kk vkoafVr gqvk Fkk mä jdck eSus fgLls ij dkr gsrq vizkFkhZ dks fn;k Fkk tks okil dCtk ugha NksM+ jgk gSA izkFklhZ dks lquk x;kA izkFkhZ ds c;ku fy;s x;sA izkFkfed :i ls ;g ik;k x;k fd iksax ck¡/k foLFkkfir gksus ds dkj.k izkFkhZ dks vkoafVr Hkwfe ij vizkFkhZ vukf/kd`r :i ls dkfct gS ftls csn[ky ugha fd;k tkuk mfpr gSA vr% 151 lh-ih-lh- ds vUrxZr iznÙk vf/kdkjksa dk iz;ksx djrs gq, rglhynkj ¼jsosU;w½ /kM+lkuk dks pd 13 Mhvks,y ds eqjCck 23@60 25 ch?kk ij fjlhoj fu;qä dj vknsk fn;s tkrs gSa fd og mä Hkwfe dk dCtk e; [kM+h Qly ysdj Hkwfe rFkk Qly dh vkxkeh vknsk rd O;oLFkk djsA i=koyh 18-7-91 dks dSEi /kM+lkuk esa isk gksA (8). A reading of Annex. 14 does not convey if any prayer for appointment of a Receiver was made. The application which would amount to an admission on the part of respondent No.3 does not go beyond taking necessary action against the appellant and to make arrangements for security of the life of the respondent and interestingly in the application itself the land is stated to have been given by the respondent himself for the purpose of cultivation and while making the statement Annex. 15, the respondent No.3 possibly forgot what he has actually stated in the application and gave a totally different account by saying that the land was given to the father in-law of Dalipsingh on share of produce and who had been giving to him such share and for preceding 3 years the land had been given to Dalipsingh on share of produce and he too has been giving to him his share and when he returned back from his village Dalipsingh told him that he has purchased the land and what right and title the respondent No.3 has in the land in question and that there was an agreement which was alleged by the appellant, which is forged. It is further stated by him in the above said statement that Dalip Singh in connivance with the Patwari had got the entries changed from his name and agreement to sell is forged and that the possession be got delivered to him and police help be provided. (9). The reading of the application and the statement even if accepted at its face value make out no case for appointment of a Receiver. The respondent himself admitted to have given the land in question as per his statement to Karam Singh and then to Dalip Singh for the purposes of cultivation on share of produce which again as per his own admission he has been receiving. It further comes to light on reading of these two documents that an agreement of sale is projected and in the given situation there was hardly any occasion for the respondent No.2 to pass the impugned order. The appellant challenged this order by way of a writ petition to which a reply was filed by the respondent No.3 of a complete denial and alleging that the agreements were forged and false. The averments regarding filing of application, statement and the impugned order were, however, admitted. A futile attempt also "appears to have been made in the return projecting as if the possession was with the respondent No.3. Annex.R.3/1 is the Khatoni, R.3/2 is a copy of F.I.R and R.3/3 is the Khasra Girdawri which are hardly relevant for the purposes of this petition since it is a conceded case from the side of the respondent No.3 that he had himself put the appellant in possession of the land in question. (10). Annex.R.3/1 is the Khatoni, R.3/2 is a copy of F.I.R and R.3/3 is the Khasra Girdawri which are hardly relevant for the purposes of this petition since it is a conceded case from the side of the respondent No.3 that he had himself put the appellant in possession of the land in question. (10). At what point of time the said possession became illegal or unauthorised, nothing is stated. The learned Single Judge after hearing the counsel for the parties and on perusal of the impugned order handed down the order which is reproduced hereunder: — "10.12.91 HONBLE SHRI V.K.SINGHAL, J. Sh.K.S.Rathore for the petitioner. Shri Vijay Agarwal for the respondents. Heard learned counsel. (11). The writ petition is dismissed with the observation that the petitioner has an alternative remedy. The petitioner shall approach the S.D.O. and put up his grievances before him. The S.D.O. will pass the appropriate order after hearing within a period of three months from the date of the receipt of this order. Till then the possession shall remain with the person who is in possession today." (12). With utmost respect to the learned single Judge, the direction given in the impugned order was like asking the appellant to play with a razor. As observed in the beginning of the order we would not have disturbed the order in the manner it has been handed down but in view of the given facts and situation as detailed above which emerges out of the pleadings there was no occasion for the learned Judge to make the observation of the kind. He should have immediately proceeded to quash the order as wholly unjust, illegal and unwarranted in the situation. One can very well imagine as to what could have happened if the appellant had appraoched the same authority for recalling of the order. There was no case filed by the respondent No.3, no such case was registered,no lis was pending, under what provision of law the application was made to him and under what provision of law or authority has exercised his jurisdiction over the matter is writ large on the face of it. There was no case filed by the respondent No.3, no such case was registered,no lis was pending, under what provision of law the application was made to him and under what provision of law or authority has exercised his jurisdiction over the matter is writ large on the face of it. The impugned order was wholly uncalled for in the given situation and as it appears the respondent No.2 did not even care to examine the application and the statement of the respondent No.3 and hastened to pass the order which one has to read with fingers crossed. The order makes a mockery of the rule of law and interestingly the provisions of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure have been referred to in the order for deriving strength from that provision in passing the impugned order. For the purpose of better understanding the provision for appointment of a Receiver as given in Order 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure is reproduced below: — "ORDER XL APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVERS R.l. Appointment of Receivers. (1) Where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient, the court may by order- (a) appoint a Receiver of any property, whether before or after decree; (b) remove any person from the possession or custody of the property; (c) commit the same to the possession, custody or management of the Receiver; and (d) confer-upon the Receiver all such powers,as to bringing and defending suits and for the realization, management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property, the collection of the rents and profits thereof, the application and disposal of such rents and profits, and the execution of documents as the owner himself has, or such of those powers as the court thinks fit. (2) Nothing in this rule shall authorise the Court to remove from the possession or custody of the property any person whom any party to the suit has not a present right so to remove." (13). A reading of the aforesaid provision makes it out " when it appears to the court to be just and convenient", these words cast a duty on the court to see that rights of the parties are not put in jeopardy and the ends of justice are not defeated. A reading of the aforesaid provision makes it out " when it appears to the court to be just and convenient", these words cast a duty on the court to see that rights of the parties are not put in jeopardy and the ends of justice are not defeated. It further requires that there has to be a lis pending between the parties and further the party desirous of getting a Receiver appointed should make out a prima facie case in its favour if there is an emergency or danger or loss which requires immediate action to save or preserve the property. The appointment of Receiver can be made only by the court where a suit or proceedings are pending and before such a power is exercised the court must see that there is not only a strong case but a good title of the person applying for the appointment of Receiver and the property in the hands of other side is in danger of being wasted. (14). By merely making a vague, violent or whole-sale charges of malversation against the party in possession.can never be, as in the present case a ground for the exercise of power in the appointment of a Receiver. The power is meant to be exercised to prevent ends of justice being defeated and shockingly the respondent No.2 in this case has transgrassed, rather abused the authority in perpetuating injustice though the rule authorises the Court to appoint Receiver where it is just and convenient and the said rule further gives the court a discretion but as is too well known such an exercise of discretion is to be based on sound legal principles judiciously and not in the arbitrary and/or autocratic manner in which the respondent No.2 assumed and exercised the same. There should be some material before the court demanding such an immediate action and if possible a notice for a short date should be given calling upon the other side to show-cause why in the given situation the Receiver be not appointed. The person so applying might as in this case try to keep the court in complete darkness and obtain an order of the kind on totally baseless allegations. (15). The person so applying might as in this case try to keep the court in complete darkness and obtain an order of the kind on totally baseless allegations. (15). It was atleast expected from the respondent No.2 who is an quasi judicial authority to have an insight of the provisions for which he was exercising his jurisdiction and authority and even the bare minimum rules of equity were not adhered to. It is any ones guess to make out as to how the impugned order could be passed in the facts and circumstances of this case. (16). The appointment of a Receiver is always done in the harsh situations. The principles by which the Court of Chancery in England was guided in appointing a Receiver before the Judicature Acts, (and which were given effect to by the Judicature Acts), are stated by Lord Cranworth L C, as follows: — "The Receiver, if appointed in this case, must be appointed on the principle on which the Court of Chancery acts, of preserving property pending the litigation which is to decide the right of the litigant parties. In such cases the Court must, of necessity,exercise a discretion as to whether it will or will not take possession of the property by its officer......Where, indeed, the property is, as it were, in medio, in the enjoyment of no one, the Court can hardly do wrong in taking possession. It is the common interest of all parties that the Court should prevent a scramble....but where the object of the plaintiffs is to assert a right to property,of which the defendant is in the enjoyment, the case is necessarily involved in further questions. The Court by taking possession at the instance of the plaintiff may be doing, a wrong to the defendant, in some cases, an irreparable wrong. If the plaintiff should eventually fail in establishinfg his right against the defendant, the court may,by its interim interference, have caused mischeif to the defendant, for which the subsequent restoration of the property may afford no adequate compensation." (1853) IV H.L.C.996 (1032). (17). The principles laid down by the English Court of Equity have been adopted as safe-guards by the Courts in this country for the puposes of appointment of Receiver in a given situation. (17). The principles laid down by the English Court of Equity have been adopted as safe-guards by the Courts in this country for the puposes of appointment of Receiver in a given situation. The discretion is not to be exercised in unregulated manner but with great caution,per judicial norms and after consideration of the entire circumstances of the case. A Receiver is not merely to be appointed simply because it would be expedient or- convenient or would result in no harm. A person like the appellant in the present case in possession of the property in question should not be disturbed with the appointment of a receiver unless there were some substantial grounds calling for such interference unless a case could be made out that the property in question would be dissipated or that irreparable mischief could be anticipated,the Court shall not give its protection. Under our jurisprudence person even in unauthorised possession can be evicted only following a procedure known to law. Even under the Public Premises (unauthorised Occupants) Act the other side is notified for the proposed action. The respondent No.2 in the given case gave a complete go-bye to the basic norms of law and procedure of which he was expected to have some knowledge and respect. (18). The observations made by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Nain Singh vs.Koonwarjee and others(l) may also be usefully stated hereunder where the Apex Court while dealing with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure held: — "Inherent jurisdiction of the Court must be exercised subject to the rule that if the Code does contain specific provisions which would meet the necessities of the case, such provisions should be followed and inherent jurisdiction should not be invoked. In other words the Court cannot make use of the special provision of section 151 of the Code where a party has a remedy provided elsewhere in the Code and he neglected to avail himself of the same." (19). The need of quoting the aforesaid observations has arisen because the respondent No.2 in the impugned order has tried to derive strength from Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for exercising the jurisdiction in the appointment of Receiver. (20). The need of quoting the aforesaid observations has arisen because the respondent No.2 in the impugned order has tried to derive strength from Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for exercising the jurisdiction in the appointment of Receiver. (20). Testing the impugned order on the scales of the principles applying to the appointment of a Receiver the impugned order is hereby struck down as not only unjust but wholly unwarranted, in utter abuse of the power and jurisdiction. (21). We have refrained ourselves from making any observation upon the various documents which the petitioner has placed on record since going into these documents and expressing any opinion might have amounted to an exercise of jurisdiction on disputed questions of facts. Suffice it to say, that the appellant is in possession as per the admission of the respondent No.3, he cannot be dispossessed except by due course of law. The proceedings held by the respondent No.2 are declared void and ineffective on the rights of the appellant qua the property in question. The respondents are further restrained from interfering with the possession of the appellant over the land in question. (22). The appeal consequently succeeds. The order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside. Since the respondent No.2 has abused the process of law and jurisdiction in passing the impugned order and driving the appellant to this Court to file writ petition and the present appeal the respondent State is burdened with Rs. 10,000/- as costs which may be realised from the concerned officer after giving him opportunity to explain his conduct. The respondent No.3 is burdened with Rs. 5,000/- as costs. (23). We would have taken strong exception about the role and conduct which the respondent No..2 has exhibited in passing the impugned order. 10,000/- as costs which may be realised from the concerned officer after giving him opportunity to explain his conduct. The respondent No.3 is burdened with Rs. 5,000/- as costs. (23). We would have taken strong exception about the role and conduct which the respondent No..2 has exhibited in passing the impugned order. We have taken a very serious note of it and we might have linked to proceed against him and called him in the Court to explain the circumstances under which the impugned order was passed by him but on information supplied by the learned State Counsel we are informed that Shri Jagmal Singh,R.A.S. posted as Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Raisinghnagar at the relevant time when he passed the impugned order has since retired from service, we, therefore, leave it to the Chief Secretary, Government of Rajasthan to take such appropriate action against him as may be deemed just and proper for such an act and report to us the action taken against him within four months from today. (24). A copy of this judgement be sent to the Chief Secretary, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur for taking such necessary action against the respondent No.2 as is deemed just and proper.