ORDER S.K. Dubey, J. 1. Petitioner against whom the respondent No. 1, the complainant (since deceased), filed, a complaint under Sections 167, 409, 420, 467 and 468, I.P.C., has come up in revision against the order dated 16-1-1990, passed in Criminal Revision No. 118 of 1988 by the Sixth Additional Sessions Judge, Gwalior, whereby the order dated 2-4-1988 by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gwalior, of dismissal of the complaint, passed under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, the 'Code'), was set aside and the case was remitted to the Inquiring Magistrate for reconsideration and to pass orders in accordance with law, on the material of the inquiry made under Section 202 of the Code. 2. The complainant, as a citizen, filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner on 28-1-1986 making allegations therein that the petitioner, who is in the service of Government of Madhya Predesh and working as Deputy Director, Agriculture, has falsely withdrawn T.A., D.A. and has also withdrawn the amount of Rs. 10,000/- for payment of wages of two muster-roll pseudonymous persons, namely, Girish and Brij Bhushan, of which verification was made by him. It was also alleged that the petitioner has committed forgery in the stock register by showing distribution of more quantity than actually distributed of Superphosphate fertilizer. 3. The Inquiring Magistrate on receipt of complain, vide order dated 14-2-86, instead of examining the complainant and the witnesses present, directed investigation to be made by a police officer Under Section 156(3) of the Code. The Station House Officer, Police Station, Padav, made an investigation and sent his report dated 17-4-1986, with 54 documents containing the statements recorded during inquiry and also the documents filed by the complainant and the wit-nesses.The Station House Officer, after investigation, came to the conclusion that the complaint is false annd frivolous, which has been made at the instance of the employees because of the enmity and differences between the petitioner and the employees of the Department. After receipt of this report, the Inquiring Magistrate himself held the inquiry and recorded the statements of the complainant and witnesses present, namely, Prakash Narayan Sexena, Brij Narayan Rohatgi, Hakim Singh Yadav, Amritrao Surve, Bhau Saheb Bhale, and Devi Singh. After receipt of this report, the Inquiring Magistrate himself held the inquiry and recorded the statements of the complainant and witnesses present, namely, Prakash Narayan Sexena, Brij Narayan Rohatgi, Hakim Singh Yadav, Amritrao Surve, Bhau Saheb Bhale, and Devi Singh. Vide order dated 3-8-1987, a report was also called from the Director of Agriculture, Government of Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal about the truthfulness of the allegations made in the complaint as to the cheating, forgery and embezzlement. In compliance of this order, the Joint Director of Agriculture sent a report dated 7-12-1987 stating therein that from time to time, the complaints were made against the petitioner in respect of the allegations;of the said allegations an inquiry was made wherein the allegations were not found to be true, and therefore, the departmental action was dropped against the petitioner. The Inquiring Magistrate, after due consideration of the materials of the inquiry and the report of investigation as directed Under Section 202(1) of the Code, and after hearing the complainant, formed an opinion that there is no 'sufficient ground' for proceeding with the complaint, and dismissed the same. 4. The complainant aggrieved of the dismissal of the complaint under Section 203 of the Code, preferred a revision. The revisional Court, after hearing the complainant, petitioner and the State, allowed the revision and remitted the case for deciding afresh, observing that the inquiring Magistrate acted illegally in calling of the report from the Director of Agriculture, which was not permissible, as for ascertaining whether there is a prima facie case for proceeding with the complaint and for issuing process the Inquiring Magistrate has to look only to the material adduced by the complainant in the inquiry before it, or the report of the investigation made Under Section 156(3). Hence, this revision by the petitioner. 5. Shri J.P. Gupta, Senior Advocate with Shri Sunil Soni, counsel for the petitioner, and Shri M. K. Jain, Deputy Government Advocate, for the State, heard. Shri V.K. Saxena, counsel for the complainant, did not advance any argument because of the death of the complainant during the pendency of this revision. 6. After hearing counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the case should go back before the revisional Court for deciding the revision afresh, for the reason to follow. Section 190 of the Code deals with the cognizance of offences by Magistrate. 6. After hearing counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the case should go back before the revisional Court for deciding the revision afresh, for the reason to follow. Section 190 of the Code deals with the cognizance of offences by Magistrate. Sub-section (1) of this Section lays down that the cognizance can be taken in three ways: (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offences; (b) upon a police report of such facts'; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge that such offence has been committed. For taking cognizance on receipt of complaint by a private person, 6f facts constituting an offence, the procedure is prescribed in Sections 200 to 203 of Chapter XV of the Code. Under Section 200, on presentation of a complaint Under Section 190(1)(a), for taking cognizance the Magistrate is bound first to examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, to ascertain whether there is a prima facie case against the person accused of the offence in the complaint, to enable him to issue process, or the Magistrate may postpone the issue of process pending further inquiry by himself, or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, under Section 202(1), for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint whether or not there is 'sufficient ground for proceeding. After the result of such inquiry or report of investigation, if the, Magistrate forms an opinion that there is no 'sufficient ground' for proceeding, he may, after briefly recording reasons, dismiss the complaint under Section 203. 7. A bare reading of Section 202(1) shows that when a Magistrate postpones the issue of process for holding further inquiry for deciding whether or not there is 'sufficient ground' for proceeding, the Magistrate may adopt the modes prescribed in Section 202(1), i.e., he may inquire into the matter himself or direct an investigation to be made by the police officer Under Section 156(3) of the Code. Though these modes are alternatives, necessarily are not exclusive. Where alternative choices have to be given, invariably the language employed has to be in the usual form that the person being given such discretion may either resort to one or the other. Though these modes are alternatives, necessarily are not exclusive. Where alternative choices have to be given, invariably the language employed has to be in the usual form that the person being given such discretion may either resort to one or the other. It does not necessarily follow that he then cannot either resort to both or intermix the same. The power so vested may include the exercise of both rather than necessarily exclude one from the other. The mere employment of the two words 'either' and/ 'or' cannot in any way be conclusive. See, A Division Bench decision of Patna High Court in case of Parasuram Jha v. State of Bihar 1986 Cri LJ 1266. 8. The inquiry under Section 202 of the Code is for the purpose of ascertaining the .truth or falsehood, whether there is evidence in support of the complaint so as to justify issue of process and commencement of proceedings against the person concerned. The section does not say that a regular trial for adjudging the guilt or otherwise of the person complained against should take place at that stage, for the person complained against can be legally called upon to answer the accusation against him only when a process has issued and he is put to trial. See a decision of the Supreme Court in case of Vadilal Panchal v. Dettatraya Dulaji Chadigaonker AIR 1960 SC 1113 : 1960 Cri LJ 1499. 9. The Supreme Court in case of Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose Alias Chabi Bose AIR 1963 SC 1430 : 1963 (2) Cri LJ 397, referring to Vadilal's case (Supra), considered the scope and object of enquiry under Section 202(1) and has observed in para 7 thus: at page 400 of Cri LJ. No doubt, one of the objects behind the provisions of Section 202, Cr. PC, is to enable the Magistrate to scrutinise carefully the allegation made on the complaint with a view to prevent a person named therein as accused from being called upon to face an obviously frivolous complaint. But there is also another object behind this provision and it is to find out what material there is to support the allegations made in the complaint. But there is also another object behind this provision and it is to find out what material there is to support the allegations made in the complaint. It is the bounden duty of the Magistrate while making an enquiry to elicit all facts not merely with a view to protect the interests of an absent accused person, but also with a view to bring to book a person or persons against whom grave allegations are made. Whether the complaint is frivolous or not has, at that stage, necessarily to be determined on the basis of the material placed before him by the complainant. Whatever defence the accused may have can only be enquired into at the trial. An enquiry under Section 202 can in no sense be characterised as a trial for the simple reason that in law there can be but one trial for an offence. Permitting an accused person to intervene during the enquiry would frustrate its very object and that is why the legislature has made no specific provision permitting an accused person to take part in an enquiry. 10. Recently, the Supreme Court in case of Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha, AIR 1992 SC 1815 : 1992 Cri LJ 2916, while quashing the proceedings and process issued against the accused persons on a private complaint filed Under Section 109, 114 and 409, I.P.C., observed that it is salutary to note that judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The complaint was laid impleading the Chairman, the Managing Director of the Bank by name and a host of officers. There lies responsibility and duty on the Magistracy to find whether the concerned accused should be legally responsible for the offence charged for. Only on satisfying that the law casts liability or creates offence against the juristic person or the persons impleaded then only process would be issued. At that stage, the Court would be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of the private complainant as vendetta to harass the persons needlessly. Vindication of majesty of justice and maintenance of law and order in the society are the prime objects of criminal justice but it would not be the means to wreak personal vengeance. 11. Vindication of majesty of justice and maintenance of law and order in the society are the prime objects of criminal justice but it would not be the means to wreak personal vengeance. 11. In the present case in hand, the Inquiring Magistrate exercised the power under Section 202(1) of the pre-cognizance stage to ascertain whether the allegations are prima face true or not for issuing the process. While forming an opinion that there is no sufficent ground for proceeding, the Inquiring Magistrate did not surrender his discretion to the report of the investigation made Under Section 156(3), but considered the material adduced by the complainant in the inquiry and also the report of the Joint Director of Agriculture, and then formed the opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, and dismissed the complaint. So far as the report of Joint Director is concerned, in my opinion, the Magistrate was not right in considering the report, as in Section 202(1), on postponement of issue of process, for taking cognizance, only two modes are prescribed; the Magistrate either may inquire the matter himself or direct an investigation to be made by the police officer, or by such other person as he thinks fit. As the Magistrate directed the .investigation to be made not by a private person but by the police Under Section 156(3), it was not within the province of the Magistrate to call for the report from the Director of Agriculture and to take it into consideration, as the Director of Agriculture was. not entrusted with the investigation for the purpose of Section 202(1). To that extent, learned Additional Sessions Judge was right in holding that such a report of Joint Director, Agriculture, cannot be taken into consideration. However, the learned Additional Sessions Judge was not right in remitting the case to the Inquiring Magistrate for reconsideration and for passing fresh orders after ignoring the report of Joint Director. That could have been done by the Additional Sessions Judge himself, who after ignoring the report and taking the report of the investigation and the inquiry held by the Magistrate, could have decided whether order of dismissal of complaint under Section 203 of the opinion formed by the Inquiring Magistrate that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint is legal and proper or not. 12. Therefore, the revision is allowed, the order impugned is set aside. 12. Therefore, the revision is allowed, the order impugned is set aside. The Sixth Additional Sessions Judge is directed to decide the revision on merits. While hearing and deciding the revision, the revisional Court shall also consider the effect of death of the complainant. Records of the two Courts be sent back to the revisional Court with a copy of this order.