Judgment :- Petitioner, a Lecturer in Vimala College, Trichur was relieved of her duties consequent to unauthorised absence. The order was challenged in appeal before the Calicut University Appellate Tribunal. By Ext. P1 1 judgment the Tribunal held the appeal not maintainable finding that the institution is administered by a minority community and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Petitioner seeks to quash Exts. P5, P4 and PI 1 orders issued by the management. 2. Petitioner joined service on 14-10-1980 as Lecturer in Commerce. The appointment was duly approved by the University with effect from that date. While in employment she applied for leave from 1-6-1987 to 1-1-1989 which was sanctioned by the management. Thereafter she joined duty on 2-1-1989 and continued till the midsummer vacation of that year. She left for Abudabi to join her husband who is employed there. She could not join duty on the reopening of the College for the academic year 1989-90 due to rheumatoid arthritis. Leave on medical ground "was applied for with necessary medical certificate from 1-6-1989 to 1-9-1989. Since she continued to be ill she requested for grant of leave for a further period from 1-9-1989 to 2-1-1990. In the meantime she was asked by the management to appear before a Board of Doctors at Trichur. A telegram sent to this effect was followed by a letter. Petitioner sent a reply explaining her difficulties to go over to Trichur on account of her illness. Thereafter the management informed petitioner by Ext. P3 that in case she did not rejoin duty they would be compelled to relieve her from service. Ext. P4 communication was since then received from the management informing her that she had been relieved from service. 3. On receipt of Exts. P5 and P4 petitioner's relatives at Trichur consulted a lawyer and an appeal was filed before the Calicut University Appellate Tribunal. Since there was a delay of 15 days the appeal was presented along with an application to condone delay. The appellate authority considered the maintainability of the appeal as a preliminary point and after hearing both sides held that the management is a minority religious institution and the appeal is therefore not maintainable. Hence the original petition seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Exts. P5, P4 and Pll and a writ of mandamus directing second respondent to reinstate petitioner in service with back wages. Hence the original petition seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Exts. P5, P4 and Pll and a writ of mandamus directing second respondent to reinstate petitioner in service with back wages. A direction to first respondent, the University Appellate Tribunal to take up Exts. P5 and P6, the appeal and the application for condonation of delay and to dispose of the same on merits in accordance with law is also claimed. 4. The second respondent, the corporate manager of the college filed counter affidavit stating that petitioner had been granted leave even earlier. On those occasions also she had taken leave on medical ground without informing the Principal. The management sanctioned leave on those occasions in the absence of a medical certificate not to create difficulties for petitioner. She abruptly left alter 31-3-1989 without informing the principal- and sending an application for leave from 1-6-1989 to 1-9-1989 on medical ground. This leave was not granted by the management. The management having entertained doubts about the genuineness of the medical certificate petitioner was requested to appear before a Board of Doctors. A telegram was sent for this purpose followed by a letter. Petitioner did not comply with that direction with the result that she was again informed that in case she did not join before 15-8-1989 her services would be terminated. Petitioner failed to join duty as directed by the management. That resulted in Ext. P4 order relieving petitioner from service. 5. It is contended by 2nd respondent that Exts. P5 and P4 were not passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. The provisions of Clause 71 of the Calicut University First Statute as alleged in para.7 is applicable only when there is complaint of misconduct. There was no wilful termination of service. The preliminary objection was raised before the Tribunal on valid grounds and based on a decision of the Kerala High Court on an interpretation of Ss.60 and 61, of the Kerala University Act. Since the first respondent had not acted arbitrarily, or unreasonably Exts. P5 and P4 are not liable to be interfered with. Since the Tribunal has only followed the decision of this Court it was perfectly justified and does not call for any interference. 6. Since the first respondent had not acted arbitrarily, or unreasonably Exts. P5 and P4 are not liable to be interfered with. Since the Tribunal has only followed the decision of this Court it was perfectly justified and does not call for any interference. 6. A reply affidavit was filed by petitioner controverting the averments in the counter affidavit of 2nd respondent and in particular pointing out that there is no pleading or proof before the first respondent to show that the institution managed by the second respondent is one established and administered by a minority community based on religion. 7. Heard counsel on both sides. 8. The first aspect to be considered is whether the University Appellate Tribunal was right in holding the appeal not maintainable against an institution administered by a minority community. S.60(7) of the Calicut University Act enables any teacher aggrieved by an order passed after the commencement of the Act in any disciplinary proceedings taken against him to appeal to the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Act and the Tribunal may, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, ad after such further enquiry as may be necessary, pass such order thereon including an order of reinstatement of the teacher concerned. The period prescribed for presentation of an appeal is sixty days from the date on which a copy of the order is served on the teacher or within sixty days after the Appellate Tribunal has been constituted under the Act whichever period expires later. The proviso enables the Tribunal to admit an appeal presented after the expiration of the said period if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not prescribing the appeal within the said period. Petitioner, a teacher of the institution run by the 2nd respondent had filed an appeal before the first respondent-Tribunal challenging the order of dismissal issued against her by the college management. A preliminary objection was raised by the management before the Tribunal that the appeal is not maintainable, the management being one run by a religious minority. This plea was sustained by the Tribunal and in consequence the appeal was dismissed. The Tribunal mainly relied on the Full Bench decision of this Court in Manager, St. Joseph's Training College for Women and another v. University Appellate Tribunal and others, I.L.R 1979 (2) Ker.789 =1980 KLT 67. This plea was sustained by the Tribunal and in consequence the appeal was dismissed. The Tribunal mainly relied on the Full Bench decision of this Court in Manager, St. Joseph's Training College for Women and another v. University Appellate Tribunal and others, I.L.R 1979 (2) Ker.789 =1980 KLT 67. Assailing the finding of the Tribunal learned counsel for petitioner submitted that there has been a change in the law by the decision of the Supreme Court in Frank Antony Public School Employees Association v. Union of India and others, A.I.R 1987 SC 311. Counsel has taken me through various other decisions also in support of his contention that the Tribunal is empowered to pass appropriate orders after making proper enquiries and giving an opportunity to the parties of being heard. On the other hand, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent pointed out that the decision of the Full Bench of this Court holds the field and the law laid down therein that sub-sections (5) and (7) of S.60 of the Kerala University Act are inconsistent with the fundamental right guaranteed to religious and linguistic minorities by Art.30(1) of the Constitution has not been reversed or modified by any of the decisions of the Supreme Court. 9. In the Full Bench decision relied on by 2nd respondent this Court was considering the nature, scope and ambit of the right of a minority religious institution under Art.30(1) of the Constitution. The challenge in that case was to the provision contained in Ss.60(7) and 61 of the Kerala University Act. The constitutional validity of these sections was questioned by a minority religious institution which claimed the protection under Art.31 of the Constitution of India. The challenge in that case was to the provision contained in Ss.60(7) and 61 of the Kerala University Act. The constitutional validity of these sections was questioned by a minority religious institution which claimed the protection under Art.31 of the Constitution of India. S.60(7) of the Kerala University Act reads: "Any teacher aggrieved by an order passed after the commencement of this Act in any disciplinary proceedings taken against him may, within sixty days from the date on which a copy of such order is served on him or within sixty days after the Appellate Tribunal has been constituted under this Act, whichever period expires later, appeal to the Appellate Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal may, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, and after such further inquiry as may be necessary, pass such order thereon as it may deem fit, including an order of reinstatement of the teacher concerned: Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may admit an appeal presented after the expiration of the said period if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the said period." Section 61 stipulates that all disputes between the management of a private college and any teacher of that college relating to the conditions of service of such teacher pending at the commencement of the Act shall be decided under the Act in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Statutes made thereunder. A right to reopen decisions taken before the commencement of the Act was also conferred on a teacher who was competent to apply to the Appellate Tribunal in that behalf. While considering the constitutional validity of these provisions, the Full Bench observed that no guidelines whatever have been provided by the legislature as to the grounds on which and the circumstances in which the Appellate Tribunal can interfere with an order passed by the management in a disciplinary proceeding nor is there any limitation as to the nature of the orders against which appeals will lie. On the plain reading of sub-section(7) of S.60 any order of whatever kind passed by the management against a teacher in a disciplinary proceeding can be taken up in appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. It is observed that sub-sections (5) and (7) of S.60 do not specify which interference by the Appellate Tribunal will be justified. On the plain reading of sub-section(7) of S.60 any order of whatever kind passed by the management against a teacher in a disciplinary proceeding can be taken up in appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. It is observed that sub-sections (5) and (7) of S.60 do not specify which interference by the Appellate Tribunal will be justified. On the other hand, the Tribunal is expressly empowered to pass such order in the manner as it may deem fit including an order of reinstatement of the teacher concerned. On the basis of these provisions, the Full Bench held that the provision in sub-section (7) in so far as it enables the teachers to drag the management before an external Appellate Authority whenever any order is passed by it against the concerned teacher in the exercise of the disciplinary power will seriously hamper the effective exercise of the management's disciplinary control over the teaching staff. The Full Bench is of the view that the absence of guidelines as to the procedure to be followed by the Appellate Authority may not vitiate the conferment of the power but the scope of the power to be exercised by the Appellate Authority must be defined in the Statute itself. For these reasons it was held that the powers conferred on the Appellate Authority by sub-sections (5) and (7) of S.60 are uncanalised and unguided in the sense that no restrictions are placed on the exercise of the power. A blanket power is therefore stated to have been conferred on the Appellate Authority without any guidelines as to the grounds on which interference by it would be justified. The Full bench ultimately held that sub-sections (5) and (7) of S.60 are inconsistent with the fundamental right guaranteed to religious and linguistic minorities by Art.30(1) of the Constitution and hence they cannot be applied to an educational institution established and managed by a religious and linguistic minority. 10. In State of-Kerala, etc. v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial, etc., A.I.R 1970 SC 2079, the Supreme Court was considering the constitutional validity of the provisions contained in Ss.53(1), (2) and (3) and other Sections of the Kerala University Act, 1969. 10. In State of-Kerala, etc. v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial, etc., A.I.R 1970 SC 2079, the Supreme Court was considering the constitutional validity of the provisions contained in Ss.53(1), (2) and (3) and other Sections of the Kerala University Act, 1969. Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of S.53 confer on the Syndicate of the University the power to veto even the action of the governing body or the management council in the selection of the principal The sub-section gives a right of appeal to the Syndicate to any person aggrieved by the action of the governing body or the managing council. The Supreme Court observed that this makes the Syndicate the final and absolute authority in these matters. Coupled with this is the power of the Vice Chancellor and the Syndicate in sub-sections (2) and (4) of S.56. The Supreme Court held that these provisions clearly take away the disciplinary action from the governing body and the managing council and confer it upon the University. It is observed that S.58 enables political parties to come into picture of the administration of minority institution which may not like this interference. The Supreme Court also referred to S.63 which provides for the power to regulate the management of private colleges in which the governing body of the managing council have no say. The Supreme Court held that all these provisions are ultravires Art.31 in respect of the minority institution. 11. Next in order is the decision in St. Xavier's College v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R 1974 SC 1389, where it was held that the right conferred on the religious and linguistic minorities to administer educational institutions of their choice is not an absolute right but this right is not free from regulation. Just as regulatory measures are necessary for maintaining the educational character and content of the minority institutions similarly regulatory measures are necessary in ensuring orderly efficient and sound administration. The Supreme Court observed that the right to administer is not the right to mal¬administer. The appointment of teachers is an important part in the educational institutions and the qualifications and the character of the teachers are really important. It is further observed that the right of minority institutions to administer institution implies the obligation and duty of the minority institutions to render the very best to the students. The appointment of teachers is an important part in the educational institutions and the qualifications and the character of the teachers are really important. It is further observed that the right of minority institutions to administer institution implies the obligation and duty of the minority institutions to render the very best to the students. In the right of administration checks and balances in the shape of regulatory measures are required to ensure the appointment of good teachers and their conditions of service. Regulations are, therefore, necessary to see that there are no divisive or disintegrating forces in the administration. 12. The Supreme Court in Lilly kurian v. St. Leovina and others, 1979(1) SCR 820, after referring to St. Xavier's College case observed that the reasons given by the majority in that decision were that the power of the management to terminate the services of any member of the teaching or other academic or non-academic staff was based on the relationship between the employer and his employees and no encroachment can be made on this right to dispense with their services under the contract of employment which was an integral part of the right to administer. The question in that case was whether an educational institution established and managed by a religious or linguistic minority is bound by the provisions of the Ordinance 33(3) Chapter LVII of the Ordinance framed by the Syndicate of the University of Kerala under S.19J of the Kerala University Act, 1957. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had gone wrong in holding that the Vice Chancellor while exercising the appellate powers under Ordinance 33(4) cannot direct reinstatement of a teacher or grant a declaration that his dismissal was wrongful. It is observed that the High Court has fallen into error in holding that the right of appeal before the Vice Chancellor against the teachers of private colleges in trie matter of suspension and dismissal was not violative of the right of religious minorities under Art.30(1) of the Constitution. It is held that the power of appeal conferred on the Vice Chancellor under Ordinance 33(4) is not only a grave encroachment on the right of the institution to enforce and gather discipline in its administration but it is uncanalised and unguided in the sense that no restrictions are placed on the exercise of the power. It is held that the power of appeal conferred on the Vice Chancellor under Ordinance 33(4) is not only a grave encroachment on the right of the institution to enforce and gather discipline in its administration but it is uncanalised and unguided in the sense that no restrictions are placed on the exercise of the power. The extent of the appellate power of the Vice Chancellor is unlimited and undefined. The ground on which the Vice Chancellor can interfere are not defined and indeed the powers are unlimited. He can even interfere against the infliction of punishment. The Supreme Court held that there is complete interference with the disciplinary power of a minority institution and in the absence of any guidelines it cannot be said that power of the Vice Chancellor under Ordinance 33(4) was merely a check on mal-administration. 13. The scope and ambit of the right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions were again considered by the Supreme Court in All Saints High School v. Government of A.P., A.I.R 1980 SC 1042. The Supreme Court by a majority invalidated Ss.3(1), 3(2), 4 and 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Recognised Private Educational Institutions Control Act (Act 11 of 1975). S.3(1) directs that no teacher employed in any private educational institutions shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor shall his appointment be otherwise terminated, except with the prior approval of the competent authority. This is subject to any rule that may be made in mat behalf. The sub-section contains a proviso that if any educational management, agency or institution contravenes the provisions of sub-section, the teachers affected shall be deemed to be in service. Sub-section (2) provides that where the proposal to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank or otherwise terminate the appointment of any teacher employed in any private educational institution is communicated to the competent authority, that authority shall if it is satisfied that there are adequate and reasonable grounds for such proposal approve such dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of appointment. Sub-section 3(a) relates to suspension and S.4 provides for appeal against the orders of punishment imposed on teachers employed in private educational institutions. S.5 relates to special provision regarding appeal in certain past disciplinary cases. 14. Sub-section 3(a) relates to suspension and S.4 provides for appeal against the orders of punishment imposed on teachers employed in private educational institutions. S.5 relates to special provision regarding appeal in certain past disciplinary cases. 14. The Supreme Court held that while there could be no objection in setting up a high authority to supervise the teaching staff so as to keep a strict vigilance on their work and to ensure the security of tenure for them, but the authority concerned must be provided with proper guidelines under the restricted field which they have to cover. Sub-section (2) of S.3 was held unconstitutional being violative of Art.30(1) of the Constitution and wholly inapplicable to minority institutions. It is observed that it was the inherent and fundamental right of the institution to deal with its employees or teachers and take necessary action against them. The State should have taken care to make proper rules giving sufficient powers to the management in the manner in which it was to act. It is further observed that the induction of an outside authority over the head of the institution and making its decision final and binding on the institution was a blatant interference with the administrative autonomy of the institution. In a separate judgment, the chief justice held: "I find it difficult to save Ss.3(1) and 3(2) by reading them down in the light of the objects and reasons of the impugned Act. The object of the Act and the reasons that led to its passing are laudable but the Act, in its application to minority institutions, has to take care that it does not violate the fundamental right of the minorities under Art.30(1). Ss.3(1) and 3(2) are in my opinion unconstitutional in so far as they are made applicable to minority institutions since, in practice, these provisions are bound to interfere substantially with their right to administer institutions of their choice. Similar provisions were held lobe void in Very Rev. Mother Provincial; D.A. V. College and Lilly Kurien. Ss.3(1) and 3(2) are in my opinion unconstitutional in so far as they are made applicable to minority institutions since, in practice, these provisions are bound to interfere substantially with their right to administer institutions of their choice. Similar provisions were held lobe void in Very Rev. Mother Provincial; D.A. V. College and Lilly Kurien. There is no distinction in principle between those provisions and the ones contained in Ss.3(1) and 3(2)." The Supreme Court further observed that sub-sections (1) and (2) of S.3 together confer upon the competent authority in the absence of proper rules, a wide and untrammelled discretion to interfere with the proposed order, whenever in its opinion, the order is based on grounds which do not appear to it either adequate or reasonable. 15. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that regulatory measures intended to make the functioning of educational institutions effective do not violate the guarantees provided under Art.30(1) of the Constitution. Counsel pointed out that there has been a change in law by the decision in Frank Antony Public School Employees Association v. Union of India and others, A.I.R 1987 SC 311. The attack of the petitioner in that case was against S.12 of the Delhi School Education Act as violative of Arts.14, 21 and 23 of the Constitution. S.12 provides that nothing contained in Chapter IV of that Act dealing with terms and conditions of service of employees of recognised private schools shall apply to an unaided minority school. Petitioner in that case sought a declaration directing the Delhi Administration to enforce all the provisions of the Delhi School Education Act other than Ss.12 and 21 and to fix the pay, allowances, benefits, etc., to persons employed in the school governed by the Act in relation to unaided minority schools at par with the persons employed in other schools. The scales of pay of teachers and other employees of Frank Antony Public School, New Delhi, were far less than the scales of pay of teachers of Government Schools, and the schools run by the Delhi Administration. The Supreme Court held that S.12 of the Delhi School Education Act which makes the provisions of Chapter IV in applicable to unaided minority institutions is discriminatory and void except to the extent that it makes S.8(2) inapplicable to unaided minority institutions. The Supreme Court held that S.12 of the Delhi School Education Act which makes the provisions of Chapter IV in applicable to unaided minority institutions is discriminatory and void except to the extent that it makes S.8(2) inapplicable to unaided minority institutions. A declaration was therefore granted to that effect and the Union of India and Delhi Administration were directed to enforce the provisions of Chapter IV except S.8(2) in the manner provided in that Chapter in the case of Frank Antony Public School. The management of the School was also directed not to give effect to the orders of suspension passed against the members of the staff. In this connection the Supreme Court held that regulatory measures which are designed towards achievement of the goal of making the minority educational institutions effective instruments for imparting education cannot be considered to impinge upon the right guaranteed by Art.30(1) of the Constitution. 16. The Supreme Court further held that the mere prescription of scales of pay and other conditions of service would not jeopardise the right of the management of minority institutions to appoint teachers of their choice. It is observed that the management of a minority educational institution cannot be permitted under the guise of the fundamental right guaranteed by Art.30(1) to oppress or exploit its employees any more than any other private employees. It is held that the management of minority institution cannot complain of invasion of the fundamental right to administer the institution when it denies the members of the staff the opportunity to achieve the very object of Art.30(1) which is to make the institution an effective vehicle of education. 17. S.8(3) of that Act provides for an appeal to the Tribunal constituted under S.11 consisting of a person who has held office as a District Judge or any equivalent judicial office. The right of appeal itself is confined to a limited class of cases, namely, those of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank and not to every dispute between the employees and the management. The Supreme Court held that the limited right of appeal, the character of the authority constituted to hear the appeal and the manner in which the appellate power is required to be exercised make the provision for an appeal perfectly reasonable. 18. The Supreme Court held that the limited right of appeal, the character of the authority constituted to hear the appeal and the manner in which the appellate power is required to be exercised make the provision for an appeal perfectly reasonable. 18. Relying on the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court, counsel for petitioner argues that the aggrieved teacher is given a right to prefer an appeal before the appellate Tribunal constituted under the Calicut University Act. The Appellate Tribunal as per S.65(2) of the Act shall be a judicial officer not below the rank of a District Judge nominated by the Chancellor in consultation with the High Court. The provision in S.60(7) of the Calicut University Act which is in pari materia with S.60(7) of the Kerala University Act does not violate any of the rights guaranteed under Art.30(1) of the Constitution, argues counsel. Attention is also drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in Manohar Harries Walters v. Basel Mission H.E Centre, Dharwad, A.I.R 1991 SC 2230, wherein it was held that the right guaranteed to minority institutions by Art.30(1) of the Constitution is not invaded merely because a Tribunal is constituted under an Act to hear appeals against the order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of an employee in the service of a minority institution. Counsel would therefore submit that S.60(7) can be read down to apply to a minority institution atleast in the matter of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of an employee. The contention though attractive is not appealing in view of the specific ground on which S.60(7) of the Kerala University Act was struck down by a Full Bench of this Court in Manager, St. Joseph's Training College for Women and another 1980 KLT 67, holding that the powers conferred on the Appellate Authority by sub-sections (5) and (7) of S.60 of that Act are uncanalised and unguided in the sense that no restrictions are placed on the exercise of the power. The extent of the appellate power is not defined. The powers of the Appellate Authority are unlimited. Sub-section (7) of S.60 of the Calicut University Act empowers the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Act to pass any order which it may deem fit including an order of reinstatement of the teacher concerned. The extent of the appellate power is not defined. The powers of the Appellate Authority are unlimited. Sub-section (7) of S.60 of the Calicut University Act empowers the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Act to pass any order which it may deem fit including an order of reinstatement of the teacher concerned. The sub-section enables any teacher aggrieved by any order passed after the commencement of the Act in any disciplinary proceeding taken against him to file an appeal .to the Appellate Authority. As observed by the Full Bench the jurisdiction of the Tribunal goes far beyond that of scrutinising whether the disciplinary proceeding has been conducted in conformity with the procedure laid down in sub-section (6) of S.60 as well as the principles of natural justice or whether it is an action taken mala fide or vindictively as a measure of victimisation, etc. The Full Bench in that case observed that the Appellate Tribunal is thus vested with the blanket power to interfere with every order passed by the management in disciplinary matters. This, according to the Full Bench, will seriously hamper the effective exercise of the management's disciplinary control over the teaching staff. 19. The Full Bench was/considering an identical provision in the Kerala University Act which was struck down as violative of Art.30(1) of the Constitution of India. Though the decision was rendered as early as 29-8-1979 no attempt is seen to have been made to get the Act amended in the light of the principles laid down therein. The Calicut University Act, 1975 is seen to have been amended thereafter by Act 6 of 1980, Act 29 of 1985 and Act 24 of 1986. The amendment of sub-sections (5) and (7) of the Act was not thought of. The Full Bench decision therefore applies to the facts of the present case wherein the rights of the religious minority institution are involved. Applying the principles laid down in that decision has to be held that sub-section (7) of S.60 of the Calicut University Act is not applicable to an institution run by a religious minority. For the same reason the decision in Manohar Harries Walters' case, A.I.R 1991 SC 2230 is not applicable since the Tribunal in that case was constituted to hear appeals against the order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of an employee in the service of a minority institution. For the same reason the decision in Manohar Harries Walters' case, A.I.R 1991 SC 2230 is not applicable since the Tribunal in that case was constituted to hear appeals against the order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of an employee in the service of a minority institution. In other words, there were specific rules and guidelines in that case whereas they are lacking in S.60 of the Calicut University Act. The question of the powers of the Tribunal constituted under the Calicut University Act to hear appeals against the order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank alone does not therefore arise. The result is that the first respondent was right in holding that the 2nd respondent is a religious minority institution to which sub-section (7) of S.60 of the Calicut University Act is not applicable. No interference is, therefore, called for in a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. 20. Learned counsel for the 2nd respondent has raised a contention that jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution need be exercised only if there is substantial injustice or substantial miscarriage Or failure of justice. It is pointed out that sufficient opportunity had been given to petitioner to present herself before a Board of Doctors in order to obtain a certificate to prove her illness, the ground on which leave was sought. Even after petitioner failed to appear before the Board as directed petitioner was again informed to join duty on a particular date and failing which she would be relived from service. Inspite of that letter, petitioner had not cared to rejoin duty and rest contented by presenting a leave application with a medical certificate. The leave applied for was not granted by the management wanted proof of the reason mentioned. Records reveal that petitioner had not cared to rejoin duty inspite of the letters sent by the management. Considerable difficulties would be experienced by the management if a teacher like petitioner enters on leave for short durations causing considerable hardship and inconvenience to the students and the management. It was under these circumstances that petitioner was relieved from service. Counsel would point out that no substantial injustice has been done and petitioner had been relieved of her duties only after giving reasonable and sufficient opportunity. Under such circumstances, interference under Art.226 of the Constitution is not warranted, according to counsel. It was under these circumstances that petitioner was relieved from service. Counsel would point out that no substantial injustice has been done and petitioner had been relieved of her duties only after giving reasonable and sufficient opportunity. Under such circumstances, interference under Art.226 of the Constitution is not warranted, according to counsel. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in lyyappan Mills Ltd. v. I. M. W. Union, 1961 KLT 589. Therein it was held mat the mere absence of jurisdiction of a subordinate court or tribunal or the mere presence of errors apparent on the face of the record without any resultant manifest injustice is not sufficient to call for the exercise of the discretionary powers of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution. It is observed that the lack of jurisdiction of the subordinate Tribunal by itself is not substantial or manifest injustice. In view of my finding that the Full Bench decision in Manager, St. Joseph's Training College for Women and another's case, 1980 KLT 67(FB) applies to the facts of the case it is unnecessary to consider other aspects including the merits of the claim made by the petitioner. For that reason, I desist from making any observation on the merits of the case. For the aforesaid reasons the Original Petition is dismissed, but without costs.