A. R. TIWARI, J. ( 1 ) KISAN Sahakari Prakriya Avam Vipanan Samiti maryadit, Badnawar, District Dhar (Respondent No. 3) is a Marketing society registered as a Co-operative Society under the M. P. Co-operative societies Act. During the year 1976 the petitioner was one of the elected directors of this Society and was the Chairman of the Board of Directors. In the course of its business, this Society used to buy cotton from the cultivators. The cotton season commenced every year around Dlvali i, e. sometime in November. At this stage of the opening, popularly known as mahurat, rate for purchase of the cotton is declared by the Chairman of the Board of Directors on behalf of the Society. The petitioner declared the purchase rates after diligence and Making proper enquires in that behalf. The rates so declared were guided by infirmation published in Daily Marwadi Cotton reporter. On the basis of first declaration, the Society purchased about 1500 quintals of cotton. The respondent No. 2 felt that the rates fixed for the purchase of cotton on 24-11-76 were on high side and consequently the loss to the tune of Rs. 1,63,046 20 p was caused to the Society. Respondent no. 2 therefore, Initiated the proceeding of surcharge under Section 63 (1) of the M. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (for short the Act) for recovery of the aforesaid amount with Interest thereon. He also appointed Additional Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Dhar as the Enquiry Officer to hold an enquiry against the petitioner on the charge framed The Enquiry Officer found the petitioner guilty of the charge levelled against him and submitted the report. The Disciplinary Authority concurred with the finding of the Enquiry Officer. Notice Annexure-B was therefore, issued to the petitioner. The petitioner through his reply dated 28 6-82 explained the circumstances under which he bona fide fixed and declared the rate. He specifically contended that there was no negligence, much less gross, on his part the Disciplinary Authority, however, concluded that the petitioner was liable to indemnify the Society for the loss occasioned to it. The petitioner was, therefore, asked to pay the amount together with interest at the rale of 12 per cent per annum from the date of purchase Annexure-D. Aggrieved of this order passed by respondent No. 2, the petitioner filed an appeal before respondent No. 1 (Annexure-E ). The petitioner was, therefore, asked to pay the amount together with interest at the rale of 12 per cent per annum from the date of purchase Annexure-D. Aggrieved of this order passed by respondent No. 2, the petitioner filed an appeal before respondent No. 1 (Annexure-E ). The petitioner also filed application under Order, Rule 27 CPC. The respondent No 1 by its order dated 21-3-1984 (Annexure-H) dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order passed by respondent No. 2. The copy of the appellate order is filed as annexure-H. The petitioner has now challenged the validity of the order of respondent No 2 (Annexure-D) as also the appellate order passed by respondent No. 1 (Annexure-H ). ( 2 ) THE respondent Nos. 3 and 4 have not appeared to oppose the petition. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the orders are ex facie infirm and illegal and deserves to be dislodged and demollsed. According to him there is no material to show that the petitioner committed any gross negligence. It is contended that the petitioner in bona fide exercise of the duty foisted on him, fixed and declared the rates and there was absolutely no bad intention or bad faith on his part. In fact there is no want of diligence also. The counsel, therefore, submits that the orders as impugned deserve to be set aside. He placed reliance on AIR 1970 m P. 39 Nanhelal v Asstt Registrar Co-operative Societies Narsinghpur. The conclusion in Annexure-D is extracted below "3ft 5t% 3t3tsf9rtt $fa arfiwt TW ^ fc ff | l" the order thus rests on linchpin of want of foresight and not on gross negligence. ( 4 ) I have considered the contentions. It clearly emerges that petitioner as Chairman of the Board of Directors was required to declare and fix the rates of mahurat. It is further not in disputed before me that the rates were in fact not only declared but were in accused with information published in the Marwari Cotton Reporter. The charge as levelled loosely uses the word "grmpwr" This charge does not give further particulars to justify the use of such an expression. This is one flaw. The other flaw is that there is no material to reach any conclusion about the expression so used in the charge. The Enquiry Officer, respondent No. 2 and respondent no. The charge as levelled loosely uses the word "grmpwr" This charge does not give further particulars to justify the use of such an expression. This is one flaw. The other flaw is that there is no material to reach any conclusion about the expression so used in the charge. The Enquiry Officer, respondent No. 2 and respondent no. 1 have proceeded on untenable assumptions and presumptions. In fact it appears that the burden was wrongly cast OB the petitioner. ( 5 ) IT Is held in Nanhelavs case (supra) that liability under Section 63 (1) of the Act arises only when the loss is shown to be caused by gross negligence and not merely by ordinary negligence. It is explained therein that gross negligence connotes higher degree of negligence. It is negligence not arising merely from want of foresight or mistake of judgment but from culpable default. It is held in the aforesaid case as under :"there is yet another defect in the impugned order. There is no finding that the petitioner was guilty of gross-negligence; the finding merely is that the petitioner was guilty of negligence. There is a distinction between negligence and gross negligence, although the dividing line is difficult to demarcate "gross negligence" connotes higher degree of negligence; it is negligence not arising merely from some want of foresignt or mistake of judgment but from some culpable default, See Giblin v. Mc mullen ; (1869) LR 2 PC 317 at p 337. In Black's Law diclldonary the expression is defined as follows : "the intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or property of another; such a gross want of care and regard for the rights of others as to justify the presumption of wllfulness and wantonness". The liability under Section 63 (1) arises when loss is caused by "gross negligence" and not merely by ordinary negligence. In the absence of finding that the petitioner was guilty of gross negligence the order of surcharge cannot be sustained". In AIR 1984 SC 1361 it is held as under :"where misconduct when proved entails penal consequences it is obligatory on the employer to specify and if necessary define it with precision and accupancy so that any act post facto interpretation of some incident may not be camouflaged as misconduct. In AIR 1984 SC 1361 it is held as under :"where misconduct when proved entails penal consequences it is obligatory on the employer to specify and if necessary define it with precision and accupancy so that any act post facto interpretation of some incident may not be camouflaged as misconduct. " ( 6 ) AS noted above the charge does not specify anything like gross negligence and there is no evidence even about the expression loosely used in the charge. No person can be subjected to suffer any loss or stigma in such manner. ( 7 ) I am satisfied that the order passed by respondent No. 2 and upheld by respondent No. 1 is vitiated on account of perversity and illegality. The orders as impugned in this petition are thus clearly found interferrable. Judicial review aims at correcting orders which are vitiated on account of flaw in the decision making process. Relevant facts and factors have been considered. In State of U. P. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh, air 1989 SC 997 it is held as under :"judicial review under Article 226 cannot be converted into an appeal. Judicial review is directed, not against the decision but is confined to the examination of the decision making-process. When the issues raised in judicial review is whether a decision is vitiated by taking into account of relevant factors or is no manifestly unreasonable that no reasonable authority, entrusted with the power in question could reasonably have made such a decision, the judicial review of the decision making process includes examination, as a matter of law, of the relevance of the factors. " ( 8 ) IN the result I am satisfied orders Annexurc-D and H cannot be sustained in law. Accordingly I set aside the same. The petition is thus allowed, but without any orders as to costs. The security cost shall be refunded to the petitioner after due verification. Petition allowed .