Devinder Gupta ( 1 ) IN this writ petition, the petitioners have soughtthe quashing of acquisition proceedings in respect of a plot of land comprised inkhasra No. l8/8 measuring 1 Bigha and4biswas (1200 sq. yds. approx.) situatedwithin the revenue estate of village Badli in Delhi. In the alternative, it is prayedthat its possession be not disturbed till such time respondent No. 1 allots anddeliver an alternate site of an equally sized industrial plot in a regular industrialarea. ( 2 ) THROUGH notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Acton 24/10/1961, a very vast area was notified for being acquired by thegovernment at public expense for public purpose, namely, planned developmentof Delhi. It included the land in question also. ( 3 ) COLLECTOR, Land Acquisition of Delhi (Shahdara) on 30. 3. 1965 made hisaward. It is the petitioners case that a piece of land comprised in Khasra No. l8/8 measuring 1 Bigha 4 biswas has been in their occupation as a tenant which waslet out by its owner M/s Badli Cooperative Multi-purpose Society. At the time ofletting out there already existed three rooms and a verandah but later onimprovements were carried out by the petitioners and a boundary wall was alsoconstructed after spending considerable amount. Plant and machinery wereinstalled for carrying on its business of processing food-stuffs. It is further averredthat after the Collector, Land Acquisition made his award, actual possession ofthe property acquired was not taken from the petitioners. Only symbolicpossession was taken. The petitioners continued to remain in actual occupationof the plot of land and had been running the manufacturing activity on thedisputed plot for which requisite permission was also accorded from time to timeby respondent No. l. In the year 1970, a request was made by the petitioners forallotting analternate site for establishing the factory in view of the policy whichhad been formulated by the Central Government for resettlement of occupants ofsuch lands who were affected by the planned development of Delhi. Withoutdeciding the said application and without taking recourse to law, the subordinatestaff of respondent No. 2, on 23. 1. 1993 came to the property in question withoutany notice and demolished the petitioners property with the help of bull-dozersas a result of which the petitioners suffered a huge loss to the tune of about Rs. 25lakhs. The petitioners are still in occupation of the plot. In this background this writ petition has been filed. 1. 1993 came to the property in question withoutany notice and demolished the petitioners property with the help of bull-dozersas a result of which the petitioners suffered a huge loss to the tune of about Rs. 25lakhs. The petitioners are still in occupation of the plot. In this background this writ petition has been filed. ( 4 ) IN the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 1, it is claimedthat the owner of the plot in question, namely, M/s. Badli Cooperative Multipurpose Society, through one Net Ram Yadav preferred their claim for compensation who also took part in acquisition proceedings but did not claim any alternate site under the Scheme. The petitioners status was that of a tenant underm/s Badli Cooperative Multi-purpose Society and it had no right, title or interestover the land in question. Under the Scheme it had no right to claim any alternatesite. In terms of the policy, only the claims of owners of the property are tenable. It is also claimed that after the possession of the property had been taken underthe provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, the property was transferred tomunicipal Corporation of Delhi on 29. 10. 1983 for Sanjay Gandhi Transport Nagarand on and from that date when the possession was taken, the property vestedin the Government free from all encumbrances. Symbolic possession of theproperty was taken on 26/06/1965. It is denied by respondent No. l that thepetitioners in the year 1960 established a factory over the plot in question. Asregards the averments made by the petitioner of making improvements and forgrant of permission for running a factory, it is claimed that the petitioners registration in the year 1965 was not on the plot in question but it was on D-3/18, Model Town, Delhi. All correspondence was addressed to the petitioners onmodel Town address. It is also claimed that the petitioners had been operatingfrom Model Town, Delhi and not from the plot in question. Being tenant they couldnot lay any claim for alternate site because the owners under whom they claim tobe tenant did not lay such a claim and there is no policy for allotment of alternatesite for the tenants. ( 5 ) WE have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and gonethrough the affidavits. Being tenant they couldnot lay any claim for alternate site because the owners under whom they claim tobe tenant did not lay such a claim and there is no policy for allotment of alternatesite for the tenants. ( 5 ) WE have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and gonethrough the affidavits. ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners has contended that since physicalpossession was not taken from them and only symbolic possession was taken,therefore, the particular plot of land in their occupation did not vest in Govern-ment under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and it continued to haverights over the plot in question. The acquisition proceedings as such have notconcluded and the petitioner s right to claim alternate site under the terms of thepolicy still subsists. The action of respondent No. 2 in demolishing the structurestanding on the plot was without any authority of law. The petitioners as suchare entitled to the reliefs claimed. ( 7 ) TWO questions arise for consideration from the submissions made by thelearned Counsel for the petitioners - firstly as to whether the land vested ingovernment as per the award and secondly whether the petitioners are entitledto have an alternate plot in lieu of the plot in question. ( 8 ) IT is not disputed that on 30. 3. 1965 award was made by the Collector, Land Acquisition, under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Annexure P-8 is thecopy of proceedings at the time of delivery of possession which were recordedby the officers of the Land Acquisition Department as well as of respondent No. l. In the presence of number of officials and villagers possession of the propertydetailed therein was obtained. It is recorded that with respect of plot in Khasrano. 18/8 only symbolic possession had been handed over. Proceedings are of26. 6. 1965 in pursuance to warrant of delivery of possession dated 24. 6. 1965. On2. 6. 1970, Commissioner (Implementation), D. D. A. had also addressed acommunication to the petitioners confirming that actual possession had not been taken sofar and the petitioners could continue on the site till taking over of physicalpossession. It was also clarified that in the event of acquisition and taking overof physical possession, no claim for compensation for the additions or alternationsthat may be put up will be entertained . It was also clarified that in the event of acquisition and taking overof physical possession, no claim for compensation for the additions or alternationsthat may be put up will be entertained . ( 9 ) SECTION 16 of the Land Acquisition Act empowers the Collector to takepossession of the land after the award made under Section 11. It is only whenpossession is taken as envisaged under Section 16 of the Act that the landabsolutely vests in the Government free from all encumbrances. In Balwantnarayan Bhagde v. M. D. Bhagwat and Others, AIR 1975 SC 1767 it was held thatwhen Govt. proceeds to take possession of land under the Land Acquisition Act,it must take actual possession ofthe land since all interests in the land are soughtto be acquired by it. There can be no symbolical possession in the senseunderstood by judicial decisions under the Code of Civil Procedure. What the Actcontemplates as a necessary condition of vesting of the land in the Government isthe taking of actual possession of the land. Such possession would have to be takenas the nature of the land admits of. There can be no hard and fast rule laying downthat what act would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land. Thepresence of owner or occupant of the land is not necessary to effectuate thetaking of possession. It is also not strictly necessary as a matter of fact or legalrequirement that notice should be given to the owner or the occupant of the landthat possession would be taken at a particular time. ( 10 ) SINCE in the instant case the proceedings also suggest and it is also the caseof the petitioners that it was in occupation of the plot in question with superstructure standing thereon, it cannot be disputed that it was only a symbolicalpossession which was taken by the respondents on 26/06/1965. The award ofthe Collector would also show that in so far as the plot of land comprising Khasrano. l8/8 is concerned besides assessing the amount of compensation for the land,separate amount of compensation of Rs. 5,656. 00 was assessed for the structurestanding thereupon. Thus, the Collector, Land Acquisition determined theamount of compensation payable for the land along with super structure standingthereupon. It is the case of respondents that the owner of the property participatedin the acquisition proceedings and claimed compensation for it. The owner is nota party to these proceedings. 5,656. 00 was assessed for the structurestanding thereupon. Thus, the Collector, Land Acquisition determined theamount of compensation payable for the land along with super structure standingthereupon. It is the case of respondents that the owner of the property participatedin the acquisition proceedings and claimed compensation for it. The owner is nota party to these proceedings. The owner has not disputed that the property hasnot vested in the Government or possession thereof was not taken by theauthorities under the Land Acquisition Act. It is not the case of the petitioners thatin the amount of compensation for the land or superstructure they claimed anyapportionment or sought reference under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement ofcompensation. It is also not in dispute that owners have not accepted the amountof compensation determined. In these circumstances the mere use of word symbolic possession in the proceedings for taking possession will not change oraffect the type of possession which had been taken by the officials of the Landacquisition Department and delivered to respondent No. 1 who in clear andcategorical terms pointed out that in the year 1983 the entire property includingplot was transferred to respondent No. 2 for the purpose of Sanjay Gandhitransport Nagar. In case, on 26/06/1965 respondent No. 1 had been put inpossession of the property in terms of Section 16 of the Act the same will have theeffect of absolute vesting of property in the Government. Use or occupation ofthe plot by the petitioners thereafter at the most may be treated with impliedconsent of respondent No. l but that alone will not be sufficient to say that title ofthe owner has not vested in the Government or the petitioners are still the tenantsover the plot more especially when owner has not disputed the position. Use of theproperty by the petitioners after 26/06/1965, if any, cannot have the effect ofdivesting the title of the Government from the property. In Bhagde s case (supra)in similar situation it was observed by their Lordships that even if the appellanttherein entered upon the land and resumed possession (which was only symbolic)the very next moment after the land was actually taken possession of and becamevested in the Government, such an act on the part of the appellant did not havethe effect of obliterating the consequences of vesting. ( 11 ) ONCE the possession of the property had been taken, on the strength ofsection 16 of the Act, the land stood vested in the Government. It is also not indispute that presently no structure is standing upon the land. The questionwhether it was on 23. 1. 1993 when actually the factory was bull-dozed or not is aserious disputed question of fact which cannot be decided by us in writjurisdiction. Writ petition was admittedly filed after the said date and on the dateof the filing of the writ petition there was no structure standing on the plot ofland. Only vacant land was there. The owner as observed above has not made anygrievance that property has not vested in the Government. The owner hasrealised his claim of compensation and in the plot of land the petitioners have noindependent right to remain. For the aforesaid demolition if any of the structurestanding upon the land which stood vested in the Government, the petitionershave other remedies available in law such as claim for damages etc. but not adeclaration that the acquisition proceedings are liable to-be quashed. ( 12 ) IN so far as the second submission of the learned Counsel for thepetitioners is concerned for a claim for alternate site, suffice it to say that we havebeen taken through the entire scheme which has been placed on record asannexure P-7 which is a communication dated 2. 5. 1961 from Deputy Secretary tothe Government of India to the Chief Commissioner, Delhi on the subject controlon land values in the urban areas o,f Delhi acquisition development and disposalof land. Learned Counsel for the petitioners was not in aposition to pinpointany part of the scheme which might enable a tenant independently in the absenceof the owner to claim an alternate site of land in lieu of the acquired plot. In theinstant case the owner has already claimed and accepted compensation for theacquired land, which is claimed to have been let out to the petitioners. It willnot be permissible to make an allotment of an alternate site to the petitioners forrunning factory since the owner did not claim any alternate Site. In theinstant case the owner has already claimed and accepted compensation for theacquired land, which is claimed to have been let out to the petitioners. It willnot be permissible to make an allotment of an alternate site to the petitioners forrunning factory since the owner did not claim any alternate Site. Had the ownerclaimed an alternate site, it might possibly be said that the tenant in that eventualitymight claim tenancy over the land allotted in lieu of the acquired land but in a casewhere the owner does not claim for an alternate site the tenant cannot make sucha claim, more especially when policy does not confer such a right. ( 13 ) IN view of the above, we do not find any merit in the instant petition,which is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.